Design an A-10 Replacement

[Morphic Tide]

It's a Tactical Bomber, not a heavy bomber, and two that is only for the stuff for the USN's VLS units, not the USAF. We've been double-tapping with Hellfires for Christ's sake!

I did point out that it was primarily an issue with naval cruise missiles, but the supply bottleneck remains a serious problem. Because missiles are expensive. Anything that'd call for a "tactical bomber" is a degree of ordnance usage rate that is not sustainable. You're talking a successor to the A-6, not a successor to the A-10.

Hence my talk of overlapping the thing with the helicopter uses with VTOL, as everyone is still digging at the hole of the helicopter gunship and uses the things for a variety of tasks, so having a close air support jet able to double for some of those makes for an airframe that has an assured usage independent of hard engagement risks.

That isn't going to be viable thanks to the proliferation of MANPADs.

Line of sight limited, direct manpower sink, reliant on human response times, very limited ammo? In any situation but a fully intact sensor net, MANPADs are a distant secondary concern compared to the largely automated SAM vehicles, and there are a variety of ways to compromise the communications needed to give those troops the baring to look at. And even then, there's a variety of target environments with plenty of interference for the lock-on of the missiles in question, such as anything urban or forested.

A troop carrying a dedicated MANPAD is a troop not carrying an ATGM, and is a troop likely carrying 30+ pounds of not-doing-infantry-things equipment. Against the armies that actually train their troops worth a damn, with the sensor net to give advanced warning needed to deal with a successor to the A-10 (or hell, even the existing A-10), you don't see commonplace MANPADs because they have other, much better, anti-air systems and use for infantry gear weight, and as previously mentioned a MANPAD is a sizable chunk of not-doing-infantry-things gear.

Given that you'll need UV countermeasures to have even a hope to avoid things like Stingers, you're shit out of luck in that sort of battlefield.

Or design a low-flying jet that keeps the UV flare minimally visible for minimizing time in which the things can be fired with any chance to hit, much as the A-10 specifically places the wings as armor sheets for the engines? Or, again, make use of cover because all these sensors are line of sight. Whole reason so much uses radar to find targets is because radar isn't line of sight.

 

[LordSunhawk]

There were *five* A-10 losses in Desert Storm, Aaron, not 20. There were also *five* F-16 losses.

Stop spreading misinformation and engaging in rhetorical games when the actual data has already been presented.

 

[Zachowon]

Nope, the A-10 took 20 casualties in Desert Storm, the F-16 only took seven.

CAS as of the A-10s specs is no longer a thing, hell A-10 proponents have screwed with the definition of CAS so divergently from its original definition (i.e. air support (i.e. aircraft mounted weapon deployment) landing within close proximity of the troops) that it is unrecognizable.

The biggest problem for the USAF's CAS capabilities is that they're ruled by a fighter mafia that would rather let everything but their fighters rot away and hates anything that deals with the ground with a passion of a thousand suns.

Aaron, do you know how Radars work? PLease answer me this before you go on about how the SPAAGs and SAMs work and usefulness

But yes Fighter jocks are the issue. Army knows this.

CAS is still damn important, nobody contest that. The problem is, that against anything other than a very permissive environment is very dangerous. While in the last 20-ish year's US/NATO as fought COIN or against incompetent adversaries, nothing guarantee that the future is going to be so easy.

There are ways the US military is preparing for that, and it involves changing the whole of training tactics and the like. They literally changed how the AITs train because of that. I learned Force on Force over COIN in my AIT, and my MOS is greatly used in COIN

Didn't you know, combnined arms doctorine does not exist, and if a plane is not a strike fighter that can fly in the first wave of combat the bird does not belong in the sky.

Obviously CAS is an Army only thing and they have helicopters so why do they need any jets?

Also...if the A-10 is not as good, yet we have Attack helicopters still that do something similar, move slower, less defenses.....Yet we still use them and so does our major enemies... SO why still use them because all the same arguments for the A-10 being useless is the same for them?

 

[LordSunhawk]

Some photos of A-10's showing just how tough they are...

Here's one, took SAM hits, made it back to base.

How about this one, absolutely raked with AAA fire... made it back to base

And there's this one, was hit by one of those supposed A-10 Killers That Make It Totally Obsolete

Oh... it made it back to base.

The whole point of the A-10 is that it can take hits that would destroy any other bird, and make it back home. No other bird in our inventory can take the sheer level of punishment of an A-10.

It can make it home on 1.25 wings, 1 engine, half a tail AND no nose. It's done it.

5 of 7 F-16's that were hit by *anything* in Desert Storm were lost, dead right there.

5 of 20 A-10's that were hit, generally multiple times by much heavier fire, were lost.

The A-10 cannot do the F-16's job. It cannot do the F-35's job.

It's not intended to.

Neither the F-16 nor the F-35 can do the A-10's job. *They aren't intended to*

 

[Zachowon]

Some photos of A-10's showing just how tough they are...

Here's one, took SAM hits, made it back to base.

How about this one, absolutely raked with AAA fire... made it back to base

And there's this one, was hit by one of those supposed A-10 Killers That Make It Totally Obsolete

Oh... it made it back to base.

The whole point of the A-10 is that it can take hits that would destroy any other bird, and make it back home. No other bird in our inventory can take the sheer level of punishment of an A-10.

It can make it home on 1.25 wings, 1 engine, half a tail AND no nose. It's done it.

5 of 7 F-16's that were hit by *anything* in Desert Storm were lost, dead right there.

5 of 20 A-10's that were hit, generally multiple times by much heavier fire, were lost.

The A-10 cannot do the F-16's job. It cannot do the F-35's job.

It's not intended to.

Neither the F-16 nor the F-35 can do the A-10's job. *They aren't intended to*

It is the modern day B-17 of taking damage. It takes the hits and keeps flying

I mean its nickname is the Warthog for a reason. It takes so damn much to kill it.

It is what happens when the Army tries to make a flying tank and the Air force takes it from them

 

[Doomsought]

We've also learned to do interesting things with Kevlar that lend themselves to making light weight defenses. Those types of armor don't prevent damage, but they can reduce its effect.

The goal is never to be immune to damage, but to increase the amount of time it takes to create a kill or mission kill.

 

[Aaron Fox]

Basically, US Army needs to learn how to fight without aerial support.

Not really, given Desert Storm.

To be fair CAS in a contest environment is supposed to be the F-35s job with the main goal of uncontesting said airspace so the rest of the airforce can be used more aggressively.

Which against anyone with even Iraqi levels of competence is harder than it looks. Hell, the entire NATO SEAD/DEAD paradigm fell apart once it went up against someone that was competent (Serbia).

There were *five* A-10 losses in Desert Storm, Aaron, not 20. There were also *five* F-16 losses.

Stop spreading misinformation and engaging in rhetorical games when the actual data has already been presented.

Not according to the Coalition's own data. Losses were 20 A-10s compared to 7 F-16s. Low and slow was never going to last long and became invalidated with technology. Remember, the A-10 was designed by a good idea fairy.

Aaron, do you know how Radars work? PLease answer me this before you go on about how the SPAAGs and SAMs work and usefulness

The core aspect of regular old radar is that it sends out 'pulses' of radio or microwaves that reflect on various materials and that reflection creates a return. More modern radars have all sorts of 'fun' bits including (and not limited to) using quantum mechanics to detect return manipulation (i.e. the sent pulse has a quantum signature that will change if toyed with).

Obviously CAS is an Army only thing and they have helicopters so why do they need any jets?

Also...if the A-10 is not as good, yet we have Attack helicopters still that do something similar, move slower, less defenses.....Yet we still use them and so does our major enemies... SO why still use them because all the same arguments for the A-10 being useless is the same for them?

Attack helicopters have to stay away from any sort of AAA in the doctrinal sense. The moment they pop up against anything resembling competence they get screwed before being forced to bug out.

I did point out that it was primarily an issue with naval cruise missiles, but the supply bottleneck remains a serious problem. Because missiles are expensive. Anything that'd call for a "tactical bomber" is a degree of ordnance usage rate that is not sustainable. You're talking a successor to the A-6, not a successor to the A-10.

Because that's how technology rolls. The A-10's viable time in the air has always been stupid limited by its base design (which is by a Good Idea Fairy who ignored things like the rapid development of ATGMs or guided munitions). The 'low and slow' died in 1991 when A-10s went up against Iraqis and got shredded.

Hence my talk of overlapping the thing with the helicopter uses with VTOL, as everyone is still digging at the hole of the helicopter gunship and uses the things for a variety of tasks, so having a close air support jet able to double for some of those makes for an airframe that has an assured usage independent of hard engagement risks.


Line of sight limited, direct manpower sink, reliant on human response times, very limited ammo? In any situation but a fully intact sensor net, MANPADs are a distant secondary concern compared to the largely automated SAM vehicles, and there are a variety of ways to compromise the communications needed to give those troops the baring to look at. And even then, there's a variety of target environments with plenty of interference for the lock-on of the missiles in question, such as anything urban or forested.

You can say the same thing for ATGMs but you aren't complaining.

A troop carrying a dedicated MANPAD is a troop not carrying an ATGM, and is a troop likely carrying 30+ pounds of not-doing-infantry-things equipment. Against the armies that actually train their troops worth a damn, with the sensor net to give advanced warning needed to deal with a successor to the A-10 (or hell, even the existing A-10), you don't see commonplace MANPADs because they have other, much better, anti-air systems and use for infantry gear weight, and as previously mentioned a MANPAD is a sizable chunk of not-doing-infantry-things gear.

However, everyone and their brother is heading in that direction anyway due to the inherent advantages of having a MANPAD on hand than not having one.

Or design a low-flying jet that keeps the UV flare minimally visible for minimizing time in which the things can be fired with any chance to hit, much as the A-10 specifically places the wings as armor sheets for the engines? Or, again, make use of cover because all these sensors are line of sight. Whole reason so much uses radar to find targets is because radar isn't line of sight.

That doesn't work given the losses in Desert Storm. MANPADs and IR SAMs ignore trivial things like engine survivability design choices unsurprisingly enough.

 

[Morphic Tide]

Because that's how technology rolls. The A-10's viable time in the air has always been stupid limited by its base design (which is by a Good Idea Fairy who ignored things like the rapid development of ATGMs or guided munitions). The 'low and slow' died in 1991 when A-10s went up against Iraqis and got shredded.

Then why is the Army dumping truckloads into modernizing helicopters? Barely off the ground and hovering. And it doesn't need to be the exact same layout but upgraded, it can do literally anything that's technically possible; we're talking a hypothetical from-scratch successor.

Also, with regards to "getting shredded", there's a spectacular amount of overhead you can throw away when making a CAS airframe that brings the unit cost of the things down massively, making the airframe being a total write-off still able to be cheaper than running the spectacular fighter mafia shit.

Not needing to be supersonic is a big deal in aviation, because you can then afford a spectacular degree of simpler components, throw out a chunk of the precision in those components, ignore almost everything to do with vortex management, and use considerably cheaper materials. On top of not needing the computer systems and control surface particulars involved in keeping stable at supersonic speeds, and passing up most of the sensor fidelity because you're working with a fraction of the distances.

However, everyone and their brother is heading in that direction anyway due to the inherent advantages of having a MANPAD on hand than not having one.

What says that massive quantities of MANPADs is actually the best use of the opportunity costs? That's materiel being shipped, shit the troops have to carry on them, production that has to be allocated, and in some regards resources that have to be processed.

The same can be done vastly better by an even slightly dedicated platform that's often largely interchangable, freeing the troops up for more rations, more ammo for their main mission, ATGMs, medical supplies, or whatever else one wishes their soldiers to carry.

That doesn't work given the losses in Desert Storm. MANPADs and IR SAMs ignore trivial things like engine survivability design choices unsurprisingly enough.

The coalition data you yourself linked to gives 7 F-16 entries, of which 3 were losses, against 20 A-10 entries, of which 9 were losses. This is only very slightly over a two percent difference of damage against survival, with AAA managing one incident on the F-16s, while the A-10 had eleven of its incidents be from AAA fire. So if we're talking about just the guided projectiles, it's 6 incidents with 3 losses for the F-16s, and 8 incidents with 4 losses for the A-10.

In other words, in the specific area you're saying the data you brought up fortells doom in, the A-10's high-risk "low and slow" situation produced a third more incidents with guided munitions, and no difference in rate of loss when damaged by them.

And no, they don't magically ignore you building a jet to have high engine survivability. Even if the A-10's setup is completely ineffectual against a guided munition hit, any successor is rather obviously getting designed to defend against its threat profile, which means that the design choice of the A-10 placing its wings in the way of its engines is likely to see some analogous design work to shield the engines proper from damage against these munitions.

Especially MANPADs and IR-SAMs, as MANPADs don't have the space for the spectacular stuff you'd need to get them to terminal maneuver directly at the engine intake or exhaust from the secondary or tertiary data they'd have access to, and infrared has so many layers of countermeasure one can dig into that it's not all that large a threat if you are building for survival, where your super-go-fast stuff can't afford it. Also, redundancy! The A-10 can already shrug off losing one of its two engines and still get back to base, while missing most of its control surfaces.

Throwing in a third engine, or going for a much more embedded than usual engine placement with distant exhausts and nearer backups, or any manner of other system by which one can have an "engine" hit not actually take out the thrust, is a very obvious thing to put on the table. The US military considered this monstrosity a good proof of concept, because when you don't need supersonic speed or a high flight ceiling, virtually everything about conventional jet design goes back up in the air because you can afford all sorts of cludgy stupidity to brute-force the matter.

 

[Aaron Fox]

Then why is the Army dumping truckloads into modernizing helicopters? Barely off the ground and hovering. And it doesn't need to be the exact same layout but upgraded, it can do literally anything that's technically possible; we're talking a hypothetical from-scratch successor.

Also, with regards to "getting shredded", there's a spectacular amount of overhead you can throw away when making a CAS airframe that brings the unit cost of the things down massively, making the airframe being a total write-off still able to be cheaper than running the spectacular fighter mafia shit.

Only to add sensor mast and datalink capability last I've checked, that and allowing for more modern ATGMs to be fitted onto said helicopters.

In a combat scenario, if a SPAAG or MANPAD is in the area, the helicopter(s) have to bug out because they're just in a losing proposition last I've checked.

The coalition data you yourself linked to gives 7 F-16 entries, of which 3 were losses, against 20 A-10 entries, of which 9 were losses. This is only very slightly over a two percent difference of damage against survival, with AAA managing one incident on the F-16s, while the A-10 had eleven of its incidents be from AAA fire. So if we're talking about just the guided projectiles, it's 6 incidents with 3 losses for the F-16s, and 8 incidents with 4 losses for the A-10.

Damaged is a loss in combat, no more no less. Why? Because you can't repair damaged shit fast enough to be combat viable within a tiny time-frame.

Before you go off masturbating on the armor, you keep forgetting that its a losing proposition to armor aircraft. Aircraft like the IL-2 and other 'heavily armored' monsters barely have any armor on them. Trying to armor them will only ensure that they never fly off the ground. Outside the bathtub cockpit, there is barely any armor to speak of on the A-10, most of it is in survivability redundancies that are based around 23mm autocannon, and when you get to 30mm and larger caliber AA autocannons, you're plain ass fucked as such rounds will rip your wing right off. As sensor density increases, the ability of 'low and slow' to go to their targets decreases... and we're nearing the sensor density of yes.

 

[Morphic Tide]

In a combat scenario, if a SPAAG or MANPAD is in the area, the helicopter(s) have to bug out because they're just in a losing proposition last I've checked.

...Which is why the A-10 is a thing? The AAA guns the thing is built to face-tank also utterly screw over helicopters. The point is that the military still finds a much worse CAS option to be worth dumping far more money into, so the professional military with vast reams of data wildly outside your reach find the mission still very important to have available, being willing to dump vastly larger sums than the Air Force spends on A-10s into the money pit that is the helicopter gunships.

Damaged is a loss in combat, no more no less. Why? Because you can't repair damaged shit fast enough to be combat viable within a tiny time-frame.

There's a world of difference between them, because in one case you have the entire airframe to replace and a lost pilot, while in the other it can amount to a few thousand in high-quality sheet metal if the damage is just needing to replace a wing. And it also matters in anything you can seriously call a war, because a "damaged" airframe is one you can throw back at the front in a week or two, most of the time, without needing to build a new one from scratch and ship it to the theater.

All your talk is about how a reduction in asymmetric or irregular opponents will doom the CAS mission, so we're talking the gap between the US and the enemy forces closing. The loss of the "roll over a country in a week" situation we've enjoyed ready access to. Which means that keeping the munitions rolling becomes a far higher priority than it is now, because pushes will be taking longer. Which, in turn, means that low operational cost solutions to light armor capable of reasonably withstanding anti-air fire will be a godsend if even remotely workable.

Are you genuinely unable to envision any method by which one could make an aircraft that doesn't need to go faster than sound and doesn't need to fly above 5,000 feet operate in an environment lacking air superiority? Is there no technology you can think of that one can afford to stick on that to make it hold up? Perhaps those point-defense systems you've ranted about invalidating the exact threats you are saying invalidate the A-10?

 

[Aaron Fox]

...Which is why the A-10 is a thing? The AAA guns the thing is built to face-tank also utterly screw over helicopters. The point is that the military still finds a much worse CAS option to be worth dumping far more money into, so the professional military with vast reams of data wildly outside your reach find the mission still very important to have available, being willing to dump vastly larger sums than the Air Force spends on A-10s into the money pit that is the helicopter gunships.

The main reason that helicopters are still around right now is that they work far closer with allied tanks and infantry than an aircraft do. They don't go far from said tanks and infantry unless shit has gone horribly wrong.

There's a world of difference between them, because in one case you have the entire airframe to replace and a lost pilot, while in the other it can amount to a few thousand in high-quality sheet metal if the damage is just needing to replace a wing. And it also matters in anything you can seriously call a war, because a "damaged" airframe is one you can throw back at the front in a week or two, most of the time, without needing to build a new one from scratch and ship it to the theater.

You are ignoring all the other bits into an airframe that drive up repair time. Last I've heard, if it isn't repaired and ready to go within an hour, it's a combat loss. Please note what I linked considers damaged aircraft as losses. Not complete losses but losses in the context of a combat situation which is what the military considers losses anyway.

All your talk is about how a reduction in asymmetric or irregular opponents will doom the CAS mission, so we're talking the gap between the US and the enemy forces closing. The loss of the "roll over a country in a week" situation we've enjoyed ready access to. Which means that keeping the munitions rolling becomes a far higher priority than it is now, because pushes will be taking longer. Which, in turn, means that low operational cost solutions to light armor capable of reasonably withstanding anti-air fire will be a godsend if even remotely workable.

Are you genuinely unable to envision any method by which one could make an aircraft that doesn't need to go faster than sound and doesn't need to fly above 5,000 feet operate in an environment lacking air superiority? Is there no technology you can think of that one can afford to stick on that to make it hold up? Perhaps those point-defense systems you've ranted about invalidating the exact threats you are saying invalidate the A-10?

Wow, how to twist my words. As I said, getting LAMS to protect an aircraft against MANPADs at NOE altitudes requires a reaction time that makes milliseconds seem like forever. This is far harder than it looks, hence why current prototypes are designed for high-altitude only, for it is the only way to allow for the system to not be massive and/or impossibly power-hungry to get it to react that fast.

BIG FAT CONTEXT EDIT:

What I'm trying to say is that building an aircraft around a gun or an armor scheme is a losing proposition. With modern radar and data link systems, your best bet is to not be seen.

If you want to have something like the A-10, the only way forward is a Su-25 which isn't built around the gun but an extensive array of rockets, bombs, and missiles. It is either that or a modernized A-6.

 

[Aldarion]

Is not that difficult - after all, everybody else can do.

True, but there will be learning curve involved.

To be fair CAS in a contest environment is supposed to be the F-35s job with the main goal of uncontesting said airspace so the rest of the airforce can be used more aggressively.

Yeah, but that is not just it. A peer opponent would be able to largely neutralize the very systems (radar, GPS, laser and IR guidance) which enable fast movers to perform close air support. And if environment can still be made too dangerous for low-and-slow approach, then you don't have any options for CAS.

Not really, given Desert Storm.

Desert Storm was against Iraqis, though. Not exactly representative of a near-peer opponent.

 

[Aaron Fox]

Desert Storm was against Iraqis, though. Not exactly representative of a near-peer opponent.

If the Iraqis of all people can rip the A-10s apart, anyone more competent would simply outright slaughter the A-10. We've seen the massive difference between Iraqis using soviet ADS and someone competent in soviet ADS in the form of the Serbs. To give you an idea of how competent the Serbs were, they basically laughed at NATO's attempts at SEAD/DEAD on their ADS assets, had their equipment stay effective by regular maintenance, and kept as many of their ADS assets as mobile as possible.

Then there are the combat losses of the Su-25, which paints a very bad picture for anything going low.

 

[Aldarion]

If the Iraqis of all people can rip the A-10s apart, anyone more competent would simply outright slaughter the A-10. We've seen the massive difference between Iraqis using soviet ADS and someone competent in soviet ADS in the form of the Serbs. To give you an idea of how competent the Serbs were, they basically laughed at NATO's attempts at SEAD/DEAD on their ADS assets, had their equipment stay effective by regular maintenance, and kept as many of their ADS assets as mobile as possible.

Then there are the combat losses of the Su-25, which paints a very bad picture for anything going low.

Or maybe change the way aircraft are employed? You said that:

The main reason that helicopters are still around right now is that they work far closer with allied tanks and infantry than an aircraft do. They don't go far from said tanks and infantry unless shit has gone horribly wrong.

So what about utilizing fixed-wing aircraft in said role? Basically, instead of going off into deep strikes, they loiter behind battlefield and provide close air support on-call, and in area where one's own artillery can at least somewhat suppress air defences. I think Super Tucano and similar would have much better loiter time as well as lower maintenance requirement than something like AH-64 Apache.

So in other words, problem isn't necessarily in the A-10 or close air support as such... but rather in USAF's concept of close air support which seeks to divorce it from the Army and the role of "flying artillery" - basically, there is too much "air" in "close air support".

 

[Zachowon]

Not really, given Desert Storm.

Which against anyone with even Iraqi levels of competence is harder than it looks. Hell, the entire NATO SEAD/DEAD paradigm fell apart once it went up against someone that was competent (Serbia).

Not according to the Coalition's own data. Losses were 20 A-10s compared to 7 F-16s. Low and slow was never going to last long and became invalidated with technology. Remember, the A-10 was designed by a good idea fairy.

The core aspect of regular old radar is that it sends out 'pulses' of radio or microwaves that reflect on various materials and that reflection creates a return. More modern radars have all sorts of 'fun' bits including (and not limited to) using quantum mechanics to detect return manipulation (i.e. the sent pulse has a quantum signature that will change if toyed with).

Attack helicopters have to stay away from any sort of AAA in the doctrinal sense. The moment they pop up against anything resembling competence they get screwed before being forced to bug out.

Because that's how technology rolls. The A-10's viable time in the air has always been stupid limited by its base design (which is by a Good Idea Fairy who ignored things like the rapid development of ATGMs or guided munitions). The 'low and slow' died in 1991 when A-10s went up against Iraqis and got shredded.

You can say the same thing for ATGMs but you aren't complaining.

However, everyone and their brother is heading in that direction anyway due to the inherent advantages of having a MANPAD on hand than not having one.

That doesn't work given the losses in Desert Storm. MANPADs and IR SAMs ignore trivial things like engine survivability design choices unsurprisingly enough.

Radars still operate in ways that involve clear lines of sight. Especially the radars involved with the Missles and AAAs. They are generally fixed or roaming radars that only focus one area or require something to track should it be turned on. They also have to rely on line of sight and trees and hills which favor what the A-10 does is very good cover.

Also what has longer loiter time? An A-10 or an Apache?

Or maybe change the way aircraft are employed? You said that:

So what about utilizing fixed-wing aircraft in said role? Basically, instead of going off into deep strikes, they loiter behind battlefield and provide close air support on-call, and in area where one's own artillery can at least somewhat suppress air defences. I think Super Tucano and similar would have much better loiter time as well as lower maintenance requirement than something like AH-64 Apache.

So in other words, problem isn't necessarily in the A-10 or close air support as such... but rather in USAF's concept of close air support which seeks to divorce it from the Army and the role of "flying artillery" - basically, there is too much "air" in "close air support".

I see no reason the A-10 cant do the same thing

 

[Aaron Fox]

Or maybe change the way aircraft are employed? You said that:

So what about utilizing fixed-wing aircraft in said role? Basically, instead of going off into deep strikes, they loiter behind battlefield and provide close air support on-call, and in area where one's own artillery can at least somewhat suppress air defences. I think Super Tucano and similar would have much better loiter time as well as lower maintenance requirement than something like AH-64 Apache.

However, the AH-64 Apache has one advantage compared to any low and slow fixed wing that they can never replicate, they can be -for all intents and purposes- crabgrass to enemy radars. Trying to fly a heavily armed fixed-wing 30 meters from ground level is -for all intents and purposes- impossible, especially if you want to RTB even partially in one piece.

So in other words, problem isn't necessarily in the A-10 or close air support as such... but rather in USAF's concept of close air support which seeks to divorce it from the Army and the role of "flying artillery" - basically, there is too much "air" in "close air support".

From what I understand, you'll need to cover two roles with the A-10: Close Air Support (CAS) and Battlefield Interdiction (BAI). Both of these are vital in combat conditions. BAI goes out to damage or annihilate enemy combat formations while CAS is simply 'flying artillery' in the traditional sense. Due to the aforementioned limitation of fixed-wing aircraft, you'll have to fly high and fast, out of the range of MANPADs and AAGs.

Also, the definition of 'Close' in 'Close Air Support' isn't on how close the aircraft is to the troops, that's just due to technological issues, but on how close the ordinance is landing to the troops. Basically, if the ordinance is landing close to the soldiers (up to and including 'danger close'), then its CAS. Everything else is BAI.

Radars still operate in ways that involve clear lines of sight. Especially the radars involved with the Missles and AAAs. They are generally fixed or roaming radars that only focus one area or require something to track should it be turned on. They also have to rely on line of sight and trees and hills which favor what the A-10 does is very good cover.

Not really, radar has gotten damn good at the low altitudes that the A-10 was designed for. You have to have an altitude of 30 meters or so to avoid even SPAAG radar... and 30 meters for a fixed-wing is deadly dangerous. Remember what I found out in the Sgt. York program, where aircraft had to have solid cover between them and the radar set? Yeah, that's an actual thing for a long-ass time now.

Also, networking is becoming a real thing, meaning that you'll get to the point where one set sees, everyone else sees. I wouldn't be surprised that this capability is being retrofitted on vehicles that can be fitted with such tech.

Also what has longer loiter time? An A-10 or an Apache?

The A-10, but it's -in any current or future ADS scenario- basically dead meat if the enemy is even half-way competent with its AA assets.

 

[Panzerkraken]

@Aaron Fox That data you linked only has 5 losses for A-10 airframes. The other entries are damage. Only one of those loss entries was from AAA, the others were from various SAMs.

The data also shows that 15 of them were damaged, but were able to RTB. There's no indication of whether that damage was severe enough to ground the airframe or if it was able to be repaired on site and continue flying.

 

[Aaron Fox]

@Aaron Fox That data you linked only has 5 losses for A-10 airframes. The other entries are damage. Only one of those loss entries was from AAA, the others were from various SAMs.

The data also shows that 15 of them were damaged, but were able to RTB. There's no indication of whether that damage was severe enough to ground the airframe or if it was able to be repaired on site and continue flying.

In combat, any real damage is considered an effective loss due to how aircraft are. Being shot at isn't conclusive to all the components to allow you flight, like being shot at isn't conclusive to living. Out of the various airframes in Desert Storm, only the Tornado got it worse.

 

[Panzerkraken]

In combat, any real damage is considered an effective loss due to how aircraft are. Being shot at isn't conclusive to all the components to allow you flight, like being shot at isn't conclusive to living. Out of the various airframes in Desert Storm, only the Tornado got it worse.

I was looking for other sources for loss data and found this report, which makes for a nice read. The gist of it is that airframe losses to SAM and AAA are pretty uncommon.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a434084.pdf

 

[Aaron Fox]

I was looking for other sources for loss data and found this report, which makes for a nice read. The gist of it is that airframe losses to SAM and AAA are pretty uncommon.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a434084.pdf

This is heavily due to the opponent, given that the majority of the Middle East is more towards 'coup proofing' their militaries than allowing them to make modern war. Iraq is just one of many of them in this regard.

The Yugoslavia intervention used how even a fairly incompetent (in general) military -aka Iraq- was able to give the various airforces a licking and used the 10k feet 'floor' to limit possible casualties and it is telling that most of the losses there were due to complacency than anything.

If the Iraqis were more competent in general, the losses would have skyrocketed.