AH Challenge- After armistice day 1918, Britain decides on and sticks w/ a policy of lockstep cooperation with France?

[raharris1973]

Here is the challenge - what if after armistice day 1918, Britain decides on and sticks w/ a policy of lockstep cooperation with France on European, indeed global affairs.

It does this, instead of its nearly opposite, OTL policy of running away from commitments to France as much as possible, and always urging France to tone down its commitment to the letter of the Versailles treaty and the precise European territorial status quo set up by Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, Neuilly & Riga.

Of course, by mid-1939, Britain was back to realignment with France, but the time away from that alignment was costly, and gave the Nazis room to make free gains.

In other words, Britain is consistent with its wartime alliance with France, and its prewar policy toward France since the Entente Cordiale, generally siding with France on international questions.

I'm inspired to start this thread after reviewing threads I started on what *France* could have done post Versailles, or during Versailles, to sustain a more secure position for itself in the decades after 1919 (you know, a future, not leading to the debacle of 1940).

These discussions were had on multiple forums here:

What's the best deal France can make and take at Versailles?

AHC – France sustains its post-Versailles security order for 44 years

AHC – France sustains its post-Versailles security order for 44 years

What's the best deal France can make and take at Versailles?

AHC – France sustains its post-Versailles security order for 44 years

A big conclusion from the discussions was that France *tried* hard to avoid the fate of 1940, but didn't have the weight/strength to do it without British support. The French largely knew this, which was why they were always checking for British approval before standing up for themselves, or anyone else in Europe, against Germany, but the British never gave France approval to stand up against Germany until the spring of 1939.

In those discussions I took British non-cooperation as an unchangeable, mindless force of nature, that France just had to deal with and couldn't do anything to affect.

But here, I am asking if we can plausibly get British leaders, elites, people to walk away from the end of WWI and the armistice with a different set of preferences and lessons, and decide that France is *the* vital partner, strategy has to be co-developed with France, and if France needs support for encircling or containing Germany, it should get it.

In hindsight, the logic of 'stick with France through thick and thin' is pretty good. Who else can Britain stick with? Russia is revolutionary and unavailable. America is too aloof. Japan is too distant to make the big difference in Europe, and America is strong-arming Britain into cutting the alliance anyway. Germany? Germany has some bitterness against Britain and Britain sits on some German old property. Italy - too little strength north of the Alps. The idea, to the extent that British policymakers ever entertained it after WWI, that France was now now *too strong* on the continent and would over-dominate it in league Central European allies like Poland (despite poor Relations with both Germany and Soviet Russia) seems a gross over-estimate of France's ability to domineer and become a menace, especially in hindsight. In retrospect, what Britain and France would have achieved working together was not a new Napoleonic order in Europe, but basically just enough force to hold on to the European status quo by denying Germany and Italy the maneuvering room and oxygen to do wars of conquest through the 1940s.

How could British leaders/government come to this conclusion, implement this policy, what costs would they pay, and what would the results be through the 1940s and beyond?

 

[stevep]

It was definitely a mistake but there was a desire to put the huge and very costly continental commitment behind them and also to try and get a better relationship with the US. Which seems to have totally missed the hostility by many in the US's leadership to Britain continuing as a great power or economic rival, as at this point it was the only other western power able to even attempt to compete with the US. Plus with the civil war in Ireland distracting many.

Possibly if the Liberal split had somehow been avoided I think a government under Lloyd George might have been more friendly towards France? I.e. one where he had real power rather than being dependent on the Tory majority because most Liberal MPs sided with Asquith.

If they did then there's a chance of a lasting alliance developing although every time one wants something that isn't in the other's interest things are going to come under strain. For instance Britain opposed the Franco-Belgium occupation of the Rhur when Germany stopped paying reparations. Or the French support of the Turks because they were concerned about growing British influence in the ME.

If somehow the alliance survived until the mid 30's and Germany follows a similar path you could well see Britain supporting a French intervention to prevent the Germans re-occupying the Rhur in 1936. Which might see Hitler deposed but would make later expansion very much more difficult of course as an allied move into the Rhineland would cause immense harm to any German war effort.

Of course the down side, if WWII is averted is that the same idiots who supported pacifism and the anti-nuclear movement in the 1950's would probably be marching in opposition to this sort of 'aggression' against Germany.

 

[raharris1973]

Why does Britain have to regard close relations with France as a zero sum trade off for good relations with the US? It’s not like the US had a paranoia about France like it did with, say, Japan.

Is it fair to call France’s policy to support Turkey after WWI an ant British balancing maneuver in the Middle East? Or was it France just not being signed up for Lloyd George’s rather idiosyncratic support for theVenizelists in the Greco-Turkish war? I could tell you who else wasn’t signed up for L-G’s policy on that- the British commanders on the ground at Chanak, and the Canadian Prime Minister.

Why does continued alliance/Entente have to rest especially or only on the political success of the Liberal Party? Yes, Lloyd George, Asquith and Grey were wartime leaders and liberals, but the Conservatives under the Balfour government were the ones who started the Entente with France in 1904, and had a stronger intraparty consensus for a Germanophobe and pro-Entente policy every year and day up until the war started in 1914.

 

[WolfBear]

A relevant question that should be asked here is whether the British were actually willing to have a much larger military-industrial complex in the interwar era, because in a practical sense, this is what supporting the French would have necessarily entailed. The US was able to keep order in post-WWII Western Europe, but it also had a giant military-industrial complex. Ditto for the post-WWII Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Would the British people really be willing to spend much more on their military during peacetime in the interwar era just like both of the superpowers did during the Cold War in real life?

 

[Buba]

The OP means Poland with the two plebiscite areas and Danzig. It was Lloyd George the Polonophobe who shot down the idea of their outright transfer to Poland. AFAIK ...
Hence an economically stronger Poland and with better strategic setting versus Germany. Czechoslovakia has a shorter border with Germany too, with north Moravia shielded by Poland and the highest portions of the Sudeten.

 

[sillygoose]

To the OP's point they simply couldn't and the US wouldn't go along anyway, which was a huge problem financially. The French and British just had too different of interests for this to work; the Ruhr was the OTL breaking point because by France looting Germany and the economy collapsing as a result severely screwed over Britain financially as they then couldn't collect reparations either nor could their economy continue to function, as Germany was one of if not their biggest their trade partners. So you'd need to have France actually stick with Britain and hold back in the 1920s to make this remotely viable.

Also as a point about the different situation in the 1930s France kept acting out of pocket and making the Depression worse, so the Brits gave up on working with them especially after the French far left took over in the mid-1930s.

The OP means Poland with the two plebiscite areas and Danzig. It was Lloyd George the Polonophobe who shot down the idea of their outright transfer to Poland. AFAIK ...
Hence an economically stronger Poland and with better strategic setting versus Germany. Czechoslovakia has a shorter border with Germany too, with north Moravia shielded by Poland and the highest portions of the Sudeten.

LG was more concerned about the Germans fighting if they turned over Danzig. The US didn't understand Europe well and France was only concerned about weakening Germany, but Britain was trying to make the peace sustainable and didn't want to make things worse by setting up an issue that the Germans would fight over, like turning over a 95% German city to a foreign country. The OTL territory transfers were only areas with a non-German dominant population, so switching over Danzig would be a very different thing.

Poland wouldn't really be economically stronger, as they got access to Danzig anyway IOTL. Borders like that would virtually guarantee war at some point and probably a greater Soviet-German cooperation.

 

[raharris1973]

Could Britain have ended WWI embracing its alliance with France instead of running away from it like a bat out of hell if the war had gone better and between less costly? Say for example the Entente wins in 1917? Or in 1916? Or in 1915? Or in 1914? Say its because in any of those cases the Entente has better luck and planning to one degree or another and the CP has it worse. For example- Gallipolli works, or Ottomans neutral, or Romanians join at a better time, or Italians or Greeks join war early, or Americans join war early, or for a 1914 win, German western attack fails bad?

 

[raharris1973]

Or was Britain, after winning against Germany, always going to zigzag toward Germany vs France, thinking that’s the ‘balance of power’ move?

 

[sillygoose]

Or was Britain, after winning against Germany, always going to zigzag toward Germany vs France, thinking that’s the ‘balance of power’ move?

Since their entire motivation was balance of power, of course they would defect to Germany when convenient. Britain never has allies, only interests, the main being the balance of power on the continent.

 

[stevep]

Since their entire motivation was balance of power, of course they would defect to Germany when convenient. Britain never has allies, only interests, the main being the balance of power on the continent.

That is actually the logical and often the common action of all powers, especially in a region historically divided like Europe was. Britain was better at it because of geographical advantages i.e. being a well located island and also social and cultural results of that development. All nations had an interest in a balance of power unless they were the ones seeking to establish a hegemony.

 

[stevep]

Could Britain have ended WWI embracing its alliance with France instead of running away from it like a bat out of hell if the war had gone better and between less costly? Say for example the Entente wins in 1917? Or in 1916? Or in 1915? Or in 1914? Say its because in any of those cases the Entente has better luck and planning to one degree or another and the CP has it worse. For example- Gallipolli works, or Ottomans neutral, or Romanians join at a better time, or Italians or Greeks join war early, or Americans join war early, or for a 1914 win, German western attack fails bad?

Especially with a 1915-16 victory and possibly a 1917 one the big difference, even more than the fiscal dominance of the US being reduced, would be the existence of a non-communist and much stronger Russia. That gives France a balancing power to the east of Germany which would greatly reduce the need for Germany to be crippled as a military threat. A lot would depend on how the two interact and their attitude towards the defected CPs.

Its slightly different possibly if a Provisional Government survives, at least for the moment, in Russia. That might be willing to give independence, or at least a large measure of autonomy to areas such as Poland and Finland. Also I think it would be mainly concerned with internal issues, even without the probably threat by extremists on both flanks.

In this case Britain is far more likely to seek to protect Germany somewhat as a balance to a potential Franco-Russian threat and a shorter war with less losses would reduce the emnity towards Germany in all three countries. Although given their actions in those countries France and Belgium are likely to continue to have reservations about being too generous to Germany.

 

[raharris1973]

Since their entire motivation was balance of power, of course they would defect to Germany when convenient. Britain never has allies, only interests, the main being the balance of power on the continent.

&

That is actually the logical and often the common action of all powers, especially in a region historically divided like Europe was. Britain was better at it because of geographical advantages i.e. being a well located island and also social and cultural results of that development. All nations had an interest in a balance of power unless they were the ones seeking to establish a hegemony.

How good were the British at actually calculating power balances on the continent and globe correctly, to throw their weight around in a way that maximized their own power? Were their choices to regulate the balances with war every time they did so in the nineteenth and twentieth century smart and well-timed every time? Were their bouts of withdrawal and reversals of alliances exquisitely well-timed and executed to maximize their power and minimize costs, compared to all available choices?

It seems to me Britain bled power pretty fast from 1900 to 1950. Would they have gone down faster without all the zig-zagging they called 'balance of power'?

 

[ATP]

British try balance of powers again - they forget,that it worked till prussian conqered other german states.Free them,made Saxony,Bawaria and others independent again - and then you could support defeated prussian,or rather use them as England tool again.
With German state intact and controlled by prussians,it could not worked.

So,either made german states free again,or support France against Berlin.

 

[sillygoose]

How good were the British at actually calculating power balances on the continent and globe correctly, to throw their weight around in a way that maximized their own power? Were their choices to regulate the balances with war every time they did so in the nineteenth and twentieth century smart and well-timed every time? Were their bouts of withdrawal and reversals of alliances exquisitely well-timed and executed to maximize their power and minimize costs, compared to all available choices?

It seems to me Britain bled power pretty fast from 1900 to 1950. Would they have gone down faster without all the zig-zagging they called 'balance of power'?

Given the results of the wars it doesn't seem like Britain did all that well. They certainly ensured the US would run the world though.

 

[stevep]

How good were the British at actually calculating power balances on the continent and globe correctly, to throw their weight around in a way that maximized their own power? Were their choices to regulate the balances with war every time they did so in the nineteenth and twentieth century smart and well-timed every time? Were their bouts of withdrawal and reversals of alliances exquisitely well-timed and executed to maximize their power and minimize costs, compared to all available choices?

Well it always relies on the leadership actually making correct decisions plus for much of the 19thC things were relatively stable. Plus at this period Britain was at the height of its power so it was less concerned with a need for a balance. This was the basis for the Tory stance towards the end of the 19thC century of 'splendid isolationism'. Which wasn't really the best idea.

There were a couple of points in the 18thC where things got rocky. The decision to ally with Prussia rather than Austria after the War of the Austrian Succession was possibly not the best idea. Similarly after the 7 Year's War Britain failed to maintain alliances which left it vulnerable when the American Revolution started, although this seems to been largely due to hubris meaning that the government under the young George III seemed not to think that allies were necessary.

It seems to me Britain bled power pretty fast from 1900 to 1950. Would they have gone down faster without all the zig-zagging they called 'balance of power'?

That was when the power was clearly seen to decline but the underlying problems occurred earlier, with the degree of slippage of relative power from its peak in the early/mid 19thC. There were bad economic policies adopted plus a failure to recognise the need for a well educated and motivated population.

Britain was always going to be supplanted by powers with greater demographic capability but the relative qualitative loss could [and should] have been avoided.

 

[sillygoose]

That was when the power was clearly seen to decline but the underlying problems occurred earlier, with the degree of slippage of relative power from its peak in the early/mid 19thC. There were bad economic policies adopted plus a failure to recognise the need for a well educated and motivated population.

Britain was always going to be supplanted by powers with greater demographic capability but the relative qualitative loss could [and should] have been avoided.

So the question then is what if Britain was willing to ally with Germany+Austria in the early 20th century instead of Russia and France? Might the world wars have been avoided and the British empire kept together?

 

[raharris1973]

So the question then is what if Britain was willing to ally with Germany+Austria in the early 20th century instead of Russia and France? Might the world wars have been avoided and the British empire kept together?

That depends. If a London-Berlin alliance happens - Would France and Russia ever get a feeling of being backed into a corner or a closing window of opportunity to as they weaken, leading them to strike out? Would the British or German-Austrians decide to start a world war, "for fun" against France & Russia to pick their empires apart, a world war that would probably be quicker and less costly than OTLs, but still more costly than anybody expects?

As far the possibility of a London Berlin alliance in the first place: Can London get over itself, and joint the Triple Alliance or Three Emperor's League on the same terms as everybody else? Or failing that, could Germany accept a special lopsided alliance on terms favorable to Britain, without feeling its being taken advantage of and set up for suffering as Britain's meat shield like Frederick the Great was in the 7 Years War? Failure to overcome those limitations prevented said alliance in OTL in addition to any concern about raw 'balance'.

 

[stevep]

That depends. If a London-Berlin alliance happens - Would France and Russia ever get a feeling of being backed into a corner or a closing window of opportunity to as they weaken, leading them to strike out? Would the British or German-Austrians decide to start a world war, "for fun" against France & Russia to pick their empires apart, a world war that would probably be quicker and less costly than OTLs, but still more costly than anybody expects?

As far the possibility of a London Berlin alliance in the first place: Can London get over itself, and joint the Triple Alliance or Three Emperor's League on the same terms as everybody else? Or failing that, could Germany accept a special lopsided alliance on terms favorable to Britain, without feeling its being taken advantage of and set up for suffering as Britain's meat shield like Frederick the Great was in the 7 Years War? Failure to overcome those limitations prevented said alliance in OTL in addition to any concern about raw 'balance'.

It basically requires a Germany that is willing to accept other powers, most especially Britain, as equals and cease threatening Britain all the time. I know the Germanphlies will reject that viewpoint but Britain can't have a stable relationship with a power that continually threatens its vital interests, most especially as a independent state.

If that does happen then it might delay matter for a decade or two but given the growing instability of the Hapsburg empire and assuming that Russia continues to develop - preferably with a reasonably rational Czar/government when Nickolas II kicks the bucket would Berlin still be looking with concern about the opposition being too strong to be defeated militarily?

Britain is unlikely to be willing to start a war but could be drawn in depending on what develops. Unless there are drastic changes in the British political viewpoint they will want peace for trade and commerce.

Of course this also raises questions of what happens with the US and also parts of the colonial empires, plus probably the Ottoman empire.

 

[stevep]

So the question then is what if Britain was willing to ally with Germany+Austria in the early 20th century instead of Russia and France? Might the world wars have been avoided and the British empire kept together?

If its possible to get such an alliance, which would mean Germany changes its path, then it could avoid or delay WWI but sooner or later the overseas colonial empires will go. Its probably too late for a federation of the white settled dominions and India is likely to lead the move towards independence of the non-white colonies. Hopefully without a massive amount of violence which would be highly destructive to all involved.

 

[sillygoose]

That depends. If a London-Berlin alliance happens - Would France and Russia ever get a feeling of being backed into a corner or a closing window of opportunity to as they weaken, leading them to strike out? Would the British or German-Austrians decide to start a world war, "for fun" against France & Russia to pick their empires apart, a world war that would probably be quicker and less costly than OTLs, but still more costly than anybody expects?

Given that Germany and Austria hadn't been aggressive toward Russia or France for no reason prior to the start of WW1 I don't know how they would feel that way, especially if Britain agrees to the 1900-01 alliance negotiations. The CPs didn't have any claims on Entente territory or colonies other than Italy against France...or against Austria. With Britain backing the CPs there would be no fear from France and Russia, so no need to start a war.

As far the possibility of a London Berlin alliance in the first place: Can London get over itself, and joint the Triple Alliance or Three Emperor's League on the same terms as everybody else? Or failing that, could Germany accept a special lopsided alliance on terms favorable to Britain, without feeling its being taken advantage of and set up for suffering as Britain's meat shield like Frederick the Great was in the 7 Years War? Failure to overcome those limitations prevented said alliance in OTL in addition to any concern about raw 'balance'.

The German side of the equation seems to have been the more problematic one; a large part of what torpedoed the negotiations (which went on for 3 years and was scuppered by a variety of things) was the misunderstandings created by the principle German and British negotiators who were extremely amateurish in their efforts:

View of The Anglo-German Alliance Talks and the Failure of Amateur Diplomacy

journals.library.ualberta.ca

The original 'sin' was the British negotiator being too direct and conveying British desperation for the alliance, which set the character of the negotiations and distorted how the offer was perceived by the Germans.
The German negotiator was vastly more to blame by effectively deceiving everyone, including his bosses, about what was actually going on. The entire bungled process was far more complicated than I had thought and the major sticking point was thinking they could ask the British to formally join the Triple Alliance, rather than understanding that Britain wasn't looking for all the obligations that would come with it, as they were more interested in a bi-lateral agreement with just Germany; Germany was meanwhile trying to allay Austrian fears of potential partitioning upon the death of FJ, which is why they wanted Britain to join the Triple alliance, though that would come with Britain being required to defend everyone in the alliance rather than just Germany and they were worried about getting sucked into a war with Russia as a result given the problems in Austria and the Balkans. Or Italy, which Britain didn't want to be bound to. Somehow too the negotiator also failed to convey that any alliance would protect the entire British empire, not just the British Isles. Understandably Britain considered the alliance offer to be a too high a price for what they would be getting.

Thus it seems that there was actually the opportunity for an alliance, but it would require different negotiators who wouldn't bungle things and accurately convoy what was going on so that so many miscommunications wouldn't happen.

It did seem likely in the early stages if communications had been more accurate that a bi-lateral deal could have been worked out and a defensive alliance between just Germany and Britain set that would have prevented WW1.

If its possible to get such an alliance, which would mean Germany changes its path, then it could avoid or delay WWI but sooner or later the overseas colonial empires will go. Its probably too late for a federation of the white settled dominions and India is likely to lead the move towards independence of the non-white colonies. Hopefully without a massive amount of violence which would be highly destructive to all involved.

From the above paper it would seem that Germany didn't need to change its path, just get a better negotiator. It would help too if the British one wasn't so direct and appearing desperate for a deal, which caused the Germans to demand more than Britain was willing to give. If those negotiation issues were worked out it would seem that an alliance was definitely achievable, as both sides were actually interested in a deal of some sort. The earlier in the process it was worked out the better, as then the fears of Austria wouldn't have been as developed and form a stumbling block to the negotiations.

Are you sure that India was on the independence path prior to WW1? I thought that was more the result of WW1, since that dramatically changed relations between the Indians and Britain. Not that Dominion status wasn't coming eventually, but that if the process was slower India likely would have been more closely tied to Britain and the empire.