peter Zeihan 2020

The problem with news out of china is that communists lie, and they lie a lot.

At each level from the smallest to the biggest units of government the officials there fudge the numbers to make themselves look better so even bejinng cant trust the numbers their getting. What we do know is that there are more men then women, that each generation is purposefully smaller then the next and that smog, mismanagement, and bunch of other crisis's are heading their way.

If a major famine hists the 750 million number might be entirely accurate.

75% of China's food supply is domestically sourced, and they are the 4th largest oil producer. Given they are in the process of building multiple pipelines with Russia, it seems like they're learning to counter a lot of these shortfalls.
 
No, Zeihan postulated that Mexico would end up being the barrier; and that is actually what has happened.


Interestingly enough, couldn't these migrants be a net boon for Mexico since they would be easier to assimilate there than they would be in the US? Less strain on welfare and whatnot, I mean. And extra human capital for Mexico.
 
75% of China's food supply is domestically sourced, and they are the 4th largest oil producer. Given they are in the process of building multiple pipelines with Russia, it seems like they're learning to counter a lot of these shortfalls.

Is their oil supply enough to counter Western sanctions? And do they have what it takes (infrastructure, et cetera) to mass produce synthetic fuels?

BTW, if China wanted a human capital increase, Vietnam is a more attractive target than Taiwan since Vietnam has 4-5 times as many people as Taiwan has. But of course Vietnam might also be harder to conquer. Depending on just how China's amphibious capabilities compare with its land-based capabilities.
 
75% of China's food supply is domestically sourced, and they are the 4th largest oil producer. Given they are in the process of building multiple pipelines with Russia, it seems like they're learning to counter a lot of these shortfalls.

Having 25% of your food imported is a pretty big deal, then you get into the fact that their agerculture requires a lot of imputes to make work and function. And while they do have oil they don't have enough to go around for everyone and are heavily dependent on the middle east.

Then you get into the oil coming in from Russia and well lets be honest you never want to rely on Russians for anything.
 
Is their oil supply enough to counter Western sanctions? And do they have what it takes (infrastructure, et cetera) to mass produce synthetic fuels?

BTW, if China wanted a human capital increase, Vietnam is a more attractive target than Taiwan since Vietnam has 4-5 times as many people as Taiwan has. But of course Vietnam might also be harder to conquer. Depending on just how China's amphibious capabilities compare with its land-based capabilities.

Energy imports as of 2014 according to the World Bank was 15%, given the Chinese turn to Russia, I'd say yes they could do it. Certainly recent reports out suggest Xi and the rest are bullish on it.

Having 25% of your food imported is a pretty big deal, then you get into the fact that their agerculture requires a lot of imputes to make work and function. And while they do have oil they don't have enough to go around for everyone and are heavily dependent on the middle east.

Then you get into the oil coming in from Russia and well lets be honest you never want to rely on Russians for anything.

25% is survivable, especially given the main Chinese staples are fine and they can turn to Russia for what they don't have, both in food and in inputs such as fertilizers. Power of Siberia I and II basically are China turning away from Middle East energy precisely because of these concerns.
 
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Interestingly enough, couldn't these migrants be a net boon for Mexico since they would be easier to assimilate there than they would be in the US? Less strain on welfare and whatnot, I mean. And extra human capital for Mexico.

Of note on Mexico, from his recent book I think:

CZgPQ1iZ_o.jpg
 
and that's with 60 years of the left purposefully trying to destroy the american family think of where we would be with out that fuckery.
 
and that's with 60 years of the left purposefully trying to destroy the american family think of where we would be with out that fuckery.

If the right was actually serious about reducing illegitimate births, then it would reform our child support laws to make child support for illegitimate children much harder to acquire without the unwilling parent's consent.
 
How did he do that?

Here's Balkan Insight talking about it, specifically, titled Helping Hungarians Have All the Babies They Want. Lyman Stone of IFS also did an article on the subject, which explains Orban's policies:

Starting around 2012, but really taking off in 2015 and 2016, women in Hungary started becoming more likely to get married. The marriage rates shown below reflect what share of unmarried women in a given age group the year prior got married in the last year. In most countries, this number is flat or falling, especially for younger women, as the average age of first marriage is pushed later and later. But in Hungary, the rise in the age of first marriage, which has been so inexorable in other countries, has actually stalled out and perhaps started to fall. The country is not just experiencing a fertility spike; Hungary is winding back the clock on much of the fertility and family-structure transition that demographers have long considered inevitable.​
This is true even on some unfortunate metrics: unmarried teen pregnancies have risen in Hungary in recent years, even as they have fallen in other countries. Marriage rates of teen women are rising as well, which may be good, or may reflect women being relegated to homemaker roles and kept out of the public sphere, perhaps against their desires.​
It’s hard to say exactly what may have driven this turnaround in marriage behaviors. Hungary was hard-hit by the Great Recession, and its GDP per capita took longer to recover to pre-recession levels than many other countries, so it probably is not due to an economic boom.​
However, in 2011, Hungary adopted a new, and extremely controversial, constitution. Criticized by many international organizations as consolidating too much power around the ruling party, the document was Hungary’s first democratically produced framework for governing. It includes statements such as, “We trust in a jointly-shaped future and the commitment of younger generations. We believe that our children and grandchildren will make Hungary great again,” and, “We hold that the family and the nation constitute the principal framework for our coexistence,” and “We bear responsibility for our descendants.” It also includes strong language committing the country to historic national heritage, Christian identity, and community values. Moreover, Article L of the constitution, which, again, is the basis of Hungarian government today, says,​
Hungary shall protect the institution of marriage as the union of a man and a woman… and the family as the basis of the nation’s survival. Hungary shall encourage the commitment to have children. The protection of families shall be regulated by a cardinal Act.​
These changes were largely a surprise to many Hungarians, who are not, according to public surveys, an extremely religious or family-oriented people; in fact, Hungary has the third highest religiously unaffiliated population share in central and eastern Europe. But while it may have been a surprise, once implemented, constitutions can be hard to undo. Whatever exact policy details may be, Hungarians have a durable commitment from their government to make sure that some kind of family support will always exist: it’s written in the constitution! Given the long-term nature of child-rearing, this guarantee may be very important and serve as a positive shock to the long-run family expectations of Hungarian women.​
It’s also possible that the proclamation of a constitution so directly aimed at ginning up national feeling, a sense of connectedness to heritage, and a promotion of the family has its own cultural effect. I’ve shown before that “cultural policies” can have large effects on childbearing and marriage: it’s possible that Hungary’s constitutional change is a kind of cultural signal to Hungarians, urging them to adopt somewhat different values.​
 
Here's Balkan Insight talking about it, specifically, titled Helping Hungarians Have All the Babies They Want. Lyman Stone of IFS also did an article on the subject, which explains Orban's policies:

Starting around 2012, but really taking off in 2015 and 2016, women in Hungary started becoming more likely to get married. The marriage rates shown below reflect what share of unmarried women in a given age group the year prior got married in the last year. In most countries, this number is flat or falling, especially for younger women, as the average age of first marriage is pushed later and later. But in Hungary, the rise in the age of first marriage, which has been so inexorable in other countries, has actually stalled out and perhaps started to fall. The country is not just experiencing a fertility spike; Hungary is winding back the clock on much of the fertility and family-structure transition that demographers have long considered inevitable.​
This is true even on some unfortunate metrics: unmarried teen pregnancies have risen in Hungary in recent years, even as they have fallen in other countries. Marriage rates of teen women are rising as well, which may be good, or may reflect women being relegated to homemaker roles and kept out of the public sphere, perhaps against their desires.​
It’s hard to say exactly what may have driven this turnaround in marriage behaviors. Hungary was hard-hit by the Great Recession, and its GDP per capita took longer to recover to pre-recession levels than many other countries, so it probably is not due to an economic boom.​
However, in 2011, Hungary adopted a new, and extremely controversial, constitution. Criticized by many international organizations as consolidating too much power around the ruling party, the document was Hungary’s first democratically produced framework for governing. It includes statements such as, “We trust in a jointly-shaped future and the commitment of younger generations. We believe that our children and grandchildren will make Hungary great again,” and, “We hold that the family and the nation constitute the principal framework for our coexistence,” and “We bear responsibility for our descendants.” It also includes strong language committing the country to historic national heritage, Christian identity, and community values. Moreover, Article L of the constitution, which, again, is the basis of Hungarian government today, says,​
Hungary shall protect the institution of marriage as the union of a man and a woman… and the family as the basis of the nation’s survival. Hungary shall encourage the commitment to have children. The protection of families shall be regulated by a cardinal Act.​
These changes were largely a surprise to many Hungarians, who are not, according to public surveys, an extremely religious or family-oriented people; in fact, Hungary has the third highest religiously unaffiliated population share in central and eastern Europe. But while it may have been a surprise, once implemented, constitutions can be hard to undo. Whatever exact policy details may be, Hungarians have a durable commitment from their government to make sure that some kind of family support will always exist: it’s written in the constitution! Given the long-term nature of child-rearing, this guarantee may be very important and serve as a positive shock to the long-run family expectations of Hungarian women.​
It’s also possible that the proclamation of a constitution so directly aimed at ginning up national feeling, a sense of connectedness to heritage, and a promotion of the family has its own cultural effect. I’ve shown before that “cultural policies” can have large effects on childbearing and marriage: it’s possible that Hungary’s constitutional change is a kind of cultural signal to Hungarians, urging them to adopt somewhat different values.​

Very interesting. I just wish that this constitution would have been more LGBTQ+inclusive while also encouraging them to procreate a lot.
 
This fits somewhat well with the publicly available numbers, yes.

I think that he's probably trying to make educated guesses about what the real numbers are, but then that's just a guess on my part.

Something else to keep in mind is that the lying isn't just going to be about current population levels. It's also going to be about birth rates, death rates, life expectancy, etc.

An easy example of how their numbers must involve lying, is that if the average deaths per year figure is 12 million, in a population of 1.4 billion? That means that their average life expectancy would need to be around 115 years, or rapidly heading in that direction, because that's how long it takes for 1.4 billion people to die at that rate. Given we know they have a collapsing demography, that just isn't really possible.

Eh, that's actually easy enough to explain by the massive population growth: If the population was 500 million in 1950, a 50 year life expectancy would suggest about 10 million dyeing per year, which is roughly in line with their numbers. You then have a tripling of their population between then and now. They're big baby boom was post great leap forward, roughly over the 60s till about 1980. That generation is about 400-500 million people, won't have its earliest generations "retiring" until 2025, and won't really die en mass until the 2040s.

Those dying now would be mostly those alive in the 1960s and earlier, which was "only" about 600-700 million. 10 million dying out of a population of that scale suggests an average life expectancy of that age cohort of about 70, which doesn't seem crazy out of line.
 
China is the fastest aging society on the planet if you want to set up colonies you use young men, who will be desperately needed at home.

Eh, in a theoretical famine situation, which is what you theorized, the opposite is the case. You were theorizing a famine that would kill roughly 500 million people. If you have that kind of deficit domestically, you need your young man going out to the food to feed themselves and send the surplus back. Your young man staying home and starving to death is the least optimal use of them.

Instead of 500 million starving, if say 100 million moved to the US as mere laborers making $1 dollar a day equivalent, that's 100 million saved from starvation. They make $5 an hour mini wage hard labor, working 2,500 hours, that's $1 trillion dollars in income. At, say $5,000 per person food expenses, quite high, but if were theorizing a famine, then they feed themselves and are able to send enough food back home to save another 100 million.

If the desperate need is more food, and for some reason they can't import more, then you want to put your best workers out to where they can 1) Not die, and 2) secure more food. Everyone would prefer grandma starves than the grandson. If grandma selling her house to pay for the grandchildren to leave, leaving grandma to starve on the street back home, that's what you do.

I'm pretty sure in the Irish famine, the scale of what your suggesting, it was not the 70 year old grandma's who moved to America.
 
If you can fix things to keep divorce-rape from happening, you'll probably see a lot more people getting married.

I actually see that one as more or less envitable.

I don't know if we will see it in our lifetimes but the current road is completely unsustainable.
 
Eh, in a theoretical famine situation, which is what you theorized, the opposite is the case. You were theorizing a famine that would kill roughly 500 million people. If you have that kind of deficit domestically, you need your young man going out to the food to feed themselves and send the surplus back. Your young man staying home and starving to death is the least optimal use of them.

Instead of 500 million starving, if say 100 million moved to the US as mere laborers making $1 dollar a day equivalent, that's 100 million saved from starvation. They make $5 an hour mini wage hard labor, working 2,500 hours, that's $1 trillion dollars in income. At, say $5,000 per person food expenses, quite high, but if were theorizing a famine, then they feed themselves and are able to send enough food back home to save another 100 million.

If the desperate need is more food, and for some reason they can't import more, then you want to put your best workers out to where they can 1) Not die, and 2) secure more food. Everyone would prefer grandma starves than the grandson. If grandma selling her house to pay for the grandchildren to leave, leaving grandma to starve on the street back home, that's what you do.

I'm pretty sure in the Irish famine, the scale of what your suggesting, it was not the 70 year old grandma's who moved to America.
However, any big starvation situation in China would necessarily have a huge background of idiotic political mandates, which would include not allowing such a shameful waste of manpower, not other seemingly simple solutions. After all, it's CCP we are talking about.
After all, in totally theoretical famine situation, China, as a middle income, industrial country, can simply sell random stuff to import food even more efficiently than sending away young men. For actual famine to happen, massive political upheaval of one sort or another is needed.
The calculation you have presented applies much more to poor, agriculture heavy countries. If their agriculture fails for whatever reason, well, they are stuck without their main export, so good luck buying much food and logistics to get it home.
 
However, any big starvation situation in China would necessarily have a huge background of idiotic political mandates, which would include not allowing such a shameful waste of manpower, not other seemingly simple solutions. After all, it's CCP we are talking about.
After all, in totally theoretical famine situation, China, as a middle income, industrial country, can simply sell random stuff to import food even more efficiently than sending away young men. For actual famine to happen, massive political upheaval of one sort or another is needed.
The calculation you have presented applies much more to poor, agriculture heavy countries. If their agriculture fails for whatever reason, well, they are stuck without their main export, so good luck buying much food and logistics to get it home.

This is why I don't find a famine, especially on the scale implied, particularly likely. They will starve Africa first, and have the resources to do it. There's apparently 400,000 chinese in South Africa already, and depending how their placed can work to prioritize export vs domestic consumption. And of course there are a lot of Chinese in Canada, about 5% of the population at 1.8 million. In crisis, the pre-existing populations and connections makes surging more as necesary comparatively easy.

And in the case of political upeaval, well, middle income means you can afford to leave, and there's extensive overseas chinese populations to facilitate it. If dirt poor vietnamese had roughly 1 million boat people flee, the number of Chinese who can leave would be much higher.
 

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