Without hindsight, was the Russian decision in 1914 to go to war the right one?

WolfBear

Well-known member
Without hindsight, was the Russian decision in 1914 to go to war the right one? With hindsight, you obviously know my view, but without hindsight, the question is much more interesting. I mean, Serbia wasn't worth all that much to Russia in and of itself, but if there is to be a Great Power confrontation, wouldn't it be prudent for Russia to fight it while it still has both France and Britain at its side and while neither France nor Britain is actually distracted by anything else? (World War I put a temporary freeze to the escalating situation in Ireland for Britain, after all. A more heated Ireland would have meant less British and/or British Empire troops at disposal for Europe.) And British entry into the war could subsequently eventually bring the Americans into the war. If Russia were not to risk war in 1914 but instead wait until later, then it would lose Serbia as an ally and could possibly lose Britain and the US as allies; would Russia itself being stronger due to the completion of Russia's Great Military Program actually be sufficient compensation for this? On the flip side, though, Russia itself had very little to gain in a European war, even without hindsight, so this does raise the incentive for Russia to maintain peace at almost any cost.

Anyway, what do you think?
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
Going to war in 1914 is still a gamble, and not a strictly necessary one, but, for the reasons you cite, it is a gamble with much better odds than Russia has seen in years, and than Russia may see again in the future.

The generally known outlines of the military plans of the time show the relative upsides of a war then versus other circumstances. Russia's enemies, Austria and Germany, are concentrating their initial blows not at Russia, but instead at Serbia and France, keeping the two of them "honest" as Russian allies while allowing Russia to start the war unscathed and to potentially make early gains. Germany's France-first approach only strengthens the odds of having Britain participate against Germany (and possibly Turkey) as Russia's ally.
 

stevep

Well-known member
Going to war in 1914 is still a gamble, and not a strictly necessary one, but, for the reasons you cite, it is a gamble with much better odds than Russia has seen in years, and than Russia may see again in the future.

The generally known outlines of the military plans of the time show the relative upsides of a war then versus other circumstances. Russia's enemies, Austria and Germany, are concentrating their initial blows not at Russia, but instead at Serbia and France, keeping the two of them "honest" as Russian allies while allowing Russia to start the war unscathed and to potentially make early gains. Germany's France-first approach only strengthens the odds of having Britain participate against Germany (and possibly Turkey) as Russia's ally.

I would agree plus also with Bulgaria alienated after the Balkan wars and Greece now with a pro-German monarch Serbia [along with the much smaller Montenegro possibly] was their last ally in the region. Romania while many had designs on Transylvania they had a German monarch and also interests in Russian Bessarabia.

Also I think the Russians were still distrustful and angry after they had been double crossed by Vienna after the latter's annexation of Bosnia-HZ in 1908 - having agreed with the Austrians that they would in turn get some territory - forget which area - see Bosnian Crisis for details - this also angered Serbia which had claims on the region. Relations between Austria and both Russia and Serbia were poisoned by what they considered a betrayal.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
Going to war in 1914 is still a gamble, and not a strictly necessary one, but, for the reasons you cite, it is a gamble with much better odds than Russia has seen in years, and than Russia may see again in the future.

The generally known outlines of the military plans of the time show the relative upsides of a war then versus other circumstances. Russia's enemies, Austria and Germany, are concentrating their initial blows not at Russia, but instead at Serbia and France, keeping the two of them "honest" as Russian allies while allowing Russia to start the war unscathed and to potentially make early gains. Germany's France-first approach only strengthens the odds of having Britain participate against Germany (and possibly Turkey) as Russia's ally.

Yeah, IMHO, the Great Military Program and strategic railway construction were risky endeavors for Russia. On the one hand, they would have made Russia stronger, but on the other hand, they would have likely made British and thus US support in any future Great War less likely since they would have made a German invasion of Belgium less likely since a France-first strategy would have become much more risky for Germany in such a scenario.

A France-first approach did carry the risk that France would quickly fall. This didn't happen in 1914 but did, in fact, happen later on, specifically in 1940. But if France holds out, the addition of Britain and later on possibly the US into the war would be a huge benefit for Russia--if Russia could actually hold out until then, that is. As for Serbia and France bearing the brunt of Germany's initial blows, interestingly enough, I wonder if Russia would have been better off bearing the brunt of Germany's initial blows itself since that way the Tannenberg disaster would have been avoided. But that's only if Britain still enters the war, which as I said is far from guaranteed without a German invasion of Belgium.

As a side note, this isn't all that relevant here, but I find it sad that Tsarist Russia was not able to conduct another census after 1897. It planned another census for December 1915 but it got cancelled due to World War I and was never rescheduled before Russia descended into revolution. Russia's next full census was only held in December 1926. It's similar to the situation in Ukraine right now. Ukraine held its last census in 2001, was planning to hold another census in 2023, but the current war tragically got in the way of this. :(
 

Atarlost

Well-known member
If Russia were not to risk war in 1914 but instead wait until later, then it would lose Serbia as an ally and could possibly lose Britain and the US as allies; would Russia itself being stronger due to the completion of Russia's Great Military Program actually be sufficient compensation for this?

Ah, but including that in the calculations would violate the no foresight rule.

The Triple Entente isn't actually an alliance, just a set of agreements not to step on each others spheres of influence. Russia must make its decisions as if it is alone because it can't be certain that Germany will pursue a France first strategy or that it will roll through Belgium if it does and without that the UK doesn't have an excuse and even France, being a republic, may have a hard time justifying a prolonged commitment. There's no way the US can be expected to get involved on Russia's side.

On the other hand, the Triple Alliance is an actual alliance. Russia has to assume that Italy will uphold its treaty commitments and pile on as well for what it's worth, which if France or Britain are considering whether to attack Germany or not is a lot. The UK has 22 Dreadnoughts in 1914. Germany, Italy, and the AHE combined have 21 and the Brits have no confidence in the French Navy. This is not sufficient superiority to inspire confidence. This is a fight where even if they win they probably get dropped to below the USA's numbers. And France doesn't want a southern front against Italy or Italy casually demolishing its navy and cutting off its colonies if the UK decides to sit this one out.

Meanwhile, Serbia has by supporting the assassination of a crown prince provided every monarch with a vested interest in not having his son murdered with a perfect excuse to throw it under the bus. Russia's interest in Serbia is a vanity project without real value anyways. Protector of Orthodox Christianity is a title that only has meaning if most Orthodox Christians outside your actual kingdom agree and the larger Balkan states don't.

The answer is, thus, no.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
Ah, but including that in the calculations would violate the no foresight rule.

It is hindsight that is banned, not foresight.

Your post works at one level or layer comparing the Triple Alliance versus the non-Alliance Entente. I also agree there would be *no way* for Russia to anticipate or have reasonable foresight of likely American entry on its side.

But, besides the bare bones Triple Entente over colonial spheres, subsequent political, military, and naval agreements, conventions, and staff talks between the Russians, French, and British created a reasonable basis for the Russians to estimate a high likelihood of having France and Britain fighting on their side in 1914. And between Russia and France, there was a genuine, binding, dual alliance. Britain's moral commitments to protect the French channel coast (due to Anglo-French naval agreements to shift forces between the Atlantic and Mediterranean) were understood in Russia. Many on all sides projected Belgian neutrality would be violated. As for Italy's position, there were plenty of clues it would not be a loyal Triple Alliance member - its vocal dissatisfaction over the Bosnia crisis, its own side treaty of Racconigni with Russia to preserve the Balkan status quo or coordinate any changes with Russia, and the fact that Austria starting the war left Italy with a legal escape clause. As I noted, the French had an actual alliance with the Russians, and the French and Russians had an agreement to both mobilize and attack within a certain number of days with a certain number of troops against Germany after a declaration of war. Plus, President Poincare made it quite explicit in his 1914 visit, that in contrast to 1912-1913, that France's commitment to support Russia applied not only to cases of direct Triple Alliance attack on the Russian homeland, but in cases of Russian involvement in war over its Balkan interests.
So, the "bet" on the participation of Russia's initial European allies was not all that reckless a projection.

In a way, although the Triple Alliance was the longer-lasting, more legally binding, alliance than the pile of agreements that constituted the Triple Entente, it was the latter which by 1914 had involved much more joint, detailed planning on the conduct of military campaigns and handling specific military problems and priorities.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
It is hindsight that is banned, not foresight.

Your post works at one level or layer comparing the Triple Alliance versus the non-Alliance Entente. I also agree there would be *no way* for Russia to anticipate or have reasonable foresight of likely American entry on its side.

But, besides the bare bones Triple Entente over colonial spheres, subsequent political, military, and naval agreements, conventions, and staff talks between the Russians, French, and British created a reasonable basis for the Russians to estimate a high likelihood of having France and Britain fighting on their side in 1914. And between Russia and France, there was a genuine, binding, dual alliance. Britain's moral commitments to protect the French channel coast (due to Anglo-French naval agreements to shift forces between the Atlantic and Mediterranean) were understood in Russia. Many on all sides projected Belgian neutrality would be violated. As for Italy's position, there were plenty of clues it would not be a loyal Triple Alliance member - its vocal dissatisfaction over the Bosnia crisis, its own side treaty of Racconigni with Russia to preserve the Balkan status quo or coordinate any changes with Russia, and the fact that Austria starting the war left Italy with a legal escape clause. As I noted, the French had an actual alliance with the Russians, and the French and Russians had an agreement to both mobilize and attack within a certain number of days with a certain number of troops against Germany after a declaration of war. Plus, President Poincare made it quite explicit in his 1914 visit, that in contrast to 1912-1913, that France's commitment to support Russia applied not only to cases of direct Triple Alliance attack on the Russian homeland, but in cases of Russian involvement in war over its Balkan interests.
So, the "bet" on the participation of Russia's initial European allies was not all that reckless a projection.

In a way, although the Triple Alliance was the longer-lasting, more legally binding, alliance than the pile of agreements that constituted the Triple Entente, it was the latter which by 1914 had involved much more joint, detailed planning on the conduct of military campaigns and handling specific military problems and priorities.

Excellent analysis, Rob!

Also, was it reasonable foreseeable in 1914 that Britain might be less capable and/or less willing to help in a future European war? I know that the Irish situation was already heating up on the eve of World War I, and I also know that Russia wanted to renegotiate its 1907 Convention with Britain in 1915. I also know that British diplomats were not optimistic about the chances of a successful 1915 renegotiation of this convention before WWI, but I don't know about Russian diplomats.
 

stevep

Well-known member
Ah, but including that in the calculations would violate the no foresight rule.

The Triple Entente isn't actually an alliance, just a set of agreements not to step on each others spheres of influence. Russia must make its decisions as if it is alone because it can't be certain that Germany will pursue a France first strategy or that it will roll through Belgium if it does and without that the UK doesn't have an excuse and even France, being a republic, may have a hard time justifying a prolonged commitment. There's no way the US can be expected to get involved on Russia's side.

On the other hand, the Triple Alliance is an actual alliance. Russia has to assume that Italy will uphold its treaty commitments and pile on as well for what it's worth, which if France or Britain are considering whether to attack Germany or not is a lot. The UK has 22 Dreadnoughts in 1914. Germany, Italy, and the AHE combined have 21 and the Brits have no confidence in the French Navy. This is not sufficient superiority to inspire confidence. This is a fight where even if they win they probably get dropped to below the USA's numbers. And France doesn't want a southern front against Italy or Italy casually demolishing its navy and cutting off its colonies if the UK decides to sit this one out.

Meanwhile, Serbia has by supporting the assassination of a crown prince provided every monarch with a vested interest in not having his son murdered with a perfect excuse to throw it under the bus. Russia's interest in Serbia is a vanity project without real value anyways. Protector of Orthodox Christianity is a title that only has meaning if most Orthodox Christians outside your actual kingdom agree and the larger Balkan states don't.

The answer is, thus, no.

Some good points here but I think it was fairly well known by at least the military's of both sides that Germany would enter any great was with an invasion of France via Belgium. What wasn't known was the sheer size of it and how far north the right wing would go - although that was less than what elements of the German military wanted as they wished to occupy at least a southern part of the Netherlands as well.

Also elements in Serbia were involved in the assassination including at least one medium ranked figure in the army but it was very much an amateur affair with no clear links to the Serbia government, which was itself a monarchy remember.

Furthermore the railway projects were a risk in a way because they might take pressure off France if Germany concentrated on Russia as a result. However it was also a risk not to do that given what was known about German plans. While it could be - and has been - argued that the German attack was doomed to fail for logistical reasons among others this wasn't known at the time and Germany had a powerful and very well regarded army. Not having the ability to support France quickly and having it knocked out of the war within possibly a couple of months would be a far worse threat then having the bulk of the German army heading east since Russia would then be on the defensive with the ability to give up a lot of ground for time and Germany would still have to keep substantial forces in the west against France.
 

Atarlost

Well-known member
Some good points here but I think it was fairly well known by at least the military's of both sides that Germany would enter any great was with an invasion of France via Belgium.

That assumes Germany is going to be stupid. In hindsight it was an accurate assumption, but without hindsight that's not something to gamble your national future on. Every nation should strive to mislead potential enemies as to their military plans so what is well known is actually suspect by reason of being well known. There's a confidence ceiling for this sort of thing and it's just not high enough to stake national survival on Germany blundering into a war with the UK. If the Germans were clever they could deploy facing France and Belgium and have the Belgium facing army not move while the France facing army fell back and then hit the resulting French salient from the north, or hold on the French border and shift the forces facing Belgium east by rail to form the second wave of an offensive against Russia.

Also elements in Serbia were involved in the assassination including at least one medium ranked figure in the army but it was very much an amateur affair with no clear links to the Serbia government, which was itself a monarchy remember.

Serbia being a monarchy doesn't mean it's okay for them to undermine the unwritten rule that protects royal families, it just makes them particularly stupid to do so. If the AHE trusted Serbia to investigate itself their ultimatum would not have included a demand that AHE forces conduct the investigation. The one element of the ultimatum Serbia rejected was the one absolutely just demand. An acceptable investigation couldn't be conducted by the accused, couldn't be conducted by the allies of the accused or geopolitical enemies of the victim, couldn't be conducted by a republic with strong anti-monarchist leanings (eg. the US), and couldn't be conducted by anyone without modern investigative apparatus.

Refusing the key element of the ultimatum instead of making a counter-offer that at least tried to address the AHE's legitimate concerns like eg. asking the Swiss to investigate as a neutral party looks enough like an admission of guilt to justify Russia not protecting Serbia. Russia could also get out by being the one to suggest the Swiss as a neutral investigator but that's another form of throwing Serbia under the bus.

There's no presumption of innocence for Serbia. Russia doesn't have that and I don't think the AHE does either and if Serbia itself does it doesn't matter because they aren't sovereign enough to defend their own borders without Russian aid. They have to prove not merely that the government didn't commit the assassination but that it didn't allow it through willful negligence. And allowing it through non-willful negligence would also cast enough doubt on their sovereignty that it would be easy for one of or more of their neighbors who are willing to put up with more ethnically Serbian citizens to justify annexing or partitioning them for the safety of the neighborhood.
 

Agent23

Ни шагу назад!


It is gonna be a very interesting winter, especially with all the various refugees from all over the globe pouring into Europe after the huge inflation, lack of fertilizers and other events.
 

stevep

Well-known member
That assumes Germany is going to be stupid. In hindsight it was an accurate assumption, but without hindsight that's not something to gamble your national future on. Every nation should strive to mislead potential enemies as to their military plans so what is well known is actually suspect by reason of being well known. There's a confidence ceiling for this sort of thing and it's just not high enough to stake national survival on Germany blundering into a war with the UK. If the Germans were clever they could deploy facing France and Belgium and have the Belgium facing army not move while the France facing army fell back and then hit the resulting French salient from the north, or hold on the French border and shift the forces facing Belgium east by rail to form the second wave of an offensive against Russia.

The problem was German leadership was that stupid in the decades immediately preceding the war. Wilhelm dropped friendship with Russia then threatened the UK forming the alliance that ultimately took them down. The army tied itself to offensive warfare and especially an attack into France because they were wedded to the idea of a quick decisive victory and understood that couldn't occur quickly against Russia. To the point where when Wilhelm asked whether there was an alternative to invading Belgium he was reported told no it was impossible to change the plan. German 'diplomacy' was riddled with such errors both before and during the war. As such its going to take a hell of a lot of change to make Germany drop its planned attack on France.

Serbia being a monarchy doesn't mean it's okay for them to undermine the unwritten rule that protects royal families, it just makes them particularly stupid to do so. If the AHE trusted Serbia to investigate itself their ultimatum would not have included a demand that AHE forces conduct the investigation. The one element of the ultimatum Serbia rejected was the one absolutely just demand. An acceptable investigation couldn't be conducted by the accused, couldn't be conducted by the allies of the accused or geopolitical enemies of the victim, couldn't be conducted by a republic with strong anti-monarchist leanings (eg. the US), and couldn't be conducted by anyone without modern investigative apparatus.

Refusing the key element of the ultimatum instead of making a counter-offer that at least tried to address the AHE's legitimate concerns like eg. asking the Swiss to investigate as a neutral party looks enough like an admission of guilt to justify Russia not protecting Serbia. Russia could also get out by being the one to suggest the Swiss as a neutral investigator but that's another form of throwing Serbia under the bus.

There's no presumption of innocence for Serbia. Russia doesn't have that and I don't think the AHE does either and if Serbia itself does it doesn't matter because they aren't sovereign enough to defend their own borders without Russian aid. They have to prove not merely that the government didn't commit the assassination but that it didn't allow it through willful negligence. And allowing it through non-willful negligence would also cast enough doubt on their sovereignty that it would be easy for one of or more of their neighbors who are willing to put up with more ethnically Serbian citizens to justify annexing or partitioning them for the safety of the neighborhood.

The problem is your missing most of what I said. While there was hostility between the two nations and with some good reason on the Serbian side there is no evidence that the Serbian monarchy knew, let alone supported the assassination attempt - which is supported by how make-shift it was. You can't have one nation making wild allegations that the state was responsible and insisting on what was basically an unconditional surrender by it without a lot more evidence that Vienna had. By the same basis the US had at least as much right to claim to occupy Saudi Arabia after the 2001 attack on the twin towers.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
That assumes Germany is going to be stupid. In hindsight it was an accurate assumption, but without hindsight that's not something to gamble your national future on. Every nation should strive to mislead potential enemies as to their military plans so what is well known is actually suspect by reason of being well known. There's a confidence ceiling for this sort of thing and it's just not high enough to stake national survival on Germany blundering into a war with the UK. If the Germans were clever they could deploy facing France and Belgium and have the Belgium facing army not move while the France facing army fell back and then hit the resulting French salient from the north, or hold on the French border and shift the forces facing Belgium east by rail to form the second wave of an offensive against Russia.



Serbia being a monarchy doesn't mean it's okay for them to undermine the unwritten rule that protects royal families, it just makes them particularly stupid to do so. If the AHE trusted Serbia to investigate itself their ultimatum would not have included a demand that AHE forces conduct the investigation. The one element of the ultimatum Serbia rejected was the one absolutely just demand. An acceptable investigation couldn't be conducted by the accused, couldn't be conducted by the allies of the accused or geopolitical enemies of the victim, couldn't be conducted by a republic with strong anti-monarchist leanings (eg. the US), and couldn't be conducted by anyone without modern investigative apparatus.

Refusing the key element of the ultimatum instead of making a counter-offer that at least tried to address the AHE's legitimate concerns like eg. asking the Swiss to investigate as a neutral party looks enough like an admission of guilt to justify Russia not protecting Serbia. Russia could also get out by being the one to suggest the Swiss as a neutral investigator but that's another form of throwing Serbia under the bus.

There's no presumption of innocence for Serbia. Russia doesn't have that and I don't think the AHE does either and if Serbia itself does it doesn't matter because they aren't sovereign enough to defend their own borders without Russian aid. They have to prove not merely that the government didn't commit the assassination but that it didn't allow it through willful negligence. And allowing it through non-willful negligence would also cast enough doubt on their sovereignty that it would be easy for one of or more of their neighbors who are willing to put up with more ethnically Serbian citizens to justify annexing or partitioning them for the safety of the neighborhood.

Nicholas II did offer to submit the Austro-Serbian dispute over to the Hague during the July Crisis. Would that have been a sufficiently good alternative to a Swiss investigation of this?

The problem was German leadership was that stupid in the decades immediately preceding the war. Wilhelm dropped friendship with Russia then threatened the UK forming the alliance that ultimately took them down. The army tied itself to offensive warfare and especially an attack into France because they were wedded to the idea of a quick decisive victory and understood that couldn't occur quickly against Russia. To the point where when Wilhelm asked whether there was an alternative to invading Belgium he was reported told no it was impossible to change the plan. German 'diplomacy' was riddled with such errors both before and during the war. As such its going to take a hell of a lot of change to make Germany drop its planned attack on France.

To be fair to Kaiser Bill, though, he also secured an additional ally for Germany in the form of the Ottoman Empire. But Yeah, pissing off BOTH Russia AND Britain was a mistake. One can be pissed off, but not both. It's good to have at least one of them as a German ally. If Russia would have been a German ally, then the two of them would have jointly dominated Europe, and if Britain would have been a German ally, then Germany would have dominated most of continental Europe while Britain would have dominated the seas and we would have thus now had an Germanic Supremacy meme! ;)

The problem is your missing most of what I said. While there was hostility between the two nations and with some good reason on the Serbian side there is no evidence that the Serbian monarchy knew, let alone supported the assassination attempt - which is supported by how make-shift it was. You can't have one nation making wild allegations that the state was responsible and insisting on what was basically an unconditional surrender by it without a lot more evidence that Vienna had. By the same basis the US had at least as much right to claim to occupy Saudi Arabia after the 2001 attack on the twin towers.

*You're missing (not "your missing"). No offense, but typos are my pet peeves, especially when they're obvious. You're instead of your and they're instead of their (or vice versa).

BTW, interestingly enough, the Serbian government subsequently executed Apis in 1917. I wonder if that would have still occurred in the absence of World War I.

Apis was a Serbian government official but AFAIK he was acting on his own initiative, not at the initiative of the official Serbian government. In contrast to the Afghan Taliban, I think, which made a formal decision to allow al-Qaeda to set up bases in Afghanistan, if I recall correctly. So, your analogy with Saudi Arabia is probably spot-on, Steve.
 

ATP

Well-known member


It is gonna be a very interesting winter, especially with all the various refugees from all over the globe pouring into Europe after the huge inflation, lack of fertilizers and other events.


And how it is important for tsar Nicky in 1914?
Who should wait till russian ammo factory was finished/1916/ and start war under any pretext after that.I bet,that germans would deliver a lot of them.

P.SFor your information - Kharkow counteroffensive arleady win without those Stingers.
 

Atarlost

Well-known member
The problem was German leadership was that stupid in the decades immediately preceding the war. Wilhelm dropped friendship with Russia then threatened the UK forming the alliance that ultimately took them down. The army tied itself to offensive warfare and especially an attack into France because they were wedded to the idea of a quick decisive victory and understood that couldn't occur quickly against Russia. To the point where when Wilhelm asked whether there was an alternative to invading Belgium he was reported told no it was impossible to change the plan. German 'diplomacy' was riddled with such errors both before and during the war. As such its going to take a hell of a lot of change to make Germany drop its planned attack on France.
You're using hindsight. Again. Wilhelm being stupid is not indicative of the general staff being stupid and the general staff only proves that the stupid plan was the real plan after the war starts. The general staff's job is to prepare to win wars and part of that is misleading potential enemies about their capabilities and intentions.

The problem is your missing most of what I said. While there was hostility between the two nations and with some good reason on the Serbian side there is no evidence that the Serbian monarchy knew, let alone supported the assassination attempt - which is supported by how make-shift it was.
And you are persistently ignoring that all that is needed is an excuse. It does not matter one iota if the Serbian government is actually responsible, only that the Russians can construct an excuse to throw them under the bus without endangering their alliance with France. There is no way to avoid or significantly delay war without throwing Serbia under the bus, and Russia is not prepared for war and the allies you claim they might lose with time are none of them actually allies.

Nicholas II did offer to submit the Austro-Serbian dispute over to the Hague during the July Crisis. Would that have been a sufficiently good alternative to a Swiss investigation of this?
It's a start, but unless the Hague eventually concludes that Serbian involvement must be investigated by an outside force it just kicks the can down the road, and most importantly, Russia must not demonstrate bad faith by mobilizing. It doesn't have to be the Swiss. It could be any credible European neutral that doesn't want to permanently occupy Serbia. I think Switzerland is the most credible neutral, but if I were in Franz Joseph's place I'd consider the Belgians another viable compromise if the starting point was the assumption that the Serbian government must be investigated by a non-Serbian government outside Serbia's alliance network.

Apis was a Serbian government official but AFAIK he was acting on his own initiative, not at the initiative of the official Serbian government. In contrast to the Afghan Taliban, I think, which made a formal decision to allow al-Qaeda to set up bases in Afghanistan, if I recall correctly. So, your analogy with Saudi Arabia is probably spot-on, Steve.

No it isn't. The correct comparison is the 1916 Punitive Expedition into Mexico. Mexico could not keep its anarchy contained and one of the warlords conducted an act of war against the United States. Mexico in 1916 was functionally not a sovereign nation because it was incapable of performing the basic obligations of sovereignty. Serbia could not keep its domestic terrorists contained and one of them conducted an act of war against the AHE. Serbia in 1914 was functionally not a sovereign nation either for the same reason. And that's the most generous interpretation. Considering that the Black Hand and Narodna Odbrana are effectively merged and the positions some of the latter's members held it looks a lot more like a deniable asset. Even if the government didn't order the assassination, it supported the organization that carried it out at least unofficially. Stepan Stepanovic was deeply involved in Narodna Odbrana. He was also recently the minister of war. If you believe that Wikipedia correctly cites a Serbian BBC article and that the BBC is credible, then crown prince Alexander I was a financial contributor to the Black Hand. In 1914 some of this may not be known, but it's a known unknown. That's why an investigation is needed.
 

ATP

Well-known member
Russia in 1915 fought almost without ammo,becouse they used stockpiles and ammo production was not enough.
But - they built many factories,which would be open in 1916 which let them fight normal war.
So - just wait till 1917.Even if it mean throwing serbs under bus.
 

stevep

Well-known member
You're using hindsight. Again. Wilhelm being stupid is not indicative of the general staff being stupid and the general staff only proves that the stupid plan was the real plan after the war starts. The general staff's job is to prepare to win wars and part of that is misleading potential enemies about their capabilities and intentions.

Did you actually read what I wrote? Its not a question of hindsight at all but simple common sense. Relying on threatening virtually all your neighbours with military attacks is not an intelligent approach to providing security for your country. That Wilhelm himself was stupid doesn't make the army's [mis-]leadership any less stupid. The problem was nothing to do with seeking to deceive potential enemies but making so many potential enemies actual ones.

And you are persistently ignoring that all that is needed is an excuse. It does not matter one iota if the Serbian government is actually responsible, only that the Russians can construct an excuse to throw them under the bus without endangering their alliance with France. There is no way to avoid or significantly delay war without throwing Serbia under the bus, and Russia is not prepared for war and the allies you claim they might lose with time are none of them actually allies.

No I wasn't ignoring anything. I was missing the point that you were suggesting that Russia should conclude that with the CPs intent on attacking an [admitted minor] ally regardless of the facts and that therefore dumping that ally was the best approach. Which - using hindsight would probably have been a better choice but would have had dangerous as I mentioned. France is definitely an ally at this point.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
Exactly this, as the course of action ultimately proved Stolypin prophetic in his desire for 20 more years of peace.



What would've been the ultimate fate of Russia, had she not went down this abyss?



What I'm intrigued by is the willingness of Russian soldiers to succumb to defeatism after the US had already entered World War I. There were also some mutinies elsewhere in 1917, such as in France, but nowhere near Russia's levels. Interestingly enough, by Anatoly Karlin's own criteria, this might mean that World War I Russia was a loser country, starting a war that it was unable to fight to the finish even though it was perfectly capable of doing this after the US had already entered the war.
 

Cherico

Well-known member
Exactly this, as the course of action ultimately proved Stolypin prophetic in his desire for 20 more years of peace.



What would've been the ultimate fate of Russia, had she not went down this abyss?



if Russia hadn't litterally destroyed their country no their civilization with communism they would have been the great power of the 20th century and it would have been a sustainable power. They could very well be the power that would have dominated the west instead of the united states as in our time line.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Top