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What If? WI Stalin from August 1938 SI's into himself in January 1926

raharris1973

Well-known member
What if Stalin's mind, from August 1938, self-inserts, into his mind and body of January 1926?

Stalin, as of August 1938, has multiple achievements under his belt, and multiple concerns. He has rapidly constructed Socialism by implementing two Five-Year plans of collectivization and heavy industrialization and military build-up.

Unfortunately, class conflict has intensified, not lessened, with the construction of socialism, it's been necessary to purge the party and even the military with the discovery of bourgeois-Trotskyist-Fascist wreckers aligned outside Fascist powers like Germany and Japan found in the most unlikely of places. Comrade Yezhov is uprooting wreckers and traitors everywhere, and comrades who'd long been seen as coming around to the right line or even had sterling ideological pedigrees were confessing involvement in all sorts of traitorous designs.

The international environment was no less threatening. Stalin was using Soviet and international "volunteers" to support the Spanish Republic's war effort and try to corral its loose factions to resist and overcome Italian and German backed Spanish right-wing Nationalists. The Hitler regime was unremittingly anti-Soviet, had swallowed Austria whole without firing a shot in March 1938, and since May had been threatening Czechoslovakia, the only Central European state that the USSR had primarily positive relations with.

In Asia, Japanese forces were clashing with Soviet forces along Lake Khasan around the Soviet-Korean-Manchurian border. Japan was also engaged in a brutal war of conquest against China, and the Soviet Union, while limiting its direct combat involvement, was supplying the Chinese United Front of Nationalists and Communists with arms, advisors, financing, and volunteers pilots in its fight against Japan.

Foreknowledge of all these achievements, policies, and dangers is there in Stalin's consciousness as it goes back in time to January 1926.

In January 1926, the Soviet Union is still using the New Economic Policy, a partial retreat to capitalism, to finish recovery from WWI, the Civil War and famine year. It has reached a good stride and gotten a long way to recovering output to 1913 levels, but it is getting difficult to motivate the agriculture sector to produce more for the urban working class, and urban enterprises are not producing much that agricultural producers are interested, or that builds the industrial capital base of the country. Internationally, Moscow controls foreign Communist parties through the COMINTERN, but attempts at revolution throughout European countries have been a bust. Japan in 1925 vacated northern Sakhalin, returning it to Soviet sovereign control, and resuming trade. Relations with Britain, earlier reestablished, had been broken in the aftermath of the Zinoviev letter affair. The USSR at this moment had no diplomatic relations with the United States, but decent diplomatic relations with Weimar Germany and secret military cooperation.

In China, the USSR and COMINTERN was putting its primary support behind the Guomindang-Communist Party United Front based in the far southern city of Guangzhou in Guangdong province (also allied ideologically with Guangxi landlords) and the parties had chapters in other Chinese cities. The USSR also had some ties to other Chinese warlords like the northwestern "Christian General" Feng Hsu-Yiang.

Stalin, "Comrade card-file" at this time was supporting the NEP policy against Left Communist challenges.

How does Stalin proceed, now that he has foreknowledge of the next dozen years and all its desired and undesired elements?

For example, does he end the NEP a year or two early and corresponding launch the 5 year planning and collectivization processes earlier? The temptation to do so is to speed up capital development. The potential disadvantage in doing so is that the imported western expertise and machinery he used for much of OTL's first 5 year plan will not be as cheap on the world market if he starts earlier, in prosperous years like 1926 or 1927.

Likewise, is Collectivization run any smarter, better, less wastefully? Not necessarily out of any kind-heartedness but out of practical efficiency. Perhaps ways are found to deceive more people into selling their livestock for scrip of perceived value, or state cattle rustling before slaughter is more efficient? Perhaps emergency food distribution is better prepared, and certainly weather conditions.

On a very ugly side, the combined 1938/1926 Stalin will now be seeing or hearing about daily hundreds of people he came to regard as traitors, so he'll instinctively want to speed these people's demise. But in 1926, he doesn't have absolute power to make this happened, and if he moves too fast or crudely, he risks a counter-reaction that jeopardizes himself.

In world affairs, he knows that things are ready to go from seemingly promising to bad to worse over the next five years in East Asia, with Chiang Kai-shek screwing over and then massacring the Chinese Communist Party in 1926-1927, Zhang Xueliang challenging the Soviet hold on the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929, and then the Japanese military going batshit insane aggressive on the Asian mainland from 1931 onward. How might Stalin try to act to head off any or all of these negative developments.

In Europe, he knows the Depression is coming, but that it turned out to be a threat, driving the rise of Nazi Germany and spread of Fascism, not an opportunity for Communism. What will he do to discourage and or prepare for the rise of Hitler? To head off the Spanish coup and Civil War? Etc.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
Re: Hitler: He might tell the German Communists to form a broad-based German coalition government with the Social Democrats and others that excludes the Nazis. But whether Paul von Hindenburg would actually be willing to accept such a government in place of appointing Hitler as Chancellor is an open question. He could, of course, make this option a bit more palatable to Hitler by having it be a minority government, with the German Communists supporting this government from the outside. That way, there is less risk of German Communists causing trouble later on.
 

ATP

Well-known member
Re: Hitler: He might tell the German Communists to form a broad-based German coalition government with the Social Democrats and others that excludes the Nazis. But whether Paul von Hindenburg would actually be willing to accept such a government in place of appointing Hitler as Chancellor is an open question. He could, of course, make this option a bit more palatable to Hitler by having it be a minority government, with the German Communists supporting this government from the outside. That way, there is less risk of German Communists causing trouble later on.

Nope.Sralin supported Hitler,becouse he knew that he burn Europe.So he could come as liberetor.That would not change.
Only main difference - Trocky woud die earlier.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
Re: Hitler: He might tell the German Communists to form a broad-based German coalition government with the Social Democrats and others that excludes the Nazis. But whether Paul von Hindenburg would actually be willing to accept such a government in place of appointing Hitler as Chancellor is an open question. He could, of course, make this option a bit more palatable to Hitler by having it be a minority government, with the German Communists supporting this government from the outside. That way, there is less risk of German Communists causing trouble later on.

The difficulty with the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) trying to oppose Hitler through parliamentary maneuvers is that they have the opposite of political "magnetism". They are politically repellent/repulsive to all political parties of the center and right. So one can criticize them for sabotaging enemies of Hitler likely the Social Democrats through hostility and competition, but trying to be friendly to SocDems and other parties of the left and center just sabotages them a different, indirect way, by 'tainting' them with Communist kooties and stink among the electorate and conservative opinion.

So Stalin's best option re: Hitler really is Chekha/NKVD 'wet work' assassination that he can hopefully make non-attributable or mis-attributed to rivals on the right, or the French or British intel services.

Other 'wet work' international assassination targets could include Francisco Franco, and Sanjurjo in Spain, because of their future role in the Spanish Civil War and military coup.

Soviet influence in China is fairly high at this time, with the KMT-CCP United Front. Knowing that Chiang Kai-shek will soon purge and massacre the Chinese Communists while seizing dominant control of the KMT, blowing up the Soviet investment, Stalin would be highly interested in ensuring the KMT falls under alternate leadership and that Chiang Kai-shek is liquidated or at least sidelined from leadership.

The difficulty is finding a good alternate leadership. Wang Jingwei, ideologically to Chiang's left, and more in favor of the United Front, would be the natural substitute candidate, but 1938 Stalin would likely view Wang Jingwei as disqualified because he later went soft in the face of Japanese aggression and became a collaborating puppet under them. More ideologically ideal and potentially reliable would have been Liao Zhongkai, leader of the KMT far left. But he had unfortunately already been assassinated by this point in time, in early 1925. Others in the KMT, like Hu Hanmin, don't seem to have the right ideological fit as a a conservative.

Stalin could try to liquidate Chiang, sideline Wang, and explore promoting "the widows", the widows of Sun Yatsen and Liao Zhongkai remained sympathetic to the left and to United Front with the Communists and anti-Japanese resistance throughout their lives, but it would be risky because although they had a lot of admiration and moral cachet, they may not be taken seriously as command authorities as women in Chinese power politics. Possibly, pulling in "the sons" like Sun Yat-sen's son Sun Fo and Liao Zhongkai's son, who tended to be left-wing sympathetic could help, but as of 1925 neither had exercised political muscle. Stalin could also promote and try his luck with KMT-aligned generals from Guangxi like Li Zongren, or others including Deng Yanda.

Stalin could also urge Mikhail Borodin and the Chinese Communist Party to start eliminating or coopting and converting Shanghai's Green Gang triggermen who ended up being the foot soldiers of the Shanghai anti-communist massacre of 1927, before they get a chance to carry it out.

If it is useful, Stalin could try to prevent the upcoming Sino-Russian war of 1929, by deterrent signaling to Chinese warlord Zhang Xueliang that Soviet commitment to and power over the Chinese eastern railway zone is too strong to be challenged, or by making concessions to Zhang and boosting his own will and ability to resist the Japanese when they invade in 1931.

All else being equal, I think Stalin would move towards collectivization and five year planning as soon as it is politically feasible for him to do so, so it gets started 6 to 18 months early. I think we would consider it a waste of time to wait any longer than he has to.

Stalin will be purging some people early. But if he's smart he will proceed cautiously, and proceed using the "fake accident" or "assassination by patsy" method more often than an arrest or show trial in his first few years.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
The difficulty with the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) trying to oppose Hitler through parliamentary maneuvers is that they have the opposite of political "magnetism". They are politically repellent/repulsive to all political parties of the center and right. So one can criticize them for sabotaging enemies of Hitler likely the Social Democrats through hostility and competition, but trying to be friendly to SocDems and other parties of the left and center just sabotages them a different, indirect way, by 'tainting' them with Communist kooties and stink among the electorate and conservative opinion.

So Stalin's best option re: Hitler really is Chekha/NKVD 'wet work' assassination that he can hopefully make non-attributable or mis-attributed to rivals on the right, or the French or British intel services.

Other 'wet work' international assassination targets could include Francisco Franco, and Sanjurjo in Spain, because of their future role in the Spanish Civil War and military coup.

Soviet influence in China is fairly high at this time, with the KMT-CCP United Front. Knowing that Chiang Kai-shek will soon purge and massacre the Chinese Communists while seizing dominant control of the KMT, blowing up the Soviet investment, Stalin would be highly interested in ensuring the KMT falls under alternate leadership and that Chiang Kai-shek is liquidated or at least sidelined from leadership.

The difficulty is finding a good alternate leadership. Wang Jingwei, ideologically to Chiang's left, and more in favor of the United Front, would be the natural substitute candidate, but 1938 Stalin would likely view Wang Jingwei as disqualified because he later went soft in the face of Japanese aggression and became a collaborating puppet under them. More ideologically ideal and potentially reliable would have been Liao Zhongkai, leader of the KMT far left. But he had unfortunately already been assassinated by this point in time, in early 1925. Others in the KMT, like Hu Hanmin, don't seem to have the right ideological fit as a a conservative.

Stalin could try to liquidate Chiang, sideline Wang, and explore promoting "the widows", the widows of Sun Yatsen and Liao Zhongkai remained sympathetic to the left and to United Front with the Communists and anti-Japanese resistance throughout their lives, but it would be risky because although they had a lot of admiration and moral cachet, they may not be taken seriously as command authorities as women in Chinese power politics. Possibly, pulling in "the sons" like Sun Yat-sen's son Sun Fo and Liao Zhongkai's son, who tended to be left-wing sympathetic could help, but as of 1925 neither had exercised political muscle. Stalin could also promote and try his luck with KMT-aligned generals from Guangxi like Li Zongren, or others including Deng Yanda.

Stalin could also urge Mikhail Borodin and the Chinese Communist Party to start eliminating or coopting and converting Shanghai's Green Gang triggermen who ended up being the foot soldiers of the Shanghai anti-communist massacre of 1927, before they get a chance to carry it out.

If it is useful, Stalin could try to prevent the upcoming Sino-Russian war of 1929, by deterrent signaling to Chinese warlord Zhang Xueliang that Soviet commitment to and power over the Chinese eastern railway zone is too strong to be challenged, or by making concessions to Zhang and boosting his own will and ability to resist the Japanese when they invade in 1931.

All else being equal, I think Stalin would move towards collectivization and five year planning as soon as it is politically feasible for him to do so, so it gets started 6 to 18 months early. I think we would consider it a waste of time to wait any longer than he has to.

Stalin will be purging some people early. But if he's smart he will proceed cautiously, and proceed using the "fake accident" or "assassination by patsy" method more often than an arrest or show trial in his first few years.

Re: China: Why not support Wang Jingwei for the KMT leadership for the time being only to subsequently purge him once someone better (possibly groomed by the Soviet Union) appears on the scene, whenever that might be? Wang won't become a problem for a while, after all.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
Re: China: Why not support Wang Jingwei for the KMT leadership for the time being only to subsequently purge him once someone better (possibly groomed by the Soviet Union) appears on the scene, whenever that might be? Wang won't become a problem for a while, after all.

Not the worst idea. The trick will be watching him like a hawk and surrounding him with a peer group determined to stand up against Japanese pressure, so that he doesn't discard Soviet patronage and united front with Communist Party at a moment when he conveniently feels the Japanese are becoming ascendant in the region and must be appeased more than the Soviets.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
Not the worst idea. The trick will be watching him like a hawk and surrounding him with a peer group determined to stand up against Japanese pressure, so that he doesn't discard Soviet patronage and united front with Communist Party at a moment when he conveniently feels the Japanese are becoming ascendant in the region and must be appeased more than the Soviets.

Completely agreed and also the Soviets can presumably quickly take him out if it ever looks like he's becoming too close with the Japanese.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
Not the worst idea. The trick will be watching him like a hawk and surrounding him with a peer group determined to stand up against Japanese pressure, so that he doesn't discard Soviet patronage and united front with Communist Party at a moment when he conveniently feels the Japanese are becoming ascendant in the region and must be appeased more than the Soviets.

The other part of the trick will be forging reliably revolutionary, pro-Soviet, anti-imperialist ruling authorities in China, but not provoking a unified Japanese and western intervention against United Front China and its Soviet backers where Japan and the West come to agree eye-to-eye that Chinese nationalism and opposition to imperialism and friendship with the Soviet Union needs to be crushed. In OTL, by the 1930s, despite both being anti-communist, Japan and the west disagreed too much over methods and distrusted each other too much to decide Nationalist China was a common enemy. Without Nationalist massacres of Communists and exploitation of ties to Shanghai's financial, gangster, and Christian communities, maybe Nationalist China would have appeared too "radical" to sympathize with in the west.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
The other part of the trick will be forging reliably revolutionary, pro-Soviet, anti-imperialist ruling authorities in China, but not provoking a unified Japanese and western intervention against United Front China and its Soviet backers where Japan and the West come to agree eye-to-eye that Chinese nationalism and opposition to imperialism and friendship with the Soviet Union needs to be crushed. In OTL, by the 1930s, despite both being anti-communist, Japan and the west disagreed too much over methods and distrusted each other too much to decide Nationalist China was a common enemy. Without Nationalist massacres of Communists and exploitation of ties to Shanghai's financial, gangster, and Christian communities, maybe Nationalist China would have appeared too "radical" to sympathize with in the west.

Could we see a Soviet-Japanese war over China in this TL in due time? Especially if Stalin kills Hitler before Hitler can make a lot of trouble in Europe?
 

stevep

Well-known member
Guys

Would Stalin of this time want to have Hitler killed off? A few years later having seen how dangerous he is and how much the USSR is devastated yes definitely. However by August 1938 his primary concern is the failure of the west to stand up to Hitler. Otherwise its clearly splitting the capitalist opposition to the USSR and hence the threat to his own empire.

It would depend on how much he was concerned or not about the rapid re-militarization of Germany compared to his own 'success' in industrializing the USSR and his balance of whether he considered Nazi Germany more of a threat or a possible tool to distract and tie down the other western states.

Steve
 

Buba

A total creep
Would Stalin of this time want to have Hitler killed off?
I don't think so. Just like for Varys in ASOIAF, for Stalin "the worse things get the better for us". Increasing tensions among capitalists etc. are a Good Thing.
 
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raharris1973

Well-known member
Guys

Would Stalin of this time want to have Hitler killed off? A few years later having seen how dangerous he is and how much the USSR is devastated yes definitely. However by August 1938 his primary concern is the failure of the west to stand up to Hitler. Otherwise its clearly splitting the capitalist opposition to the USSR and hence the threat to his own empire.

It would depend on how much he was concerned or not about the rapid re-militarization of Germany compared to his own 'success' in industrializing the USSR and his balance of whether he considered Nazi Germany more of a threat or a possible tool to distract and tie down the other western states.

Steve

good question to ask!



Let’s look at the reasons (circumstantial evidence) Stalin would/should or not make thwarting Hitler a primary focus from his 1938 standpoint.

reasons not, and why Hitler might be a “fun” chaotic element to have around to divide the capitalist west:

-the USSR has not experienced a Nazi invasion yet.
-The USSR has not seen a rapidly successful Nazi invasion against anyone (like France) to know it is possible yet.
-Stalin in the late 20s and early 30s had the “make it worse” and anti “Social Fascist” line
-Even when vocally supporting collective security guarantees for Czechoslovakia against Germany in 1938 a bit later, the Soviets proposed method was to help by attacking Poland! A method more suited to settling bilateral territorial claims than helping the Czechs
-This same Stalin later made the pact with Hitler.

On the other hand, in favor of the anti Hitler priority focus we have other circumstantial evidence:
-The appointment of Litvinov, public support for collective security, Soviet joining of the League of Nations, and the change in Comintern line all in favor of supporting democratic anti fascist popular fronts and United fronts, all begun in 1934, and not dropped anywhere until the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of august 1939.
—the much greater emphasis in the second Soviet five year plan on military production and military specific industry in comparison to the first 5 year plan’ emphasis on basic heavy industrial capitalization and infrastructure.
-the Hitler regime’s sudden hostile policy shifts towards the USSR, compared to the Weimar regime, over 1933-1934:
- the abrupt halt to Soviet-Reichswehr secret military cooperation, 1933.
-the ending of the Soviet monopoly on gasoline wholesale and retail distribution in Germany, 1934
-the end of the common anti-Polish policy, with the signature of the German-Polish nonaggression pact in 1934
-Hitler’s moves to shift German trading partnerships away from Soviet enterprises to bilateral trade deals with Balkan states, Poland, and the Baltic states.
-Hitler’s demonstrated territorial expansion east, with the annexation of Austria, and Italy and the west’s lack of will to stop it,
-Hitler’s demonstrated ambition, since the May 1938 crisis, to absorb the Sudetenland and dismember Czechoslovakia, the only Soviet friendly Central European state.
-Stalin’s lone readiness among the powers to proxy fight against Germany (and Italy) in Spain.
-Stalin’s lack of assurance/confidence that anyone else will solve the “Hitler problem” if he doesn’t.
-the fact that the accused in purge trials were accused of plotting with the Nazi Germans far more than any other power. Certainly far, far more than the British and French.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
Getting back to handling China and the Far East, sorry to obsess about it- If the Soviets had their way, the KMT northern expedition never would have been as fast or aggressive, especially in the northeastward direction toward Shanghai, as Chiang Kai-shek took it.

I think in OTL, Chiang was in a hurry to get to Shanghai to connect with his Green Gang organized crime blood brothers and connect with Shanghai financiers, winning, and extorting, the support of the latter. The Soviets and left KMT were for a more cautious advance and one more directed through the interior, up the the line of the Guangzhou-Wuhan-Beijing railway, and points west, not points to the east where the the United Front would be challenged western and Japanese imperialists in the regions where they were strongest and most committed.

If the KMT-CCP is more left-leaning and amenable to Soviet advice, it may more slowly, and cautiously and along a more interior path, avoiding clashes in Shanghai, and then with the Japanese in Jinan, Shandong in 1928-29, and possibly avoiding causing the flight and defeat and assassination of Zhang Zuolin, thus delaying the start of direct rogue Japanese Army invasions of China.

The downside of bypassing Shanghai is that Shanghai did have a strongly developed worker's movement and industrial sector, so leaving it outside of friendly control automatically dilutes the national legitimacy of any political movement with nationwide claims to political authority.

Ideally, the USSR could increase its influence over China while improving its relations with the Japanese empire and discouraging Japanese militarism, but that is a tall order. Japan is not likely to be amenable to a common anti-western alliance, and that is also a risky approach in the 1920s. Also, the move from Taisho democracy to militarist extremism seems like a broader seismic shift within the Japanese body politic, and not something amenable to easy change just by eliminating a few individuals, or changing Japanese Communist Party tactics.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
Ideally, the USSR could increase its influence over China while improving its relations with the Japanese empire and discouraging Japanese militarism, but that is a tall order. Japan is not likely to be amenable to a common anti-western alliance, and that is also a risky approach in the 1920s. Also, the move from Taisho democracy to militarist extremism seems like a broader seismic shift within the Japanese body politic, and not something amenable to easy change just by eliminating a few individuals, or changing Japanese Communist Party tactics.

Maybe the USSR could encourage Japan to hold off on China and instead wait for the US to withdraw from the Philippines so that Japan could seek to expand its influence there? But China is a much more lucrative market and territory relative to the Philippines, right?
 

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