WI Second Sino-Japanese War was fought 4 years in advance? (starting in 1933 not 1937)

[raharris1973]

WI Second Sino-Japanese War was fought 4 years in advance? (starting in 1933 not 1937)

Scenario:

Instead of the Tanggu truce taking hold in May 1933 and leading to a lull in Japanese expansion for a few years and a de-escalation of Sino-Japanese fighting, confrontation and expansion escalate that summer and fall of 1933 to full-scale Sino-Japanese warfare.

The four year advance of the war provides an opportunity to test several hypotheses about the Sino-Japanese war and key trends in both countries during the 1930s, Japan’s wider policies, and other powers’ reactions to the Sino-Japanese war.

I will elaborate more on those later, but first I want to anchor us on the basic timeline of the second Sino-Japanese war from 1937 on, and apply it onto the somewhat different context of the earlier 1930s.

Now would all the outcomes of the battles and the schedules and intervals between them be the same? Now probably not. Odds would be some things would go differently.

But it is *not* enough to just say things would be different, throw your hands up, and stop there. This what-if invites the question of “how” things would go differently, to who’s relative advantage, Japanese, Chinese Nationalist or Chinese Communist. And, the timeline and military events of OTL’s Sino-Japanese war were shaped by broad Sino-Japanese national capabilities and geographic realities. So in my opinion, transposing the timeline of the 1937-1945 war onto the earlier starting time is still a decent place to start since it provides guideposts on deciding at what points in the struggle things would take a different direction from OTL in ways great or small.

So here’s the provisional timeline:

July 1933 - Equivalent of the Marco Polo Bridge incident happens, the incident in North China that gives the Japanese Army the excuse and motivation to do big operations in North China south of the Great Wall to grab a couple more provinces, but which forces the Chinese to resist on a national scale

Early August 1933 - Japanese complete conquest of Beijing and Tianjin, Nationalists, Communists and Warlords proclaim unified resistance under Jiang Jieshi

August 1933 - Japanese troops occupy Chahar province, eastern Inner Mongolia

August 13-Nov 20th 1933 - Japanese ultimately win the hard fought battle of Shanghai against Jiang’s central government troops

August-Nov 1933 - Japanese seize North China provinces advancing south along the Beijing-Wuhan and Tianjin-Pukou railway axes

Dec 1933 - Japanese seize the capital of Nanjing and commit massacre of civilians, Nationalist central government evacuates to Wuhan

June-October 1934 - Japanese conquest of Wuhan, Nationalist central government evacuates to Chongqing

October-December 1934 - Japanese conquest of Guangzhou

Feb 1935 - Japanese conquest of Hainan island

Sep-Oct 1935 - Chinese repel 1st Japanese attack on Changsha, Hunan province, central food source for south China armies

Nov 1935 - Japanese seize the coast of Guangxi province (north of Hainan, east of Indochina)

Nov 1935 - Mar 1936 - With Japanese overstretched, Chinese nationwide winter offensive shows the Chinese are still in the fight, but they fail to liberate any major strategic cities or regions.

Sep-Oct 1937 Chinese repel second Japanese attack on Changsha


— so far, this has exactly mirrored the timeline of the Sino-Japanese war for the period it was a strictly bilateral affair, from OTL July 1937 to December 1941, and applying it to the July 1933 to December 1937 timeframe instead.


From August 1941 on, Japan’s war was affected by a total US embargo- that’s not guaranteed to happen in August 1937 here. From December 1941, the Sino-Japanese war was entangled with the wider World War II, especially the Pacific Theater and CBI front.

Although it was a relatively isolated theater, the fronts affected each other, so if it was risky to mechanically apply OTL’s timeline to events in the war so far, it gets even riskier going forward.

But I’m going to do it, just to give us points of reference:

December 1937 - January 1938 Chinese repel third Japanese attack on Changsha

April-Dec 1940 - Japanese Ichigo offensive. They finally win at Changsha, and keep going, and build a land corridor connecting all occupied territories they hold within China up to the Indochinese border by the end of the year.

Jan-Apr 1941 - Japan remains on the offensive against the Chinese in south-central, southwest China, contemplating a potential assault on Chongqing and the Sichuan basin later in the year.

[And at this point, on OTL’s schedule of the war, in April 1945, Japan was getting hammered so hard from so many directions and aid was starting to flow in again so Japan lost the initiative in China, and China started counterattacking and regaining some provincial territories. In August, multiple deus ex machina, the two atomic bombs, and the Soviet invasion, rescued China from the Japanese occupation. Those aren’t going to happen in 1941. At least not without a a lot of fresh background and explaining.]

As I said earlier, the four year advance of the war provides an opportunity to test several hypotheses about the Sino-Japanese war and key trends in both countries during the 1930s, Japan’s wider policies, and other powers’ reactions to the Sino-Japanese war. Here are some examples of these hypotheses we get to test:

H1. Von Falkenhausen’s German aid and advice program the Chinese Nationalists in the early Nazi years was essential in making making the ChiNat’s National Revolutionary Army (NRA) as strong and resilient as it was by 1937 and the battle for Shanghai. This alternate scenario tests that by throwing the NRA into combat with the Japanese with four years less German training, armament, and advice. If it was a decisive factor, we should expect worse ChiNat/NRA performance.

H2. Jiang Jieshi believed China needed more time to unify and develop before it would be ready to fight Japan. He saw near-term war with Japan as a disaster, but time being on China’s side. If he was correct, in an earlier war, we could expect the Chinese Nationalist side to suffer from less administrative development and control, and less economic growth and infrastructure development from the ‘Nanjing decade’ of Chinese Nationalist control and revenue raising and investment, including less control and preparation of the Chinese interior to serve as a fall-back position after the loss of cities like Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan

H3. On the other hand, Jiang’s political critics roundly condemned his policy of military non-resistance to Japan from 1931-1937 as morally wrong. Nonresistance against Japan, while trying to exterminate the Communists and crush regional dissidents was considered by most of the educated public and many political and armed factions to be immoral and unpatriotic. Jiang did in truth avoid major new damage from confrontation with Japan in 1933-1937, but he did have the cost of civil wars, and even regional uprisings whose stated motives were anti-Japanese. Politically, one could all argue this weakened Chinese national unity and morale, which could have set a bad example and led to weakened performance when resistance when full-scale war happened in OTL 1937.

H4. There’s a theory that the Sino-Japanese war between 1937 and 1941 in OTL was bankrupting Japan’s economy and depleting Japan’s foreign exchange reserves, even before taking any US or international embargos or asset freezes into account. This theory contends by that point Japan’s eroding economy was forcing it to either a) imminently withdraw from China or drastically scale down operations, or b) seize the western colonies in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific, and the resources in them, so they could be looted instead of purchased, to continue to power the Japanese economy and war effort in China. Unless something else in this alternate timeline cause China to lose or concede earlier, then, if this hypothesis were correct, Japan would have to make the choice to “go big or go home” in the Pacific by late 1937/early 1938. An interesting implication of that is while US and western mlitaries and navies aren’t very strong, the Japanese Navy isn’t very strong either. Even more importantly, None of France, Britain, Netherlands, nor the Soviet Union are directly tied down at that moment by occupation or invasion threats from Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy.

H5. Some scholars contend the total US embargo and asset freeze on Japan of August 1941, the precipitating step that in OTL confronted Japan with the choice of backing down or moving forward to strike the western powers throughout the Pacific, were not started, and would never have been started over China. Rather, these economic warfare initiatives were provoked by signs that Japan was threatening not just China, but areas beyond, by occupying French Indochina, and signing the Tripartite (Axis) Pact with Germany.

• If they are correct, in this alternate timeline, in by August 1938 the situation will not be ripe for the Japanese to have occupied or attacked French Indochina, and escalated military cooperation with Germany beyond the vague terms of the Anti-Comintern pact looks unattractive, so a U.S. and multinational embargo is highly unlikely. That can change Japanese calculations and allow them to keep fighting the Chinese alone for several more years without the pressure of having to attack other areas outside of China.

H6. Other folks contend that the total US embargo and asset freeze on Japan of August 1941 in OTL the a final, logical escalation of minor economic restrictions and embargoes that had begun even before WWI in started, including the June 1938 “don’t sell Japan airplanes” SecState note, the 1939 restrictions on aircraft parts and high-quality aviation gas, and the US provision of six months notice that it would end the Japanese Commercial Treaty in July 1939, freeing it to increase tariffs or other trade regulations at will. According to this theory, the embargo was the ultimate, and basically inevitable, result of Japanese invasion, and atrocities, in China, plus their continuation over multiple years as American patience ran out.

• If they are correct, a US embargo and asset freeze would have been coming anyway around August 1933, even if Japan was only fighting in China and not allying more with Germany and there was no war in Europe yet. A US embargo and asset freeze as the biggest oil exporter to Japan and biggest foreign holder Japanese reserves, would be a big problem for Japan, and the British would be highly susceptible to pressure to follow suit. Any oil embargo would be more third-party oil producers still in the game, but Japan’s ability to pay in hard currency is crunched. This could all lead to Japan having to stand down by 1939, or having to scream and leap to seize all Southeast Asia against odds they know are impossible against the full might of every other significant Navy in the world.

H7. Some contend that the Long March (really a long retreat or long escape) of Chinese Communist forces from base areas in Southeast China to Northwest China was essential to firmly establishing Mao Zedong in charge of the Chinese Communist Party, and that Mao’s paramount leadership, and his political and strategic concepts, were decisive for the Chinese Communists to win national power over China after WWII. This ATL, with the Sino-Japanese war going full-scale from summer of 1933, will mess with the Long March a lot.

• Dealing with Japanese assaults on Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou in 1933-1934, the Chinese Nationalists will never be able to finish their 5th Encirclement campaign and other encirclement campaigns of that year that forced the evacuation of all the Chinese Communist base areas in southern and central China. All these Chinese Communist base areas will remain in place. Communist troops will likely be called in to participate in the defense of Wuhan and Changsha as part of the United Front.
• 
  
• The Chinese Communists will go into the Sino-Japanese War healthier in numbers and equipment than in OTL, with their center of gravity further to the south in the country, but potentially without having some of the Long March experiences and “lessons” that some say were part of the secret sauce of their ultimate victory.

Changes on the Japanese side of the 1930s are less discussed, or perhaps I’ve just read less about them. So here’s an obscure, final hypothesis I propose:

H8. Japan didn’t go from parliamentary democracy to genocidal death cult overnight, despite the gradual rise of rogue military ops, government by assassination, and ultranationalist pressure groups. Japan at the public and institutional level probably wasn’t as fully settled in an acclimated to crazytown by 1933 as 1937. Nor were its Army forces as large. There’s a decent chance that if war escalates to full-scale in 1933 instead of 1937, and it’s not a ‘quick win’, public, parliamentary, and Imperial opposition and dissent may emerge and force the government to look for negotiations rather than victory after a year or two.

 

[Atarlost]

Along the lines of H8, I'm not sure that there is a Rape of Nanking, at least not so early in the war because that is a consequence of the same loss of faith in civilized norms of conduct as the rogue military ops and government by assassination. If the Chinese conduct guerilla warfare there may start to be reprisals in 1934. Without Nanking I'm not sure FDR can justify an embargo when his electoral mandate is for domestic issues and Japan is keeping American oilmen in business.

 

[ATP]

Along the lines of H8, I'm not sure that there is a Rape of Nanking, at least not so early in the war because that is a consequence of the same loss of faith in civilized norms of conduct as the rogue military ops and government by assassination. If the Chinese conduct guerilla warfare there may start to be reprisals in 1934. Without Nanking I'm not sure FDR can justify an embargo when his electoral mandate is for domestic issues and Japan is keeping American oilmen in business.

I agree.No rape of Nankin in 1937.
About other issues - commies stronger till japaneese do not crush them.I think,that till 1941 most of China would be taken.
And since FDR made embargo to save soviets,not China,he would do that after german attack and soviet losses.
If Japan attack USA,nothing change.If They get samrt and attack only dutch,they would win.

Unless - smart Japan made peace with smart China leader.Not Possible.You need 2 miracles here.

 

[stevep]

I would say some other things to consider.
a) In 33 the world is deep in depression so that will affect how all the nations and groups involved act. World trade is at a long term low because many countries have followed the US into deep protectionism for instance. Even Britain has finally imposed some tariffs by this point. Does it prompt any of the democratic powers to at least dabble with the recovery by massive military spending of Germany and Japan? In this TL there is probably no 2nd London Naval Treaty in 1936 either. [Unless the Japanese economy is in such a mess that its government decide it should support further limits to settle a naval race it has even less chance of winning than OTL.]

b) There are far more powers involved than just China, Japan and the US. Britain and France especially have big interests in China and neighbouring areas and OTL until the threat in Europe became gave some support to China, largely financial. They could well continue to do so for longer here as the situation is a lot less serious in 1937 than it was in 1940-41. Ditto what does Stalin do with the Japanese deep into China and no immediate threat in Europe? Could you see a major attack on the Japanese position in Manchuria say and if so does things like the Great Purge still occur? Both of which could prompt big further butterflies themselves.

c) Similarly such a major conflict in east Asia has impacts world wide. How do events in Europe especially go with this happening now? Does Hitler try and expand even earlier and faster because Britain and France are distracted by events in the Far East. If so does he misjudge it, resulting in either an earlier war and probably his quick defeat or possibly some coup against him? Does it prompt earlier, even if relatively minor, military spending in the democracies and if so what develops from those steps?

 

[raharris1973]

Love and like the responses. Nobody's voting. What are ya, chicken?

 

[Atarlost]

In this TL there is probably no 2nd London Naval Treaty in 1936 either.

I wouldn't be so sure of that. Japan walking out of the conference didn't prevent it TTL and I'm not sure what Japan could possibly do to scuttle it if that didn't work.

 

[Buba]

Love and like the responses. Nobody's voting. What are ya, chicken?

No, ignorant

 

[raharris1973]

a) In 33 the world is deep in depression so that will affect how all the nations and groups involved act. World trade is at a long term low because many countries have followed the US into deep protectionism for instance. Even Britain has finally imposed some tariffs by this point. Does it prompt any of the democratic powers to at least dabble with the recovery by massive military spending of Germany and Japan? In this TL there is probably no 2nd London Naval Treaty in 1936 either. [Unless the Japanese economy is in such a mess that its government decide it should support further limits to settle a naval race it has even less chance of winning than OTL.]

Great point about various economic effects.- World trade was indeed at a long-term low. Sino-Japanese war would stimulate a cross-Pacific revival of sorts as Japanese demand for oil and metals products goes up. This will help revive the economy in US oil and steel states and make the recovery of FDR’s first term even stronger, which would predict an even stronger position for him politically as he goes into his second term, but, would not dictate him tacking particularly to the left or right in policy terms. On the one hand, strong recovery lessens pressure for fundamental reforms, on the other hand, strong tax receipts from the recovery economy mean less self-imposed pressure to cut programs to get back to a balanced budget, and need-based relief programs become less expensive.

Mexico also gains from increased global oil demand, and one would assume, prices. I’m not sure if oil was fully nationalized there yet.

The Soviet Union, Dutch East Indies (and therefore Netherlands) and Britain via the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company should benefit too. Also Romania and perhaps even Poland a bit on the margins. While costs for pure importers like France, Germany, Spain, and Italy go up compared to OTL. Maybe if countries have a combination of agricultural surplus and protectionism, they experiment more with ethanols.

Sino-Japanese war, especially as it extends down the China Coast to the Yangzi delta, Shanghai, and ultimately rubs shoulders with Hong Kong and French Indochina will certainly alarm western powers.

It will probably stimulate all western powers (Americans, British Empire w/Dominions, French, Dutch) to shore up their navies & Far East defenses a bit more, earlier than OTL, but I don’t think military spending would become *the* make-work recovery strategy in any of the democracies in peacetime.

The Second London Naval Treaty is up in the air. Faith in disarmament dies hard, westerners will still want it, even as they mistrust Japanese intentions. From a Japanese POV, the civilians and Army may look benignly on limitation, but the Navy would feel insulted if the govt accepts it, and somebody’s going to do a murder-suicide over it.

b) There are far more powers involved than just China, Japan and the US. Britain and France especially have big interests in China and neighbouring areas and OTL until the threat in Europe became gave some support to China, largely financial. They could well continue to do so for longer here as the situation is a lot less serious in 1937 than it was in 1940-41.

Yes the British in particular have a freer hand to aid China in the first couple years before first Italy (in Abyssinia) and then Germany become distracting. Even France has some capacity, although it will always be ‘Europe-first’. Both will be contending with their economies too. They will think a little harder about imperial defense certainly.

Japanese aggression is south and central China is going to have them be tilting anti-Japan, pro-Nationalist China. However, if things go badly enough for the Nationalists that they look doomed in the first couple years of the war, and it looks like China’s fate will most likely be to fall to Japan and its puppets, or the Chinese Communists operating all over the countryside (backed by a direct Soviet intervention or not) London and Paris may have a hard time choosing sides *against Japan*. Especially if they don’t do their worst atrocities.

The Germans had interests in China also, selling arms and advice and manufacturing technology for tungsten and other minerals. That would be a factor early on. But I imagine, as China’s seaports get closed through 1934, it’s ability to export to Germany gets reduced and Berlin starts to lose interest.

Ditto what does Stalin do with the Japanese deep into China and no immediate threat in Europe? Could you see a major attack on the Japanese position in Manchuria say and if so does things like the Great Purge still occur? Both of which could prompt big further butterflies themselves.

Theoretically, you could have the Russians decide with Japanese getting in deep in China in 1933, and Russia, by its own estimates, having finished its Five-Year Plan targets early and successfully, that this is the right time for the Rasplata “the payback” for the war of 1904-1905 and show what a Socialist country can do.

I frankly think Stalin is too cautious for that. Only two years before he was extremely worried about military weakness in the Far East, and let the Japanese (and not Chinese) use the Soviet owned rails in Manchuria, and desperately sought a nonaggression pact with the Japanese, which the latter rebuffed. He would be most likely to see the Sino-Japanese war as OTL, an opportunity to use Japan’s preoccupation with points further south in China for the present time to build up the strength of the Soviet Far East and Outer Mongolia.

To that end, I think his most likely course of action is to fortify, indirectly support Chinese resistance, and launch his second, more militarily-oriented 5 year plan, but not launch an attack. His intention could well be to launch the Rasplata attack on Japan in 1938 after exhausting it in five years of China warfare and completing the five year plan and thorough attack preparations. He could have contingency plans to deal with a surprise Japanese attack, or a sudden drastic turn in the war sooner, but mainly be patient.

Fearing war or planning to start one is not going to stop officer purges from happening in the USSR. Depending on the timing of the war, some purged in OTL talent may get used well in combat before it is purged.

c) Similarly such a major conflict in east Asia has impacts world wide. How do events in Europe especially go with this happening now? Does Hitler try and expand even earlier and faster because Britain and France are distracted by events in the Far East.

Now if we go with my H4 "Japan must go big or go home after 4 years" or H6 "US and world will embargo Japan after 4 years no matter what" hypotheses, and Japan starts the Pacific war in late 1938-1939, attacking all the western possessions in the western Pacific, then things would be different, because by 1938, Hitler at least would think he has the strength to act while others are distracted.

The Japanese would have to be crazy, at a whole new level they did not show in OTL, by the way, to launch the Pacific War without the Axis powers riding high in occupation of Europe. It would be sort of a “Boxer Rebellion – but with aircraft carriers” equally doomed, but with some fancier technology. Japan striking south would be facing off against a “6 nation-alliance” of the US, UK, France, Netherlands, Australia, Portugal & New Zealand, in addition to China, with an uncommitted Soviet Union to the north, leering down at Manchuria, more than happy to jump in as the 8th nation to join in the group curbstomp of Japan.

But, if Japan started the Pacific Banzai charge and raised high the “kick me” banner, Hitler would probably feel by 1938 like he could get away with one-off, sequential, bilateral wars with small central European neighbors like Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Lithuania. He could we be right that none of the great powers would declare war on him if they are at the moment fighting Japan, and Hitler doesn’t touch their own territory.

But that would be the absolute limit of what he could do. If he touches France, Britain, or the USSR, obviously, it’s on with that power and any of it’s allies, and the western powers would be triggered by any aggression against Scandinavia, the Low Countries, or Romania as well. The Soviets would be triggered by any aggression on Romania, Latvia or Estonia, or any total takedown of Poland that doesn’t give them a share.

 

[Buba]

Lots of interesting reading, thanks!
1 - Poland was a net importer of oil. And about to commit economic suicide, so it does not benefit in any way.
2 - Panay Incident happens as in OTL? Is news of it supressed like in OTL?
3 - in OTL the Sino-Japanese War did not bring about rearmament by European Powers, as that was already ongoing due to efforts of the Usual Suspects. So here it might do that, and/or killing the LNT.
3a - in this ATL Netherlands may actually get to build its capital ships. Then again, this might bring forward WWII.
3b - carrier based airpower is in combat for the first time. This should cause some reaction - France starts building such ships earlier? Britain scraps or rebuilds the misfits? US builds something?

 

[Atarlost]

This will help revive the economy in US oil and steel states and make the recovery of FDR’s first term even stronger, which would predict an even stronger position for him politically as he goes into his second term, but, would not dictate him tacking particularly to the left or right in policy terms.

It would, however, be politically difficult while the economy is recovering based on oil exports to enact an embargo on the nation whose increased oil imports are responsible for the rising oil prices.

I think the great powers, at least those whose opinion Japan cares about because it needs to trade with them for strategic resources, reluctantly decide that Chinese Sovereignty isn't worth the cost, and the French and as Raharris has it the Russians reluctantly decide that Chinese Sovereignty costs more than they can pay at the time. The UK may join the Scramble for China to keep Japan from getting too close to its important colonies, but I don't think is likely to do anything to prevent most of China from being conquered by Japan.

 

[stevep]

Lots of interesting reading, thanks!
1 - Poland was a net importer of oil. And about to commit economic suicide, so it does not benefit in any way.
2 - Panay Incident happens as in OTL? Is news of it supressed like in OTL?
3 - in OTL the Sino-Japanese War did not bring about rearmament by European Powers, as that was already ongoing due to efforts of the Usual Suspects. So here it might do that, and/or killing the LNT.
3a - in this ATL Netherlands may actually get to build its capital ships. Then again, this might bring forward WWII.
3b - carrier based airpower is in combat for the first time. This should cause some reaction - France starts building such ships earlier? Britain scraps or rebuilds the misfits? US builds something?

Is there that much carrier based air at this point? Although unless there's major acceleration in its development there's no radar so all ships are more vulnerable to air attack when the a/c can find them. On the other hand a/c are a lot more fragile and limited in capacity than OTL and they don't have radios - possibly receivers - so coordinating operations is going to be a lot more difficult.

Things will be accelerated if a major war starts early. How rapidly would depend on how things develop. An early success for air power would attract attention but some failure or loss of one of the few CVs about could mean that one or more nations dismiss them as unimportant. Which might of course come back to bite them badly in a future conflict of course.

 

[Buba]

The IJN has the Hosho, Kaga and Akagi. And the freshly commissioned "looks about to turn turtle" small carrier with name starting with "R".
IMO there need not be some spectacular success - IMO quite a few Officers will take notice what happens when the Japanese show up with a floating airfield with 80 planes on it.
Interestingly, a war in 1933 puts back the rebuilds of the Kaga and Akagi, which soldier on with their steampunk three decks (British ships no better).
A piccie, on laundry day:

 

[stevep]

It would, however, be politically difficult while the economy is recovering based on oil exports to enact an embargo on the nation whose increased oil imports are responsible for the rising oil prices.

I think the great powers, at least those whose opinion Japan cares about because it needs to trade with them for strategic resources, reluctantly decide that Chinese Sovereignty isn't worth the cost, and the French and as Raharris has it the Russians reluctantly decide that Chinese Sovereignty costs more than they can pay at the time. The UK may join the Scramble for China to keep Japan from getting too close to its important colonies, but I don't think is likely to do anything to prevent most of China from being conquered by Japan.

That would depend on whether oil exports - more specifically to Japan - are that important by the time an embargo is considered. It could be that by that time there is enough money circulating and pick up of world trade generally Japan is largely irrelevant to the US economically. Not to mention that an earlier invasion of China while Japan is still deep in recession means that it could be running out of funds for foreign purchases anyway.

I'm not sure that the Soviets would be that happy with the Japanese 'winning' as opposed to being bogged down there. Britain wouldn't either, both because of its important colonies and its heavy economic interests in China. France has less to play for here, although it would be concerned about FIC and is going to be a lot more concerned about Germany earlier than Britain so is more likely to be interested in some acceptance of Japanese control over China.

Don't think Britain carving out a colonial zone in China would be practical. British support of any area in China would be a clearly anti-Japanese move as it would be seen as a rival to any puppet government Japan tried to set up and gain support from the bulk of the Chinese population. Plus Britain's main economic interests are in the Yangtze valley, much of which will be under Japanese control assuming developments as OTL but 3-4 years earlier, long before China is defeated. However your likely to see more non-military support for China without the dire crisis Britain was in after the fall of France and its not impossible that some sort of military action/threat might occur, albeit unlikely probably.

 

[stevep]

The IJN has the Hosho, Kaga and Akagi. And the freshly commissioned "looks about to turn turtle" small carrier with name starting with "R".
IMO there need not be some spectacular success - IMO quite a few Officers will take notice what happens when the Japanese show up with a floating airfield with 80 planes on it.
Interestingly, a war in 1933 puts back the rebuilds of the Kaga and Akagi, which soldier on with their steampunk three decks (British ships no better).
A piccie, on laundry day:

Well Hosho was pretty tiny and slow, rather like HMS Hermes. Kaga and Akagi with their rebuilds delayed would face problems as at least one of the launch decks would be of limited use as a/c size and performance increase. See IJN Kaga for a little more on this. Also the Kongo's may not be rebuilt either which leaves them as thinly armoured BCs plus does Japan already rearm the 4th one which had been disarmed under the 1930 London Treaty I think it was.

Similarly the USN doesn't have a lot of its early CVs yet, with the Langley, Lexington and Saratoga in service. There is an interesting summary of some of the USN carrier ideas in Saratoga's service prior to WWII, which gives some details of their exercises. Some of this might be changed but also study of Japanese operations might give additional info.

The RN was the only other one which had CV I believe and more in number although most were experimental with the best being Courageous and Glorious. Furious I'm not sure what state it was in then and Eagle although of similar size was slow and had a small air fleet, not much different than HMS Hermes.

Steve

 

[stevep]

Great point about various economic effects.- World trade was indeed at a long-term low. Sino-Japanese war would stimulate a cross-Pacific revival of sorts as Japanese demand for oil and metals products goes up. This will help revive the economy in US oil and steel states and make the recovery of FDR’s first term even stronger, which would predict an even stronger position for him politically as he goes into his second term, but, would not dictate him tacking particularly to the left or right in policy terms. On the one hand, strong recovery lessens pressure for fundamental reforms, on the other hand, strong tax receipts from the recovery economy mean less self-imposed pressure to cut programs to get back to a balanced budget, and need-based relief programs become less expensive.

Mexico also gains from increased global oil demand, and one would assume, prices. I’m not sure if oil was fully nationalized there yet.

The Soviet Union, Dutch East Indies (and therefore Netherlands) and Britain via the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company should benefit too. Also Romania and perhaps even Poland a bit on the margins. While costs for pure importers like France, Germany, Spain, and Italy go up compared to OTL. Maybe if countries have a combination of agricultural surplus and protectionism, they experiment more with ethanols.

Sino-Japanese war, especially as it extends down the China Coast to the Yangzi delta, Shanghai, and ultimately rubs shoulders with Hong Kong and French Indochina will certainly alarm western powers.

It will probably stimulate all western powers (Americans, British Empire w/Dominions, French, Dutch) to shore up their navies & Far East defenses a bit more, earlier than OTL, but I don’t think military spending would become *the* make-work recovery strategy in any of the democracies in peacetime.

The Second London Naval Treaty is up in the air. Faith in disarmament dies hard, westerners will still want it, even as they mistrust Japanese intentions. From a Japanese POV, the civilians and Army may look benignly on limitation, but the Navy would feel insulted if the govt accepts it, and somebody’s going to do a murder-suicide over it.



Yes the British in particular have a freer hand to aid China in the first couple years before first Italy (in Abyssinia) and then Germany become distracting. Even France has some capacity, although it will always be ‘Europe-first’. Both will be contending with their economies too. They will think a little harder about imperial defense certainly.

Japanese aggression is south and central China is going to have them be tilting anti-Japan, pro-Nationalist China. However, if things go badly enough for the Nationalists that they look doomed in the first couple years of the war, and it looks like China’s fate will most likely be to fall to Japan and its puppets, or the Chinese Communists operating all over the countryside (backed by a direct Soviet intervention or not) London and Paris may have a hard time choosing sides *against Japan*. Especially if they don’t do their worst atrocities.

The Germans had interests in China also, selling arms and advice and manufacturing technology for tungsten and other minerals. That would be a factor early on. But I imagine, as China’s seaports get closed through 1934, it’s ability to export to Germany gets reduced and Berlin starts to lose interest.



Theoretically, you could have the Russians decide with Japanese getting in deep in China in 1933, and Russia, by its own estimates, having finished its Five-Year Plan targets early and successfully, that this is the right time for the Rasplata “the payback” for the war of 1904-1905 and show what a Socialist country can do.

I frankly think Stalin is too cautious for that. Only two years before he was extremely worried about military weakness in the Far East, and let the Japanese (and not Chinese) use the Soviet owned rails in Manchuria, and desperately sought a nonaggression pact with the Japanese, which the latter rebuffed. He would be most likely to see the Sino-Japanese war as OTL, an opportunity to use Japan’s preoccupation with points further south in China for the present time to build up the strength of the Soviet Far East and Outer Mongolia.

To that end, I think his most likely course of action is to fortify, indirectly support Chinese resistance, and launch his second, more militarily-oriented 5 year plan, but not launch an attack. His intention could well be to launch the Rasplata attack on Japan in 1938 after exhausting it in five years of China warfare and completing the five year plan and thorough attack preparations. He could have contingency plans to deal with a surprise Japanese attack, or a sudden drastic turn in the war sooner, but mainly be patient.

Fearing war or planning to start one is not going to stop officer purges from happening in the USSR. Depending on the timing of the war, some purged in OTL talent may get used well in combat before it is purged.



Now if we go with my H4 "Japan must go big or go home after 4 years" or H6 "US and world will embargo Japan after 4 years no matter what" hypotheses, and Japan starts the Pacific war in late 1938-1939, attacking all the western possessions in the western Pacific, then things would be different, because by 1938, Hitler at least would think he has the strength to act while others are distracted.

The Japanese would have to be crazy, at a whole new level they did not show in OTL, by the way, to launch the Pacific War without the Axis powers riding high in occupation of Europe. It would be sort of a “Boxer Rebellion – but with aircraft carriers” equally doomed, but with some fancier technology. Japan striking south would be facing off against a “6 nation-alliance” of the US, UK, France, Netherlands, Australia, Portugal & New Zealand, in addition to China, with an uncommitted Soviet Union to the north, leering down at Manchuria, more than happy to jump in as the 8th nation to join in the group curbstomp of Japan.

But, if Japan started the Pacific Banzai charge and raised high the “kick me” banner, Hitler would probably feel by 1938 like he could get away with one-off, sequential, bilateral wars with small central European neighbors like Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Lithuania. He could we be right that none of the great powers would declare war on him if they are at the moment fighting Japan, and Hitler doesn’t touch their own territory.

But that would be the absolute limit of what he could do. If he touches France, Britain, or the USSR, obviously, it’s on with that power and any of it’s allies, and the western powers would be triggered by any aggression against Scandinavia, the Low Countries, or Romania as well. The Soviets would be triggered by any aggression on Romania, Latvia or Estonia, or any total takedown of Poland that doesn’t give them a share.

Some interesting ideas here. General agreement but some doubt on Stalin not going to war in say 1933-34. If the Japanese are increasingly bogged down deep in China and earning international outrage as a result it could look an attractive option for him. Especially if he continues to support Chiang and the KMT as the legitimate ruler of China. Doubly so if Japan is struggling economically due to the demands of the war.

It doesn't even need a major war actually. A major build up of Soviet forces and some serious border clashes could force Japan to relax the pressure on China because it needs to reinforce the defence of Manchuria and neighbouring areas.

Not so sure that Japan won't react as barbarically as OTL given that politically inspired violence is already fairly well embedded in the military and society and a war started while Japan is deep in recession is likely to highlight the 'need' for national unity and a 'solution' for Japan's need in terms of colonial markets.

Agree that its less likely Japan will pick a war with the western powers due to serious raw material shortages threatening to terminate their operations in China. Whether those are due to economic problems or western embargoes. There's a possibility that if the US is still strongly isolationist and its Britain and France doing most of the political pushing Japan might seek a war against the European powers only. Which I think they would still lose, possibly fairly quickly depending on the situation in China, but could be hairy for the democracies if Japan lasts long enough for Germany to start getting aggressive.

What happens with Poland in a TL where the western allies are so distracted by a war with Japan that they don't guarantee Poland could be interesting, for all involved. Will Poland submit to becoming a German puppet? Will it still fight and if so what happens with a potential Nazi-Soviet border distinctly further east? How does Stalin react?

Alternatively on the bright side a clash between the western powers and Japan starting in 1933-4 say might even be over by say 1936. The Japanese are unlikely to have anything like their OTL early successes and they would quickly face a dire economic situation will little no oil or other imports as well as naval conflict in areas like the S China Sea and parts of the Pacific and allied forces supply or even operating in direct support of China. In that case you might see Britain and France bloodied but also with some battle experience and a boost in military developments in a position both militarily and politically to come down hard on either Italian adventuring in Ethiopia or Germany starting to throw its weight about in Europe.

Steve

PS Sorry just realised there's a major problem in my timing. For some reason I was thinking it was war from 1931 when Japan initially seized Manchuria rather than triggered in 1933. Duh! That screws up the timing of a number of the things I was considering. Apologies.

 

[Buba]

Soviets fighting Japan in China - how? No way that they are the attackers. Logistics ...
And the state of the Red Army at that time.

Poland had a military treaty with France. The British "guarantees", if you read the text carefully, are meaningless, vague "blah blah".

 

[ATP]

Lots of interesting reading, thanks!
1 - Poland was a net importer of oil. And about to commit economic suicide, so it does not benefit in any way.
2 - Panay Incident happens as in OTL? Is news of it supressed like in OTL?
3 - in OTL the Sino-Japanese War did not bring about rearmament by European Powers, as that was already ongoing due to efforts of the Usual Suspects. So here it might do that, and/or killing the LNT.
3a - in this ATL Netherlands may actually get to build its capital ships. Then again, this might bring forward WWII.
3b - carrier based airpower is in combat for the first time. This should cause some reaction - France starts building such ships earlier? Britain scraps or rebuilds the misfits? US builds something?

Netherlands planned ships with 280mm guns,so it would be rather battlecruisers.
China in 1937 get weapons and advisors from Germany,Italy and USA.They even had schools for pilots.Italian trained were considered worst.Dunno how things were in 1933.
Impact on other navies - i think,that both french and italian would start building carriers and navy planes 1-2 years earlier.
Which,if rest history do not change,mean nothing for France,but Italy in 1941 could win some major sea battle.British sea planes really sucked.