WI: No Lend-Lease for the USSR?

Captain X

Well-known member
Osaul
What if the US decided to punish the USSR for its part in starting the war in Europe by invading Poland right along with Germany in 1939 by never extending Lend-Lease aid to them? There would also obviously not be any kind of an alliance between the USSR and the other Allied nations in fighting the war, so at best, the USSR would have been used as a distraction for Nazi Germany.

How do you think the war would have turned out differently? Would the USSR have been overwhelmed and fallen? If not, would the war have continued between the West and the USSR after the downfall of Germany?
 
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bintananth

behind a desk
What if the US decided to punish the USSR for its part in starting the war in Europe by invading Poland right along with Germany in 1939 by never extending Lend-Lease aid to them? There would also obviously not be any kind of an alliance between the USSR and the other Allied nations in fighting the war, so at best, the USSR would have been used as a distraction for Nazi Germany.

How do you think the war would have turned out differently? Would the USSR have been overwhelmed and fallen? If not, would the war have continued between the West and the USSR after the downfall of Germany?
The Soviets would have held.

The longest WWII Eastern Front lines were actually about 1,500 miles.

Leningrad to Stalingrad is about St. Louis to the Atlantic coast in less than 24 hours by car.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
What if the US decided to punish the USSR for its part in starting the war in Europe by invading Poland right along with Germany in 1939 by never extending Lend-Lease aid to them? There would also obviously not be any kind of an alliance between the USSR and the other Allied nations in fighting the war, so at best, the USSR would have been used as a distraction for Nazi Germany.

How do you think the war would have turned out differently? Would the USSR have been overwhelmed and fallen? If not, would the war have continued between the West and the USSR after the downfall of Germany?

Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part II by Denis Havlat:

During World War II the Soviet Union received large amounts of aid from the Western world in the form of supplies and military intervention, both of which were declared to have been irrelevant for the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany by Soviet historians. This article examines the claim made by Soviet historiography, and it comes to the conclusion that both Western supplies and military intervention were far more helpful than claimed by the Soviets. Without this aid the Red Army would not have been able to perform as well as it did historically, tilting the balance in Germany’s favor. Soviet claims about the irrelevance of Western aid can thus be dismissed as propaganda and inaccurate.

The USSR and Total War: Why Didn’t the Soviet Economy Collapse in 1942? by Mark Harrison:

Roosevelt also contributed to Soviet stabilization. The first installment of wartime Allied aid that reached the Soviet Union in 1942, although small by later standards, amounted to some 5 per cent of Soviet GNP in that year. Although Allied aid was used directly to supply the armed forces with both durable goods and consumables, indirectly it probably released resources to households. By improving the balance of overall resources it brought about a ceteris paribus increase in the payoff to patriotic citizens. In other words, Lend-Lease was stabilizing. We cannot measure the distance of the Soviet economy from the point of collapse in 1942, but it seems beyond doubt that collapse was near. Without Lend-Lease it would have been nearer. Stalin himself recognized this, although he expressed himself more directly. He told Khrushchev several times that the Soviet Union had suffered such heavy losses that without Allied aid it would have lost the war.19

Boris V. Sokolov (2007). The role of lend‐lease in Soviet military efforts, 1941–1945, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies: Vol. 7, issue 3, pages 567-586:

In general, we can conclude that without Western supplies, the Soviet Union not only could not have won the Great Patriotic War, but was not even able to resist the German invasion, not being able to produce a sufficient amount of weapons and military equipment and provide it with fuel and ammunition. This dependence was well understood by the Soviet leadership at the beginning of the war. For example, the special envoy of President F.D. Roosevelt, G. Hopkins, reported in a message dated July 31, 1941, that Stalin believed it was impossible without American assistance from Great Britain and the USSR to resist the material might of Germany, which had the resources of occupied Europe. {70}Roosevelt, back in October 1940, announcing his decision to allow the military department to provide weapons and equipment that are surplus for the needs of the American armed forces, as well as strategic materials and industrial equipment to those countries that could protect American national interests, allowed the inclusion of these countries and Russia. {71} Without such an attitude on the part of the president, the pre-war placement in the United States of Soviet orders for equipment important for the production of weapons and military equipment would hardly have been possible.​

Hunger and War: Food Provisioning in the Soviet Union during World War II:

3j4GfGz4_o.png

MTrRlP8L_o.png


tl;dr the Soviets are defeated in the 1941-1943 timeframe, exact date depending on personal interpretation and actions all parties (Nazis, Anglo-Americans and Soviets themselves) take in the emerging strategic situation. My own is that the Soviet war effort is crippled in 1942, and the Nazis deal the death blow by 1943 by occupying the A-A Line; Urals Line follows by 1944 with an effectively minimally opposed advance reminiscent of early 1918.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
As for ramifications, see Mark Stoler's Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II reveals the planning of the JCS as it concerns the war and situational contingencies therein specifically related to if the Soviets went under. From Page 72:

Eisenhower and his subordinates were far from alone or original in perceiving the overriding importance of continued Soviet participation in the war. As previously noted, in the summer and fall of 1941 Roosevelt and army planners had begun to recognize that victory over Germany might not be possible unless the Red Army continued to tie down the bulk of the Wehrmacht, and they consequently had made assistance to Russia a focal point of their global strategy. The JB had forcefully reiterated this conclusion by informing Roosevelt on December 21 that ‘‘Russia alone possesses the manpower potentially able to defeat Germany in Europe.’’ 26 The Soviets’ late 1941 success in stopping the German advance on Moscow and launching a counteroffensive, occurring at a time when Axis forces were everywhere else successful, further reinforced this belief. As a result virtually all Allied planning papers in late 1941– early 1942 stressed the critical importance of aiding the Russians so that they could survive a renewed German onslaught. Roosevelt agreed. ‘‘Nothing would be worse than to have the Russians collapse,’’ he told Treasury secretary Henry Morgenthau on March 11. ‘‘I would rather lose New Zealand, Australia, or anything else than have the Russians collapse.’’ Five days earlier the JUSSC had bluntly stated that ‘‘Russia must be supported now by every possible means’’ because the absence of a Russian front would postpone ‘‘indefinitely’’ the end of the war.27 And as army planners realized, such postponement would only increase public and naval pressure to turn away completely from the indecisive European theater in favor of the Pacific.​

Page 80:

Marshall’s reasoning was based not only on Eisenhower’s February–March presentations but also on military and political events since then which had heavily reinforced the OPD’s original conclusions. Once again the focal point was the Soviet Union. ‘‘The retention of Russia in the war as an active participant is vital to Allied victory,’’ now acting chief of staff McNarney had emphasized on April 12; if German armies were allowed to turn west, ‘‘any opportunity for a successful offensive against the European Axis would be virtually eliminated.’’ 56 In mid June the staff again warned that Russian collapse would necessitate a strategic reassessment, ‘‘possibly with the result of directing our main effort to the Pacific rather than the Atlantic.’’ 57​

Page 93:

As early as April–May, OPD, g-2, and the joint committees had begun to explore the appropriate response should this ‘‘desperate situation’’ result in a Soviet collapse, and in early August the JUSSC completed and forwarded to the JPS a massive study of such a contingency. This study indicated that Russian collapse would be a ‘‘catastrophe’’ of such magnitude as to put the United States in a ‘‘desperate’’ situation too, one in which it ‘‘would be forced to consider courses of action which would primarily benefit the United States rather than the United Nations.’’
Indeed, it might be the only remaining major member of the United Nations, because the British Commonwealth might collapse and the British public react to Soviet defeat by overthrowing Churchill and agreeing to a negotiated peace that would leave Hitler in control of Eurasia. A revival of isolationism and an ‘‘increase in defeatism’’ within the country were also possible in this scenario. Even without British withdrawal, however, the only sound U.S. response to a Soviet collapse would be to ‘‘adopt the strategic defensive in the European Theater of War and to conduct the strategic offensive in the Japanese theater.’’ On August 19 the JPS the great strategic debate 93 approved this report, forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs as JCS 85, and ordered the preparation of a strategic plan for the defeat of Japan.40​

tl;dr is the American planning bodies-whose assessment FDR accepted and agreed with-was that it would be impossible to defeat the Germans without the Soviets in the fight. This is the main rationale behind Lend Lease as it occurred historically.
 

bintananth

behind a desk
@History Learner,

Successfully invading Russia is almost as difficult as successfully invading the US.

With the US it's "there will be a rifle behind every blade of grass" because there is more than one privately owned firearm for every American adult.

With Russia it's "what grass are they using for cover?" because they'll burn the whole place down when retreating and you aren't going to enjoy the counterattack one bit.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
@History Learner,

Successfully invading Russia is almost as difficult as successfully invading the US.

With the US it's "there will be a rifle behind every blade of grass" because there is more than one privately owned firearm for every American adult.

With Russia it's "what grass are they using for cover?" because they'll burn the whole place down when retreating and you aren't going to enjoy the counterattack one bit.

German difficulties in Russia were based on logistics for the most part, which here would be resolved by 50% of Germany's war time expenditure being available on top of existing usage. For example, instead of 1,000 U-Boats over the course of the war, Germany could choose to build 100,000 more trucks hypothetically. Instead of 25% of artillery munitions being used in an AA capacity over the Reich itself by 1944, they would here be available for usage against the Soviets.

Specific to German occupation of the USSR, munitions output doubled in 1942 and increased again in 1943, partly based on the use of mineral resources of the occupied region. The Ivan Program, largely based on Ukraine, was producing 13,000 tons of munitions annually by 1943, and in 1942/1943 the occupied regions of the USSR supplied about 20% of Germany's food needs.
 

bintananth

behind a desk
13,000 tons of munitions sounds impressive if you have no sense scale.

A single Brooklyn-class cruiser could send roughly 175 tons of ammunition addressed "to whom it may concern" in about 20 minutes.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
13,000 tons of munitions sounds impressive if you have no sense scale.

A single Brooklyn-class cruiser could send roughly 175 tons of ammunition addressed "to whom it may concern" in about 20 minutes.

First, for some vital context on the Ivan Program:

Due to the start-up difficulties, this program was initially focused purely on the production of 10.5 cm grenades. The start of production for the 15 cm and 21 cm grenades should take place later. By order of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition of August 6, 1943, the dates of the Iwan program were to be brought forward by 3 months. When production started in August 1943, the production of 150,000 bullets 10.5 cm was planned for September. Preparations for the start of production of 15 cm and 21 cm grenades began in August 1943. [6]
The program came to an end with the German withdrawal in 1943. During the retreat, a significant part of the operations that had recently been built were dismantled and the parts that could not be dismantled were made unusable by targeted blasts. The program’s production goals were never fully achieved at any point in its brief existence. [7]

So, basically in one month this one incomplete program was producing the equivalent of 75 Brooklyn-Class cruisers ammunition holdings. For reference, the United States only built nine such ships.
 

Chiron

Well-known member
Immediate effects:

The 1941-42 winter offensive either doesn't launch due to lack of an emergency shipment of US locomotives and rail cars, or it is far narrower and half as powerful and comes a full 4 weeks later than historical. Considering AGC had taken Kalinin (now called Tver) at this point, the Soviets need to get it back, or the Wehrmacht will be in strike range of major dams which if ruptured, would flood Moscow. The Soviets themselves had partly opened the gates on them to help defend Moscow. A 4 week delay enables the Germans to get their Railheads much further forward before the offensive which in turn raises their combat power.

The other critical spot was Tikhvin, the main access road to Lake Lagoda which they could run a rail road through. They fail to take it back, they lose Leningrad and their Baltic Fleet.

So if nothing else they push on those 2 cities otherwise they pack it in and evacuate Moscow as indefensible. That of course would be a fatal blow to European Russia and cause a complete strategic route. So one way or another, Stalin will demand those cities retaken at all costs if nothing else.

While victories for the propaganda mills, this would still leave the Germans firmly entrenched in Moscow Oblast and make Hitler's choice for him in 42.

But then if the winter offensive is delayed 4 weeks, the Soviets lose the best time frame to attack when the Luftwaffe was effectively crippled by weather for the second half of December 41.
 

ATP

Well-known member
What if the US decided to punish the USSR for its part in starting the war in Europe by invading Poland right along with Germany in 1939 by never extending Lend-Lease aid to them? There would also obviously not be any kind of an alliance between the USSR and the other Allied nations in fighting the war, so at best, the USSR would have been used as a distraction for Nazi Germany.

How do you think the war would have turned out differently? Would the USSR have been overwhelmed and fallen? If not, would the war have continued between the West and the USSR after the downfall of Germany?

Sralin in OTL wonted peace /gave up Belarus and Ukraine/- problem is,Hitler practically wonted capitulation/border on Ural/
So,no peace there.
No after Hitler genocided most of soviet soldiers who surrender almost without fight,becouse idiots thought,that germans come to liberate them.
War would be fought there till last soldier on both sides.


USA spend about 9,5 billions of $ on Lend-Lease for soviets.To compare - Manchattan project cost 2 billions,all Liberty ships 1,9 billion,and 1000 B.29 0,8 billions.
Soviets could do nothing to them,and germans - almost nothing.
USA could just not provoke Japan/or crush them/,built A bombs and B.29,and wait.In 1945,when soviets would fight between Dniepr and Don,drop 10 bombs on main german cities,and demand surrender of germany,and soviets not crossing 1939 borders.

American century from 1945.Since they need proof,that soviets was monsters - send US fleet and marines to take Magadan,and show american public death camps there.With or without Japan.

In OTL 114.000 polish citizen was evacuated to Persia with general Anders/2.800 died there from soviets plagues,and 4000 jews deserted/
Now,they would remain in soviets - but ,since soviets need all live slaves without Lend-Lease,most would survive.After 1945 they would come back,after Sralin saw what 10 A bombs could do./B.29 from England could burn both Moscow and Leningrad/
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part II by Denis Havlat:

During World War II the Soviet Union received large amounts of aid from the Western world in the form of supplies and military intervention, both of which were declared to have been irrelevant for the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany by Soviet historians. This article examines the claim made by Soviet historiography, and it comes to the conclusion that both Western supplies and military intervention were far more helpful than claimed by the Soviets. Without this aid the Red Army would not have been able to perform as well as it did historically, tilting the balance in Germany’s favor. Soviet claims about the irrelevance of Western aid can thus be dismissed as propaganda and inaccurate.

The USSR and Total War: Why Didn’t the Soviet Economy Collapse in 1942? by Mark Harrison:

Roosevelt also contributed to Soviet stabilization. The first installment of wartime Allied aid that reached the Soviet Union in 1942, although small by later standards, amounted to some 5 per cent of Soviet GNP in that year. Although Allied aid was used directly to supply the armed forces with both durable goods and consumables, indirectly it probably released resources to households. By improving the balance of overall resources it brought about a ceteris paribus increase in the payoff to patriotic citizens. In other words, Lend-Lease was stabilizing. We cannot measure the distance of the Soviet economy from the point of collapse in 1942, but it seems beyond doubt that collapse was near. Without Lend-Lease it would have been nearer. Stalin himself recognized this, although he expressed himself more directly. He told Khrushchev several times that the Soviet Union had suffered such heavy losses that without Allied aid it would have lost the war.19

Boris V. Sokolov (2007). The role of lend‐lease in Soviet military efforts, 1941–1945, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies: Vol. 7, issue 3, pages 567-586:

In general, we can conclude that without Western supplies, the Soviet Union not only could not have won the Great Patriotic War, but was not even able to resist the German invasion, not being able to produce a sufficient amount of weapons and military equipment and provide it with fuel and ammunition. This dependence was well understood by the Soviet leadership at the beginning of the war. For example, the special envoy of President F.D. Roosevelt, G. Hopkins, reported in a message dated July 31, 1941, that Stalin believed it was impossible without American assistance from Great Britain and the USSR to resist the material might of Germany, which had the resources of occupied Europe. {70}Roosevelt, back in October 1940, announcing his decision to allow the military department to provide weapons and equipment that are surplus for the needs of the American armed forces, as well as strategic materials and industrial equipment to those countries that could protect American national interests, allowed the inclusion of these countries and Russia. {71} Without such an attitude on the part of the president, the pre-war placement in the United States of Soviet orders for equipment important for the production of weapons and military equipment would hardly have been possible.​

Hunger and War: Food Provisioning in the Soviet Union during World War II:

3j4GfGz4_o.png

MTrRlP8L_o.png


tl;dr the Soviets are defeated in the 1941-1943 timeframe, exact date depending on personal interpretation and actions all parties (Nazis, Anglo-Americans and Soviets themselves) take in the emerging strategic situation. My own is that the Soviet war effort is crippled in 1942, and the Nazis deal the death blow by 1943 by occupying the A-A Line; Urals Line follows by 1944 with an effectively minimally opposed advance reminiscent of early 1918.

Does Moscow hold out in 1941, only to fall in 1942?

BTW, might a realistic PoD for this be if the Soviet Union acquires and annexes the General Gouvernment (minus Warsaw, which would be German) in addition to the Kresy (eastern Poland) in 1939? In such a scenario, the Soviet Union will expand into clear and indisputable Polish territories as opposed to simply trying to unify the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Does Moscow hold out in 1941, only to fall in 1942?

BTW, might a realistic PoD for this be if the Soviet Union acquires and annexes the General Gouvernment (minus Warsaw, which would be German) in addition to the Kresy (eastern Poland) in 1939? In such a scenario, the Soviet Union will expand into clear and indisputable Polish territories as opposed to simply trying to unify the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples.

Quite possibly and no, I don't think it would be sufficient; the USSR did, after all, invade and annex the Baltics and attack Finland.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
Quite possibly and no, I don't think it would be sufficient; the USSR did, after all, invade and annex the Baltics and attack Finland.

Gotcha. BTW, how would Operation Barbarossa have turned out with Lend-Lease and with the Soviets controlling the General Gouvernment (minus Warsaw) at the start of Operation Barbarossa, in your honest opinion?
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Gotcha. BTW, how would Operation Barbarossa have turned out with Lend-Lease and with the Soviets controlling the General Gouvernment (minus Warsaw) at the start of Operation Barbarossa, in your honest opinion?

Maybe about the same? The Germans would probably achieve an even better earlier encirclement but the need to rebuild the railway network in that area would constitute a serious hurdle.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
What about in terms of their overall advance?

My gut instinct is that it terminates around Smolensk in AGC's sector; if the situation is still sufficient for a Vyzama encirclement though, they'll probably still go for it. Instead, focus will shift on finishing off Kiev and Leningrad as Hitler was leaning towards anyway in August IOTL.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
My gut instinct is that it terminates around Smolensk in AGC's sector; if the situation is still sufficient for a Vyzama encirclement though, they'll probably still go for it. Instead, focus will shift on finishing off Kiev and Leningrad as Hitler was leaning towards anyway in August IOTL.
Is Leningrad actually likely to fall in this TL?

Also, how many additional Soviet Jews are likely to succeed in evacuating to the interior of the USSR in this TL and thus to escape the impending Holocaust?
 

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