Why were the first 14 post-Bismarck years so lacking in war scares?

[raharris1973]

When looked at from a German-centered and continental-centered perspective, the first 14 years after Wilhelm fired Bismarck were less tense in Europe than the preceding Bismarck years of 1862-1889, and the later years of 1905-1914.

in the former era, there were war scares and German general staff advocacy of preventive wars in 1875 and the 1887-1889 period. There was the great eastern crisis of the late1870s and then then Bulgarian and Boulanger crises of the 1880s during Bismarck’s time.
Then after Bismarck gets fired, the supposedly impetuous Wilhelm gets more pliant chancellors and drops Russia, we end up with a period of relative quiet in Europe from 1890-1904. The Franco-Russian alliance happens, but German and Austrian tensions with France and Russia basically subside. The German general staff doesn’t make a peep about preventive war.

this calm in Europe doesn’t last forever, from 1905 to 1914 there is a steady diet of Moroccan and Balkan crises, culminating in WWI.

But I guess my question is, what accounts for the 14 years of quiet and calm in the main vector of European rivalry (1890-1905) right at the time we have all the ingredients in place to plunge the continent into WWI (I’m thinking the opposing Austria-German and Franco-Russian alliances by 1892, impetuous Wilhelm in charge and unfiltered by 1890, etc.)?

 

[stevep]

When looked at from a German-centered and continental-centered perspective, the first 14 years after Wilhelm fired Bismarck were less tense in Europe than the preceding Bismarck years of 1862-1889, and the later years of 1905-1914.

in the former era, there were war scares and German general staff advocacy of preventive wars in 1875 and the 1887-1889 period. There was the great eastern crisis of the late1870s and then then Bulgarian and Boulanger crises of the 1880s during Bismarck’s time.
Then after Bismarck gets fired, the supposedly impetuous Wilhelm gets more pliant chancellors and drops Russia, we end up with a period of relative quiet in Europe from 1890-1904. The Franco-Russian alliance happens, but German and Austrian tensions with France and Russia basically subside. The German general staff doesn’t make a peep about preventive war.

this calm in Europe doesn’t last forever, from 1905 to 1914 there is a steady diet of Moroccan and Balkan crises, culminating in WWI.

But I guess my question is, what accounts for the 14 years of quiet and calm in the main vector of European rivalry (1890-1905) right at the time we have all the ingredients in place to plunge the continent into WWI (I’m thinking the opposing Austria-German and Franco-Russian alliances by 1892, impetuous Wilhelm in charge and unfiltered by 1890, etc.)?

Well the Franco-Russian and German-Austrian alliances were fairly stable in that no one could be sure that a war between them would be won by either side. Plus with Britain as a powerful neutral that could swing either way and other powers such as Italy and Turkey that could place a role there was sufficient insecurity for either side that they could win by starting a war.

Then you have Wilhelm and Tirpitz basically driving Britain into the entente camp and also the slow industrial - and faster demographic - development of Russia and the view from Berlin especially was starting to look darker. Coupled possibly with the development of the Schlieffen Plan as a way of knocking out France quickly which seemed to give Germany a chance of a quick victory but again the clock was clicking with logistical developments in Russia.

Possibly also the future in Austria with the agreement with Hungary due to be renegotiated in 1916 and also by some reports at least Franz Ferdinand was less supportive of the alliance with Germany so that raised other concerns in Berlin and the situation became less and less stable.

Similarly Germany made attempts to disrupt the EP alliances by things such as the Morroccian crisis but in response it tended to tighten links, especially between France and Britain as they saw it as a way of deterring Germany while Germany in turn felt more and more vulnerable but couldn't seem to reverse course.

 

[WolfBear]

Well the Franco-Russian and German-Austrian alliances were fairly stable in that no one could be sure that a war between them would be won by either side. Plus with Britain as a powerful neutral that could swing either way and other powers such as Italy and Turkey that could place a role there was sufficient insecurity for either side that they could win by starting a war.

Then you have Wilhelm and Tirpitz basically driving Britain into the entente camp and also the slow industrial - and faster demographic - development of Russia and the view from Berlin especially was starting to look darker. Coupled possibly with the development of the Schlieffen Plan as a way of knocking out France quickly which seemed to give Germany a chance of a quick victory but again the clock was clicking with logistical developments in Russia.

Possibly also the future in Austria with the agreement with Hungary due to be renegotiated in 1916 and also by some reports at least Franz Ferdinand was less supportive of the alliance with Germany so that raised other concerns in Berlin and the situation became less and less stable.

Similarly Germany made attempts to disrupt the EP alliances by things such as the Morroccian crisis but in response it tended to tighten links, especially between France and Britain as they saw it as a way of deterring Germany while Germany in turn felt more and more vulnerable but couldn't seem to reverse course.

Franz Ferdinand actually did support the alliance with Germany but wanted to keep some distance between both Germany and Russia, according to Ottokar von Czernin's post-WWI memoirs:

The Project Gutenberg eBook of In the World War, by Count Ottokar Czernin

www.gutenberg.org

The Archduke had a special fondness for the navy. His [Pg 51]frequent visits to Brioni brought him into close touch with our navy. He was always anxious to transform the Austrian Navy into one worthy of a Great Power. In regard to foreign policy, the Archduke was always in favour of a Triple Alliance of the three Emperors. The chief motive of this idea must have been that, in the three then apparently so powerful monarchs at Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna, he saw the strongest support against revolution, and wished thereby to build up a strong barrier against disorganisation. He saw great danger to the friendly relations between Russia and ourselves in the rivalry between Vienna and Petersburg in the Balkans, and contrary to the reports that have been spread about him, he was rather a partisan than an opposer of Serbia. He was in favour of the Serbians because he felt assured that the petty agrarian policy of the Magyars was responsible for the constant annoyance of the Serbians. He favoured meeting Serbia half-way, because he considered that the Serbian question was a source of discord between Vienna and Petersburg. Another reason was that he was no friend of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who constantly pursued an anti-Serbian policy. I believe that if those who were responsible for the organisation of the assassination of the Archduke had known what little justification there was for supposing him to be the man they thought him, they would have desisted.

Franz Ferdinand had a very pronounced feeling that in spite of all alliances the Monarchy must remain independent. He was opposed to any closer combine with Germany, not wishing to be bound to Germany more than to Russia, and the plan that was formulated later as "Central Europe" was always far removed from his wishes and endeavours.

Recreating the Triple Alliance would have, of course, been impossible in the near-term due to Russia's alliance with France and the Franco-German Alsace-Lorraine dispute.