What if the wheels weren't squeaky? Global market access for the Axis without World War II?

[raharris1973]

In OTL from 1946-47 (in Italy's case) and about 1950 onward to the present, the former Axis nations of Germany, Japan, and Italy have had pretty open access to the American consumer and capital markets, and to wider global markets supported by first the GATT and then WTO, with special openness for Germany and Italy within the EU.

This was part of deliberate post-WWII and Cold War strategy based on a confluence of events. The fact that some held protectionist blocs responsible for World War Two and perhaps WWI, to provide former enemy states an alternative to the economic autarky they had sought by military conquest, to bind the economies of strategically important states on the "rimlands" of Eurasia closer to North America and help them rebuild, at a time when the US manufacturing lead and share, 50%+, was so strong, that protection from foreign capitalist industrial production was hardly a worry, and the fact that wartime and immediate postwar planning, while bipartisan, was led by the Party traditionally more inclined toward free trade, the Democrats, rather than the more traditionally pro-tariff Republicans.

One could say that in the years leading up to WWII and the war itself, Germany, Italy, and Japan had a right spectacle of themselves, they were, to put it mildly, squeaky wheels, and with the post-war trading order of relatively freer trade, and for several decades, gold convertible currencies, they got the grease.

But what if there was not a World War Two? What if Germany, Japan, and Italy suffered their economic and political malaise in silence at home, without lashing out in external conquest. This could be because they remain functional democracies or authoritarian regimes with restrained, cautious foreign policies, or because they are too riven with internal disorder and factional infighting to consolidate and build up an effective war machine to project power for foreign conquest?

If they never lash out in aggressive warfare, would Germany, Italy, and Japan in the second half of century ever get negotiated and pretty open access to the American, European, and global markets, or would they face high tariff walls almost everywhere, except for exceptional countries more committed to lower tariff policies (like perhaps the British Empire and China)?

 

[sillygoose]

If they never lash out in aggressive warfare, would Germany, Italy, and Japan in the second half of century ever get negotiated and pretty open access to the American, European, and global markets, or would they face high tariff walls almost everywhere, except for exceptional countries more committed to lower tariff policies (like perhaps the British Empire and China)?

What is the POD here? The reason they had to 'lash out' was the Great Depression made it impossible for the existing system to continue functioning since the alternative was communist uprisings, so great was public pressure to do something.

Yes the Axis countries would continue to be beggared by global trade policy, because the 'Haves' were suffering too and didn't want to share. I suppose if you could get Schacht in the top economic policy position in Germany and have him start his trade regime you could see a barter system built up:


People tend to forget WW2 was the entire cause of the post-war 'free' trade system that the US imposed on everyone; without it we'd have a 'every man for himself' global economic system of trade blocs and the global trade system broke down in the aftermath of the Great Depression.

But the issue of the eastern border would still be there, same with trade competition and the ToV limitations. Short of ASB disarming everyone I don't see how it is possible to get the scenario you mention given the pressures and realities of the world at the time.

 

[raharris1973]

So, shorter summary of @sillygoose response is: No. No WWII, no free trade order. Germany, Japan not squeaky wheels, they get no grease.

 

[sillygoose]

So, shorter summary of @sillygoose response is: No. No WWII, no free trade order. Germany, Japan not squeaky wheels, they get no grease.

IOTL Germany and Japan did get grease, the world stepped back and let them reorder their regions to a point. Once they started stepping on toes of global giants they got put on the hit list. Power doesn't give concessions without a demand backed by force, hence the behavior of the Axis powers IOTL, they just pushed further than the 'haves' were willing to tolerate because that meant they would have to give up something and given the economic situation at the time they were unwilling to do so without war.

 

[raharris1973]

IOTL Germany and Japan did get grease, the world stepped back and let them reorder their regions to a point. Once they started stepping on toes of global giants they got put on the hit list. Power doesn't give concessions without a demand backed by force, hence the behavior of the Axis powers IOTL, they just pushed further than the 'haves' were willing to tolerate because that meant they would have to give up something and given the economic situation at the time they were unwilling to do so without war.

They got a little grease for a few years before the war. But the grease I was really referring to in my post and title was the grease they got *after* being totally defeated, access to the postwar global trading system, and while it lasted, the Bretton Woods exchange system.

Even in defeat, the winners (at least the western ones) didn't decide, "no grease for you". So the losers "won" something, through some very, very costly "bargaining". But without "bargaining," they wouldn't have gotten it, you seem to agree.

 

[stevep]

So, shorter summary of @sillygoose response is: No. No WWII, no free trade order. Germany, Japan not squeaky wheels, they get no grease.

Without WWII there's no free trade because there would be multiple competing great powers and under those circumstances the US would definitely not support a world-wide free trade system. By 1931 even Britain had turned its back on the idea in the face of the higher levels of protectionism around the world.

SG is inaccurate about the reasons for both the rise of fascism and its aggressiveness. The primary reason for the aggressiveness of the fascist powers was because they were highly militarised and gloried war and national expansion by military means. There were also desires for territorial expansion in all three primary fascist powers, Germany, Japan and Italy.

 

[sillygoose]

SG is inaccurate about the reasons for both the rise of fascism and its aggressiveness. The primary reason for the aggressiveness of the fascist powers was because they were highly militarised and gloried war and national expansion by military means. There were also desires for territorial expansion in all three primary fascist powers, Germany, Japan and Italy.

We've each laid out our perspectives on this. Frankly you have a very Anglo view of the war that really doesn't account for the perspective of all the different nations involved in the conflict.

I'd suggest challenging yourself and reading the book "The War That Had Many Fathers", which covers much of the various causes that Anglo-American histories leave out because it is inconvenient to the narrative that the Allies wanted to propagate after the war to absolve themselves of any blame. Just remember that the victors write the history and they only want to tell the story that they want. Contrary to what you might think he blames Hitler and the German government quite a bit too; he just contextualizes the actions of the European Axis within the broader context of European politics from pre-WW1 through to the invasion of Poland.

The author gives a lecture here with english subtitles if you want a very abbreviated version of his work:


The reality is there were very strong economic and geo-political reasons for the war that went far beyond 'Axis pure evil, Allies pure good'; the Allies, including the 'neutral' US, had a lot more to do with the causes of the war than anyone in the West wants to admit, since the narrative propagated by the Allies after the war is the foundational basis of the Western world being able to work together.

 

[stevep]

We've each laid out our perspectives on this. Frankly you have a very Anglo view of the war that really doesn't account for the perspective of all the different nations involved in the conflict.

I'd suggest challenging yourself and reading the book "The War That Had Many Fathers", which covers much of the various causes that Anglo-American histories leave out because it is inconvenient to the narrative that the Allies wanted to propagate after the war to absolve themselves of any blame. Just remember that the victors write the history and they only want to tell the story that they want. Contrary to what you might think he blames Hitler and the German government quite a bit too; he just contextualizes the actions of the European Axis within the broader context of European politics from pre-WW1 through to the invasion of Poland.

The author gives a lecture here with english subtitles if you want a very abbreviated version of his work:


The reality is there were very strong economic and geo-political reasons for the war that went far beyond 'Axis pure evil, Allies pure good'; the Allies, including the 'neutral' US, had a lot more to do with the causes of the war than anyone in the West wants to admit, since the narrative propagated by the Allies after the war is the foundational basis of the Western world being able to work together.

I will have a look at it when I get a chance. It will however take a lot to persuade me that Hitler wasn't what he repeatedly claimed to be and that 75+ years of historians have got it totally wrong. Have briefly skimmed through some of the reviews but some bloody odd statements there.

 

[sillygoose]

I will have a look at it when I get a chance. It will however take a lot to persuade me that Hitler wasn't what he repeatedly claimed to be and that 75+ years of historians have got it totally wrong. Have briefly skimmed through some of the reviews but some bloody odd statements there.

Judge for yourself. It is possible to entertain an perspective without accepting it fully, rather just refine your own given new information. I don't expect this will change your mind since you seem pretty firm in your views, but who knows maybe it will alter your views a bit.

 

[stevep]

We've each laid out our perspectives on this. Frankly you have a very Anglo view of the war that really doesn't account for the perspective of all the different nations involved in the conflict.

I'd suggest challenging yourself and reading the book "The War That Had Many Fathers", which covers much of the various causes that Anglo-American histories leave out because it is inconvenient to the narrative that the Allies wanted to propagate after the war to absolve themselves of any blame. Just remember that the victors write the history and they only want to tell the story that they want. Contrary to what you might think he blames Hitler and the German government quite a bit too; he just contextualizes the actions of the European Axis within the broader context of European politics from pre-WW1 through to the invasion of Poland.

The author gives a lecture here with english subtitles if you want a very abbreviated version of his work:


The reality is there were very strong economic and geo-political reasons for the war that went far beyond 'Axis pure evil, Allies pure good'; the Allies, including the 'neutral' US, had a lot more to do with the causes of the war than anyone in the West wants to admit, since the narrative propagated by the Allies after the war is the foundational basis of the Western world being able to work together.

Finally had some time to watch that video and made some notes. He raises some intriguing points but is also evasive at others. Late here so will try and reply in more detail tomorrow.

Steve

 

[sillygoose]

Finally had some time to watch that video and made some notes. He raises some intriguing points but is also evasive at others. Late here so will try and reply in more detail tomorrow.

Steve

I'm curious what your opinion is.
Personally, I don't buy everything he's selling, but it is always helpful to consider another perspective.

 

[stevep]

I'm curious what your opinion is.
Personally, I don't buy everything he's selling, but it is always helpful to consider another perspective.

Made a number of notes but will just cover some of the main points.
a) He makes the comment that if a neighbour has a 3-1 advantage militarily over a country that might be a rival then its intent is aggressive. Of course with the small army limited by Versailles Germany was outnumbered by its neighbours. Greatly so by France until some way into the frenzied rearmament under the Nazis. However with the exception of the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr by France, along with Belgium, in response to Germany failing to make reparation repayments which both countries needed, France made no attack on Germany. Despite having good reason to do so when Hitler renounced the ToV, ended democracy in Germany, started rearming rapidly and abusing assorted internal groups, reoccupying the Rhineland. By any logic this would be a very good reason for France to act militarily while they could do so safely.

If as I suspect he's making reference to the 3-1 'rule' often stated as a need for a successful offensive as an ex military man himself he should know that its a 'rule of thumb' because its dependent on many factors such as troops and leadership quality, morale, equipment, terrain, luck and many other factors. Plus its often overlooked that the rule applies at the point of contact, not over the entire scope of the war.

b) He made comments about the ratio of forces between Germany and France and its allies against Germany. However apart from saying that in the 1920's this didn't include Britain or the US he never said who those allies were? Which makes it impossible to say how accurate or not what he said was. Poland is obviously an ally as both had reason to fear German revanchment but even them and France are not enough to give the was it 93-1 ratio he suggested for France and its allies when fully mobilized compared to Germany.

Similarly he says that France and its allies had a 5-2 ration when war started in 1939. Again without making clear who those allies were. Obviously at this point Poland and Britain would probably be included but what forces? Is he doing something like including colonial forces, especially Indian units for Britain which along with at least some white units are unlikely to be available against Germany because they have commitments elsewhere facing potential threats from other powers or internal unrest.

c) He states that a speech by Hitler to his generals shortly before the invasion of Poland was doctored by the addition of a last sentence that stated Hitler feared someone offering peace. Possibly but that does imply that the rest of the speech was genuine, which made clear his willingness to attack Poland and his contempt for his opponents.

d) He talks about the concerns for the German minority in Poland and there could well have been persecution there against German as well as other minority groups as the Polish leadership of the time. This is supposed to be the driver both for a number of treaties on treatment of minorities, which by implication he's suggesting Poland kept breaching. However later he said relations with Poland were good even after Piłsudski's death, up until March 39 and the annexation of the rump Czech state, which he admits was a mistake by Hitler? Also if the primary concern is the position of the German minority inside Poland how would transferring the corridor to Germany control remove that as an issue as not all the Germans lived there?

e) At one point he mentioned that Hitler delayed the attack on Poland 3 times for further negotiation but then he goes on to say that when he 1st instructed the army to plan for an attack on Poland his date for the attack was 1st September!

f) He mentions Hitler gave a 16 point proposal to Poland but doesn't give details of what those were. Mentions some points which are favourable to Poland but without knowing what the other points are we don't know what the full terms were.

g) Similarly he complains about Britain [which he keeps calling England!] and France being deeply opposed to Germany but totally ignores that Hitler's behaviour with breakneck rearmament - albeit not as large as German propaganda suggested - and repeated breaches of agreements by Hitler as well as his own internal excesses.

h) On the negotiations with Stalin over the pact there are some fishy issues here. Yes Stalin may have pressed the western powers for allowing him to annex the Baltic's and agreeing to that would be morally wrong. [Albeit that in an crisis like this I can see why it might be agreed.] However he gives a very dubious presentation of the German-Soviet negotiations. If he's to be believed there were 4 parts but he only mentions parts 1 & 4 - again giving incomplete information. He suggests initially that those were part 1 - a non-Aggression Pact and part 4 - for the mutual guarantee of the Baltic states. It was only a week before the German attack was due that the Soviets suddenly change this to the historical pact with part 4 now giving them the Baltic's, E Poland and Finland. There are some problems with this.
i) He repeatedly implies an equality between the deal alleged agreed between Stalin and the western powers over the Baltic's and the deal that Germany ultimately agreed, which also included Finland and E Poland.
ii) More seriously if those points were only raised at the last moment he suggesting that Stalin was happy to have Germany occupy all of Poland with nothing for the USSR. Which would be an extremely unbalanced deal, especially considering it was Germany that needed a deal and the previous public hostility of Nazi Germany towards the USSR.
iii) Factually also Hitler did have a choice other than accepting the pact. He could have simply refused to start the war, waiting for a better moment to achieve his aims. Also he could himself do as Stalin did after the German attack on the USSR and leak the Soviet proposals which would have caused serious issues inside Poland at least.

There are other points I could raise but those are the primary ones.

Steve