What if the Germans put the brakes on the Sarajevo Crisis on July 23rd, 1914?

[raharris1973]

What if the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister (agreeing with the Kaiser's inclination) decided on the night of the July 23rd 1914 that the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum was 'good enough', that Austria would no longer be justified in launching a war on Serbia over the assassinations, and Germany informed the Austrians at this point it was no longer obligated to give Austria its unqualified support to protect it against all eventualities should it choose to start a war over the matter?

Do the Austrians gamble on going to war with the Serbians anyway?

Assuming they don't, knowing they don't have German support, how do observers in Vienna, Berlin, Belgrade, St. Petersburg, Paris, London, and "neutral" capitals end up "scoring" this mid-summer diplomatic tussle involving the Sarajevo assassinations, the Austrian ultimatum, and Serbia's prompt acceptance of *most* of the ultimatum.

What reputations do each of the powers walk away with, and how do allies feel about each other.

I imagine Pasic in Serbia will be in domestic political hot water for accepting the parts of the ultimatum he did accept.

I imagine actors in Vienna can instrumentally view it as a victory when they want to feel good, but when they want to call the government weak or argue for war or more punishment of Serbia they can call it a defeat. Austrian circles can and probably will privately fume about the Germans withdrawing the blank check mid crisis.

I think the Germans to themselves can put a happy face on to the crisis, saying they stood by their ally's just demands, and avoided a Europe-wide conference where they'd likely be outvoted. Doomsayers and military leaders would worry Germany has missed the best chance to win/survive an inevitable war.

The French can probably feel like they showed themselves to be solid friends to their Russian allies, but still worry if Russia will keep needing them down the road.

In European politics, the hits keep coming however.

Within a week or two, two new dreadnoughts are due to be delivered to the Ottoman Navy from Britain.

Will the Greeks implement their plan for a preemptive attack on the Turkish fleet and Gallipolli peninsula before the dreadnoughts arrive? Basically at the beginning of August?

If the Greeks do it, will this war remain a bilateral affair, or will the powers take sides?

If so, would anyone have been inclined to pick the Ottoman side at this time?

Could great power intervention in a Greco-Ottoman war have led to pressure on the Ottomans to enact the Ottoman Reform package, greatly weakening their sovereignty? If the Turks refuse to acquiesce, could that lead to a war of partition of the Ottoman Empire?

I imagine, as in OTL, Russia, Britain, and France (and Italy and Greece) would be best positioned to grab slices. Would Austria and Germany sit still while the Entente grows?

Alternatively, might the Greeks hesitate, and the Ottomans get their dreadnoughts. Then the Ottomans perhaps start a war with the Greeks over the eastern Aegean islands. Or the Ottomans remain peaceable, with a strong deterrent. If the Ottomans start a war, do the powers get in or stay out?

Supposing there's no Greco-Ottoman war at all in 1914 to draw in the powers, what will be the Irish situation by Jan 1915?

Will there be any new alliances in the Balkans? Perhaps the Austrians, Bulgarians, and Ottomans moving closer together?

If there's no European wars between 1914 and 1916, how will internal German and French politics be developing in that time?

How will the transition from Franz Joseph to Karl go, and the next Ausgleich negotiations between Austria and Hungary?

If that somehow got violent, would Austria-Hungary's neighbors leave A-H alone to solve its problems, or alone to solve it with its German ally? Or would neighboring countries like Italy, Serbia, Romania, Russia possibly get involved then, perhaps kicking off WWI that way?

Will Anglo-Russian arrangements over Persia still hold, or break down?

 

[Buba]

The French can probably feel like they showed themselves to be solid friends to their Russian allies, but still worry if Russia will keep needing them down the road.

The French will worry over what next new clusterfuck will the Russians drag them into ...
The French need the Russians and they have invested lots of capital (money) in the form of cheap loans there, funding the construction of economically unviable (at least at such scale) railways to transport Russian troops to the western border.
But the Russians - as there are still shreds of sanity floating about in Sankt Peterburg - know that they need the French too. During the Balkan Wars related war scares involving Russia and A-H the French told them "lolnope" and Russia stood down from its "Russia pee-pee stronk" posturing.

I'm sorry to say I'm not knowledgeable enough to contribute much
Due to the stupidity slushing about by the bucketful in European capitals events are IMO difficult to predict.
I'd expect the 1915 military budget of A-H to be much larger than that for 1914, though.

Another player in the Aegan is Italy - it has not given back the islands it was supposed to return to Turkey in ... 1912.

 

[Atarlost]

Well, at least you can stop worrying about Ireland starting a war. I can't imagine enough nations thinking they're worth facing the Royal Navy over to form a coalition that actually has a chance, especially since if the US gets involved Japan probably sides with England to take us down a notch.

 

[Husky_Khan]

Maybe negotiations after the Serbian Crisis is resolved can have Germany try and guarantee that Britain, France and Russia won't gangbang Ottoman Turkey in case of a Bilateral War between Greece and Turkey, especially if Greece is the aggressor.

Italy might be another story, but having the conflict contained to Italy and Greece and the Ottomans is probably still far more limited then a War that could drag in all of the major powers. And most outcomes of potential conflict are preferable to what we got with the Great War in almost every measure.

It does almost seem like an inevitability that the Ottomans would be further reduced because as stated earlier in the thread, they do require reforms to stay afloat. And the European powers, even ones with semi-decent relationships with the Ottomans at the time like Britain and Germany, wouldn't just stand aside. Britain (and France) obviously wanted bits of the Middle East and Germany its cool railroad through the Middle East and Balkans but hopefully they can talk out their differences instead of warring over the crumbling of the Ottomans before they potentially reform into a smaller and more stable state.

 

[raharris1973]

funding the construction of economically unviable (at least at such scale) railways to transport Russian troops to the western border.

Well, I guess those railroads are ubiquitous enough bring enough Polish and Ukrainian seasonal migrant workers to bring in the eastern German harvests for pay rates German Junkers are willing to pay and German farmworkers are no longer willing to accept. Since those low end customers can only pay the cheapest fares the companies have to make up what they lose on price with volume.

During the Balkan Wars related war scares involving Russia and A-H the French told them "lolnope" and Russia stood down from its "Russia pee-pee stronk" posturing.

Most of what I've seen on this subject says that by 1914, the French, under Poincare's domineering influence, had definitely changed their tune and were making very clear to the Russians that their solidarity with the Russians extended all the way to Russia's Balkan interests as well. In essence, during his July travels to Russia, Poincare was giving the Russians just as much a blank check as the Germans gave the Austrians. The French, or Poincare's motive for sucking up more unconditionally to Russia? Non-stop revanchism? Not exactly. Fear the Germans were getting impossibly stronger? Not exactly either. Apparently it was because Poincare feared *Russia* was soon going to be so strong it wouldn't need any allies at all, and so France felt it had it better to "catch" the next crisis where Russia's interests were at stake to have a war with Russia onside (and Sarajevo fit the bill) because if it waited until it was a French issue, like another Morocco-like crisis, Russia could blow it off.*

*I don't know what stance exactly Russia took in the 2nd Morocco Crisis. In "scoring" that crisis, France "won" in that it annexed Morocco, but "lost" in that it had to give Germany territory in equatorial Africa in compensation.

I'd expect the 1915 military budget of A-H to be much larger than that for 1914, though.

Good point. And about freaking time.

Another player in the Aegan is Italy - it has not given back the islands it was supposed to return to Turkey in ... 1912.

Also a good point. In my speculations on a Greco-Ottoman war, I suppose unless either party wants to bring Italy into the fight, they better stick to northeast Aegean islands, north of the Dodecanese, to avoid the Italians. Even then, they better hope the Italians don't find it in their interest to get involved.

 

[raharris1973]

Well, at least you can stop worrying about Ireland starting a war. I can't imagine enough nations thinking they're worth facing the Royal Navy over to form a coalition that actually has a chance, especially since if the US gets involved Japan probably sides with England to take us down a notch.

Were you reacting to my statement here?

what will be the Irish situation by Jan 1915?

I wasn't suggesting any sort of *international* war over Ireland, silly, but possibly a civil war within Ireland and Britain itself.

 

[stevep]

Interesting possibility. It would calm things down a good bit although there are still a lot of tensions and Germany especially is widely considered to be operating on a limited schedule given its widely stated fears about when the Russian railway system is upgraded. Of course as long as their war plan is an attack on France via Belgium regardless of circumstances that's still going to cause both a coalition war and at the least serious concerns in London. Of course there is the possibility that Germany might change its plans for a defensive strategy and to improve relations with Britain but that would seem unlikely with the people currently in power.

Plus as stated Austria has a couple of ticking bombs in terms of the renegotiation of the treaty between Austria and Hungary and when FJ finally dies and control now passes to Karl. The latter wanted at least some reforms and to give a lot more power to the Slavic populations to keep many of them in-line. If there's a new deal with Hungary before he takes over then that could be blocked depending on the details. If he gets involved in it then elements in Budapest are going to be very unhappy but would they risk war? Especially since I have heard that the main problems would be the Magyar aristocracy and they might be brought into line by threatening a more general franchise which would undermine their power.

In terms of the Ottomans Britain at least already has the territories that it desired. Egypt and Cyprus while still techncially part of the [Ottoman] empire are under British control the former giving security for the canal and the latter another useful naval base in the region. There will be sympathy for the subject Christian populations, both because of the Turkish tendency for bloody pogroms and the strong Greecophil character of much of British culture but its unlikely to bring Britain in to a carve up of the empire unless it becomes a major war.

The other Balkan states are too divided after the 2nd Balkan war to really threaten the empire unless it falters further. Unless they get support from a big power - Russia or Italy being the likely ones - their not going to do anything with the possible exception of the Greeks panicking prior to the dreadnoughts reaching Turkey.

I think the agreement in Iran is stable as long as both Britain and Russia are more concerned about Germany than each other.

Ireland could well be a mess and how much impact it would have on Britain is difficult to say. OTL Redmond missed one chance to make a deal with the Unionists which would have removed most of the problems but likely to have the nutters on both sides seeking to derail things. Hopefully a more lasting deal could be arranged which would benefit all parties, other than those same nutters of course.

 

[PsihoKekec]

The French will worry over what next new clusterfuck will the Russians drag them into ...

Worry? The French were pressing the Russians to go all the way in backing of Serbia, their government was looking forward to the war.

 

[Buba]

@raharris1973 @Butch R. Mann
Thank you for explaining to me how the French were war-hungry as well.

 

[stevep]

Worry? The French were pressing the Russians to go all the way in backing of Serbia, their government was looking forward to the war.

Evidence please? At the time when the crisis 1st developed the French President was on a visit to St Petersburg and I have read that the Germans adviced Vienna not to pressure Serbia until he was on his way home, by sea, to make it more difficult for France and Russia to discuss the issue.

 

[ATP]

What if the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister (agreeing with the Kaiser's inclination) decided on the night of the July 23rd 1914 that the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum was 'good enough', that Austria would no longer be justified in launching a war on Serbia over the assassinations, and Germany informed the Austrians at this point it was no longer obligated to give Austria its unqualified support to protect it against all eventualities should it choose to start a war over the matter?

Do the Austrians gamble on going to war with the Serbians anyway?

Assuming they don't, knowing they don't have German support, how do observers in Vienna, Berlin, Belgrade, St. Petersburg, Paris, London, and "neutral" capitals end up "scoring" this mid-summer diplomatic tussle involving the Sarajevo assassinations, the Austrian ultimatum, and Serbia's prompt acceptance of *most* of the ultimatum.

What reputations do each of the powers walk away with, and how do allies feel about each other.

I imagine Pasic in Serbia will be in domestic political hot water for accepting the parts of the ultimatum he did accept.

I imagine actors in Vienna can instrumentally view it as a victory when they want to feel good, but when they want to call the government weak or argue for war or more punishment of Serbia they can call it a defeat. Austrian circles can and probably will privately fume about the Germans withdrawing the blank check mid crisis.

I think the Germans to themselves can put a happy face on to the crisis, saying they stood by their ally's just demands, and avoided a Europe-wide conference where they'd likely be outvoted. Doomsayers and military leaders would worry Germany has missed the best chance to win/survive an inevitable war.

The French can probably feel like they showed themselves to be solid friends to their Russian allies, but still worry if Russia will keep needing them down the road.

In European politics, the hits keep coming however.

Within a week or two, two new dreadnoughts are due to be delivered to the Ottoman Navy from Britain.

Will the Greeks implement their plan for a preemptive attack on the Turkish fleet and Gallipolli peninsula before the dreadnoughts arrive? Basically at the beginning of August?

If the Greeks do it, will this war remain a bilateral affair, or will the powers take sides?

If so, would anyone have been inclined to pick the Ottoman side at this time?

Could great power intervention in a Greco-Ottoman war have led to pressure on the Ottomans to enact the Ottoman Reform package, greatly weakening their sovereignty? If the Turks refuse to acquiesce, could that lead to a war of partition of the Ottoman Empire?

I imagine, as in OTL, Russia, Britain, and France (and Italy and Greece) would be best positioned to grab slices. Would Austria and Germany sit still while the Entente grows?

Alternatively, might the Greeks hesitate, and the Ottomans get their dreadnoughts. Then the Ottomans perhaps start a war with the Greeks over the eastern Aegean islands. Or the Ottomans remain peaceable, with a strong deterrent. If the Ottomans start a war, do the powers get in or stay out?

Supposing there's no Greco-Ottoman war at all in 1914 to draw in the powers, what will be the Irish situation by Jan 1915?

Will there be any new alliances in the Balkans? Perhaps the Austrians, Bulgarians, and Ottomans moving closer together?

If there's no European wars between 1914 and 1916, how will internal German and French politics be developing in that time?

How will the transition from Franz Joseph to Karl go, and the next Ausgleich negotiations between Austria and Hungary?

If that somehow got violent, would Austria-Hungary's neighbors leave A-H alone to solve its problems, or alone to solve it with its German ally? Or would neighboring countries like Italy, Serbia, Romania, Russia possibly get involved then, perhaps kicking off WWI that way?

Will Anglo-Russian arrangements over Persia still hold, or break down?

Not possible.Russian economy become stronger every year,and army better.German wonted war till 1916,becouse they feared that they would lost.But,let assume that germans did so:

1.If Greek attacks,Serbia would join.Maybe even Bulgary and Romania/i doubt it/. if they score few victories,Russia and Italy would join,too.France and England later.End of Ottoman empire.
No success - nothing change.

2.Without war,we could see some kind of partition of A-H,if germany agreed to take only austrian territories and let Russia take rest.If not,WW1 with weaker central powers.

3.If Russia could take part of Turkey,they would keep agreement about Persia.If not,not.

 

[PsihoKekec]

Evidence please? At the time when the crisis 1st developed the French President was on a visit to St Petersburg and I have read that the Germans adviced Vienna not to pressure Serbia until he was on his way home, by sea, to make it more difficult for France and Russia to discuss the issue.

It's in The Sleepwalkers, the Russians knew of the rough outline of the ultimatum from their spy network and Poincare was crucial in convincing Nicky /and more importantly - those around Nicky) to stick to Serbia no matter the content of the final draft.

 

[raharris1973]

Of course as long as their war plan is an attack on France via Belgium regardless of circumstances

It would be interesting to see if that continues to be the German plan in 1915, 1916, 1917 and so on, or if they restore and Aufmarsch Ost option. As recently as the 1912-1913 planning year, the Germans had maintained an Aufmarsch Ost option, in addition to Aufmarsch West, aka, the Schlieffen Plan.

Of course there is the possibility that Germany might change ... improve relations with Britain but that would seem unlikely with the people currently in power.

Strictly bilateral Anglo-German relations weren't too bad in 1912-1914. The Germans pretty much conceded the naval race by around 1912 and shifted emphasis back to land armaments (they had little choice, having to catch up with French and Russian build-ups). The British and Germans had some tentative paper agreements about contingencies for the Portuguese colonies and ironed out what had been tensions over the Berlin-Baghdad railway project.

The last people who the Germans were really playing brinkmanship games with were the French in the 1911 2nd Morocco crisis, where they compelled the French to offer them some equatorial African land in compensation for the completion of the French takeover of Morocco. The Russians also chose to take the Ottoman hiring of Liman Von Sanders as a major army commander as an example of Germany getting in its grill, flipped out, and got the Germans to back down.

Germany wasn't getting in Britain's grill in the same way. But, the problem both Britain and Germany had is they were both more and more irrevocably committed to their alliances, and their alliances were on a collision course getting ever tighter during the Balkan Wars.

Especially since I have heard that the main problems would be the Magyar aristocracy and they might be brought into line by threatening a more general franchise which would undermine their power.

Good points both.

 

[raharris1973]

1.If Greek attacks,Serbia would join.

What could Serbia possibly gain from attacking the Ottoman Empire in 1914 or later, when it doesn't have a common border with it?

Maybe even Bulgary and Romania/i doubt it/.

What could Romania gain from the Ottoman Empire, when it doesn't have a common border with it? Bulgaria can try to join the fight for Thrace, as much in competition with Greece as in cooperation.

they score few victories,Russia and Italy would join,too.

Russia could join in, for, or against Ottomans, as much in competition against Greeks and Bulgarians as in cooperation with them, but yes, they certainly want a pound of flesh, they want the straits and the Armenian issue is also an excuse to get involved.

What else would Italy want from the Ottomans so soon, when it's busy wasting money pacifying the Libyan sandbox?

Without war,we could see some kind of partition of A-H,if germany agreed to take only austrian territories and let Russia take rest.

Galicia is technically in the Austrian half, but I imagine you would see the Russians getting that, right? Plus all of Hungary? That's quite a lot.

 

[ATP]

What could Serbia possibly gain from attacking the Ottoman Empire in 1914 or later, when it doesn't have a common border with it?



What could Romania gain from the Ottoman Empire, when it doesn't have a common border with it? Bulgaria can try to join the fight for Thrace, as much in competition with Greece as in cooperation.



Russia could join in, for, or against Ottomans, as much in competition against Greeks and Bulgarians as in cooperation with them, but yes, they certainly want a pound of flesh, they want the straits and the Armenian issue is also an excuse to get involved.

What else would Italy want from the Ottomans so soon, when it's busy wasting money pacifying the Libyan sandbox?



Galicia is technically in the Austrian half, but I imagine you would see the Russians getting that, right? Plus all of Hungary? That's quite a lot.

Serbia would send help to show,that they are local power.
Romania - you are right,Bulgary - the same,but they do not fight Greeks unless they start loosing.
Russia- they always wonted Constantinopole for themselves,and tsar could even really belived in legend of missing priest/priest hide in the wall of Haghia Sophia and would come back when christian reclaim it/
They would attack even if Greek start loosing.
Italy - you are right.

Russian really would wont Galicia,and let germans take only ethnic german territories.So,i do not belive Germans would agree.
I think,we would have WW1 later - but without England.In OTL they joined becouse Germans could win otherwise,now with stronger Russia? they would be happy to see both sides bleed white.

 

[stevep]

It's in The Sleepwalkers, the Russians knew of the rough outline of the ultimatum from their spy network and Poincare was crucial in convincing Nicky /and more importantly - those around Nicky) to stick to Serbia no matter the content of the final draft.

Interesting thanks. I can see the comments on wiki about it, here which mentions its gathered criticism in Germany for ignoring the forces in Germany pressing for war but unfortunately nothing on the Franco-Russian discussions. There are only two reviews one of which gives no commentary but gives 2/5 and the only thing we know is its from someone in the US and the other from the UK who gives it 4/5 but does express some doubts about elements in it.

What is the wording of Poincare's comments please? Is " to stick to Serbia no matter the content of the final draft" what Poincare say's, how Clark interpret it or how you interpret it? Note I'm not saying that Germany was solely responsible for the disaster but questioning the suggestion I've met here and elsewhere that it was everybody but Germany that was to blame.

 

[stevep]

It would be interesting to see if that continues to be the German plan in 1915, 1916, 1917 and so on, or if they restore and Aufmarsch Ost option. As recently as the 1912-1913 planning year, the Germans had maintained an Aufmarsch Ost option, in addition to Aufmarsch West, aka, the Schlieffen Plan.

I think the problem would be the culture of the army and inertia. The general view in I think all the big continental powers was that while bloody the war would be quick and the side that struck 1st would have the advantage. Which to a degree Germany did have in 1914 due to its conquest of virtually all Belgium and the most industrialized area of France, which did significantly weaken France in later years - albeit with the markedly greater cost once it failed in its strategic aims - by bringing a pretty much united Britain into the conflict against them. Everybody, but probably especially the Germans looked to the successes of Prussia in 1864-70 in quickly defeating its opponents, as the way war would be waged.

As such I think it would be difficult for any power but possibly especially Germany, because of its location and the fact it had been Prussian/German forces that had set that standard, to consider a purely defensive stance. Possibly a defence in the west and offensive in the east but, especially since the Russians are likely to get wind of this and change their own strategy and given the vast size of the Russian empire its a long way toward anything really important while fighting off the French in the west. At most its likely to mean a long war and at the time I don't think anyone thought that would be either possible or viable. True that is inaccurate - especially if Germany avoids war with Britain - but very few people expected a long war in 1914. [I think Lord Kitchner is the only significant military figures I'm aware of with that viewpoint.]

Strictly bilateral Anglo-German relations weren't too bad in 1912-1914. The Germans pretty much conceded the naval race by around 1912 and shifted emphasis back to land armaments (they had little choice, having to catch up with French and Russian build-ups). The British and Germans had some tentative paper agreements about contingencies for the Portuguese colonies and ironed out what had been tensions over the Berlin-Baghdad railway project.

The last people who the Germans were really playing brinkmanship games with were the French in the 1911 2nd Morocco crisis, where they compelled the French to offer them some equatorial African land in compensation for the completion of the French takeover of Morocco. The Russians also chose to take the Ottoman hiring of Liman Von Sanders as a major army commander as an example of Germany getting in its grill, flipped out, and got the Germans to back down.

Germany wasn't getting in Britain's grill in the same way. But, the problem both Britain and Germany had is they were both more and more irrevocably committed to their alliances, and their alliances were on a collision course getting ever tighter during the Balkan Wars.

True the hostility and mistrust were less deep rooted than with France or possibly even Russia but Germany was definitely threatening Britain's vital interests by its naval challenge. While Tirpitz is in charge of the navy and pushing for more and more ships and Wilhelm was making anti-British statements so frequently there was always going to be tension. Especially since Tirpitz had managed to get the size of the fleet fixed by law in a way that bypassed the German parliament's ability to check it. I think it would have needed some agreement that saw the German capital ship force reduced - which would have enabled the RN to do likewise - to have really reduced tensions. [Plus of course no interference in support of extremists in Ireland]. Either than or if Russia starts looking too powerful, which could occur a few years down the line.

Without the attack through Belgium you would get more division inside Britain if the continental powers went to war - especially if it looked like the CPs were on the defensive rather than the aggressor. As such Germany could well avoid British intervention and have the UK largely neutral although its likely to seek to settle the conflict by negotiation - both to avoid the disruption of trade and commercial activity and also either side winning big. In such a conflict Germany and Austria could well 'win', i.e. avoid being defeated and seeing their opponents weakened, possibly with some limited territorial gains.

 

[stevep]

What could Serbia possibly gain from attacking the Ottoman Empire in 1914 or later, when it doesn't have a common border with it?



What could Romania gain from the Ottoman Empire, when it doesn't have a common border with it? Bulgaria can try to join the fight for Thrace, as much in competition with Greece as in cooperation.



Russia could join in, for, or against Ottomans, as much in competition against Greeks and Bulgarians as in cooperation with them, but yes, they certainly want a pound of flesh, they want the straits and the Armenian issue is also an excuse to get involved.

What else would Italy want from the Ottomans so soon, when it's busy wasting money pacifying the Libyan sandbox?



Galicia is technically in the Austrian half, but I imagine you would see the Russians getting that, right? Plus all of Hungary? That's quite a lot.

Fully agree. Serbia might join the conflict if Bulgaria attacked Greece which it might since Bulgarian differences are more with Greece and Serbia by 1914. Russia might also see that [a Bulgarian attack on Greece] as a suitable casus belli but that could well escalate it into a general conflict.

Romania has no real interest in conflict with the Ottomans, since they lack a common border and furthermore want the straits open for their trade. They have tensions with both Russia and Austria and will not want Bulgaria get too strong but are likely to seek neutrality in a local conflict.

Italy I can't see being likely to engage in a war on either side given it has relatively little to gain. At least as long as the conflict stays confined to the Balkans.

There are a lot of Slavs who are unhappy with being in the Austrian empire - especially the Hungarian parts. How many would be willing to stay in a more liberal empire under Karl say is difficult to tell, especially if the alternative is coming under Russian, German or Hungarian control. No one but Russia - and the wiser Russians would have concern - would want to absorb all the Slavic parts of the Austrian empire, let alone the Magyar regions and with the exception of France because it needs Russia as a balance against Germany every other major power would oppose it. Plus the Catholic Slavs are likely to prefer some form of Austrian rule rather than being under Orthodox Russia.

 

[PsihoKekec]

criticism in Germany for ignoring the forces in Germany pressing for war

Yes I got that impression as well, some details of German politics I was aware of were simply omitted from the book, I chalked it up to how the author was compensating for century of Germany having full blame for the start of war heaped upon it. But other than that flaw, it is quite comprehensive work on how European states blundered into war that most didn't want.

What is the wording of Poincare's comments please?

From what I recall (I don't have the book anymore) there are no notes of the meetings in the archives, so it's mostly compiled from various memoirs and diaries, who are not exactly in agreement with each other, but it can be narrowed to both countries showing no weakness to the Central Powers, so Serbia should be supported, with Poincare talking Nicky out of his usual meandering. However due to Russian diplomacy being rather fractured (not helped by the fact their ambassador in Belgrade dropped dead - in Austrian embassy of all places), Serbia got only some lukewarm reassurances by the time of the ultimatum.

 

[stevep]

Yes I got that impression as well, some details of German politics I was aware of were simply omitted from the book, I chalked it up to how the author was compensating for century of Germany having full blame for the start of war heaped upon it. But other than that flaw, it is quite comprehensive work on how European states blundered into war that most didn't want.


From what I recall (I don't have the book anymore) there are no notes of the meetings in the archives, so it's mostly compiled from various memoirs and diaries, who are not exactly in agreement with each other, but it can be narrowed to both countries showing no weakness to the Central Powers, so Serbia should be supported, with Poincare talking Nicky out of his usual meandering. However due to Russian diplomacy being rather fractured (not helped by the fact their ambassador in Belgrade dropped dead - in Austrian embassy of all places), Serbia got only some lukewarm reassurances by the time of the ultimatum.

OK, many thanks for the quick response.