raharris1973
Well-known member
The historic three partitions of Poland were played out between 1772 and 1795, 23 years. What if they were completed in a more compressed timeframe, 11 years, so liquidating Poland by 1783, time coincident with the Treaty of Paris ending the American Revolutionary War/Anglo-Bourbon War/4th Anglo-Dutch War?
I think this could have been quite doable through mild alterations in diplomacy amongst Frederick of Prussia, Joseph and Maria Teresa of Austria, Catherine the Great of Russia, and encouraged possibly by some slightly different events or disturbances from within Poland itself during this time that were missing in OTL. Powers that might have lodged some meaningful objection to 2nd or 3rd partitions of Poland, particularly over the period 1778-1783, like France or Britain, were notably busy fighting each other in the Atlantic. A big obstacle to Eastern (or Northern, as they were called at time) powers cooperation to partition Poland one would have to remove would be to eliminate the waste of time, money, and lives that was the intra-German, Austria versus Prussia & Saxony, War of Bavarian Succession, over 1778-1779.
Perhaps the War of Bavarian Succession could be avoided thusly: Frederick the Great in 1778, despite the passage of 15 years time since the end of the 7 Years War and Prussia's brush with destruction, is even more "war-shy" than he was historically. In OTL's Bavarian Succession War, his loss-aversion less him to conduct the war cautiously, very, very rarely committing to battle and mainly conducting stand-offs, maneuvers, and skirmishes to frustrate Austrian ambition. In the ATL, it leads him to be ready to diplomatically bargain for an alternative to war entirely. Somebody from the staff of Freddy the Great approaches the staff of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, during the Bavarian Succession Crisis and ultimately concedes as a bottom line that Prussia can give way to the territorial exchange between the Habsburgs and Wittelsbachs that nets upper (northeastern) Bavaria and upper Palatinate for Austria in exchange for part of the Austrian Netherlands for the Wittelsbachs [the proposed Habsburg-Wittelsbach bargain of 1778 was *not*, as some think, for an exchange of the entirety of Bavaria for the entirety of Austrian Netherlands/Belgium], and Prussia swallows this because it (and Russia) get to take 'compensation' in the form of a second partition of Poland, from which Austria abstains.
This 'second partition of Poland' in territorial terms equates to the second partition imposed on Poland by Russia and Prussia in OTL 1793, only the Poles are forced to swallow under dual power pressure in 1779 here. Saxony cannot go to war over the Bavaria issue without Prussia. Enforcing the partition will require shooting and movement of Prussian and Russian troops for occupation and pacification, but will not have nearly the same risk, cost, that would have been associated with even a pretty low-intensity Austria vs. Prussia war.
In all likelihood, the massive partitions shrinking Poland in 1779 will probably drive its political culture bananas with backlash and revolutionary ferment. By 1779, or no later than 1780, some noted Polish volunteers with the Continental Army like Pulaski and Kosciusko will almost certainly journey back home and look to lead rebellion or prepare for anticipated attack. Actual rebellion or drastic reform moves are highly likely to emerge by 1780-81 that lead to a third and final partition of Poland by 1782-83, this time liquidating the state, with all three "Black Eagles", Austria, Prussia, and Russia, partaking of territory. The nice thing - for the partitioners - is that any strong potentially objecting powers, like France or Britain, are too distracted through that time by the American Revolutionary War. The Ottomans and Swedes may have objections but are too weak to intervene.
A knock-on consequence could be large Polish émigré movements by nobility and intelligentsia, especially to France, but possibly some to Netherlands and London, start earlier than historically.
A further knock-on consequence is that Catherine the Great's timetable for annexing Crimea might be adjusted for a year or two, perhaps delayed to 1784 or 1785 instead of happening in 1783, because that year she is perhaps preoccupied with integrating the new annexation of Lithuania.
Overall, the historical differences may be slight or insignificant, especially as we get to the medium or long-term, especially depending on how weak or powerfully we think butterflies' wings will propel winds of change over only half a decade to a decade. On the map of Europe after all, we are only anticipating the borders of 1795 by a dozen years, in 1783.
However, there might be some interesting internal consequences in these lands. Russia gains the great bulk of its Jewry population and lands that became the Pale of Settlement lands about a decade earlier than OTL history, and needs to deal with all the associated administrative, bureaucratic and cross-cultural challenges. This is alongside gaining much larger Roman Catholic and Uniate populations. Prussia gains a large Catholic Polish speaking population and Yiddish-speaking Jewish population a decade earlier than historical, and its incorporation of these populations into its educational systems and military recruitment pool could have some interesting effects. In the Austrian zone, that includes Cracow and New Galicia a decade earlier, they get to experience the Josephine reforms doing away with obligations of serfdom and reducing the degree of Catholic clerical authority.
Plus, with new Central-East European borders settled at "Three Emperor's Corner" between Russia, Prussia, and Austria near the Vistula as early as 1783 - instead of 1795, these eastern monarchies now have time to get 'bored', a little restless, even 'footloose' before they get totally absorbed into the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. They say 'idle hands are the devil's playground'. Well, if the next Russo-Ottoman War starts on OTL schedule in 1787, and Austria also joins in like OTL, both of these powers, their frontiers 'satiated' in the north, might be insistent on exiting this Turkish war with some substantial Balkan and Caucasian territorial gains at Ottoman expense rather than none (as in the case of Austria, despite its operations ranging through Wallachia, Serbia and Bosnia) or modest (the Russian gains of the Ochakov district on the Black Sea and the Dniester frontier).
I think this could have been quite doable through mild alterations in diplomacy amongst Frederick of Prussia, Joseph and Maria Teresa of Austria, Catherine the Great of Russia, and encouraged possibly by some slightly different events or disturbances from within Poland itself during this time that were missing in OTL. Powers that might have lodged some meaningful objection to 2nd or 3rd partitions of Poland, particularly over the period 1778-1783, like France or Britain, were notably busy fighting each other in the Atlantic. A big obstacle to Eastern (or Northern, as they were called at time) powers cooperation to partition Poland one would have to remove would be to eliminate the waste of time, money, and lives that was the intra-German, Austria versus Prussia & Saxony, War of Bavarian Succession, over 1778-1779.
Perhaps the War of Bavarian Succession could be avoided thusly: Frederick the Great in 1778, despite the passage of 15 years time since the end of the 7 Years War and Prussia's brush with destruction, is even more "war-shy" than he was historically. In OTL's Bavarian Succession War, his loss-aversion less him to conduct the war cautiously, very, very rarely committing to battle and mainly conducting stand-offs, maneuvers, and skirmishes to frustrate Austrian ambition. In the ATL, it leads him to be ready to diplomatically bargain for an alternative to war entirely. Somebody from the staff of Freddy the Great approaches the staff of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, during the Bavarian Succession Crisis and ultimately concedes as a bottom line that Prussia can give way to the territorial exchange between the Habsburgs and Wittelsbachs that nets upper (northeastern) Bavaria and upper Palatinate for Austria in exchange for part of the Austrian Netherlands for the Wittelsbachs [the proposed Habsburg-Wittelsbach bargain of 1778 was *not*, as some think, for an exchange of the entirety of Bavaria for the entirety of Austrian Netherlands/Belgium], and Prussia swallows this because it (and Russia) get to take 'compensation' in the form of a second partition of Poland, from which Austria abstains.
This 'second partition of Poland' in territorial terms equates to the second partition imposed on Poland by Russia and Prussia in OTL 1793, only the Poles are forced to swallow under dual power pressure in 1779 here. Saxony cannot go to war over the Bavaria issue without Prussia. Enforcing the partition will require shooting and movement of Prussian and Russian troops for occupation and pacification, but will not have nearly the same risk, cost, that would have been associated with even a pretty low-intensity Austria vs. Prussia war.
In all likelihood, the massive partitions shrinking Poland in 1779 will probably drive its political culture bananas with backlash and revolutionary ferment. By 1779, or no later than 1780, some noted Polish volunteers with the Continental Army like Pulaski and Kosciusko will almost certainly journey back home and look to lead rebellion or prepare for anticipated attack. Actual rebellion or drastic reform moves are highly likely to emerge by 1780-81 that lead to a third and final partition of Poland by 1782-83, this time liquidating the state, with all three "Black Eagles", Austria, Prussia, and Russia, partaking of territory. The nice thing - for the partitioners - is that any strong potentially objecting powers, like France or Britain, are too distracted through that time by the American Revolutionary War. The Ottomans and Swedes may have objections but are too weak to intervene.
A knock-on consequence could be large Polish émigré movements by nobility and intelligentsia, especially to France, but possibly some to Netherlands and London, start earlier than historically.
A further knock-on consequence is that Catherine the Great's timetable for annexing Crimea might be adjusted for a year or two, perhaps delayed to 1784 or 1785 instead of happening in 1783, because that year she is perhaps preoccupied with integrating the new annexation of Lithuania.
Overall, the historical differences may be slight or insignificant, especially as we get to the medium or long-term, especially depending on how weak or powerfully we think butterflies' wings will propel winds of change over only half a decade to a decade. On the map of Europe after all, we are only anticipating the borders of 1795 by a dozen years, in 1783.
However, there might be some interesting internal consequences in these lands. Russia gains the great bulk of its Jewry population and lands that became the Pale of Settlement lands about a decade earlier than OTL history, and needs to deal with all the associated administrative, bureaucratic and cross-cultural challenges. This is alongside gaining much larger Roman Catholic and Uniate populations. Prussia gains a large Catholic Polish speaking population and Yiddish-speaking Jewish population a decade earlier than historical, and its incorporation of these populations into its educational systems and military recruitment pool could have some interesting effects. In the Austrian zone, that includes Cracow and New Galicia a decade earlier, they get to experience the Josephine reforms doing away with obligations of serfdom and reducing the degree of Catholic clerical authority.
Plus, with new Central-East European borders settled at "Three Emperor's Corner" between Russia, Prussia, and Austria near the Vistula as early as 1783 - instead of 1795, these eastern monarchies now have time to get 'bored', a little restless, even 'footloose' before they get totally absorbed into the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. They say 'idle hands are the devil's playground'. Well, if the next Russo-Ottoman War starts on OTL schedule in 1787, and Austria also joins in like OTL, both of these powers, their frontiers 'satiated' in the north, might be insistent on exiting this Turkish war with some substantial Balkan and Caucasian territorial gains at Ottoman expense rather than none (as in the case of Austria, despite its operations ranging through Wallachia, Serbia and Bosnia) or modest (the Russian gains of the Ochakov district on the Black Sea and the Dniester frontier).