raharris1973
Well-known member
North Vietnam managed to weather the the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s pretty well, although it feared the split would leave it disastrously exposed and isolated in the face of American hostility. The Sino-Soviet split may have even *aided* the North Vietnamese by spurring each side to show they could do *more* to help North Vietnam.
Even as Sino-Soviet polemics and then military border clashes worsened and almost led to war in 1969, trainloads of Soviet supplies flowed through China to North Vietnam, until at least 1970. (There's allegations of China looting, obstructing, or pilfering Soviet shipments, but it's hard to separate fact from fiction, and allegations would be convenient considering poor Chinese relations with the Soviets and Vietnamese from the mid 70s through the 80s).
Ultimately, during the Vietnam war from 64 and 65 on both sides sent arms to the Vietnamese, with Soviets taking up an ever increasing share. The Soviets bolstered North Vietnamese air defenses, but from 65 or 66-71 the Chinese supplied much more labor intensive aid including stationing of ground troops in the north, and having them work on numerous reconstruction and damage repair tasks.
Going back to before the mid-decade escalation-
In Khrushchev's last years, after the Laos neutralization settlement of 1962 and before his ouster of 1964, he pretty much wrote off North Vietnam and Indochina and Chinese and American business. That changed when Brezhnev and Kosygin took over. They hoped for a hot minute to improve relations with China, but even when they're hopes were quickly dashed (Mao basically still wanted total surrender on all ideological points in dispute and de facto leadership of the Communist bloc), the Soviet leaders made the strategic decision to reassert themselves in Asia, including by aiding Vietnam.
China meanwhile was really, really keen to have Vietnam rely on China exclusively for patronage:
Sino–North Vietnamese conflict over Soviet material aid had its origins early in the Vietnam War. Some time in the last four months of 1964, Deng Xiaoping made a secret visit to Hanoi. A DRV source claims that Deng offered a substantial increase in Chinese aid, on the condition that North Vietnam stop accepting Soviet aid. After the North Vietnamese rejected this offer, the Chinese closely watched Soviet–North Vietnamese ties develop. The surge of Soviet aid to North Vietnam spurred Chinese warnings about the USSR.
It's natural that North Vietnam did not want to close off its options, and things worked out for them and they were ultimately able to get aid from both. But the Chinese were really playing for keeps in their rivalry with the Soviets.
So suppose Deng Xiaoping comes on stronger in this 1964 meeting, and makes the offer double or nothing, basically saying that if North Vietnam does not reject Soviet aid and personnel, China will not be aiding North Vietnam any more?
So one of two things happens:
A) North Vietnam accepts Deng's ultimatum, and it gets increased Chinese aid through the 1960s, but refuses Soviet and and Soviet-aligned aid. The Soviet position towards the Vietnam War is reduced to condemning US actions rhetorically and offering the Vietnamese people best wishes and moral support.
How does the Vietnam War proceed over the next decade without Soviet participation? Can the Viet Cong/PAVN team still win the war? If so, it is it nevertheless a longer, harder struggle for the Communists? Does this affect the ability of the Communist side to launch the Tet offensive or US electoral politics? Does it ultimately effect the US-PRC rapprochement that happened in OTL? Does the lack of Soviet material investment call into question the rationale for the war any earlier? Does it change Cambodian calculations?
B) North Vietnam rejects Deng's ultimatum, and China cuts off aid food and labor supplies and the use of Chinese transit infrastructure for the flow of foreign aid to North Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and its east bloc allies boost aid to counter the Americans and show up the Chinese. However, Soviet and east bloc aid is entirely dependent on maritime deliveries to Haiphong and Sihanoukville and some over-water air routes (Vladivostock-->Sea of Japan-->East China Sea--> South China Sea--> North Vietnam), or over-water, over-neutral state air routes (USSR-->Hungary-->Yugoslavia-->Mediterranean-->Syria-->Iraq-->Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea-->India-->Burma-->Laos-->North Vietnam). Does this change Cambodian calculations? Allegedly, Sihanouk was convinced the Chinese favored Hanoi and were unstoppable. With China not cooperating maybe he makes different decisions.
How does the Vietnam War proceed over the next decade without Chinese participation? Can the Viet Cong/PAVN team still win the war? If so, it is it nevertheless a longer, harder struggle for the Communists? Does this affect the ability of the Communist side to launch the Tet offensive or US electoral politics? Does the Soviet dependence on air and sea routes lead to any changes in the timing or duration of the US's OTL moves to mine? Haiphong harbor or shut down Sihanoukville through regime change in Cambodia?
Even as Sino-Soviet polemics and then military border clashes worsened and almost led to war in 1969, trainloads of Soviet supplies flowed through China to North Vietnam, until at least 1970. (There's allegations of China looting, obstructing, or pilfering Soviet shipments, but it's hard to separate fact from fiction, and allegations would be convenient considering poor Chinese relations with the Soviets and Vietnamese from the mid 70s through the 80s).
Ultimately, during the Vietnam war from 64 and 65 on both sides sent arms to the Vietnamese, with Soviets taking up an ever increasing share. The Soviets bolstered North Vietnamese air defenses, but from 65 or 66-71 the Chinese supplied much more labor intensive aid including stationing of ground troops in the north, and having them work on numerous reconstruction and damage repair tasks.
Going back to before the mid-decade escalation-
In Khrushchev's last years, after the Laos neutralization settlement of 1962 and before his ouster of 1964, he pretty much wrote off North Vietnam and Indochina and Chinese and American business. That changed when Brezhnev and Kosygin took over. They hoped for a hot minute to improve relations with China, but even when they're hopes were quickly dashed (Mao basically still wanted total surrender on all ideological points in dispute and de facto leadership of the Communist bloc), the Soviet leaders made the strategic decision to reassert themselves in Asia, including by aiding Vietnam.
China meanwhile was really, really keen to have Vietnam rely on China exclusively for patronage:
Sino–North Vietnamese conflict over Soviet material aid had its origins early in the Vietnam War. Some time in the last four months of 1964, Deng Xiaoping made a secret visit to Hanoi. A DRV source claims that Deng offered a substantial increase in Chinese aid, on the condition that North Vietnam stop accepting Soviet aid. After the North Vietnamese rejected this offer, the Chinese closely watched Soviet–North Vietnamese ties develop. The surge of Soviet aid to North Vietnam spurred Chinese warnings about the USSR.
It's natural that North Vietnam did not want to close off its options, and things worked out for them and they were ultimately able to get aid from both. But the Chinese were really playing for keeps in their rivalry with the Soviets.
So suppose Deng Xiaoping comes on stronger in this 1964 meeting, and makes the offer double or nothing, basically saying that if North Vietnam does not reject Soviet aid and personnel, China will not be aiding North Vietnam any more?
So one of two things happens:
A) North Vietnam accepts Deng's ultimatum, and it gets increased Chinese aid through the 1960s, but refuses Soviet and and Soviet-aligned aid. The Soviet position towards the Vietnam War is reduced to condemning US actions rhetorically and offering the Vietnamese people best wishes and moral support.
How does the Vietnam War proceed over the next decade without Soviet participation? Can the Viet Cong/PAVN team still win the war? If so, it is it nevertheless a longer, harder struggle for the Communists? Does this affect the ability of the Communist side to launch the Tet offensive or US electoral politics? Does it ultimately effect the US-PRC rapprochement that happened in OTL? Does the lack of Soviet material investment call into question the rationale for the war any earlier? Does it change Cambodian calculations?
B) North Vietnam rejects Deng's ultimatum, and China cuts off aid food and labor supplies and the use of Chinese transit infrastructure for the flow of foreign aid to North Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and its east bloc allies boost aid to counter the Americans and show up the Chinese. However, Soviet and east bloc aid is entirely dependent on maritime deliveries to Haiphong and Sihanoukville and some over-water air routes (Vladivostock-->Sea of Japan-->East China Sea--> South China Sea--> North Vietnam), or over-water, over-neutral state air routes (USSR-->Hungary-->Yugoslavia-->Mediterranean-->Syria-->Iraq-->Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea-->India-->Burma-->Laos-->North Vietnam). Does this change Cambodian calculations? Allegedly, Sihanouk was convinced the Chinese favored Hanoi and were unstoppable. With China not cooperating maybe he makes different decisions.
How does the Vietnam War proceed over the next decade without Chinese participation? Can the Viet Cong/PAVN team still win the war? If so, it is it nevertheless a longer, harder struggle for the Communists? Does this affect the ability of the Communist side to launch the Tet offensive or US electoral politics? Does the Soviet dependence on air and sea routes lead to any changes in the timing or duration of the US's OTL moves to mine? Haiphong harbor or shut down Sihanoukville through regime change in Cambodia?