raharris1973
Well-known member
This is a fairly minor what-if on the world scene, but I'm curious about your take on it, for its longer term effects.
What if, without really changing anything else about Wilhelmine foreign policy, Germany doesn't grab Qingdao from China in 1897 or buy the Spanish East Indies (Micronesia) in 1898?
Things don't come together for the for the German Navy, Cabinet, and Foreign Ministry men "on the spot" and Berlin to line up to seize Qingdao port from China and force the Chinese to yield 99 year lease over the surrounding area like in OTL's 1897. Let's assume though, that with their pre-existing interesting, there are still multiple powers scrambling for ports or concessions in China, kicked off by the Russians grabbing Port Arthur later in the year like they did in OTL. The Germans just never get around to getting any leasehold like Qingdao. The Germans end up taking part in the Boxer suppression with the other powers and have their tiny little legation quarters and concession quarters next to everybody else in Tianjin and Beijing, but not that special zone in Shandong.
Next, the Spanish-American War goes as OTL, with the US attacking the Spanish at Manila Bay, and seizing Guam and the Philippines. Without the Philippines, the rest of the Spanish East Indies (the Micronesian islands of the Palaus, Carolines, and Marianas) are worthless to Spain, and Spain is willing to sell. But Germany is somewhat distracted or uninterested at the moment, perhaps over something domestic. Somebody else buys them from Spain, perhaps France, perhaps Britain, perhaps Italy, Netherlands, or USA - it doesn't matter.
As we move into the early 1900s, Germany has the African empire we all know, and in the Pacific, it has German New Guinea, established in the 1880s, consisting of northern New Guinea, nearby islands like the Bismarcks, and claims over the Marshall Islands to the northeast. It also has a condominium over Samoa that is settled into a partition with the Americans.
European and global diplomacy, trade and warfare, and Asian-Pacific, largely rolls on as in OTL, except for the residents of Shandong province and several Micronesian islands.
When World War I breaks out, any German naval forces in the Asia-Pacific region can only have sovereign bases in New Guinea or Samoa in the Southern Hemisphere, not in Qingdao. They can do normal peacetime coaling in Far East ports in Japan and China and Hong Kong up until the war breaks out, but once war breaks out, they can't use Entente ports, and even in neutral ports need to be on the lookout for more numerous Entente shipping.
Like OTL, Britain could use a little help hunting down German raiders but it's not a make or break issue. Meanwhile, observing the outbreak of the war, while the Japanese government sees its British ally going to war, unlike OTL, it sees no nearby prospect of territorial gain by declaring war on the Germans. The Pacific possessions that Germany does have are remote, almost all south of the equator, with others like Australians, New Zealanders and the alternate purchaser of the Spanish islands much better positioned to grab them.
What policy do the Japanese and Chinese governments adopt towards the war, without Qingdao and Shandong at stake?
Assuming their neutral throughout the war, how does that affect their internal and postwar politics? What might tempt or motivate them to join the war on anyone's side?
What if, without really changing anything else about Wilhelmine foreign policy, Germany doesn't grab Qingdao from China in 1897 or buy the Spanish East Indies (Micronesia) in 1898?
Things don't come together for the for the German Navy, Cabinet, and Foreign Ministry men "on the spot" and Berlin to line up to seize Qingdao port from China and force the Chinese to yield 99 year lease over the surrounding area like in OTL's 1897. Let's assume though, that with their pre-existing interesting, there are still multiple powers scrambling for ports or concessions in China, kicked off by the Russians grabbing Port Arthur later in the year like they did in OTL. The Germans just never get around to getting any leasehold like Qingdao. The Germans end up taking part in the Boxer suppression with the other powers and have their tiny little legation quarters and concession quarters next to everybody else in Tianjin and Beijing, but not that special zone in Shandong.
Next, the Spanish-American War goes as OTL, with the US attacking the Spanish at Manila Bay, and seizing Guam and the Philippines. Without the Philippines, the rest of the Spanish East Indies (the Micronesian islands of the Palaus, Carolines, and Marianas) are worthless to Spain, and Spain is willing to sell. But Germany is somewhat distracted or uninterested at the moment, perhaps over something domestic. Somebody else buys them from Spain, perhaps France, perhaps Britain, perhaps Italy, Netherlands, or USA - it doesn't matter.
As we move into the early 1900s, Germany has the African empire we all know, and in the Pacific, it has German New Guinea, established in the 1880s, consisting of northern New Guinea, nearby islands like the Bismarcks, and claims over the Marshall Islands to the northeast. It also has a condominium over Samoa that is settled into a partition with the Americans.
European and global diplomacy, trade and warfare, and Asian-Pacific, largely rolls on as in OTL, except for the residents of Shandong province and several Micronesian islands.
When World War I breaks out, any German naval forces in the Asia-Pacific region can only have sovereign bases in New Guinea or Samoa in the Southern Hemisphere, not in Qingdao. They can do normal peacetime coaling in Far East ports in Japan and China and Hong Kong up until the war breaks out, but once war breaks out, they can't use Entente ports, and even in neutral ports need to be on the lookout for more numerous Entente shipping.
Like OTL, Britain could use a little help hunting down German raiders but it's not a make or break issue. Meanwhile, observing the outbreak of the war, while the Japanese government sees its British ally going to war, unlike OTL, it sees no nearby prospect of territorial gain by declaring war on the Germans. The Pacific possessions that Germany does have are remote, almost all south of the equator, with others like Australians, New Zealanders and the alternate purchaser of the Spanish islands much better positioned to grab them.
What policy do the Japanese and Chinese governments adopt towards the war, without Qingdao and Shandong at stake?
Assuming their neutral throughout the war, how does that affect their internal and postwar politics? What might tempt or motivate them to join the war on anyone's side?