What if Japan attacked the Dutch East Indies in 1936?

[raharris1973]

What if Japan had attacked the Dutch East Indies in 1936, based on lobbying from the Navy to gain the valuable archipelago located at the strategic maritime crossroads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, offering Japan a position outflanking Singapore and Manila Bay, and providing already extensively developed fuel resources to fuel Japan's Navy, Army, and economy under Japanese, rather than foreign control, and coincidentally, offering Naval Admiral, Captains and other officers a chance for glory and promotion?

Considered as a one-on-one struggle, as of 1936, Japan should be completely conflict in its ability to win a near term victory over the Dutch in the East Indies, conquer the territory, and hold it against a Dutch counter-attack, given the distance any Dutch relief force would have to travel.

The archipelago's distance from Japan's land-based airbases would be a serious operational and logistic problem to overcome, and least for the most valuable, populous, and productive western and central islands of the East Indies, although IJN carriers could project limit airpower against most parts of the islands from the beginning. Engaging against enemy land-based air power in the defense with only carrier-based air would be risky and hazardous however.

An operational solution could be found, without stepping on the territory of other powers, like Britain, the USA, or France, by rapid successive sequential operations starting in the easternmost of the Dutch East Indies, where land-based Japanese aircraft (likely naval rather than army, but still land-based) could provide powerful support from bases in the Japanese Micronesian Mandated islands to back up combined Special Naval Landing Forces supported also by carrier-based aircraft and battleship bombardment, to rapidly capture Dutch airfields for Japanese use.

The Japanese, bringing along engineering troops, could follow up each successive island group seizure with rapid repairs of Dutch airfields, forward transport of land-based air, and attack on the next Dutch-owned objectives, in support of the Combined Fleet and landing forces.

A rapid pace of maneuver would be essential to keep defeating the Dutch in detail and prevent defensive consolidation, and reduce time for other powers to consider possible intervention in the bilateral conflict.

Once all the principal islands were secured and the major Dutch forces in the region defeated, their continued occupation would be a fait accompli, and peace treaty and war termination with Netherlands would be a diplomatic formality in all likelihood. The Netherlands, despite being an economic and financial power, were not a vast manufacturing, military, nor territorial power, nor highly populous and thus in a position to undertake a long-distance reconquest of the East Indies.

After establishing occupation, Japan could repair damaged facilities, reorient the oil and food exports to the Japanese imperial market, and theoretically emerge stronger and self-sufficient, having a naval/maritime complement to the Army's Manchukuo project.

Well, that's sounds great, so why didn't Japan do it? What could go wrong?

• Wasn't Japan bogged down in a war with China in 1936?
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• As it turns out, if it was a war, it was not a very hot one at this time. Japan enjoyed control over the Manchukuo and Inner Mongolian (Mengjiang) puppet states north of the Great Wall of China, and had compelled China to keep large parts of Beijing's province of Hopei demilitarized under the He-Umezu truce agreement. For most of 1936 until the Xi'an incident of December, Chiang remained preoccupied with preparing an encirclement and annihilation campaign against the Communists who had survived the Long March in Shaanxi province and ignored calls to push back against Japan. Chiang did not start pushing back against Japan until July 1937, and the Japanese were not getting political signals he might be heading in that direction, until after he paused anti-Communist operations during/after the December 1936 Xi'an incident and increased resistance and unity talk.
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• What about intervention of other powers, like the USA or Britain, the Philippines, Malaya and Borneo are in between the Dutch East Indies and Japan you know?
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• The Japanese could quite plausibly calculate by this time, middle or late 1936, that none of these powers would intervene directly or effectively in a Dutch East Indies war, no matter what they said. Such a calculation could quite plausibly be correct. It would give us a pair of equally interesting scenarios if the Japanese calculation turned out to be correct, OR, if it turned out to be incorrect, and another power intervened in the war.
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• Why should Japan have confidence in non-intervention by outsiders? 1) Outside powers and the League of Nations had not militarily intervened, nor economically sanctioned Japan over the Manchurian invasion of 1931-33, and the adjunct short-term Shanghai invasion, despite diplomatic condemnation. 2) More recently outside powers had not intervened militarily, or sanctioned effectively or persistently, against Italy's invasion of Abyssinia, and ultimately its annexation from 1935-to April 1936, despite condemning it. They tried some sanctions but did not persist. Relevant to Japan's situation, Abyssinia was adjacent to British and French colonies, but still they permitted Italy to expand next to them and to use Suez. This might be explained away by economic or racial factors. Cynically, Abyssinia was poor and hardly exported anything, so maybe it wasn't worth a struggle to London and Paris, but the East Indies produced valuable petroleum and hardwood and limited rubber, rice and coffee exports of greater commercial value. Or perhaps white leaders in London, Paris, Washington could tolerate white Italians conquering black Africans, but not tolerate Asians ousting white Dutch rulers to take control over a large Asian people and Asian land. But other events of the 1930s suggested that weak will in the west and aversion to conflict was about a more general preference than just racial bias: 3) In 1934 (or 1935?) Britain had signed the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, showing a lack of determination to hold its full degree of naval superiority over Germany, even in the North Sea close to home, and 4) In 1936, France (and Britain) failed to resist the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, right upon her border, closer than the metropolitan Netherlands is to France, making any concept of Paris or London extending deterrence out to a distant Dutch *colony* less credible and more of a stretch. 5) All West European powers showed preoccupation from July 1936 onward, with the Spanish Civil War, which was turning out to be a protracted struggle, not a quick coup d'etat. Germany and Italy were intervening directly in support of the Spanish Nationalist rebels. The British were pulling the French into the unsuccessful Non-Intervention Committee and policy, to try to contain the conflict, and not actively countering Italo-German influence or encouraging France to do so (in fact discouraging it). As another bonus from a Japanese point of view, the Spanish Civil War was drawing heavy attention from the Soviet Union and allied ideological movements, leading to deployment of Soviet advisors, weapons and international volunteers, which diverted Soviet attention from northeast Asia and the Manchukuo-Korea frontier.
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• This accounts well for the alternate preoccupations and likely hesitations of European powers to intervene in the Indies. What about the USA? From a Japanese vantage point, the Roosevelt Administration's first term had been almost exclusively focused on domestic policy, not passing anything like a two-ocean Navy bill, with any naval construction advertised more as a jobs program than a security program. FDR was preoccupied with his reelection. If anything, his foreign policy as shown in the Americas, was one of retrenchment from intervention in neighbors' political affairs. With respect to the Far East, the Americans formally set a timetable for the independence of the Philippines in 1945, through the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1935. Despite some posturing of the US Navy at the tail end of the Hoover Administration during the Shanghai affair, and the failure of any Naval talks in the mid-30s, the relative quiet that had settled on the China-Manchuria front since 1933 had not added any particularly urgent stressors to US-Japanese relations by 1936. America was somewhat economically recovered from its depths of 1933, but hardly looking outward, except for trade opportunities, which it sought with Japan as much as with China and European colonies like the DEI.
• And in case, should any of these powers, America, Britain, France, the USSR, turn against Japan in the medium term or long-term, the Dutch East Indies would be a great strategic asset for Japan to possess from the beginning of any serious conflict escalation, rather than not to have.
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• Didn't the Japanese Army, not Navy, run everything in 1930s Japan?
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• It's more complicated than that. Army officers and societies organized and roamed free making up their own foreign policy as they went along (like the Manchuria incident of 1931, and earlier and later incidents), assassinating politicians and generals they felt insufficiently supportive, and attempting coups d'etat, from the 1928-1936 timeframe. But so did some Navy officer groups and societies. In February 1936 a spiritualist Army faction attempted a coup and made some headway, but was suppressed by an angry court, Army senior command, and Naval forces. The plotters, unlike in previous cases were sternly dealt with, being either executed or forced to commit suicide. The result was sort of a compromise, since the Army coup was stopped, but only with the help of other parts of the Army, with ideas not 100% dissimilar from the plotters. Initiative coups and assassinations of politicians and generals pretty much ceased at this point from military personnel. But people always worried they could happen if top leaders adopted policy broadly unpopular with the Army or Navy. The Army and Navy generally had different priorities, but both got increased funding and their share of personnel and equipment budgets, and policy influence, in the spoils system.
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• When considering Japanese military factions and their different priorities, and the Japanese Navy and Army and their different priorities and positions, it is important to remember that differences =/= diametrical opposition and differences =/=mutual hatred. Neither service was a monolith, and both Army and Navy contained "Go North" and "Go South" advocates and it is easy to provide quotes from both.
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• Edward Drea, writing on this era has noted that one of Emperor Hirohito's recurring critiques and lines of questioning toward the Army regarding its course of action in Manchuria and China was whether Japan was overreaching and investing in an unbalanced commitment to the Army in the mainland, and not taking enough care to keep Japan's Navy and Air forces and maritime position adequately strong to deal with possible threats to Japan's interests from the USA or Britain.
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• So, I could imagine it being plausible that a strong, enterprising Navy-centric group, joined by some Army officers and Civilian officials with similar ideas and economic justifications, could build a powerful case for domination of the Dutch East Indies in the mid-1930s.

 

[raharris1973]

If Japan did launched this fight in, for example, December 1936, and completed its invasion occupation of the DEI in about 10 weeks or three months, which seems a generous amount of time for Dutch resistance if Japan is focused on this one objective, Britain's Australian Dominion would be the most freaked out. The Empire is already in shock from the abdication crisis, but bold "yellow peril" showing up just to the north makes this look trivial by comparison.

Australia, with its Papua New Guinea Mandate, the Malaya and Borneo colonies, and the Dominion of India would want reassurances from Britain. The Singapore base would be outflanked. The Americans would similarly be disturbed and find the Philippines with Manila Bay, Subic Bay and Clark Airfield surrounded in a Japanese-controlled arc running north, east and south of the islands from Taiwan/Formosa to the Mandates to the East Indies.

In the event of European war or crisis, India, and Australia and New Zealand especially, would have enough home defense worries to make it unlikely they could spare any troops to support the British Empire outside of their home Indo-Pacific region. Australia and New Zealand would probably seek closer diplomatic ties to the USA for their own security, and many in the US Roosevelt Administration, State Department and Navy would like the idea, considering the extra exposure and vulnerability of the Philippines and America's other scattered Pacific possessions, but America's extant defense posture as of 1936 is very weak and the idea of commitments outside the hemisphere is very controversial.

France would be highly concerned for its Indochina colony, but would be able to spare little for it, already struggling to rearm to deal with the growing German threat in Europe, Italian naval competition in the Mediterranean, and trying to prevent spillover from the Spanish Civil War drawing France into war or internal conflict.

The Japanese military and Kempeitai (secret police) and bureaucrats and zaibatsu will have plenty to do in the occupation of the DEI and its restoration to full production. To the degree Tokyo and senior Army staff are turning the dial on pressure with the frontier with China in early 1937, they may not press it as much as historical because of other available adventures and tasks in the Indies. However, the escalation to full-scale war in China in OTL July 1937 was multi-sided. It was not driven only, or even primarily, by Tokyo based Army commanders trying to alter the previous status quo, but by initiatives and overreactions by local Japanese commanders, and by this point, just as important, a Chinese Nationalist side that was determined to demonstrate it was not going to take it lying down anymore. So, any lack of outbreak of Sino-Japanese war in July 1937 would probably be no more than a delay, not total prevention.

The Japanese presence in the DEI would almost certainly stimulate earlier than historical British and American naval building oriented toward Indo-Pacific defense. For Britain, it is likely to make her lean harder into appeasement, if that is somehow possible.

When the probable Sino-Japanese War breaks out, the additional pre-existing Japanese occupation of the East Indies could cut two opposing ways for British and American policy. On the one hand, since the Japanese "cat" is among their colonial "pigeons" more boldly and dangerously placed, the priority on building up defenses of Australia, Malaya, the Philippines, and Japan's obvious ability to lash out may mean London and Washington are more hesitant to aid China and have less to spare. Equally or more likely, they may see supporting the Chinese resistance as a greater imperative than OTL, and do more of it, earlier. In any case, I would expect Soviet support for China to be similar to OTL.

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In the event the Japanese turn out to miscalculate, and under pressure from imperial interests and Australia, which perhaps threatens to declare itself an independent republic and seek American protection, Britain under the Baldwin Government declares war on Japan - possibly after Japan disregards an ultimatum to halt and reverse its invasion of the Dutch East Indies, well that will make for an interesting medium-sized war at the tail end of 1936 and early 1937.

Britain would get itself on a war footing and dispatch fleet units to Singapore, and reinforcements of men, ships and aircraft to Australia and the Pacific. Britain's early exertions in war production, mobilization, and deployment would have growing pains, and more men would be immediately be called to the colors of RN, RAF and Army ranks to fill them out to handle needs of the Far East war and ongoing sores like ongoing Arab Revolt in Palestine. Besides continuing its crackdown there, Britain might accelerate its move to the Arab-appeasing policies of 1939 White Paper to substantially restrict and put a 10 year limit on Jewish immigration and land purchases, foreclosing prospects of a Jewish majority there, to make things more quiet.

With prompt action, and the Japanese making their approach through the Dutch East Indies from an east to west axis mainly, the British may be at risk of losing Sarak and Sabah and Brunei in Borneo, maybe - but not Malaya and Singapore, with the Japanese are unlikely to be able to approach in strength with a combination of land-based AirPower and landing forces in anything like a timely fashion before defenses are prepared and reinforcements arrive. With British assistance, the Dutch should certainly fend off any Japanese attempts to land at Sumatra, and the Dutch and British together could well entirely repulse, or stall, any Japanese invasions of Java. Depending on the tactics and circumstances and locations of battle - proximity to each side's air bases, night fighting versus day fighting, commander skill, luck - each side can suffer some high profile naval losses.

The Americans in all likelihood would not rouse themselves to the defense or direct combat assistance of the British, Australians or Dutch, but they would wish for their victory, and before long suspend exports of raw materials and war material to Japan. The Canadians and probably South Africans through would declare war on the Japanese and send forces to help out their Imperial partners.

The French would not see the Pacific and Far East as their priority, Europe would remain so. They would not "like" participating in a Far East war or devote major national efforts to it. However, by the same token since they want and feel they *need* Britain's strategic backing in European affairs, they would probably not turn down any direct requests for military assistance or use of French facilities in the Far East in Indochina, New Caledonia, Polynesia, by the British Empire, even if this caused a Japanese declaration of war. Even if this incurred damage to the French Empire in the region, earning reciprocal British obligation to France's security, and not alienating Britain from such ties, would probably be worth it to Paris. So there is a decent chance France would find itself at war with Japan if Britain does. France also would not mind *the Netherlands* owing it favors possibly redeemable in Europe as well.

Overall Japan would be contained early in this war, with a slow rollback, that, without participation of a power like the USSR, is not guaranteed to get Japan out of Manchuria and Korea. Without participation of America is not guaranteed to see Japan totally defeated and occupied, merely pushed back from its conquests, some of the China Seas, and Micronesia, after a prolonged submarine campaign.


---Another aspect of any Japanese-Dutch War turning into an Anglo-Japanese War is that it could lead right back to renewed combat in Chinese waters and on Chinese land, with Japan seizing Hong Kong and attacking British forces in the concession areas of China's ports. Chiang might stay neutral if it is appearing to him the British are not offering any revision to treaty port status and seem to be losing, and the Japanese are not spilling over much while they focus on the British, but if the British are offering some reform in the system, and more importantly money and weapons for the long-haul he thinks he can use to reclaim Manchuria, Chiang would become interested in anti-Japanese co-belligerency alongside Britain. Britain would like to make use of the Chinese territory for access to land close enough to bomb the Japanese home islands and inlets in which to hide submarines. It can be a bum costly deal for China though, with the strong Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea lashing out extensively across northern and eastern China in retaliation for China siding with Britain. But, with this type of coalition forming, Stalin in the USSR may think it a good time to avenge the Tsarist defeat of 1905 and attack Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin from the north to demonstrate the new capabilities Socialist Russia has.

 

[PsihoKekec]

Given that Japan wouldn't attack out of blue, the Netherlands would have some time to prepare DWI for defense, so the campaign could very well turn into a protracted fight. UK, France and USA would be disturbed by Japanese imperial ambitions and lend all possible help to Netherlands, short of actual help. We would see sanctions and Netherlands would be able to do military purchases on the cheap credit, but these would take effect in the long term. On short and medium term, Netherlands would probably pull its merchant shipping from Japanese contracts during the diplomatic prelude to war and once the war starts UK, France and USA might do the same. Considering that before the WWII much of the supplies that Japan needed was carried by Netherlands, UK, USA and Norwegian shipping, this would be quite a blow to Japanese economy.

Stalin in the USSR may think it a good time to avenge the Tsarist defeat of 1905 and attack Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin from the north to demonstrate the new capabilities Socialist Russia has.

Stalin would have a good laugh at capitalists killing each other and would be glad that war distracts them from USSR. Then he would go back to his purges, time has not yet come for him to start expansive foreign policy.

 

[raharris1973]

Given that Japan wouldn't attack out of blue, the Netherlands would have some time to prepare DWI for defense, so the campaign could very well turn into a protracted fight. UK, France and USA would be disturbed by Japanese imperial ambitions and lend all possible help to Netherlands, short of actual help. We would see sanctions and Netherlands would be able to do military purchases on the cheap credit, but these would take effect in the long term. On short and medium term, Netherlands would probably pull its merchant shipping from Japanese contracts during the diplomatic prelude to war and once the war starts UK, France and USA might do the same. Considering that before the WWII much of the supplies that Japan needed was carried by Netherlands, UK, USA and Norwegian shipping, this would be quite a blow to Japanese economy.

Sanctions *before* shooting? I doubt it.

Pulling shipping contracts *before* shooting? Maybe by the Dutch, hardly anyone else. Neutral Norwegians and Greeks would ship apolitically even after shooting until it became too dangerous, in addition to native Japanese Japanese shippers.

The Dutch may take a Japanese diplomatic buildup and hostile rhetoric pre-attack seriously, and the UK and USA would not like it and notice it, but they may not take it too seriously in the environment of late 1936. They are both busy with Depression recovery, Britain with the abdication crisis, and America with its reelection campaign.

------break, break --------alright, let's say this idea is impractical might a Japanese invasion/conquest of French Indochina at this time, end of 1936, beginning of 1937, be more practical/achievable in a short space of time?

1. Most parts of French Indochina are not as far from Japanese bases in places like Taiwan.
2. French Indochina is less extensive, easier to "swallow" in one "bite"u or a few quite bites by a force coming in from the coast.
3. Most important, France is not a major shipper Japan depends on. While the US and UK may sanction Japan and aid France short of war in this fight, and pull their shipping, Dutch policy in the 1930s was stubborn neutrality in Europe and everywhere, so Dutch merchant bottoms would continue to ship supplies to Japan as long as France pays, and Japan is *not* attacking the DEI.
4. Siam could be enticed to become an ally to reclaim lands earlier lost to French Indochina.

Going against the idea in comparison to DEI:

1. No oil resources in French Indochina, just rubber and a food surplus
2. France is a globally stronger power with more metropolitan forces, manufacturing, and a better string of Indian Ocean bases than Netherlands
3. France is historically a bit closer aligned to the UK than Netherlands in recent decades


----as yet another alternative target for Japan at this time, what about the Kingdom of Siam?
1. It is not part of a European empire protected by European troops, but a lonely Asian Kingdom
2. Its entire Kra Isthmus, capital of Bangkok, and southern coast are exposed to naval gunfire and a navally supported land force.
3. It produces a significant food surplus, and though not yet developed for it, possesses the right climate for rubber plantations and multiple other plantation agricultures.

Going against:

1. Siam is not currently "ready made" as an extractive colony, infrastructure investment required
2. France and Britain can provide aid to Siamese resistance in the hinterland, and would be upset at the new, aggressive, Japanese occupying presence

 

[raharris1973]

Continuing the thought of Japan succeeding in its Dutch East Indies land grab of 1936 or 1937, the Japanese pacify and develop the islands, and release Dutch experts as they learn how to run petroleum and other operations. The British and Americans try to boost the Far East defenses, the former in their colonies and especially Dominions. The French try to boost up defenses of French Indochina but can spare almost nothing in terms of revenue or manpower from metropolitan France or other parts of the empire, especially parts exposed to the Mediterranean or Red Sea, so what is done comes from increased taxation and mobilization from within the Indochina colony.

Japan, because of Army officer fervor, and because of China's hardening public opinion, forming a United Front, and newfound insistence not to be pushed around, will end up in an escalated full-scale war over the the greater Beijing area and then the Shanghai area, by no later than the summer of 1938.

I think the other powers of the world, save Germany and Italy, Japan's partners in the Anti-Comintern Pact, will condemn Japan's invasion, and morally favor China, but not intervene militarily against Japan, nor impose more than possibly limited export controls of selected weapons of war. The Soviet Union will become the most generous provisioner of aid to the Chinese United Front consisting of both the Nationalists and the Communist resisters. It will add to the USSR's global anti-Fascist "street cred" it is gaining from supporting the Spanish Republic in Europe.

One consequence of Japan's conquest of the Dutch East Indies is that for the duration of that fight, at least, Dutch merchant cargo shippers, who carried a decent share of Japan's cargo trade, will not service Japanese Empire ports and the Japanese market, and the Dutch government will pressure Royal Dutch Shell to suspend business with Japan. There is a more than even chance that the angry Netherlands would continue these unilateral anti-Japanese embargoes even in the years post-defeat and post-conquest out of anger, unless free commerce is restored via a treaty involving some compensation or promise of it for Netherlands. The loss of this cargo shipping and those oil contracts would compel Japan during the fight to develop native Japanese substitute cargo shipping lines or hire alternative foreign merchant mariners under different flags, American, British, Greek, Panamanian, Italian, Norwegian, Danish, Swedish - probably some eclectic combination, with shortages at first. But I expect between 1937 and 1941 it would sensitize Tokyo to its dependence on foreign merchant bottoms and cause some increase in domestic merchant capacity, not just warship tonnage over that time. There is the chance that, being pragmatic and businesslike, and not wanting to further hurt their economy and revenues for funding their social insurance safety net and home defense during the Depression, the Dutch could sign a treaty with Japan or provisionally resume shipping commerce between their old, now Japanese occupied colony and Japan, in return for the freedom of their civil detainees and PoWs, and further property compensations or the mere promise of it and continued business right now, day to day. There is a Depression after all, and money is hard to come by, and insecurity looms in Europe

Regarding the Sino-Japanese War once more, while London, Washington, Paris will all object to Japan's aggression in China as much as Moscow does, they may be stuck prioritizing resources between bolstering defenses of their own colonies, Dominions, Commonwealths in the Asia-Pacific region and aiding China. However, I think that surrogates for these empires in the Asia-Pacific, the Australians and New Zealanders, the command at Singapore, British Raj authorities at Simla, the US team at Manila, the French Governor General at Hanoi, will all be big boosters of the need to provide aid to China and its anti-Japanese resistance in order to tie down and immobilize Japan, and prevent it from having the means to make more conquests further south, east, or west.

So, I think by the 1939-1940 timeframe, odds would favor delivery of loans, credits, arms to China from the west via Indochina and Burma. Japan's Army would likely have probes and border clashes with the Soviets and Outer Mongolians, in which the latter would hold their own. It would also have tensions and incidents with western diplomats and western deployed forces and the western concession jurisdictions in occupied China (see Japan's Tianjin incident with Britain, from 1939).

Despite the increased apparent threat to the west, especially Britain in the Far East, and the focus that draws, and the possible precocious naval and expeditionary capability development that might cause, to some degree, I do not seeing the march of Fascist powers in Europe, the attempts at appeasement, the eventual end of appeasement, Nazi-Soviet Pact, and WWII, unfolding like OTL, on schedule.

The Nazi-Soviet Pact, in an environment where there are frequent Soviet-Japanese border clashes, and the Soviets are a prime supporter of China (indeed a supplier of volunteer pilots), is likely to disappoint Japan and strain Nazi-Japanese relations, as it did in OTL, and slow their coordination of aggressive policies.

The endgame of this timeline is that as the USA and UK get sicker of the China War and its territorial extent, they can extend sanctions. Japan can and would opportunistically benefit from German successes, like the fall of France, to occupy French Indochina, and perhaps with their DEI starting point, New Caledonia and New Hebrides. They can puppetize, strong-arm, or occupy Thailand even, while Britain and the USSR are at their weak points, fighting for their imperial Mediterranean lifelines and their capital and industrial heartlands against Axis assaults respectively.

The UK would try to add what little it could to earlier defensive precautions to Singapore, and Australia and India, already more fortified than OTL - and may be coming up a bit shorter already in the Mediterranean/North African fight than OTL because of lack of ANZAC or Indian troops there. America would be trying to enhance its western Pacific defenses, and both powers together would be embargoing raw materials to Japan, and in any case would be at the point of hoarding almost all those same materials for their own and Soviet use in the anti-German war effort.

The reality and idea of the embargo and the western build up in the Far East, and headiness over visible German advances in Europe by summer 1941 will tempt a few Japanese Navy types, civilian hawks, and one or two Army oddballs into advocating a sweeping surprise attack to drive the US and UK entirely from the Far East, but majority of the Navy staff, the institutional Army, China theater commanders, and Tokyo Cabinet will feel no such urgency and be content to let German victory ripen, or not, while plugging away, trying to wear China down and out. While the western embargo and financial freeze is a pain, and *theoretically* the British and American fleets, *if they one day concentrated them in the South China Sea* could interdict oil import routes between the Japanese East Indies and Japan and China, they show no sign of doing it now, and Tokyo would see it coming - these powers seem very preoccupied in the Atlantic, and Japan is sustaining itself adequately in petroleum.

The likely result is with the now Japanese East Indies "under its belt" for almost five years before this timeline's 1941, Japan does not "take the plunge" into Pacific War against the USA or cobelligerency alongside Germany and Italy within the Axis.

Your mileage may vary (YMMV), I am in the school of thought inclined to think that the USA and Germany were trending toward full war with each other within about 6 months or so of December 1941, regardless of what Japan did, or did not do.

So the more probable timeline ahead from here is that before metereological summertime 1942, Germany has declared war on America or vice versa, the Battle of the Atlantic is a full oceanwide American-German-British surface and undersea naval battle, and with the DoWs, the USA is now not just committed to its prior undeclared naval war, waged de facto since about April 1941, but to full engage its air and ground forces in Africa and Europe to completely defeat Germany until victory.

The ending and inevitable result of this would be after three and a half years, combined Allied defeat of Nazi Germany and division of Europe, perhaps with the dividing line slightly east of OTL. But importantly, Japan would steer clear of belligerency in this war, hoping to defeat China in its own, private war that avoids direct allied combat intervention on China's side. By the time the European War ends in late 1944 or 1945, China will not have defeated Japan in any conventional sense. On the other hand, Japan will certainly not have ended all Chinese resistance or pacified China. It may have occupied more parts of China and cut China off from land lines of supply by the west. (for an example of the possibility of late Sino-Japanese War advances, see OTL's Ichigo offensive) or even taken the Chinese capital of Chongqing, or China and Japan may have fought to a stalemate.

So, the end of the war in Europe would see a tripolar world instead of a bipolar world like OTL. Not all poles would be equal. Japan would definitely be the third and smallest of the poles, sort of like China could have been counted as the third Cold War pole, but definitely the weakest, in the 60s, 70s, and 80s. America would start off the strongest, the Soviets in second place. With the defeat of Germany, both the USSR and USA would still have a problem with Japan's ongoing aggression/occupation in China, whatever level of resistance in China is ongoing, and they both have mountains of surplus weapons to supply to Chinese resisters. However, both the USA and USSR would *also* have burgeoning problems with *each other* and fears of each other over postwar matters of the fate of Poland, German occupation policy, Greece, the Turkish straits, Iran, control of atomic energy. But although Moscow and Washington would each see each other as the most powerful of their challengers and threats, with a militaristic, heavily armed, and multi-service Japan still a widely active power throughout all East Asia, they would not be each other's only relevant challengers.

 

[Buba]

If Japan does not "take the plunge" - and other things stay same - it will take FDR at least half a year to fabricate an excuse to go to Congresss for a DOW and con it into passing it, or attacks by a neutral US Navy on German vessels in international waters will finally make Germany DOW it instead.
This IMO half year difference - as well as no Pacific front - should change events in Europe.

Bacl to NOI - even if UK does not go to war over it, I'd expect very strong protests and pressure on Japan. If I had some say in London, I'd demand that Sumatra remain in Netherland hands. Or else. [sabre rattling ... intensifies]

 

[Skallagrim]

The Japanese presence in the DEI would almost certainly stimulate earlier than historical British and American naval building oriented toward Indo-Pacific defense. For Britain, it is likely to make her lean harder into appeasement, if that is somehow possible.

The Nazi-Soviet Pact, in an environment where there are frequent Soviet-Japanese border clashes, and the Soviets are a prime supporter of China (indeed a supplier of volunteer pilots), is likely to disappoint Japan and strain Nazi-Japanese relations, as it did in OTL, and slow their coordination of aggressive policies.

The likely result is with the now Japanese East Indies "under its belt" for almost five years before this timeline's 1941, Japan does not "take the plunge" into Pacific War against the USA or cobelligerency alongside Germany and Italy within the Axis.

Your mileage may vary (YMMV), I am in the school of thought inclined to think that the USA and Germany were trending toward full war with each other within about 6 months or so of December 1941, regardless of what Japan did, or did not do.

So the more probable timeline ahead from here is that before metereological summertime 1942, Germany has declared war on America or vice versa, the Battle of the Atlantic is a full oceanwide American-German-British surface and undersea naval battle, and with the DoWs, the USA is now not just committed to its prior undeclared naval war, waged de facto since about April 1941, but to full engage its air and ground forces in Africa and Europe to completely defeat Germany until victory.

Note that before the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1937, Germany tended more towards sympathy for China. If Japan decides to go for the Dutch East Indies in 1936, this turns a lot of Europeans against Japan. Particularly in the Netherlands (which Hitler wants to absorb, under the guise of "liberation") and Britain (which Hitler would prefer to strong-arm into peace talks). Japan is all the way around the world, and not particularly useful to Germany under the circumstances. Vocally siding against Japan may turn out to be far more opportune. As you say, the Japanese actions probably incline Britain towards even more appeasement in Europe anyway, and Hitler siding against Japan will actually curry some favour (even if just minor) in Britain and the Netherlands.

I think that a potential result may be that Britain does ultimately go for a peace deal with Hitler in 1940, on the basis that this leaves Britain free to secure its own empire. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, Nazism probably enjoys a slight bit more popularity, because Hitler can credibly play up the "European united against the alien menace" angle, while also stressing how much he's into restoring the racial pride of the Germanic peoples.

On the other side of Europe, Hitler's decision to side against Japan puts him in the camp of the USSR and China, which may actually mean that the Nazi-Soviet pact holds up longer. Both Hitler and Stalin are scheming bastards, but with the war in the West genuinely over, and normal trade relations re-established between Britain and Germany, any Soviet invasion of Nazi-ruled Europe looks like a dangerous gamble. And because his economic relations are normalised, Hitler is less pressured to "conquer and loot, all day every day" just to keep his empire running. He can actually follow his initial vision of following up the conquest of Europe with a decade of consolidation and further military build-up... before embarking on "round two".

Under these circumstances, an American intervention in Europe is patently absurd. In fact, I also agree that in this scenario, Japan will not trigger war with the USA. Roosevelt can jump up and down, but he'not getting Congress to sign off on his war without Japan actually doing something stupid. Which means Roosevelt (although plausibly holding on in 1940) gets no big war to make his Keynesian bullshit look like it worked. The US economy keeps stalling somewhat, and by 1944, Roosevelt's policies will be utterly discredited. The Democrats get booted out for the next 8-to-12 years, and Keynesianism is out of fashion for the next generation at least.

Japan, being Japan and thinking in the same way as in OTL, may be stupid, however. Not against the USA, but because they get all paranoid about a two-front war against the USSR and Soviet-backed China on one end, and Britain on the other. Which means they may well attempt a pre-emptive strike against Britain's possessions. As a sort of ATL counterpart to Pearl Harbor.

Which may in turn motivate Hitler to speed up his re-armament. Either to stab either Britain or the USSR (or, stupidly, both) in the back once those guys are busy in the East... or to bide his time and pounce just as their war is winding down, provided it has sufficiently tired them out. (I.e. what Stalin was actually planning to do to Germany in OTL, assuming that the war in the West would last far longer.) Note this can take all sorts of shapes. Hitler can suddenly become a co-belligerent of Japan, for instance, versus the British and Soviet co-belligerents on the other side. But he can also make a deal with Stalin, rooted in "I'll go crush Britain now, okay, while you deal with the Japs, while they're both bloodied-- and we both keep what we conquer."

And America, having stayed out of all this nonsense, and ultimately ditching Roosevelt, gets to boost its economy after all-- by selling to everybody, and getting rich as the world fights itself bloody. (Which alters America's self-image, and its perception by the world, substantially. The "arsenal of democracy" aspect is mostly erased, and the "Capitalism Inc." aspect is stressed and underlined twice.)

 

[PsihoKekec]

Good take, but I disagree on Hitler wanting to crush the Britain, he was quite an anglophile and wanted to reach an accord with Britain, it was France he hated, as amply exhibited in Mein Kampf. Him going after France while Britain is distracted is plausible though.

 

[raharris1973]

Good take, but I disagree on Hitler wanting to crush the Britain, he was quite an anglophile and wanted to reach an accord with Britain, it was France he hated, as amply exhibited in Mein Kampf. Him going after France while Britain is distracted is plausible though.

I agree, thank you for recognizing he hated France in his book. Many wishful thinkers deny he wanted to go west at all and think he *only* want to go east for Lebensraum or crushing Communism, but he was quite hateful toward France in Mein Kampf and some other rhetoric, even though with defeat it turned out to be the most compliant of his enemies. He concluded by 1937 (an odd choice of timing, considering the ascension of Chamberlain that year) that some kind of fight with Britain was inevitable, but it was something he hoped could be settled eventually and wouldn't have to be "to the death" or the "last Nordic Aryan standing."

 

[ATP]

Note that before the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1937, Germany tended more towards sympathy for China. If Japan decides to go for the Dutch East Indies in 1936, this turns a lot of Europeans against Japan. Particularly in the Netherlands (which Hitler wants to absorb, under the guise of "liberation") and Britain (which Hitler would prefer to strong-arm into peace talks). Japan is all the way around the world, and not particularly useful to Germany under the circumstances. Vocally siding against Japan may turn out to be far more opportune. As you say, the Japanese actions probably incline Britain towards even more appeasement in Europe anyway, and Hitler siding against Japan will actually curry some favour (even if just minor) in Britain and the Netherlands.

I think that a potential result may be that Britain does ultimately go for a peace deal with Hitler in 1940, on the basis that this leaves Britain free to secure its own empire. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, Nazism probably enjoys a slight bit more popularity, because Hitler can credibly play up the "European united against the alien menace" angle, while also stressing how much he's into restoring the racial pride of the Germanic peoples.

On the other side of Europe, Hitler's decision to side against Japan puts him in the camp of the USSR and China, which may actually mean that the Nazi-Soviet pact holds up longer. Both Hitler and Stalin are scheming bastards, but with the war in the West genuinely over, and normal trade relations re-established between Britain and Germany, any Soviet invasion of Nazi-ruled Europe looks like a dangerous gamble. And because his economic relations are normalised, Hitler is less pressured to "conquer and loot, all day every day" just to keep his empire running. He can actually follow his initial vision of following up the conquest of Europe with a decade of consolidation and further military build-up... before embarking on "round two".

Under these circumstances, an American intervention in Europe is patently absurd. In fact, I also agree that in this scenario, Japan will not trigger war with the USA. Roosevelt can jump up and down, but he'not getting Congress to sign off on his war without Japan actually doing something stupid. Which means Roosevelt (although plausibly holding on in 1940) gets no big war to make his Keynesian bullshit look like it worked. The US economy keeps stalling somewhat, and by 1944, Roosevelt's policies will be utterly discredited. The Democrats get booted out for the next 8-to-12 years, and Keynesianism is out of fashion for the next generation at least.

Japan, being Japan and thinking in the same way as in OTL, may be stupid, however. Not against the USA, but because they get all paranoid about a two-front war against the USSR and Soviet-backed China on one end, and Britain on the other. Which means they may well attempt a pre-emptive strike against Britain's possessions. As a sort of ATL counterpart to Pearl Harbor.

Which may in turn motivate Hitler to speed up his re-armament. Either to stab either Britain or the USSR (or, stupidly, both) in the back once those guys are busy in the East... or to bide his time and pounce just as their war is winding down, provided it has sufficiently tired them out. (I.e. what Stalin was actually planning to do to Germany in OTL, assuming that the war in the West would last far longer.) Note this can take all sorts of shapes. Hitler can suddenly become a co-belligerent of Japan, for instance, versus the British and Soviet co-belligerents on the other side. But he can also make a deal with Stalin, rooted in "I'll go crush Britain now, okay, while you deal with the Japs, while they're both bloodied-- and we both keep what we conquer."

And America, having stayed out of all this nonsense, and ultimately ditching Roosevelt, gets to boost its economy after all-- by selling to everybody, and getting rich as the world fights itself bloody. (Which alters America's self-image, and its perception by the world, substantially. The "arsenal of democracy" aspect is mostly erased, and the "Capitalism Inc." aspect is stressed and underlined twice.)

Possible outcome.
Even if England do not made peace with Hitler,Japan would still not go to war/no oil embargo possible here/
If so,we would get canon WW2,but without Pacyfic war,and and Japan would remain third powere here.

Better world for Asia - commies were worst for them,after all - but notching change in Europe.

I agree, thank you for recognizing he hated France in his book. Many wishful thinkers deny he wanted to go west at all and think he *only* want to go east for Lebensraum or crushing Communism, but he was quite hateful toward France in Mein Kampf and some other rhetoric, even though with defeat it turned out to be the most compliant of his enemies. He concluded by 1937 (an odd choice of timing, considering the ascension of Chamberlain that year) that some kind of fight with Britain was inevitable, but it was something he hoped could be settled eventually and wouldn't have to be "to the death" or the "last Nordic Aryan standing."

True,he wonted deal with England,and here he could get it.

Another possible change - Poland was so bold in 1939 only thanks to british promised help.But...what if brits promised us notching?
Hitler tried to "ally" with us,so we would become "ally" - although maybe rather like Italy,not slovakia - go against soviets,and win thanks to :
1.Starting from better positions
2.sending 40 divisons more
3.Do not genocide locals,at least not on polish front.

So,we could have German Europe here,and Japan,of course,would take Siberia.Maybe Khazastan,too?

 

[raharris1973]

@Skallagrim - you bring up some interesting potential twists and variations I never would have thought of on my own.

Although it is nothing like what you suggested, re-looking at the shuffling of the global deck of powers at this time makes me wonder if, seeing Japan bog Britain down in the Far East by the beginning of 1937, while Britain was already dealing with the Arab Revolt in Palestine, would make Mussolini think, "Dammit, why did I just overcommit my forces to Spain?! This would be the perfect time to assault Malta and mount a convergent assault on British Somaliland, Sudan, Egypt and Suez from Italian East Africa and Libya and Italy, to make the Mare, truly Nostrum." Given Britain's more recent start on rearmament, the capability gap in favor of the UK in naval and expeditionary warfare would not have been as badly to Italy's disadvantage in 1937 as it turned out to be in 1940 and 1941. But alas Italy was committed to Spain by this point. Or, if France is not fighting alongside Britain while Britain is fighting Japan, Italy might think it has a short window of opportunity to take on the French fleet in the Mediterranean and Red Sea solo, and could grab Tunisia and Djibouti for itself, with Britain out of position to help France.

 

[ATP]

@Skallagrim - you bring up some interesting potential twists and variations I never would have thought of on my own.

Although it is nothing like what you suggested, re-looking at the shuffling of the global deck of powers at this time makes me wonder if, seeing Japan bog Britain down in the Far East by the beginning of 1937, while Britain was already dealing with the Arab Revolt in Palestine, would make Mussolini think, "Dammit, why did I just overcommit my forces to Spain?! This would be the perfect time to assault Malta and mount a convergent assault on British Somaliland, Sudan, Egypt and Suez from Italian East Africa and Libya and Italy, to make the Mare, truly Nostrum." Given Britain's more recent start on rearmament, the capability gap in favor of the UK in naval and expeditionary warfare would not have been as badly to Italy's disadvantage in 1937 as it turned out to be in 1940 and 1941. But alas Italy was committed to Spain by this point. Or, if France is not fighting alongside Britain while Britain is fighting Japan, Italy might think it has a short window of opportunity to take on the French fleet in the Mediterranean and Red Sea solo, and could grab Tunisia and Djibouti for itself, with Britain out of position to help France.

No,Mussolini was opportunist.He joined war,becouse he thought,that germans arleady win.Not going to happen here,becouse Japan would not defeat both France and England ,even if we have war.

But,on anotyher topic - french fleet.In OTL they had one carrier,and build two more.Moreover,they buyed navy planes from USA,becouse their own were not ready.
Here - they would start building more carriers,and navy planes for them,too.
Which would be interesting,becouse their new torpedo-bombers would have 2 engines,as well as dive bombers.

 

[PsihoKekec]

@Skallagrim - you bring up some interesting potential twists and variations I never would have thought of on my own.

Although it is nothing like what you suggested, re-looking at the shuffling of the global deck of powers at this time makes me wonder if, seeing Japan bog Britain down in the Far East by the beginning of 1937, while Britain was already dealing with the Arab Revolt in Palestine, would make Mussolini think, "Dammit, why did I just overcommit my forces to Spain?! This would be the perfect time to assault Malta and mount a convergent assault on British Somaliland, Sudan, Egypt and Suez from Italian East Africa and Libya and Italy, to make the Mare, truly Nostrum." Given Britain's more recent start on rearmament, the capability gap in favor of the UK in naval and expeditionary warfare would not have been as badly to Italy's disadvantage in 1937 as it turned out to be in 1940 and 1941. But alas Italy was committed to Spain by this point. Or, if France is not fighting alongside Britain while Britain is fighting Japan, Italy might think it has a short window of opportunity to take on the French fleet in the Mediterranean and Red Sea solo, and could grab Tunisia and Djibouti for itself, with Britain out of position to help France.

Mussolini did not have a particular beef with UK and he preferred to take on weaker opponents than a distracted UK. It's more likely he would go diplomatic route, to try extort concessions from the Brits. Keep in mind that Italy was reliant on British coal and was badly hit by end of deliveries in 1940, but back then Duce thought that war will be over in matter of weeks and he only needed to show enough effort to get a seat at the negotiating table, there is no such prospect here. If he feelt warlike, he would turn his attention to Yugoslavia or Greece.

 

[raharris1973]

If Japan does not "take the plunge" - and other things stay same - it will take FDR at least half a year to fabricate an excuse to go to Congresss for a DOW and con it into passing it, or attacks by a neutral US Navy on German vessels in international waters will finally make Germany DOW it instead.
This IMO half year difference - as well as no Pacific front - should change events in Europe.

Maybe the two changes to events in Europe - American participation only six months later, and no Pacific front, allowing expenditure of ever more US consumables in Europe - since they work in 180 degree opposite directions, would cancel each other out precisely, and yield the historic results in the ETO?

 

[raharris1973]

Another possible change - Poland was so bold in 1939 only thanks to british promised help.But...what if brits promised us notching?
Hitler tried to "ally" with us,so we would become "ally" - although maybe rather like Italy,not slovakia - go against soviets,and win thanks to :
1.Starting from better positions
2.sending 40 divisons more
3.Do not genocide locals,at least not on polish front.

I would ask you and @Batrix and any of the other Poles here exactly what *terms* Poland would accept in an alliance with Germany, if Britain (and France) made no promises of support for Poland against Germany?

1. Would they accept an “alliance” with Hitler’s Germany, sign a piece of paper that says we will work together to against the Soviet Union? Say they will defend Europe together?
Your opinion?
My opinion? Yes, Poland would sign, it might even do staff talks with Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe about deploying to Poland if the USSR invaded Poland.

2. Would Poland, as part of an “alliance” with Nazi Germany, accept a garrison of Nazi troops occupying and based in all of Poland from Posen to the Border with the Soviets around Brest and Bialystok and Lviv for “defense of Poland” and a joint offensive campaign?
Your opinion?
My opinion? No, the Poles would be afraid the Germans would never leave and would coup and colonize them. Only with the greatest reluctance and duress might they accept.

3. Would Poland, as part of an “alliance” with Nazi Germany, be willing to give Hitler’s Germany an extraterritorial highway through the corridor and Danzig?
Your opinion?
My opinion? Poland won’t like it, but yes.

4. Would Poland, as part of an “alliance” with Nazi Germany be willing to let Germany annex Danzig?
Your opinion?
My opinion? Maybe because of isolation/perceived no choice, but probably not honestly

5. Would Poland, as part of an alliance with Nazi Germany, be willing to cede the Polish corridor, west Prussia to Germany, allowing itself too be cut off from Gdynia and the Baltic?
Your opinion?
My opinion? Hells to the no, not without a fight and a defeat, a severe one.

So I personally see a problem with any Nazi-Polish alliance that could last through the time Germany feels strong enough to contemplate invading the USSR. (Germany and Hitler are fine with a Polish pact when they are *weak*). Poland could accept items # 1 and # 3 from my list above, and maybe item # 4. But Poland could never accept items # 2 and # 5, because they feel like handing over the whole country or partitioning it.

But Hitler is demanding by 1939, *all* of items 1 through 5. He hasn’t redeemed German historical and national claims if he doesn’t do that, and if he can’t get his Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe deployed throughout all Poland from west to east, north to south with secure supply lines, Poland useless as an invasion pathway into the Soviet Union to get wider Lebensraum.

Hitler’s demands and agenda, as of 1939, mean that the Poles have to give them land and let Germans roll over and through them to the other side. In that case, Hitler can delay killing off the Catholic Poles of central Poland for a good while and use them as extra cannon fodder against the Soviet Slavs.

 

[Jormungandr]

Good take, but I disagree on Hitler wanting to crush the Britain, he was quite an anglophile and wanted to reach an accord with Britain, it was France he hated, as amply exhibited in Mein Kampf. Him going after France while Britain is distracted is plausible though.

IIRC, Hitler wanted the UK to be a global, maritime empire and the premier trading partner to Germany, since he considered the British "brothers" to the Germans.

When things obviously didn't go that way and we went to bat for Europe, he was genuinely baffled; ultimately, he fell back on the excuse that we were being controlled by the "Jews" behind the scenes and needed "liberating."

 

[Buba]

I would ask you and @Batrix and any of the other Poles here exactly what *terms* Poland would accept in an alliance with Germany, if Britain (and France) made no promises of support for Poland against Germany?

Contentious topic, debated on the web - and occasionally other media - since 1990.
Ten Poles = eleven opinions.

 

[ATP]

Maybe the two changes to events in Europe - American participation only six months later, and no Pacific front, allowing expenditure of ever more US consumables in Europe - since they work in 180 degree opposite directions, would cancel each other out precisely, and yield the historic results in the ETO?

Indeed.We would have crushed Germany,and USA,Japan,and soviets as remaining superpowers.
Unless...Demorats were infiltrated by soviets,so could agree to war against Japan,so soviets could take continent,and USA islands.
Like in OTL.

I would ask you and @Batrix and any of the other Poles here exactly what *terms* Poland would accept in an alliance with Germany, if Britain (and France) made no promises of support for Poland against Germany?

1. Would they accept an “alliance” with Hitler’s Germany, sign a piece of paper that says we will work together to against the Soviet Union? Say they will defend Europe together?
Your opinion?
My opinion? Yes, Poland would sign, it might even do staff talks with Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe about deploying to Poland if the USSR invaded Poland.

2. Would Poland, as part of an “alliance” with Nazi Germany, accept a garrison of Nazi troops occupying and based in all of Poland from Posen to the Border with the Soviets around Brest and Bialystok and Lviv for “defense of Poland” and a joint offensive campaign?
Your opinion?
My opinion? No, the Poles would be afraid the Germans would never leave and would coup and colonize them. Only with the greatest reluctance and duress might they accept.

3. Would Poland, as part of an “alliance” with Nazi Germany, be willing to give Hitler’s Germany an extraterritorial highway through the corridor and Danzig?
Your opinion?
My opinion? Poland won’t like it, but yes.

4. Would Poland, as part of an “alliance” with Nazi Germany be willing to let Germany annex Danzig?
Your opinion?
My opinion? Maybe because of isolation/perceived no choice, but probably not honestly

5. Would Poland, as part of an alliance with Nazi Germany, be willing to cede the Polish corridor, west Prussia to Germany, allowing itself too be cut off from Gdynia and the Baltic?
Your opinion?
My opinion? Hells to the no, not without a fight and a defeat, a severe one.

So I personally see a problem with any Nazi-Polish alliance that could last through the time Germany feels strong enough to contemplate invading the USSR. (Germany and Hitler are fine with a Polish pact when they are *weak*). Poland could accept items # 1 and # 3 from my list above, and maybe item # 4. But Poland could never accept items # 2 and # 5, because they feel like handing over the whole country or partitioning it.

But Hitler is demanding by 1939, *all* of items 1 through 5. He hasn’t redeemed German historical and national claims if he doesn’t do that, and if he can’t get his Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe deployed throughout all Poland from west to east, north to south with secure supply lines, Poland useless as an invasion pathway into the Soviet Union to get wider Lebensraum.

Hitler’s demands and agenda, as of 1939, mean that the Poles have to give them land and let Germans roll over and through them to the other side. In that case, Hitler can delay killing off the Catholic Poles of central Poland for a good while and use them as extra cannon fodder against the Soviet Slavs.

Hitler was mad in strange way - he really wonted "alliance" with Poland,and really gave good conditions,only when we refused and decide to die for England started hate us, and genocided from the beginning of war.

But,if we agree? as long as he is alive,we would be relatively safe.

your questions -
1.Yes,we would agree.
2.On border with soviets - likely ,but not in other places.Except Luftwaffe - our air forces was obsolate,and AA weak,so we probably welcome them to important places.
3.We would not like it,but yes.
4.Again,we would not like it,but without England promised help - yes.
5.No,we would die before we agree.

But,as long as we agree in early 1939,Hitler would not demand 5.
Of course,after his death/probably about 1965/ we would have war and lost quickly,without anybody to help us.
So - in long turn it is good thing,that we fight.


Althought...in this scenario,when jews would accuse us of helping Hitler,it would be not lie,so....maybe we should do that for jews ?

 

[49ersfootball]

What if Japan had attacked the Dutch East Indies in 1936, based on lobbying from the Navy to gain the valuable archipelago located at the strategic maritime crossroads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, offering Japan a position outflanking Singapore and Manila Bay, and providing already extensively developed fuel resources to fuel Japan's Navy, Army, and economy under Japanese, rather than foreign control, and coincidentally, offering Naval Admiral, Captains and other officers a chance for glory and promotion?

Considered as a one-on-one struggle, as of 1936, Japan should be completely conflict in its ability to win a near term victory over the Dutch in the East Indies, conquer the territory, and hold it against a Dutch counter-attack, given the distance any Dutch relief force would have to travel.

The archipelago's distance from Japan's land-based airbases would be a serious operational and logistic problem to overcome, and least for the most valuable, populous, and productive western and central islands of the East Indies, although IJN carriers could project limit airpower against most parts of the islands from the beginning. Engaging against enemy land-based air power in the defense with only carrier-based air would be risky and hazardous however.

An operational solution could be found, without stepping on the territory of other powers, like Britain, the USA, or France, by rapid successive sequential operations starting in the easternmost of the Dutch East Indies, where land-based Japanese aircraft (likely naval rather than army, but still land-based) could provide powerful support from bases in the Japanese Micronesian Mandated islands to back up combined Special Naval Landing Forces supported also by carrier-based aircraft and battleship bombardment, to rapidly capture Dutch airfields for Japanese use.

The Japanese, bringing along engineering troops, could follow up each successive island group seizure with rapid repairs of Dutch airfields, forward transport of land-based air, and attack on the next Dutch-owned objectives, in support of the Combined Fleet and landing forces.

A rapid pace of maneuver would be essential to keep defeating the Dutch in detail and prevent defensive consolidation, and reduce time for other powers to consider possible intervention in the bilateral conflict.

Once all the principal islands were secured and the major Dutch forces in the region defeated, their continued occupation would be a fait accompli, and peace treaty and war termination with Netherlands would be a diplomatic formality in all likelihood. The Netherlands, despite being an economic and financial power, were not a vast manufacturing, military, nor territorial power, nor highly populous and thus in a position to undertake a long-distance reconquest of the East Indies.

After establishing occupation, Japan could repair damaged facilities, reorient the oil and food exports to the Japanese imperial market, and theoretically emerge stronger and self-sufficient, having a naval/maritime complement to the Army's Manchukuo project.

Well, that's sounds great, so why didn't Japan do it? What could go wrong?

• Wasn't Japan bogged down in a war with China in 1936?
• 
  
• As it turns out, if it was a war, it was not a very hot one at this time. Japan enjoyed control over the Manchukuo and Inner Mongolian (Mengjiang) puppet states north of the Great Wall of China, and had compelled China to keep large parts of Beijing's province of Hopei demilitarized under the He-Umezu truce agreement. For most of 1936 until the Xi'an incident of December, Chiang remained preoccupied with preparing an encirclement and annihilation campaign against the Communists who had survived the Long March in Shaanxi province and ignored calls to push back against Japan. Chiang did not start pushing back against Japan until July 1937, and the Japanese were not getting political signals he might be heading in that direction, until after he paused anti-Communist operations during/after the December 1936 Xi'an incident and increased resistance and unity talk.
• 
  
• What about intervention of other powers, like the USA or Britain, the Philippines, Malaya and Borneo are in between the Dutch East Indies and Japan you know?
• 
  
• The Japanese could quite plausibly calculate by this time, middle or late 1936, that none of these powers would intervene directly or effectively in a Dutch East Indies war, no matter what they said. Such a calculation could quite plausibly be correct. It would give us a pair of equally interesting scenarios if the Japanese calculation turned out to be correct, OR, if it turned out to be incorrect, and another power intervened in the war.
• 
  
• Why should Japan have confidence in non-intervention by outsiders? 1) Outside powers and the League of Nations had not militarily intervened, nor economically sanctioned Japan over the Manchurian invasion of 1931-33, and the adjunct short-term Shanghai invasion, despite diplomatic condemnation. 2) More recently outside powers had not intervened militarily, or sanctioned effectively or persistently, against Italy's invasion of Abyssinia, and ultimately its annexation from 1935-to April 1936, despite condemning it. They tried some sanctions but did not persist. Relevant to Japan's situation, Abyssinia was adjacent to British and French colonies, but still they permitted Italy to expand next to them and to use Suez. This might be explained away by economic or racial factors. Cynically, Abyssinia was poor and hardly exported anything, so maybe it wasn't worth a struggle to London and Paris, but the East Indies produced valuable petroleum and hardwood and limited rubber, rice and coffee exports of greater commercial value. Or perhaps white leaders in London, Paris, Washington could tolerate white Italians conquering black Africans, but not tolerate Asians ousting white Dutch rulers to take control over a large Asian people and Asian land. But other events of the 1930s suggested that weak will in the west and aversion to conflict was about a more general preference than just racial bias: 3) In 1934 (or 1935?) Britain had signed the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, showing a lack of determination to hold its full degree of naval superiority over Germany, even in the North Sea close to home, and 4) In 1936, France (and Britain) failed to resist the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, right upon her border, closer than the metropolitan Netherlands is to France, making any concept of Paris or London extending deterrence out to a distant Dutch *colony* less credible and more of a stretch. 5) All West European powers showed preoccupation from July 1936 onward, with the Spanish Civil War, which was turning out to be a protracted struggle, not a quick coup d'etat. Germany and Italy were intervening directly in support of the Spanish Nationalist rebels. The British were pulling the French into the unsuccessful Non-Intervention Committee and policy, to try to contain the conflict, and not actively countering Italo-German influence or encouraging France to do so (in fact discouraging it). As another bonus from a Japanese point of view, the Spanish Civil War was drawing heavy attention from the Soviet Union and allied ideological movements, leading to deployment of Soviet advisors, weapons and international volunteers, which diverted Soviet attention from northeast Asia and the Manchukuo-Korea frontier.
• 
  
• This accounts well for the alternate preoccupations and likely hesitations of European powers to intervene in the Indies. What about the USA? From a Japanese vantage point, the Roosevelt Administration's first term had been almost exclusively focused on domestic policy, not passing anything like a two-ocean Navy bill, with any naval construction advertised more as a jobs program than a security program. FDR was preoccupied with his reelection. If anything, his foreign policy as shown in the Americas, was one of retrenchment from intervention in neighbors' political affairs. With respect to the Far East, the Americans formally set a timetable for the independence of the Philippines in 1945, through the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1935. Despite some posturing of the US Navy at the tail end of the Hoover Administration during the Shanghai affair, and the failure of any Naval talks in the mid-30s, the relative quiet that had settled on the China-Manchuria front since 1933 had not added any particularly urgent stressors to US-Japanese relations by 1936. America was somewhat economically recovered from its depths of 1933, but hardly looking outward, except for trade opportunities, which it sought with Japan as much as with China and European colonies like the DEI.
• And in case, should any of these powers, America, Britain, France, the USSR, turn against Japan in the medium term or long-term, the Dutch East Indies would be a great strategic asset for Japan to possess from the beginning of any serious conflict escalation, rather than not to have.
• 
  
• Didn't the Japanese Army, not Navy, run everything in 1930s Japan?
• 
  
• It's more complicated than that. Army officers and societies organized and roamed free making up their own foreign policy as they went along (like the Manchuria incident of 1931, and earlier and later incidents), assassinating politicians and generals they felt insufficiently supportive, and attempting coups d'etat, from the 1928-1936 timeframe. But so did some Navy officer groups and societies. In February 1936 a spiritualist Army faction attempted a coup and made some headway, but was suppressed by an angry court, Army senior command, and Naval forces. The plotters, unlike in previous cases were sternly dealt with, being either executed or forced to commit suicide. The result was sort of a compromise, since the Army coup was stopped, but only with the help of other parts of the Army, with ideas not 100% dissimilar from the plotters. Initiative coups and assassinations of politicians and generals pretty much ceased at this point from military personnel. But people always worried they could happen if top leaders adopted policy broadly unpopular with the Army or Navy. The Army and Navy generally had different priorities, but both got increased funding and their share of personnel and equipment budgets, and policy influence, in the spoils system.
• 
  
• When considering Japanese military factions and their different priorities, and the Japanese Navy and Army and their different priorities and positions, it is important to remember that differences =/= diametrical opposition and differences =/=mutual hatred. Neither service was a monolith, and both Army and Navy contained "Go North" and "Go South" advocates and it is easy to provide quotes from both.
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• Edward Drea, writing on this era has noted that one of Emperor Hirohito's recurring critiques and lines of questioning toward the Army regarding its course of action in Manchuria and China was whether Japan was overreaching and investing in an unbalanced commitment to the Army in the mainland, and not taking enough care to keep Japan's Navy and Air forces and maritime position adequately strong to deal with possible threats to Japan's interests from the USA or Britain.
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• So, I could imagine it being plausible that a strong, enterprising Navy-centric group, joined by some Army officers and Civilian officials with similar ideas and economic justifications, could build a powerful case for domination of the Dutch East Indies in the mid-1930s.

Makes a juicy TL. Prequel of Fear & Loathing ?

 

[raharris1973]

Makes a juicy TL. Prequel of Fear & Loathing ?

Which particular fear and loathing timeline - it's a popular title?