raharris1973
Well-known member
What if Italy, because of different, perhaps less cautious politicians, or a less cautious monarch, expresses its irritation with Austria-Hungary over the Bosnia crisis by working to sign on formally to alliance with France and Russia, while affirming to diplomatic interlocutors, German and Austrian, and its new Entente partners, that it is dropping/repudiating all former obligations under its former Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary?
There may have been OTL realpolitik reasons to *not* do this. Italy seemed able to formally retain the alliance, define its terms suitably to avoid being trapped in unwelcome situations, while also able to make side deals. But let's say it isn't disciplined enough to keep this up. Perhaps the circle of political figures knowledgeable of, advocating for, and influencing foreign policy decisions gets a little too large for this, and the right people make political capital from venting dissatisfaction at Austria-Hungary (and by extension Germany for supporting Austria-Hungary) by dropping the Triple Alliance, and making direct ties with Russia and France. They also make the logical, or logical sounding argument that aligning with the newly emerged Triple Entente is vital for Italian interests because it is the winning alliance of the future, not just the alliance that does not bind it with the Austro-Hungarian enemy/albatross/sick man. Given Italy's dependence on British coal and British patrolled sea-lanes, and now Britain's Ententes in colonial affairs with Russia, France, and Japan, any policy of aggression toward France would be too foolish to contemplate, and getting closer to the 'club' of powers who control the oceans can only be beneficial infacilitating cooperation with Russia on Austrian and Balkan affairs or with Britain and Russia on Ottoman affairs.
So it is done, and the Austrians and Germans receive their diplomatic equivalent of a gut punch.
How do European diplomacy and crises evolve from 1909 onward?
The specific ones I am counting are the Agadir 2nd Morocco Crisis of 1911
The Tripoli Italo-Ottoman War of 1911-12
The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913
The Liman Von Sanders affair of winter 1913-14 (for completists)
The Sarajevo Crisis of 1914
How might these develop differently?
How might Berlin and Vienna behave differently with their late ally repudiating them? Would they adjust their military/naval spending and operations plans to fit new diplomatic reality?
How might Paris, St. Petersburg and London change their calculations?
There may have been OTL realpolitik reasons to *not* do this. Italy seemed able to formally retain the alliance, define its terms suitably to avoid being trapped in unwelcome situations, while also able to make side deals. But let's say it isn't disciplined enough to keep this up. Perhaps the circle of political figures knowledgeable of, advocating for, and influencing foreign policy decisions gets a little too large for this, and the right people make political capital from venting dissatisfaction at Austria-Hungary (and by extension Germany for supporting Austria-Hungary) by dropping the Triple Alliance, and making direct ties with Russia and France. They also make the logical, or logical sounding argument that aligning with the newly emerged Triple Entente is vital for Italian interests because it is the winning alliance of the future, not just the alliance that does not bind it with the Austro-Hungarian enemy/albatross/sick man. Given Italy's dependence on British coal and British patrolled sea-lanes, and now Britain's Ententes in colonial affairs with Russia, France, and Japan, any policy of aggression toward France would be too foolish to contemplate, and getting closer to the 'club' of powers who control the oceans can only be beneficial infacilitating cooperation with Russia on Austrian and Balkan affairs or with Britain and Russia on Ottoman affairs.
So it is done, and the Austrians and Germans receive their diplomatic equivalent of a gut punch.
How do European diplomacy and crises evolve from 1909 onward?
The specific ones I am counting are the Agadir 2nd Morocco Crisis of 1911
The Tripoli Italo-Ottoman War of 1911-12
The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913
The Liman Von Sanders affair of winter 1913-14 (for completists)
The Sarajevo Crisis of 1914
How might these develop differently?
How might Berlin and Vienna behave differently with their late ally repudiating them? Would they adjust their military/naval spending and operations plans to fit new diplomatic reality?
How might Paris, St. Petersburg and London change their calculations?