What if Britain put the peace of Europe ahead of cordial relations with its Entente buddies in 1914?

[raharris1973]

What if Britain put the peace of Europe ahead of cordial relations with its Entente buddies in 1914?

It might not be immediately apparent those two things were at odds, or what Britain might have done that might have angered Entente powers but prevented the outbreak of general war.

So I'll spell it out for everyone: When Austria-Hungary delivers its ultimatum to Serbia and communicates this, Britain copies the wording and issues an identically worded ultimatum to Serbia as well, clearly indicating its support for Austrian redress, and, much more importantly non-support for Russian mobilization over the Austro-Serb issue.

Knowing Britain is on the opposite side of the Austria-Serbia issue, and completely unreliable in the event this escalates into a wider war, over this issue, Russia declines to mobilize or threaten war against Austria-Hungary.

Germany has no reason/motivation/excuse to mobilize, declare, war and attack its neighbors.

Instead of WWI in 1914, we have an Austro-Serbian war that year or "third Balkan war", whose most likely additional participant, if any, isn't another great power, but Bulgaria, as a scavenger when Serbia gets ground down.

Stepping back from the Balkans, what happens to British-French-Russian relations after this, and strategic interactions between Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire in the decade after the British stiff arm the Serbian protege of their erstwhile Russian Entente partner?

 

[stevep]

What if Britain put the peace of Europe ahead of cordial relations with its Entente buddies in 1914?

It might not be immediately apparent those two things were at odds, or what Britain might have done that might have angered Entente powers but prevented the outbreak of general war.

So I'll spell it out for everyone: When Austria-Hungary delivers its ultimatum to Serbia and communicates this, Britain copies the wording and issues an identically worded ultimatum to Serbia as well, clearly indicating its support for Austrian redress, and, much more importantly non-support for Russian mobilization over the Austro-Serb issue.

Knowing Britain is on the opposite side of the Austria-Serbia issue, and completely unreliable in the event this escalates into a wider war, over this issue, Russia declines to mobilize or threaten war against Austria-Hungary.

Germany has no reason/motivation/excuse to mobilize, declare, war and attack its neighbors.

Instead of WWI in 1914, we have an Austro-Serbian war that year or "third Balkan war", whose most likely additional participant, if any, isn't another great power, but Bulgaria, as a scavenger when Serbia gets ground down.

Stepping back from the Balkans, what happens to British-French-Russian relations after this, and strategic interactions between Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire in the decade after the British stiff arm the Serbian protege of their erstwhile Russian Entente partner?

The problem with that is that by deserting Russia when its only ally in the Balkans is threatened your likely to scupper the entire entente with it and hence with France. That leaves Britain isolated against the German threat and also France and Russia if Germany was to decide on war. There was concern about the ability of Russia to moblise its army post 1916 fast enough to prevent the German quick knock out blow on France so the German military and leadership, which seems to have rejected the idea of any non-military solution to any problems was always likely to be looking for an excuse for the hoped for quick and crushing victory in the next couple of years. As such this is likely to make Europe even more unstable.

Furthermore say you let Serbia be attacked and occupied by Austria, probably with some areas being annexed to Bulgaria? That leaves the rump Serbia - along with most other Slavs in the region - even more distrustful of Austria, even assuming that the Austrians only seek to remove any terrorist groups, rather than any Serbian nationalists at all. As such there's a running sore when Austria already has more Slavs than it can handle and with the renewal of the deal with Hungary coming up in 1916 that's also going to be interesting.

 

[raharris1973]

The problem with that is that by deserting Russia when its only ally in the Balkans is threatened your likely to scupper the entire entente with it and hence with France.

One could turn it around and say the problem with joining the Entente in the first place was it encouraged France to back Russia to back Serbia, making it more likely for Austria to attack Serbia and Germany to attack Belgium and France and bring Britain into a war costing so much the continent's economy was wrecked and the next generation of Britons was unconvinced that being allied to continental powers was a good idea. It led to a path of destruction, defeat and revenge for the German losers. For the British "victors" it led to a cycle of loss, exhaustion, retrenchment, appeasement, then war again anyway, then loss, exhaustion and retrenchment all over again.

In any case, scuppering the Entente during the July crisis only becomes a dangerous thing if, a) there's no way restore coordinated resistance in a fresh crisis involving involving aggression against Triple Entente country, or if b) the imperial German government is hell-bent on conquering France in all circumstances, or c) hell-bent on conquering Russia in all circumstances.

b) and c) suppose a domestic governing ideology and system more like the Nazi dictatorship and less like the conservative constitutional monarchy Germany had in 1914.

That leaves Britain isolated against the German threat

What German threat? Britain had pulled decisively ahead of Germany in the naval race, and could sustain a rate of building that would keep it ahead of the Germans for the foreseeable future.

France and Russia if Germany was to decide on war.

You're saying these two would be isolated (from Britain) if Germany would decide on war. But how likely are there to be circumstances where Imperial Germany decides to attack France and Russia out of the blue, without there being the pre-requisites Germany needs for allied support (Austria involved) and domestic support in the Reichstag even from deputies of the center and left (fright at Russian mobilization).

The German military and leadership, which seems to have rejected the idea of any non-military solution to any problems was always likely to be looking for an excuse for the hoped for quick and crushing victory in the next couple of years.

Where's the evidence of this?

A few simple stats:

Involvement in major wars 1872-1913:

Britain - Boer War

France - Franco-Chinese War

Germany - ?

Austria-Hungary - ?

Russia - Russo-Japanese War

Italy - Italo-Ottoman war

United States - Spanish American War

Furthermore say you let Serbia be attacked and occupied by Austria, probably with some areas being annexed to Bulgaria? That leaves the rump Serbia - along with most other Slavs in the region - even more distrustful of Austria, even assuming that the Austrians only seek to remove any terrorist groups, rather than any Serbian nationalists at all.

Sure, there may be no happy endings on the Danube and the Balkans, but no reason for the rest of the continent to jump lemming-like over the cliff.

As such there's a running sore when Austria already has more Slavs than it can handle and with the renewal of the deal with Hungary coming up in 1916 that's also going to be interesting.

It could be interesting, maybe even unstable. But if 'interesting' in your book means an Austria-Hungary internally disordered, possibly to the point of breaking apart, that doesn't appear particularly disadvantageous to Britain by itself. Nor Russia, nor France. An overgrown Austria-Hungary fracturing also hardly seems to be the kind of thing to encourage: a) Germany aggression into Belgium and France in the first place, or to b) allow Germany to fight nearly as successfully and as long as it did from 1914 in OTL, thus also a better outcome for Britain, and the other members of the Entente.

 

[stevep]

One could turn it around and say the problem with joining the Entente in the first place was it encouraged France to back Russia to back Serbia, making it more likely for Austria to attack Serbia and Germany to attack Belgium and France and bring Britain into a war costing so much the continent's economy was wrecked and the next generation of Britons was unconvinced that being allied to continental powers was a good idea. It led to a path of destruction, defeat and revenge for the German losers. For the British "victors" it led to a cycle of loss, exhaustion, retrenchment, appeasement, then war again anyway, then loss, exhaustion and retrenchment all over again.

In any case, scuppering the Entente during the July crisis only becomes a dangerous thing if, a) there's no way restore coordinated resistance in a fresh crisis involving involving aggression against Triple Entente country, or if b) the imperial German government is hell-bent on conquering France in all circumstances, or c) hell-bent on conquering Russia in all circumstances.

b) and c) suppose a domestic governing ideology and system more like the Nazi dictatorship and less like the conservative constitutional monarchy Germany had in 1914.

Actually it supposes a Germany leadership very like the one that existed.

Yes the result for everybody of the mess in 1914 was bad. Worse in that Germany went even more off the rails in the following decades and unlikely the other combatants hadn't decided that war was too costly and pointless.

What German threat? Britain had pulled decisively ahead of Germany in the naval race, and could sustain a rate of building that would keep it ahead of the Germans for the foreseeable future.

At that point but Germany had a more powerful industrial base and until the new construction under way by 1914 came in - and German plans for new ships were largely scuppered by the demands of their army in the war - the lead was bloody tight and meant Britain had had to call in the bulk of its forces from other theatres.

You're saying these two would be isolated (from Britain) if Germany would decide on war. But how likely are there to be circumstances where Imperial Germany decides to attack France and Russia out of the blue, without there being the pre-requisites Germany needs for allied support (Austria involved) and domestic support in the Reichstag even from deputies of the center and left (fright at Russian mobilization).

Well Germany had decided that any crisis would result in an all out attack on France via Belgium as IT'S ONLY strategy. Any war Germany had with either power would draw in the other as they would be too vulnerable if their ally was attacked and defeated, leaving them alone. Plus it was clear by this time that Austria would follow Berlin's lead, although possibly if F-F had survived and become emperor I have seen suggestions that this might have changed,

Where's the evidence of this?

A few simple stats:

Involvement in major wars 1872-1913:

Britain - Boer War

France - Franco-Chinese War

Germany - ?

Austria-Hungary - ?

Russia - Russo-Japanese War

Italy - Italo-Ottoman war

United States - Spanish American War

Leaving aside the fact that Britain was the power attacked in the example above those are largely colonial wars. None of them greatly affected the balance of power other than the exception to that rule of the conflict between Russia and Japan.

However as I pointed out above Germany had determined that moblisation would be followed by attacking France. Note this appears to be the case even if France hadn't moblised itself! There are reports that the Germany army had other options but if so Molkte kept those from the Kaiser.

Sure, there may be no happy endings on the Danube and the Balkans, but no reason for the rest of the continent to jump lemming-like over the cliff.



It could be interesting, maybe even unstable. But if 'interesting' in your book means an Austria-Hungary internally disordered, possibly to the point of breaking apart, that doesn't appear particularly disadvantageous to Britain by itself. Nor Russia, nor France. An overgrown Austria-Hungary fracturing also hardly seems to be the kind of thing to encourage: a) Germany aggression into Belgium and France in the first place, or to b) allow Germany to fight nearly as successfully and as long as it did from 1914 in OTL, thus also a better outcome for Britain, and the other members of the Entente.

In hindsight yes but that wasn't clear without hindsight. Austria had already made one land grab in 1908 which had heightened tensions with both Serbia and also with Russia.

I'm not saying that Germany and Austria were solely responsible for the continental conflict but their behaviour in the period were the primary cause.

 

[raharris1973]

At that point but Germany had a more powerful industrial base and until the new construction under way by 1914 came in - and German plans for new ships were largely scuppered by the demands of their army in the war - the lead was bloody tight and meant Britain had had to call in the bulk of its forces from other theatres.

Actually no, they had to switch emphasis back to land arms as early as 1912

 

[stevep]

Actually no, they had to switch emphasis back to land arms as early as 1912

We're probably talking about the same thing. It was the substantial reversal of the previous British governments desire to cut back military spending than enabled the big response to the German naval programmes but that took until 1914-15 before that started arriving in enough numbers to give Britain a decent level of security at sea.

 

[Atarlost]

It is entirely reasonable for a nation like Britain to see the Serbian precedent as a threat. Serbia looks a lot like the Hapsburg's Ireland and the one Austrian demand Serbia wouldn't meet was the one that a fellow monarchy like the UK should have considered the least negotiable. Letting Serbia investigate Serbian terrorist backing of Gavrillo Princep is a bit too much like letting leaving the investigation entirely to the Irish if an avowed Irish Nationalist had murdered Prince Edward. Technicalities about sovereignty be damned, everyone* knew Serbian sovereignty was a polite fiction that was real only so far as it served Russia.

A divergence as simple as the Liberals winning by a smaller margin in 1905 and needing the Irish Nationalists in their governing coalition five years earlier would have accelerated the troubles in Ireland. If Edward VII refused to pack the house of Lords this would have killed Irish hopes for peaceful passage of the Home Rule Bill until the composition of the Lords changed through natural human mortality and violence could have broken out in 1907 or 1908 instead of 1916. The English would probably instinctively respond with the boot as they did after the war OTL even though the Home Rule Act had passed in 1914 and only been suspended for the duration of hostilities. In this environment, whichever party wound up in power by 1914, the English would be a lot more sympathetic to Franz Josef's concerns about Serbian terrorists being covered up by Serbian police.

* Everyone in this context being those whose opinions George V and H H Asquith or his possible Conservative alternate valued. Tsar Nicholas II may pretend he believes in Serbian sovereignty, but I'm confident pretense is all it is and that his cousin knew this full well. If the Russians hadn't considered Serbia their property they wouldn't have bothered to defend it. And the assumptions by Asquith and members of his government that a war could not involve their nation until after Germany's ultimatum to Belgium show what they thought of the value of Serbian sovereignty. Even Belgium wasn't important enough for some to vote for war and I suspect that it was fear of the minority of the government in favor of war over Belgium breaking off to form a hawkish coalition with the Conservatives that got the median minister to approve the counter-ultimatum to Germany.