Vlassov allowed to form the Russian Liberation Army

[sillygoose]

What if Hitler had been willing to let Vlassov form a Russian Liberation Army and use them in combat? Apparently IOTL the reason why he wasn't allowed to do so until the end of the war when it was too late was because of Soviet disinformation via the Klatt Bureau that convinced Hitler Vlassov was double dealing with the Soviets and not to be trusted. I'm not 100% sure that is true, but that is a claim I've come across about the subject. Let's run with that and say that for whatever reason this disinformation is not believed and Hitler let's Vlassov form a 50,000 man corps (a test run for the formation of a larger force) in 1942 for use in 1943; that was historically what they were able to form by 1945:

ROA in Czechoslovakia May 1945

By the middle of 1944, Vlassov’s formation, the Russkaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia (ROA – the Russian Army of Liberation) was not an army in the sense of a military organization. Units that bore its n…

weaponsandwarfare.com

The KONR Army had begun to form in November 1944, accompanied by shortages of arms and equipment. As a result of the deteriorating military situation in the East, the five divisions were reduced to two. Despite his difficulties, Vlassov formed an army headquarters, two motorized divisions, one reserve brigade, an engineer battalion and support units – a total strength of 50,000 men. On 28 January 1945, he officially took command of the army.

5 divisions had been intended, but time and equipment were short in 1944. Here if successful in combat there would be the potential to form all 5 divisions as intended in 1943.

It seems the above quote is a bit incorrect though, as the divisions were not actually motorized, but they were quite large at 18,000 men each:

600th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

At full strength, the division had 18,000 men and was equipped with, among other things, a number of T-34 tanks, Jagdpanzer 38(t) tank hunters, a few armored vehicles and various types of artillery guns.

Here let's assume they get a bunch of captured Soviet equipment from artillery to SP guns to tanks since there was so much of it and the Russian troops would be more familiar with it anyway.

For the sake of argument let's assume they are ready to go in time for Operation Citadel and due to the shortage of infantry with Model's 9th army the KONR army is subordinated to it and used as a 'shock' army to breach Soviet lines. From what I could find this would represent at least a 20% increase in the total strength of the northern pincer of Citadel, but would actually represent an increase of ~30% for 9th army as their attack divisions were all understrength and out of the roughly 230,000 men in the 9th army only 75,000 were combat troops. The full strength KONR corps would add something a bit above 20,000 combat troops.

I have my theories about what would happen, but I'd like to know what the community thinks. How would they do in combat, how would they influence the offensive at Kursk, and what wider impact would they have on the Eastern Front politically speaking and in terms of the desertion rates of the Soviet army (which IOTL increased even in 1943 as a result of ROA activity)?

 

[PsihoKekec]

It depends on the composition of the troops. If the corps is made up of former POWs, then the soldiers will most likely kill their officers upon reaching the frontline and desert en masse (there is a reason why POW formations were not used on Eastern front). If it's made mostly up from collaborators then they will fight, but the problem is that at this time these collaborators as still needed in the rear echelon.

 

[sillygoose]

It depends on the composition of the troops. If the corps is made up of former POWs, then the soldiers will most likely kill their officers upon reaching the frontline and desert en masse (there is a reason why POW formations were not used on Eastern front). If it's made mostly up from collaborators then they will fight, but the problem is that at this time these collaborators as still needed in the rear echelon.

Not necessarily. A substantial number of the historical KONR troops were PoWs and they stuck it out with the division. Vlasov was very mindful of giving motivation to his troops:

Andrey Vlasov - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

According to Varlam Shalamov and his tale The Last Battle of Major Pugachov, Vlasov emissaries lectured to the Russian prisoners of war, explaining to them that their government had declared them all traitors, and that escaping was pointless. As Vlasov proclaimed, even if the Soviets succeeded, Stalin would send them to Siberia.[10]

From the Russian article on the division, which fought in the worst circumstances of 1945:

1-я пехотная дивизия (РОА) — Википедия

ru.wikipedia.org

Before the battle, Vlasov visited the division. He spoke in every unit, talked with the soldiers, took the oath of recruits.

On April 13, 1945, at 05:15, after artillery preparation and an air raid, the regiments of the division attacked the positions of the 119th fortified area of the Soviet 33rd Army south of Furstenberg . The attack of the 3rd regiment from the south was repulsed by the middle of the day with heavy losses for the attackers. After a short respite, the attack was resumed, but again choked. The 2nd regiment operated more successfully, attacking the bridgehead from the north with the support of 12 tanks and several self-propelled guns. He managed to capture the first line of trenches and hold out on it until the next day. The total losses of the division in killed amounted to 370 people. [3] .

Not bad in the face of a collapsing front, massive Soviet superiority, and only a few months of organization and training.

In fact it seems that during the chaos of March 1945 the 1st ROA division managed to add 5000 men from escaped PoWs and Ostarbeiter that they formed into a new regiment before going into combat:

Операция «Апрельская погода» — Википедия

ru.wikipedia.org

On March 6, 1945, the division left the camp on foot for Erlangen . On the way, escaped prisoners of war and Ostarbeiters poured into it, alone and in whole groups . Their number increased, and it was decided to bring them into a five-battalion regiment, which consisted of 5,000 people. On March 22, units of the division reached Erlangen, where they were loaded into echelons for two days. On March 26, the entire division arrived at the Liberose station, located 25 kilometers north of Cottbus and 30 kilometers from the front line [7] .

No mention of desertions, failure to attack, or low morale.

ITTL they'd have something like 9 months of organization and training, all the equipment and ammo they'd need, and a much better situation in which to actually attack as part of an intact army as well as institutional support. Plus the opportunity to build themselves up with deserters from the Soviet army, which the propaganda arm of the RONA forces managed to quite successfully induce an increase.

Книга: История власовской армии

Автор: Хоффманн Йоахим, Книга: История власовской армии, Жанр: биография

www.e-reading.club

The optimism of the leaders of the Liberation Movement might seem unjustified if it were not constantly supported by practical evidence. So, already in 1943, it turned out that whenever Russian formations engage in battle with units of the Red Army, the opposite side shows obvious nervousness. As an example, the offensive of the Druzhina brigade on the central sector of the Eastern Front in 1943 was cited: “They rushed forward with shouts of“ hurray, ”the report says,“ and as soon as the Red Army men realized that it was the Russians, Vlasovites, who were advancing, they immediately surrendered"{32}

Apparently even late in the war defections from the Soviet side to the Russians fighting under the German banner was common:

Notable events took place in the area of the 1st Cossack Division (15th Cossack Cavalry Corps), which since 1944 has repeatedly engaged in battle with Soviet forces in Yugoslavia. The stories of the Cossacks invariably mention the flight of six Soviet aircraft under the command of a major to their side. The Soviet pilots, realizing that they were dealing with the Cossacks, carried out a raid on one of Tito's formations and then landed in the area of the Cossack division near Belovar in Croatia. Until October 1944, at least 803 Red Army soldiers went over to the side of the Cossacks. Among their achievements, the Cossacks also mention the complete defeat in the Pitomaki area on December 25, 1944 of the Soviet 133rd Guards Division, from where there were also many defectors {33}. This story is confirmed by other sources, indicating that on that day the 5th Don Cavalry Regiment (scout brigade) under the command of Colonel I. N. Kononov and the 6th Tersky under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Prince Karl Salmsky were called in the battle on Pitomak " The attack of the ROA strike group under the command of Colonel Sakharov on February 9, 1945 in the Oder region was also promising.

According to the German document, this first unexpected performance by a part of the Vlasov army caused "colossal confusion and surprise" among the Red Army men. Soviet soldiers from three different regiments were taken prisoner or defected to the Vlasovites. As it turned out during interrogations, there would have been much more prisoners if the Red Army did not consider the use of their compatriots on the side of the enemy as just a military trick of the Germans. The attack of the ROA strike group under the command of Colonel Sakharov on February 9, 1945 in the Oder region was also promising.

Further German reports about the fighting qualities of the 1st RONA division were actually quite good and by 1945 it was the German divisions who looked poor in comparison to the Russian division:

ВОЕННАЯ ЛИТЕРАТУРА --[ Исследования ]-- Хоффманн Й. История власовской армии

 

[WolfBear]

I have my theories about what would happen, but I'd like to know what the community thinks. How would they do in combat, how would they influence the offensive at Kursk, and what wider impact would they have on the Eastern Front politically speaking and in terms of the desertion rates of the Soviet army (which IOTL increased even in 1943 as a result of ROA activity)?

What does ROA stand for?

 

[sillygoose]

What does ROA stand for?

Russkaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia (ROA – the Russian Army of Liberation)

 

[WolfBear]

Russkaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia (ROA – the Russian Army of Liberation)

Thanks. Anyway, what about scrapping Citadel and holding the Panther-Wotan Line instead? It would involve sacrificing some Ukrainian resources, but still, it's a better defensive line.

 

[sillygoose]

Thanks. Anyway, what about scrapping Citadel and holding the Panther-Wotan Line instead? It would involve sacrificing some Ukrainian resources, but still, it's a better defensive line.

That's a subject for a different thread. I'd like to stick to the point of the OP.

 

[sillygoose]

Since this doesn't seem to have generated much discussion, let me give my opinion of what might happen and see if that generates any debate.

I've come across several books on the Vlasov forces/movement including one in German based on the wartime records of the German who worked with them already linked in this thread (in Russian translation, so you'll have to suffer through google translate). Generally speaking they were quite complementary of Vlasov and his forces, including their relatively limited combat experience, though the author also mentions the good performance of the Cossacks in German service.

So I'm inclined to think that if they had gotten the go ahead from Hitler and got the resources they needed to arm and train they'd have performed very well given how motivated the troops and officers were and would be with institutional support; a major issue IOTL was constant brush offs by the Germans and plans to break up the units; they did not do as well under German command and in places they didn't want to fight like in France, because their morale was bound up with their own leaders and political goals to defeat Stalin. So if Hitler recognized them earlier as an ally (this was done historically in December 1944 when it was too late) and actually promoted the Prague Manifesto, then I really do think there was a lot of potential to mobilize the Russian people against Stalin if reports on desertions to the Vlasov movement are accurate. After all over 1 million Soviet citizens served in the Wehrmacht and quite a bit more behind the lines in various capacities. Were it not for active and extensive efforts by Moscow to foment violence behind German lines (very similar to the North Vietnamese later on) the various ex-Soviet peoples would have been much more passive and cooperative with the Axis occupiers rather than being caught up in a horrific cycle of tit-for-tat violence between the partisans and occupiers.

Anyway in regards to the specific military accomplishments possible during Kursk, I think I gave a pretty detailed explanation why their presence alone, regardless of military efficiency (which I think would have actually been still quite good with more training and motivation coming from political recognition and status as allies on par with Italy or Romania), their sheer numbers would be a rather massive enhancement for 9th army. I'm not sure how they would actually be used, but given that there was a political need for them to do well in combat they'd be given an easier objectives, one of which could be to split the juncture of two Soviet armies, the 13th and 48th:

https://www.normandy1944.info/templates/yootheme/cache/Battle-of-Kursk-map-a6eafc0a.webp

Historically that failed because of the weak forces used by the Germans to try it, so instead of a single weak division (383rd division) there would be an entire fully strength reinforced corps used and said German division could be in reserve with its corps instead. Plus it is on the far end of the line away from Soviet armor reserves and facing only infantry formations. It think they'd be able to breach their section of the line, albeit with significant losses and then find itself the focus of Soviet counterattacks, as once they are identified the Soviets would try to do their best to destroy the unit given the political threat they represented, especially if militarily successful. That means an easier time for German units if the Soviets focus reserves on them. Ultimately I doubt it would make Citadel a successful offensive, but it would cause the Soviets a lot of problems and probably jack up their casualties considerably. During Op. Kutuzov Central Front would probably have a very hard time participating due to the extra losses during Citadel, while the extra infantry divisions of the RONA corps would be a pretty vital enhancement to Model's forces, especially given the noted Russian abilities on the defense.

Militarily in 1943 I don't see the corps playing a decisive role, but in the context of wider operations they'd have pretty significant operational impacts in the Orel area due to how many more casualties they'd cause to the Soviets and ability to sap forces from them by encouraging defections. Likely they'd have to be removed from the lines after Orel and rebuilt, but they might be able to achieve some of that themselves during the fighting due to said defections. Plus if they are militarily successful and prove trustworthy they'd probably be rapidly built up with what became the Ostbattalions sent to France historically, who in turn could be replaced by Germans, and the Kaminski Brigade (which historically was folded into RONA later). If permitted I think they could ultimately set up the full fledged army of 10 divisions and an air force that Vlasov desired and would be a massive and important enhancement in the fighting around Smolensk and Vitebsk in late 1943-1944. They might even be able to deal with the partisan problem effectively given the cultural/language affinity the Russian unit would have with the population.

I'm sure AG-Center would be thrilled to have even 5 extra divisions (>100,000 men when including corps/army level assets; the Germans took about 70,000 casualties in just the battle of Smolensk), especially if they had special skills to deal with partisans and could cause more Soviet desertions, which would be a pretty dramatic enhancement of their combat power in the Autumn-Winter of 1943 and the highway battles of winter-spring 1944.

Their major role though would probably be more in the political/morale realm, as they'd represent an alternative to both Hitler and Stalin for the Russian/Soviet peoples and troops. The latter is especially important as defectors would be more reassured that they could end up with other Russians in uniformed and fed well rather than a prison camp with limited chances of any sort of decent existence or hope of not ending up in a gulag at the end of the war for surrendering. There is also the claim that Vlasov made that he was in contact with a clique of general level officers who were anti-Stalin and looking for an option other than Stalin, so assuming that is true then RONA as a recognized, allied organization with the Axis could potentially undermine Stalin's regime quite a bit more than many think would have been possible if they could either get defections or intelligence. Rokkosovsky's name was mentioned by Vlasov and he was well known to have had all his teeth knocked out in NKVD custody during the Purges before he was rehabilitated, so it could potentially have been possible that officers with a grudge could well have been ready to repay Stalin for his crimes.

Thoughts?

 

[WolfBear]

Since this doesn't seem to have generated much discussion, let me give my opinion of what might happen and see if that generates any debate.

I've come across several books on the Vlasov forces/movement including one in German based on the wartime records of the German who worked with them already linked in this thread (in Russian translation, so you'll have to suffer through google translate). Generally speaking they were quite complementary of Vlasov and his forces, including their relatively limited combat experience, though the author also mentions the good performance of the Cossacks in German service.

So I'm inclined to think that if they had gotten the go ahead from Hitler and got the resources they needed to arm and train they'd have performed very well given how motivated the troops and officers were and would be with institutional support; a major issue IOTL was constant brush offs by the Germans and plans to break up the units; they did not do as well under German command and in places they didn't want to fight like in France, because their morale was bound up with their own leaders and political goals to defeat Stalin. So if Hitler recognized them earlier as an ally (this was done historically in December 1944 when it was too late) and actually promoted the Prague Manifesto, then I really do think there was a lot of potential to mobilize the Russian people against Stalin if reports on desertions to the Vlasov movement are accurate. After all over 1 million Soviet citizens served in the Wehrmacht and quite a bit more behind the lines in various capacities. Were it not for active and extensive efforts by Moscow to foment violence behind German lines (very similar to the North Vietnamese later on) the various ex-Soviet peoples would have been much more passive and cooperative with the Axis occupiers rather than being caught up in a horrific cycle of tit-for-tat violence between the partisans and occupiers.

Anyway in regards to the specific military accomplishments possible during Kursk, I think I gave a pretty detailed explanation why their presence alone, regardless of military efficiency (which I think would have actually been still quite good with more training and motivation coming from political recognition and status as allies on par with Italy or Romania), their sheer numbers would be a rather massive enhancement for 9th army. I'm not sure how they would actually be used, but given that there was a political need for them to do well in combat they'd be given an easier objectives, one of which could be to split the juncture of two Soviet armies, the 13th and 48th:

https://www.normandy1944.info/templates/yootheme/cache/Battle-of-Kursk-map-a6eafc0a.webp

Historically that failed because of the weak forces used by the Germans to try it, so instead of a single weak division (383rd division) there would be an entire fully strength reinforced corps used and said German division could be in reserve with its corps instead. Plus it is on the far end of the line away from Soviet armor reserves and facing only infantry formations. It think they'd be able to breach their section of the line, albeit with significant losses and then find itself the focus of Soviet counterattacks, as once they are identified the Soviets would try to do their best to destroy the unit given the political threat they represented, especially if militarily successful. That means an easier time for German units if the Soviets focus reserves on them. Ultimately I doubt it would make Citadel a successful offensive, but it would cause the Soviets a lot of problems and probably jack up their casualties considerably. During Op. Kutuzov Central Front would probably have a very hard time participating due to the extra losses during Citadel, while the extra infantry divisions of the RONA corps would be a pretty vital enhancement to Model's forces, especially given the noted Russian abilities on the defense.

Militarily in 1943 I don't see the corps playing a decisive role, but in the context of wider operations they'd have pretty significant operational impacts in the Orel area due to how many more casualties they'd cause to the Soviets and ability to sap forces from them by encouraging defections. Likely they'd have to be removed from the lines after Orel and rebuilt, but they might be able to achieve some of that themselves during the fighting due to said defections. Plus if they are militarily successful and prove trustworthy they'd probably be rapidly built up with what became the Ostbattalions sent to France historically, who in turn could be replaced by Germans, and the Kaminski Brigade (which historically was folded into RONA later). If permitted I think they could ultimately set up the full fledged army of 10 divisions and an air force that Vlasov desired and would be a massive and important enhancement in the fighting around Smolensk and Vitebsk in late 1943-1944. They might even be able to deal with the partisan problem effectively given the cultural/language affinity the Russian unit would have with the population.

I'm sure AG-Center would be thrilled to have even 5 extra divisions (>100,000 men when including corps/army level assets; the Germans took about 70,000 casualties in just the battle of Smolensk), especially if they had special skills to deal with partisans and could cause more Soviet desertions, which would be a pretty dramatic enhancement of their combat power in the Autumn-Winter of 1943 and the highway battles of winter-spring 1944.

Their major role though would probably be more in the political/morale realm, as they'd represent an alternative to both Hitler and Stalin for the Russian/Soviet peoples and troops. The latter is especially important as defectors would be more reassured that they could end up with other Russians in uniformed and fed well rather than a prison camp with limited chances of any sort of decent existence or hope of not ending up in a gulag at the end of the war for surrendering. There is also the claim that Vlasov made that he was in contact with a clique of general level officers who were anti-Stalin and looking for an option other than Stalin, so assuming that is true then RONA as a recognized, allied organization with the Axis could potentially undermine Stalin's regime quite a bit more than many think would have been possible if they could either get defections or intelligence. Rokkosovsky's name was mentioned by Vlasov and he was well known to have had all his teeth knocked out in NKVD custody during the Purges before he was rehabilitated, so it could potentially have been possible that officers with a grudge could well have been ready to repay Stalin for his crimes.

Thoughts?

Good analysis other than the second-to-last sentence here:

Rokkosovsky's name was mentioned by Vlasov and he was well known to have had all his teeth knocked out in NKVD custody during the Purges before he was rehabilitated, so it could potentially have been possible that officers with a grudge could well have been ready to repay Stalin for his crimes.

The risk of this is that, by doing this, if you'll fail, you'll end up being executed. I'm not sure that many Soviet generals who narrowly dodged death in the late 1930s would actually be willing to tempt fate a second time, especially so soon.

 

[PsihoKekec]

Yeah, by the time of Kursk battle the German crimes in Russia were already well known, the chances that more high ranking officers will decide to exchange a tyrant that might execute them for tyrant that will certainly execute them when they are not useful anymore is just Vlasov telling the Germans what they wanted to hear, so they would be more amenable to his propositions.

Not necessarily. A substantial number of the historical KONR troops were PoWs

The division that did the actual fighting (1st/600th) was built around a core of collaborators who were numerous enough to keep the POWs in check. In 1943 these collaborators are still policing the rear areas, so the divisions will be built exclusively from POWs whom Germans put through living hell, much worse than anything Soviet state ever did to them and no amount of Vlasov's encouragement will change the fact that most of these men hate Germans more than they fear Soviet Union and only joined the ROA to escape what seemed like certain death in POW work camps. If you got enough reliable men to keep them in check you can make it work. So after Bagration, when all the collaborators fled westward, you could build an effective division, maybe even two, but five would have diluted it way too much. In 1943 sending five divisions of POWs, without reliable core is a recipe for disaster.

 

[TheRomanSlayer]

How long would the Eastern Front be with a larger Soviet casualty rate and more defections to the Vlasov contingent in this case?

 

[sillygoose]

How long would the Eastern Front be with a larger Soviet casualty rate and more defections to the Vlasov contingent in this case?

Depends on how many Vlasov-ites could be raised from 1943 onwards, the casualties they could inflict, and how many defections they get. Assuming the premise is accurate and they could form a 50,000 man corps for use at Kursk/Orel and they don't suffer crippling losses and manage to keep numbers decently high due to defections then they could be a serious threat going forward. Having 100,000 men in a 5-6 division Soviet style Combined Arms army added in to AG-Center would be a massive boost to the combat strength of that army group for the 2nd half of 1943/early 1944, especially if they can reach their higher numbers by inducing substantial numbers of defections.

If that could slow the retreat out of make Citadel inflict heavier losses on the Soviets while also delaying the retreat out of Orel and inflicting heavier losses along the way and inducing defections it is entirely possible that Bagration is butterflied away and AG-North could hold their positions outside of Leningrad due to not being continually stripped of divisions to prop up AG-Center and South. The aggregate effect could then drag out the eastern front for another 6-12 months, which could in fact cause the Soviets to come up very short in the end and potentially cut a deal to end the war early.


Not sure how I missed this post, but I'll respond now:

Yeah, by the time of Kursk battle the German crimes in Russia were already well known, the chances that more high ranking officers will decide to exchange a tyrant that might execute them for tyrant that will certainly execute them when they are not useful anymore is just Vlasov telling the Germans what they wanted to hear, so they would be more amenable to his propositions.

Yet Soviet troops continued to surrender is substantial numbers and defect as well. The only reason it wasn't more was the Germans were losing by that point, so it seemed like a bad gamble for the majority to try and surrender. Actual knowledge of Germany's crimes was quite low, but knowledge of Soviet propaganda was high. Still, none of that prevented around 2 million Soviets surrendering after 1941, despite the mass die off of PoWs in 1941. If the knowledge of that was common why did so many surrender in the rest of the war?

Also roughly about 20% of the German army in Russia was actually Soviet defectors by 1944:

Hiwi (volunteer) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Belies your claim that the Germans were executing all Soviets. The mass die off of Soviet PoWs in 1941 was due to the lack of food in Europe, which was already in famine before the invasion, and the Soviets destroying or evacuation all the food in occupied territories, which left occupied Russia in famine. When the Germans repeatedly approached the Soviets for help feeding PoWs they were entirely ignored:

'Do Not Respond': Did The Soviet Government Abandon Its WWII Prisoners?

Two-thirds of the Red Army soldiers captured by the Germans during World War II died in captivity, in part because of a Soviet government policy aimed at convincing soldiers that being captured meant certain death.

www.rferl.org

The Soviet government adopted this policy as a result of a cold-blooded calculus.

"By the end of 1941, more than 3 million people had been taken prisoner, and one of the Soviet leadership's goals was to control this avalanche," Bogoslavsky said. "A Soviet soldier had to understand that if he was captured, he wouldn't be getting any food parcels from the Red Cross and he wouldn't be sending any postcards to his loved ones. He had to know that the only thing awaiting him there was inevitable death."

Stalin's government, in my opinion, was guilty of not giving moral support or material assistance to its own soldiers, who were simply abandoned."
-- Historian Konstantin Bogoslavsky

One Soviet document issued under Stalin's signature, the historian noted, asserted that "the panic-monger, the coward, and the deserter are worse than the enemy."

In addition, the Soviet government refused to allow any Red Cross representatives into its own notorious prison camps, where they might stumble on secrets of Stalin's prewar repressions.

"The distribution of food and medicine to prisoners was carried out by representatives of the Red Cross, and that would have meant allowing them access to camps in the Soviet Union," Bogoslavsky said. "The Soviet leadership was categorically opposed to that. Despite numerous requests, Red Cross representatives were never given visas to travel to the Soviet Union."

It was Stalin as a matter of policy who let his PoWs starve by refusing to allow even the Red Cross to help feed Soviet troops, not the Germans how didn't even have enough food to feed civilians or their own people. The Goebbel's private diaries even talk about how miners in the Ruhr in 1941 had lost 6kg of weight compared to 1939 due to the lack of food. Meanwhile between 1941-42 about 95% of all German PoWs in the USSR were killed by the Soviets to refused to even abide by their pledge to uphold the Geneva Convention.

The division that did the actual fighting (1st/600th) was built around a core of collaborators who were numerous enough to keep the POWs in check. In 1943 these collaborators are still policing the rear areas, so the divisions will be built exclusively from POWs whom Germans put through living hell, much worse than anything Soviet state ever did to them and no amount of Vlasov's encouragement will change the fact that most of these men hate Germans more than they fear Soviet Union and only joined the ROA to escape what seemed like certain death in POW work camps. If you got enough reliable men to keep them in check you can make it work. So after Bagration, when all the collaborators fled westward, you could build an effective division, maybe even two, but five would have diluted it way too much. In 1943 sending five divisions of POWs, without reliable core is a recipe for disaster.

You're basing all this on...?
In 1943 they had quite a few collaborators and Vlasov was begging for the chance to form units, but Hitler was holding the entire project back; never mind that over a million Soviets fought for the Germans in some capacity during the war:

Why did over a million Soviets fight for Germany during World War II?

It is not the proudest moment in Russian history, but the fact remains that there were a number of Nazi collaborators in the Soviet Union.

www.rbth.com

Soviet collaboration is, to put it mildly, not a popular theme for discussion in Russia. Perhaps this is all part of Russia’s Soviet heritage: “For almost 50 years, the fact of collaborationism was silenced in our country,” notes historian Sergei Drobyazko who provides a thorough analysis of this theme in his work Under the Enemy’s Banner: Anti-Soviet Formations within the Wehrmacht, 1941-1945.

The mere fact that some Soviet citizens preferred siding with Hitler to the Soviet authorities was too scandalous to discuss during the Soviet period. And this wasn’t just some small group of freaks either. “In total, the number of Soviet citizens and Russian emigrants serving within the ranks of the Wehrmacht, SS, police and pro-German militias was close to 1.2 million people (among them up to 700,000 Slavic people, up to 300,000 Baltic people and up to 200,000 Turkish, Caucasian and other people from minor ethnicities),” Drobyazko writes.

So what were you bullshitting about only 2 divisions being possible?

 

[TheRomanSlayer]

Having more defections to the Vlasovites could theoretically change the war in the Eastern Front, but how much?

If by some sort of a lucky streak that Vlasov does end up succeeding, what would his reputation be in the eyes of the Allies, who would have been pissed off by the collapse of their Soviet ally, but might end up with a potential partner that might be willing to work with them, and possibly sparing Eastern Europe decades of communism?

 

[sillygoose]

Having more defections to the Vlasovites could theoretically change the war in the Eastern Front, but how much?

That's the open question. Everything comes down to how many defections it causes and what level of intel that gives, as well as how many more units can be formed as a result.

If by some sort of a lucky streak that Vlasov does end up succeeding, what would his reputation be in the eyes of the Allies, who would have been pissed off by the collapse of their Soviet ally, but might end up with a potential partner that might be willing to work with them, and possibly sparing Eastern Europe decades of communism?

If the Soviets collapse the Wallies cannot win. Remember the Battle of the Bulge expended all the US's remaining reserves not just in Europe, but even available to send to Europe from the US, so things very nearly went very badly even that late in the war. So even if D-Day succeeds and gets a toe hold if the Soviets collapse or quit the Wallies are going to have to face 300% more Germans than they faced IOTL. Even as late as late 1944 roughly 2/3rds of the Wehrmacht was on the Eastern Front, including 2/3rds of their armor and army deployed FLAK. @themarcksplan has pointed out elsewhere that the Allies even in 1942 figured if the Soviets dropped out they couldn't afford the blood price to win, so would have to cut a deal.

 

[ATP]

Yeah, by the time of Kursk battle the German crimes in Russia were already well known, the chances that more high ranking officers will decide to exchange a tyrant that might execute them for tyrant that will certainly execute them when they are not useful anymore is just Vlasov telling the Germans what they wanted to hear, so they would be more amenable to his propositions.


The division that did the actual fighting (1st/600th) was built around a core of collaborators who were numerous enough to keep the POWs in check. In 1943 these collaborators are still policing the rear areas, so the divisions will be built exclusively from POWs whom Germans put through living hell, much worse than anything Soviet state ever did to them and no amount of Vlasov's encouragement will change the fact that most of these men hate Germans more than they fear Soviet Union and only joined the ROA to escape what seemed like certain death in POW work camps. If you got enough reliable men to keep them in check you can make it work. So after Bagration, when all the collaborators fled westward, you could build an effective division, maybe even two, but five would have diluted it way too much. In 1943 sending five divisions of POWs, without reliable core is a recipe for disaster.

1.Still,germans did not worst then soviets,and soviet high rang officers would be purged by Sralin when he hear about Vlasov claiming about contact with him.Those who survive would look at Hitler as better alternative.

2.In 1942 averagely 20% of german dyvisions on East fron was made gy soviet POW.They would fight under russian flag better then under german.
And remember - all people in kolchoz was basicaly slaves which lost part of their families to Sralin made artifical hunger.They would run for any occasion to fight soviets.And since most dudes send in infrantry wave attacks was that guys....
From perspective of soviet soldier,serving in infrantry,especially under butchers like Zhukow,was arleady death sentence.They have nothing to loose.

About what @sillygoose said - i think he is right,but Wlasov after Citadel could form 20 dyvisions.Keeping Smoleńsk longer.
In 1944 - 30-40.Soviets would break Dniepr rivers after Normandy,but do not take much more.
Free East Europe,/Poland and Romania could be still sold to Sralin/ but russians? Allies would not contact them,becouse FDR clique did what Sralin wonted.
So,just like in OTL,all russians would be sell to soviets.Those do not smart enough to die fighting.