en.wikipedia.org
Might the Soviets just stay without the seemingly pliable Tito in the driver seat? Might too the Yugoslav partisans fall apart without Tito at the decisive moment? That could have some pretty serious impact on the Hungarian campaign of 1944-45 if the Soviets have to keep large parts of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in Yugoslavia to tie down German forces, which then has major impact on the post-war situation.
Perhaps if this happened in 1941 or 1942, but by 1944 the party discipline was well entrenched in the partisan army, so while there would be disruptions until Ranković could assemble new HQ and reestablish communication connections, their propaganda could use the martyred supreme leader very effectively.
The Allies still needed someone fighting in Yugoslavia so death of Tito will delay recognition for couple of months at most.
Rankovic would have been killed or captured too since he was with Tito in the cave. In the OP I said it wasn't simply Tito who would be taken out, but the entire HQ in the cave.
sr.wikipedia.org
So they'd all be lost. How do the partisans survive as an organized group without all of the above?
Ribar was killed in 1943.
Ivan Ribar, not the Ivo Ribar. Tito did indeed get complacent, but his subordinates didn't, that's why new HQ was prepared, due to concern that Ustashe inteligence learned about the location of the Drvar HQ. Tito however still often stayed in the Drvar HQ over night (driving his intelligence chief and defense battalion commander crazy with worry) and did the same the night before the attack (there was celebration in the town and he could never say no to party).
Operation Rösselsprung (1944) - Wikipedia
What if the German intelligence had been better coordinated (there were 3 different units gathering intel and didn't share amongst each other) and their commando operation was properly concentrated and succeeded in killing Tito and taking his entire HQ? What impact does this have on the war in Yugoslavia for the rest of WW2 and the aftermath?
If the partisans fall apart (fragment into independent competing groups) in May 1944 due to losing their military command structure the knock on effects could go well beyond just the Hungarian/Balkan front going better for the Axis.
en.wikipedia.org
If the partisans fall apart (fragment into independent competing groups) in May 1944 due to losing their military command structure the knock on effects could go well beyond just the Hungarian/Balkan front going better for the Axis.
The Chetniks now would be the only other major organized group of militants in the country and given their support for the Axis and document history of fighting the Partisans with the decapitating of the Partisans and enhancement of the prestige of the Axis as a result as well as the Chetniks being disfavored at Tehran (which also meant loss of material support) plus the Wallies not invading the Balkans Mihailović would side with the Axis to fight the Partisans. This would be to establish his dominance of Yugoslav military groups and thus ensure his power within the region when Soviet forces arrive. With the Partisans cut off from the Allies missions and thus losing material and air support, as well as being fragmented due to the loss of central leadership as well as directives from the government in exile that helped unify the movement in 1944, they'd likely be nearly destroyed by the Chetniks and defections, if not people just going home due to loss of morale.
Though without a doubt he'd try to switch allegiance to the Soviets as soon as convenient as per OTL, until they show up in strength his group would likely make Yugoslavia quiet for the Axis, which likely helps the pull out of their forces in Greece and throughout the region. Given Mihailović's policy of non-confrontation with the occupiers to save civilian lives we could see substantially more German forces retreating intact out of Greece and presenting a much more formidable force in Croatia. You might potentially see him end up siding with the Axis if Soviet forces target him for being an anti-communist and collaborator with the Axis. That could well change everything to do with the war in the region.
As it was IOTL the Chetniks fought the Bulgarians, which probably would happen here too given that they were traditional enemies, which once again helps the Germans pull out of Greece intact and seriously hampers Soviet progress in the region.
IOTL the Partisans were pretty important to disrupting Axis defenses in Serbia after Romania switched sides and had been building up force in Serbia after breaking out of Bosnia and Montenegro, so with an uncoordinated Partisan movement under attack by the Chetniks the Germans would be free to coordinate and organize other than having to deal with Wallied air attacks (but ITTL not aided by Partisans). That means major operations like Ratweek don't really happen:
Operation Ratweek (1944) - Wikipedia
Without that operation German forces are free to withdraw by rail before the Bulgarians show up. That largely means the Belgrade offensive of OTL doesn't really happen as the Germans pull out much more quickly and intact as the Chetniks fight the Partisans and Bulgarian invasion which effectively covers their retreat into Hungary. That means more German forces are deployed to the front rather than anti-Partisan actions, which means they can hold the Soviets for a long while as Army Groups E and F then pull back and make the Danube line pretty impregnable. If that happens then Budapest isn't encircled and is not invaded, as the defensive line outside the city holds.
The big impact of that would then be that Poland isn't stripped of the vital panzer divisions that were to be the counterattack forces in case of a Soviet breakthrough, while all the planned new Hungarian divisions that were being stood up have time to actually get formed and deployed. That leaves the 3rd, 6th, and 20th panzer divisions in Poland/East Prussia, as well as the IV SS Panzer corps around Warsaw and the 1st Cavalry Corps on the Narew. Plus if the line in Hungary holds then the 6th Panzer army isn't sent to Hungary in February 1945, which means they can be a pretty major enhancement of Axis forces in the east.
Since IOTL Yalta, where the division of Europe was actually planned, didn't happen until February 1945 and by then Budapest was captured the Vistula-Oder offensive a smashing success, ITTL if the Soviets are stalled on the Danube and Budapest not taken as well as the Vistula offensive not being nearly as successful due to facing much more panzer divisions/armies than IOTL, potentially we could see the Yalta meeting not happen in February or if it does the Wallies getting an occupation zone much further east than IOTL. That is a massive change from OTL and could see Austria, Czechoslovakia, half of Hungary, part of Poland, and maybe most of Germany in the Wallied occupation zone, as the Soviets are stalled much further east in the face of larger German forces. The Cold War would be quite a bit different in that situation.
Unfortunately this POD won't impact the Warsaw Uprising. That is too related to Bagration to change. This POD would only change the situation around Poland in the December 1944-February 1945 period; by December the third Battle of Warsaw was already over and the city depopulated.
I have to strongly disagree with that; there were a number of infantry divisions still fighting and fighting relatively well given the disadvantages they had. The Waffen-SS Hungarian divisions though could be stood up here and trained in Hungary rather than Poland with all the problems that ensued from that. They'd have been regular sized (9 battalions rather than the 6 of the 1944-45 period). In fact the Vlassov division would even have a chance to get into real combat rather than the demonstration they made before trying to surrender to American forces (and failing). Given that they were actually pretty well equipped, experienced, and well led not to mention quite large (18,000 men) if they had motivation to fight in February they could actually do pretty well for themselves.
I'm not sure how the Hungarians would get Romanian tanks.
Maybe not. IOTL units were transferred from East Prussia to Poland to help once the Soviets broke through, but ITTL with 5 extra panzer divisions plus two extra cavalry (of those 1 panzer and the 2 cavalry) would be in East Prussia along with the divisions not transferred (1 elite panzer division and 1 elite panzergrenadier division) it might actually be possible for East Prussia to hold. They'd lose territory of course, but so long as Rokossovsky's front could be checked then per OTL those holding east of Koenigsberg actually could continue maintaining their positions.
It would have to last into at least August for the A-bomb to potentially come into play (IOTL it was strongly discouraged to be used in Europe given that there weren't suitable undamaged targets to try it against and Truman wouldn't be as inclined to use it on Germany anyway). I doubt it would given that the failure in the west of the Ardennes offensive would mean the western front falls apart per OTL, so by April US and British forces would be able to threaten Berlin. It would just mean the Soviets are well short of the city by that point and potentially checked on the Warthe river.
How so? Given the logistical issues the Soviets had in the Balkans and the necessity of utilizing both the Bulgarians and Partisan forces, without the Partisans and Tito around to work out the alliance with the Bulgarians to end fighting already happening between the Bulgarian and Serb forces (traditional hostility going back to the Balkan Wars and WW1) the Soviets won't really have enough ability to advance quickly enough to tear apart Axis forces on the retreat. The Chetniks fighting with the Germans against any Partisan forces that remain as well as the Bulgarians (which happened IOTL) and potentially Soviet forces if the Soviets try to disarm them as they did IOTL (they didn't resist for a variety of reasons including fear of not complying would mean being turned over to the Partisans to be dealt with) and impose a communist regime or just simply work with communist Partisans, would be a massive problem for the Soviets.
en.wikipedia.org
Assuming the scenario I laid out is what happens the Soviets still are stuck with the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts in Hungary; they could transfer out some rifle corps and their tank corps, but that's about all they could maybe commit to Poland; even then employing them would be virtually impossible except after the exploitation phase or by relieving a worn out existing tanks army since the front was so constricted in January and logistics were so constrained as result until the Oder was reached. However if due to German reserves they are stopped at the Warthe and Soviet forces haven't overrun and wiped out German forces like they did IOTL it would be somewhat difficult to gain and advantage by employing Soviet forces in Hungary to Poland instead.