peter Zeihan 2020

Maybe, but you're responding to a comment that was specifically about being able to fight. The US can also supply other countries with the fuel and weapons to make war, across oceans as we see in Ukraine,

Are you talking about the material means of being able to fight, or the combat capability of forces?

My point with my comment was that being able to stack bodies is meaningless because war is the continuation of politics by other means; you start hostilities in order to achieve clear strategic aims. Regardless of K/D of the U.S. Armed Forces in both Vietnam and Iraq, and it was favorable to be sure, they still failed in their goals and suffered strategic defeats in both, as admitted by the U.S. Army in their own studies.

so I'm not sure you've proven anything with the write up about Iran being able to do so for its neighbor.

Iran supplied the Iraq Insurgency, the Taliban against the U.S. and its proxies, mobilized 200,000 militia in Iraq and Syria against ISIS, Hezbollah against Israel, Gaza militants and the Houthis themselves. IRGC forces are currently deployed in Yemen, Syria and Iraq as we speak, with Yemen in particular being a recent development and they've now expanded to supplying Somali militants too.
 
Are you talking about the material means of being able to fight, or the combat capability of forces?

My point with my comment was that being able to stack bodies is meaningless because war is the continuation of politics by other means; you start hostilities in order to achieve clear strategic aims. Regardless of K/D of the U.S. Armed Forces in both Vietnam and Iraq, and it was favorable to be sure, they still failed in their goals and suffered strategic defeats in both, as admitted by the U.S. Army in their own studies.



Iran supplied the Iraq Insurgency, the Taliban against the U.S. and its proxies, mobilized 200,000 militia in Iraq and Syria against ISIS, Hezbollah against Israel, Gaza militants and the Houthis themselves. IRGC forces are currently deployed in Yemen, Syria and Iraq as we speak, with Yemen in particular being a recent development and they've now expanded to supplying Somali militants too.

One of the lessons of insurgencies is that given safebases, outside funding and enough willing men, an insurgency can be continued indefinitely. Just as the USA could never win in Vietnam because it was also fighting the Soviet Union, They could never win in Afghanistan because they were also fighting Pakistan and Iran.
 
One of the lessons of insurgencies is that given safebases, outside funding and enough willing men, an insurgency can be continued indefinitely. Just as the USA could never win in Vietnam because it was also fighting the Soviet Union, They could never win in Afghanistan because they were also fighting Pakistan and Iran.

Ironically, SIGAR and even the Taliban themselves concede there was a means of winning and it's the exact opposite of what the "Might Makes Right" types believe: Diplomacy. In late 2001, the Taliban offered to surrender in exchange for amnesty and being included in the new political process. There was also, as SIGAR notes, the chance to form a government with popular legitimacy by restoring the Monarchy.

We went with neither, and instead installed the GIRoA which was notoriously corrupt and had a penchant for growing poppies for Heroin as well as raping young boys. Surprise, surprise the Taliban became the public favorite with the average Afghan by 2005-2006, and it was all downhill from there.
 
Ironically, SIGAR and even the Taliban themselves concede there was a means of winning and it's the exact opposite of what the "Might Makes Right" types believe: Diplomacy. In late 2001, the Taliban offered to surrender in exchange for amnesty and being included in the new political process. There was also, as SIGAR notes, the chance to form a government with popular legitimacy by restoring the Monarchy.

We went with neither, and instead installed the GIRoA which was notoriously corrupt and had a penchant for growing poppies for Heroin as well as raping young boys. Surprise, surprise the Taliban became the public favorite with the average Afghan by 2005-2006, and it was all downhill from there.
yup.

What the USA needed good negotiators and dumptrucks of cash, not "HOOAH! Semper Fudge" military adventurism. But the modern western elite doesnt do diplomacy. it issues demands, then punishes you when you dont submit
 
yup.

What the USA needed good negotiators and dumptrucks of cash, not "HOOAH! Semper Fudge" military adventurism. But the modern western elite doesnt do diplomacy. it issues demands, then punishes you when you dont submit

If you really want to have your mind blow, when the U.S. and its allies met in Germany (???) in October of 2001, they constructed the new government for Afghanistan in just a week. Literally just cobbled it together, shot down the Taliban surrender proposal and rejected restoring the King to form a new government on the fly.

The results speak for themselves.
 
If you really want to have your mind blow, when the U.S. and its allies met in Germany (???) in October of 2001, they constructed the new government for Afghanistan in just a week. Literally just cobbled it together, shot down the Taliban surrender proposal and rejected restoring the King to form a new government on the fly.

The results speak for themselves.

The old British were so much better thus stuff. Just bribe the toughest tribe and give them lots of guns and tell them they can do what they want as long as they keep the undesirables out. The west OTOH are now ruled by psychopaths
 
The old British were so much better thus stuff. Just bribe the toughest tribe and give them lots of guns and tell them they can do what they want as long as they keep the undesirables out. The west OTOH are now ruled by psychopaths

It's worth noting even the Soviets have a better record on this. The U.S. backed GIRoA collapsed almost as soon as the U.S. pulled out, while the Soviet backed DRA lasted until 1992, having outlived its patron. It had scored notable success in maintaining its power, most prominently via the the Battle of Jalalabad in 1989 which is something the GIRoA never achieved.
 
Are you talking about the material means of being able to fight, or the combat capability of forces?

My point with my comment was that being able to stack bodies is meaningless because war is the continuation of politics by other means; you start hostilities in order to achieve clear strategic aims. Regardless of K/D of the U.S. Armed Forces in both Vietnam and Iraq, and it was favorable to be sure, they still failed in their goals and suffered strategic defeats in both, as admitted by the U.S. Army in their own studies.



Iran supplied the Iraq Insurgency, the Taliban against the U.S. and its proxies, mobilized 200,000 militia in Iraq and Syria against ISIS, Hezbollah against Israel, Gaza militants and the Houthis themselves. IRGC forces are currently deployed in Yemen, Syria and Iraq as we speak, with Yemen in particular being a recent development and they've now expanded to supplying Somali militants too.
Again is your point that Iran can provide more material than the US? You seem to not be understanding you replied to a comment saying at least the US can fight, so it follows you must be trying to prove Iran can fight better than the US but in terms of both combat capability and material distribution the US is at a level above Iran. The US population simply does not want to be involved in the middle east and hasn't since the Bush era so the ruling class is not able to come in full force. Even the "surge" in Iraq was only 20k soldiers which is nothing in a large scale war.
 
Again is your point that Iran can provide more material than the US? You seem to not be understanding you replied to a comment saying at least the US can fight, so it follows you must be trying to prove Iran can fight better than the US but in terms of both combat capability and material distribution the US is at a level above Iran.

My understanding of his comment was that he was referring to the combat capability of the U.S. Armed Forces in the abstract, not just vis-a-vis with Iran.

If the aforementioned is what he meant and If we are specifically talking about material distribution and capabilities, then I think the results speak for themselves; Iran successfully forced the U.S. out of Iraq, Afghanistan and is putting significant pressure on it still via its proxies in Yemen and the Fertile Crescent. Given the low costs of their systems and limited Defense Industrial Base of the U.S. nowadays, I'd say the advantage in that sort of strategic competition favors Iran.

If you're asking solely on combat power, than I'd still rate the U.S. as higher but, as was the point of my original comment, of what use is that in the long run? The Wehrmacht achieved 4:1 rates on the Eastern Front but the Red Army ended up in Berlin. Being deadly does not make you victorious.
 
I was saying that when. The US military is allowed to fight we fight.
When politicians take over and try to force us to be police we get what we got.

The military has nothing to do with Iran in Iraq
 
I was saying that when. The US military is allowed to fight we fight.
When politicians take over and try to force us to be police we get what we got.

The military has nothing to do with Iran in Iraq

The U.S. Army disagrees and notes numerous failures within the organization itself, specifically noting bad strategy and tactics on the part of the service directly led to the overall American failure in Iraq.

The “we weren’t allowed to fight” excuse is directly rejected by the people who fought the conflict.
 
The U.S. Army disagrees and notes numerous failures within the organization itself, specifically noting bad strategy and tactics on the part of the service directly led to the overall American failure in Iraq.

The “we weren’t allowed to fight” excuse is directly rejected by the people who fought the conflict.
What article or report are you talking about?
And I can tell you from people who were there personally, some were there in fucking 03.
The main reason for failure was due to initial LSCO training over COIN when we went in. And the aspect of being a police force in a foreign nation.
 
What article or report are you talking about?
And I can tell you from people who were there personally, some were there in fucking 03.
The main reason for failure was due to initial LSCO training over COIN when we went in. And the aspect of being a police force in a foreign nation.

The U.S. Army's official multi volume study on the conflict, written by and based on interviews with, the very men who were there. It came out in 2018 during the Trump Administration and directly criticizes the strategy and tactics made, which ultimately led to defeat.
 
Which part on the foreign stuff? A reminder this is a guy that in 2010 said China would collapse in 3-5 years. Given that's been 14 years ago...

Aside from the United States not going anywhere, I would say we expect the economic collapse of China in this coming decade. We've been talking for awhile about how the economic system there is remarkably unstable and we think that they're going to reach a break point as all of the internal inconsistencies come to light and shatter. By the end of the decade, it'll be pretty obvious to everybody that the China miracle is over. As we enter the decade, people are finally, finally starting to talk about China bubbles. If only their problem was that simple!
He also claimed piracy would start once the U.S. Navy withdraws from policing the shipping lanes, but that has happened in spite of the U.S. Navy sending two CBGs to the region. Currently the Red Sea is effectively closed to Western ships, but Chinese and Russians vessels are sailing through just fine, something Zeihan just two weeks said wouldn't happen:



Zeihan consistently misses on all of his predictions to date. Trying to separate his foreign from his domestic takes is a non-starter because they both come from the same poisoned well that is the man himself, with his open bias and double standards.


 
Also:
What does "age adjusted" mean?
I doubt that all non-opioid drug deaths in the USA amount to less than 0.11 per 100,000 (or 1.55 using the lower spike)

Nevertheless, deeply alarming. I'd rather a graph that extended past COVID but a brief glance around suggests that while it's down it's closer to the spike than to what preceded it.
 

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