peter Zeihan 2020

[JagerIV]

I don't think he's wrong America will pull back, I think he's hilariously wrong thinking it will pull back to near total isolationism and become a blatantly imperial power towards south America again and that he's dead wrong on the timescale. Also, his analysis of nations and their interests is good but his future predictions are hilariously dumb. Germany, China, Russia etc "ceasing to exist" is little more than an American nationalists fever dream.

Yeah, there's some things that are likely to push America back, but that is very different than America just "pulling out". Afghanistan might be a good example there: America didn't really "pull out" of Afghanistan. Practically, it was pushed out. The big picture difference on that is that America being pushed out of Afghanistan didn't produce a meaningful power vacuum. You might have had a little vacuum during the actual pull out, but because the US was leaving due to pressure, that vacuum was near immediately filled by the Taliban, and I get the impression the Taliban's control now is stronger than it was when we initially went in in 2001.

Likewise, the US may lose some influence in Africa, but that seems likely to generally be from the US losing a power game with Russia and China, rather than just abandoning something to chaos. Or local powers gaining authority. US authority in Russia in the 2010s was likely lower than it was in 1995, not because the US "pulled back" out of some principle, but because Russia pulled itself together and reasserted its authority. Iran, Turkey, and India seem like other areas where the US might be partially in retreat, but once again its not the US pulling back on some principle, but the locals building strength and capabilities.

The US in general doesn't seem particularly inclined to pull out of anywhere the occupation is "successful". The pull outs that have happened seem to have generally been driven by successful local resistance, not American desires/concerns. They're done in spite of what the US wants, not in accordance with it.

Now, the obvious counter example is Libya, but then again that is a US attempt at intervention gone wrong, not the result of the US pulling out. The US's appetite for intervention is also gone down, but that also seems much more driven by American failure. America did commit to trying to win and shape Afghanistan for 20 years. After 2 decades of failure, and I think its not really up for debate the US is in a relatively weaker, more fragile position than it was in 2001.

As much as we dunk on Russia, Russia now is still probably in a stronger position than it was in 2001, when its military was barely capable of fighting in Chechnya. Ands its economy is 3-5x larger now than it was in 2001, and the gap between the US and Russia closed from roughly 30-1 GDP advantage to 10-1.

 

[PeaceMaker 03]

I believe Iraq and Afghanistan are what happens when half the government is sabotaging the process as they skim off the top.

 

[Terthna]

Yeah, I think that was the one.

It's an interesting argument, but one fraught with logical fallacies and misinformation; and considering the fact that the guy is very much all about demonizing America and western civilization in general (one of his other videos has him pushing pro-Hamas propaganda) I'd take anything he has to say with a massive grain of salt.

 

[JagerIV]

It's an interesting argument, but one fraught with logical fallacies and misinformation; and considering the fact that the guy is very much all about demonizing America and western civilization in general (one of his other videos has him pushing pro-Hamas propaganda) I'd take anything he has to say with a massive grain of salt.

Sure, which is one reason I didn't initially quote him: what struck me which crystalized my general issue with Zeihan was that first sentence that Zeihan doesn't understand the US. That's part of my argument. I'm not really resting on the specifics of his arguments.

 

[Terthna]

Sure, which is one reason I didn't initially quote him: what struck me which crystalized my general issue with Zeihan was that first sentence that Zeihan doesn't understand the US. That's part of my argument. I'm not really resting on the specifics of his arguments.

Eh, fair enough; but that aside, I do think Zeihan deserves at least a little credit. Because a lot of Americans have lost interest in their country trying to enforce its will on the rest of the world; even if almost none them include the ruling elite who actually have the power to make those decisions.

 

[Cherico]

Eh, fair enough; but that aside, I do think Zeihan deserves at least a little credit. Because a lot of Americans have lost interest in their country trying to enforce its will on the rest of the world; even if almost none them include the ruling elite who actually have the power to make those decisions.

Rulling elites who make no conessions to the people dont remain ruling elites for long.

 

[bullethead]

Peter talks some more about how lithium sucks, but now Australian lithium is free trade via Biden, so not as awful as it could be:

 

[JagerIV]

Eh, fair enough; but that aside, I do think Zeihan deserves at least a little credit. Because a lot of Americans have lost interest in their country trying to enforce its will on the rest of the world; even if almost none them include the ruling elite who actually have the power to make those decisions.

Eh, I'm not sure how much credit to give for noticing Donald Trump voters exist, especially if the diagnosis doesn't seem to have much explanatory power. For example, he seems to put a lot of weight on domestic oil production as a cause for the relative isolationist position, which I'm not sure he understands either, for making that position more viable.

When in fact, I'm not sure there's much direct connection there. US was more pro intervention when the US was an oil exporter, became less in the 70s - 80s post Vietnam as the US became an oil importer, and then became more pro intervention in the 90s and 2000s post initial success in Yugoslavia and Iraq, and then turned against it as Iraq II and Afghanistan ended up not working out particularly well.

Support/acceptance for intervention much more tracks how successful American interventions are going, rather than the things Zeihan is pointing to. In which case the question is to look at why America is more or less successful in its interventions, which are a completely different set of issues than what he points to as important.

Now, why America is pro or anti intervention is just one thing among many to have a potentially wrong understanding of, except his entire prediction of the future rests on how interventionalist the US will be. Thus, getting that wrong throws every other prediction he's making into question.

 

[S'task]

Eh, I'm not sure how much credit to give for noticing Donald Trump voters exist, especially if the diagnosis doesn't seem to have much explanatory power. For example, he seems to put a lot of weight on domestic oil production as a cause for the relative isolationist position, which I'm not sure he understands either, for making that position more viable.

When in fact, I'm not sure there's much direct connection there. US was more pro intervention when the US was an oil exporter, became less in the 70s - 80s post Vietnam as the US became an oil importer, and then became more pro intervention in the 90s and 2000s post initial success in Yugoslavia and Iraq, and then turned against it as Iraq II and Afghanistan ended up not working out particularly well.

Support/acceptance for intervention much more tracks how successful American interventions are going, rather than the things Zeihan is pointing to. In which case the question is to look at why America is more or less successful in its interventions, which are a completely different set of issues than what he points to as important.

Now, why America is pro or anti intervention is just one thing among many to have a potentially wrong understanding of, except his entire prediction of the future rests on how interventionalist the US will be. Thus, getting that wrong throws every other prediction he's making into question.

You're not wrong on the timeline, but you're wrong on the correlation. The correct correlation to look at for how accepting of interventionism the "country" is is tied to what letter the President has after their name: R or D.

When the President has an R after their name, while you might initially have a population that is pro-intervention, the media will be strongly against it and you will have an entire astroturfed anti-war movement suddenly appear and begin protesting. The only time in my lifetime this did not happen was the original Gulf War, mainly because I think that went so fast and so well that the media and astroturfed antiwar movement couldn't be spun up against it. However, once it came to W you saw the media and "antiwar" movement rev up considerably and soon became the main "viewpoint" of people... at least until Obama when suddenly the antiwar movement disappeared into the aether and the media got really supportive and protective of Obama's overseas actions. The media has also tried this with Biden, but has had less success because unlike most prior interventions the anti-interventionist factions have mainly come from the right, and the normal apparatus for controlling and containing those was oriented towards left wing antiwar protestors, not right wing American isolationists (which had not been a thing since the 1940s). The rise of the right wing isolationists caught the establishment very much off guard and they've been struggling to figure out how to deal with them, though even said right wing isolationists are more case by casse, IE, there's quite a few people who oppose American involvement in Ukraine who are all for Israel destroying Hamas with American political support (though not direct involvement).

 

[bullethead]

Why the Arctic isn't as big a deal as people think it is:

 

[JagerIV]

You're not wrong on the timeline, but you're wrong on the correlation. The correct correlation to look at for how accepting of interventionism the "country" is is tied to what letter the President has after their name: R or D.

When the President has an R after their name, while you might initially have a population that is pro-intervention, the media will be strongly against it and you will have an entire astroturfed anti-war movement suddenly appear and begin protesting. The only time in my lifetime this did not happen was the original Gulf War, mainly because I think that went so fast and so well that the media and astroturfed antiwar movement couldn't be spun up against it. However, once it came to W you saw the media and "antiwar" movement rev up considerably and soon became the main "viewpoint" of people... at least until Obama when suddenly the antiwar movement disappeared into the aether and the media got really supportive and protective of Obama's overseas actions. The media has also tried this with Biden, but has had less success because unlike most prior interventions the anti-interventionist factions have mainly come from the right, and the normal apparatus for controlling and containing those was oriented towards left wing antiwar protestors, not right wing American isolationists (which had not been a thing since the 1940s). The rise of the right wing isolationists caught the establishment very much off guard and they've been struggling to figure out how to deal with them, though even said right wing isolationists are more case by casse, IE, there's quite a few people who oppose American involvement in Ukraine who are all for Israel destroying Hamas with American political support (though not direct involvement).

Well, that can be part of how foreign intervention is seen as and is successful or not. An intervention that half the population think is a bad idea in principle is one more likely to be seen as a failure because the entire premise of the thing isn't supported.

Vietnam certainly was less successful than it otherwise could have been because a good share of the domestic population wanted it to fail and were opposed to the mission of containing communism. If Ukraine fails some part of the blame could fairly be put on Republicans who aren't enthused about giving money to a democratic money laundering operation. The American Revolution likewise partially succeeded because one of the parties in London was sympathetic to the Radical Republicans cause of the Americans. This strong pro American element in the Parliament made the British less committed to victory than they otherwise could have been.

American battlefield victories and the involvement of the French was still necessary to push things so the British were willing to cut their losses and the pro-American faction could win the day. On the other hand, Lincoln had to deal with a strong streak of pro-confederates/anti war voices throughout the war. At least it in the common narrative, the anti war faction was getting close to winning, but success on the battlefield shored up support to seeing the war to victory (and even there he had to bring in a pro-southern vice president to shore up his ticket, which caused issues post assassination).

Propaganda is very powerful, and domestics 5th columns are a factor of almost all wars. But realities can very strongly drive things. Reality and public option aren't completely creatures of the Ministry of Truth, as the anti war right wing side shows. A lot of the right are ex supporters of the Iraq and Afghanistan war, disillusioned by the realities of what those wars turned out to be.

And of course, everything were pointing to and quibbling over on the exact drivers of American support for intervention are not, as far as I remember, brought up by Zeihan at all. In which case we are both arguing his wrong, and success/failure in intervention is more what should be looked at, and arguing over what are the important factors that determine success or failure: I rate foreign strength and American weakness higher as a cause, while your putting more weight on domestic spin.

 

[bullethead]

Peter explains that Ireland is in a sticky situation regard the polygonal relationship it has with the US, UK, and EU:


Peter updates us on the cartels and their impact on US-Mexico trade:


Peter talks about thorium, points out that it still produces plutonium, requires different reactors, doesn't think nuclear is going to do much without regulatory changes/new tech:

 

[Cherico]

To translate Ireland is next door to Great Britian this is not a good thing for them.

The cartels if not controlled will fuck things up.

And the real limitation to nuclear power is retarded government.

All pretty obvious things.

 

[bullethead]

Small modular reactors have stalled out due to financing falling apart:

 

[bullethead]

Peter chats with a British guy about stuff:


-AI assisted machinery will probably be picking apples soon, might not be able to do softer fruit
-9000+ steps to get new chip fabs online, lots of single product suppliers who can disappear and force reconstruction of industries in other locations
-Thinks the industrial plant of the US will be 2x the size in 10 years, 3x the amount of blue collar workers, Mexico will be integrated into the system and fast growing country in the world
-India is isolated by its neighbors hating them, might not stop their brain drain
-US political parties won't do anything on immigration until they know where unions stand on the issue

 

[Poe]

So apparently Peter decided to take part in the Twitter boycott and announced he'd be leaving the platform due to hate speech or whatever, only to post the next day as if nothing happened. He was subsequently called out for this in the comments. I think I'm unsubscribing as I can't stand the virtue signaling and it's revealed his bias that I always kind of expected.

 

[Cherico]

So apparently Peter decided to take part in the Twitter boycott and announced he'd be leaving the platform due to hate speech or whatever, only to post the next day as if nothing happened. He was subsequently called out for this in the comments. I think I'm unsubscribing as I can't stand the virtue signaling and it's revealed his bias that I always kind of expected.

I honestly think some one threatened him.

Like I said earlier the man simply can not be trusted with anything domestic.

 

[f1onagher]

I honestly think some one threatened him.

Like I said earlier the man simply can not be trusted with anything domestic.

Given the actions from Disney, it's pretty clear someone sent out a memo and Peter is absolutely a member of the intellegencia so he likely got it too. The Big Club, as Carlin would put it, is bucking at the growing pile of ankle biters. Unfortunately for us here Zeihan is a member. I'm actually starting to enjoy the information I can glean from Zeihan's naysaying since it always coincides with moves from other parts of the establishment.

 

[bullethead]

So apparently there's some climate conference going on in the Middle East:


The new hot topic is methane, which is more intense greenhouse gases... but if captured, can be used as fuel/for chemical production.

So there's probably going to be new regulations on capturing methane, which most people won't mind (because they can make money off the methane), and China will lag behind everyone because they think it'll make them look weak to follow this or whatever.

 

[DarthOne]

Given the actions from Disney, it's pretty clear someone sent out a memo and Peter is absolutely a member of the intellegencia so he likely got it too. The Big Club, as Carlin would put it, is bucking at the growing pile of ankle biters. Unfortunately for us here Zeihan is a member. I'm actually starting to enjoy the information I can glean from Zeihan's naysaying since it always coincides with moves from other parts of the establishment.

By all means feel free to share your thoughts on this here. I know I for one would appreciate it.