Doomsought
Well-known member
Good for them, it well definitely help their trade relations.
Mexico joins the United States...in the 1990s?
- Thread starter History Learner
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History Learner
Well-known member
Returning to this because I've been thinking about it a lot lately as I've been reading about the last stage of the Cold War.
The easiest PoD is probably to have the 1988 election directly spiral into a Second Mexican Civil War, which was actually pretty close to happening IOTL. For various reasons, I'll look at another PoD which indirectly causes the above via Saddam's Iraq and its war with Iran in the 1980s. How? Have Saddam be successfully assassinated at Dujail in 1982 by Kurdish fighters, which was a near miss. In the event of the death of Saddam, given the purges he had previously conducted, it's likely Ad-Douri or Khairallah Talfah would take power. Both have their issues, but would still definitely be better than Saddam in that they would more willing to let the Iraqi Army engage in offensives and counter-offensives against the Iranians. Saddam IOTL was pretty reluctant for many years to allow such, resulting in the relatively static war that dominated much of that conflict.
With a more competent Iraqi leadership from 1982 onward, it's likely the conflict could end sooner via greater exhaustion of the Iranians. Aiding this would probably be stepped up support by the Superpowers to Iraq, in order to prevent a decisive Iranian victory. The Soviets in particular would increase their material aid and training efforts to the Iraqi Army, likely on the pre-condition of improving relations with Syria. Overall, I see the war ending much sooner but along the same lines as OTL; let's say 1985. With the war over, both Iran and Iraq re-enter the global oil market and the Tanker War is avoided. Thanks to improved ties with Syria, the pipeline to the Mediterranean is reopened in 1985 a few months after the end of the war. The Saudis also still open the floodgates of their own production but slightly ahead of OTL's schedule, thanks to pressure from the Iraqis and Iranians being back on the market.
This has the effect of massively driving down oil prices from 1985 onward, at a time Mexico was struggling with its own debt crisis. The collapse in oil prices would deepen this by removing the main Mexican export, to make repayment impossible without greater austerity which would obviously undermine the PRI regime. An OTL example of this in action, funnily enough, is the crisis of the late 1980s in the East Bloc. So by 1988 you have increasingly declining living standards due to austerity and an overall collapsing economy just as the PRI has to blatantly steal an election. Once that occurs, it's likely the situation spirals out of control with widespread violence and civil disorder making Mexico ungovernable.
Such a situation, by default, would be intolerable for the United States because of the risk of violence spilling across the border, waves of refugees and the fact Mexico completely defaulting on its loan repayments would create a 2008-style crash in the Banking Industry, creating an intense political need to do something and do it now. This would likely require some sort of intervention, as the ruling PRI-regime is discredited but the opposition would not offer a meaningful alternative at this point, at least from U.S. interests. Perhaps military, but also economic and political. As the U.S. goes about the difficult task of propping Mexico up, it's likely the annexationist sympathies would come to the fore because it would be clear to the average Mexican that Mexico as an entity has failed while the U.S. provides a meaningful degree of security and prosperity. From there, you get a cascade effect, with Mexican States increasing petitioning for annexation.
For a real world model of this in action, see both the GOP and Democrats IOTL putting Puerto Rican Statehood on the Agenda. Unlike Puerto Rico, however, Mexican-Americans compose a major political bloc, especially in major states like Texas and California, while the financial classes would be more apt to push for it in order to ensure repayment of the debt, at least in some form. With this confluence of incentives, I see annexation being achieved by the early 1990s, likely on the basis of a national vote within the rebuilding Mexico.
The easiest PoD is probably to have the 1988 election directly spiral into a Second Mexican Civil War, which was actually pretty close to happening IOTL. For various reasons, I'll look at another PoD which indirectly causes the above via Saddam's Iraq and its war with Iran in the 1980s. How? Have Saddam be successfully assassinated at Dujail in 1982 by Kurdish fighters, which was a near miss. In the event of the death of Saddam, given the purges he had previously conducted, it's likely Ad-Douri or Khairallah Talfah would take power. Both have their issues, but would still definitely be better than Saddam in that they would more willing to let the Iraqi Army engage in offensives and counter-offensives against the Iranians. Saddam IOTL was pretty reluctant for many years to allow such, resulting in the relatively static war that dominated much of that conflict.
With a more competent Iraqi leadership from 1982 onward, it's likely the conflict could end sooner via greater exhaustion of the Iranians. Aiding this would probably be stepped up support by the Superpowers to Iraq, in order to prevent a decisive Iranian victory. The Soviets in particular would increase their material aid and training efforts to the Iraqi Army, likely on the pre-condition of improving relations with Syria. Overall, I see the war ending much sooner but along the same lines as OTL; let's say 1985. With the war over, both Iran and Iraq re-enter the global oil market and the Tanker War is avoided. Thanks to improved ties with Syria, the pipeline to the Mediterranean is reopened in 1985 a few months after the end of the war. The Saudis also still open the floodgates of their own production but slightly ahead of OTL's schedule, thanks to pressure from the Iraqis and Iranians being back on the market.
This has the effect of massively driving down oil prices from 1985 onward, at a time Mexico was struggling with its own debt crisis. The collapse in oil prices would deepen this by removing the main Mexican export, to make repayment impossible without greater austerity which would obviously undermine the PRI regime. An OTL example of this in action, funnily enough, is the crisis of the late 1980s in the East Bloc. So by 1988 you have increasingly declining living standards due to austerity and an overall collapsing economy just as the PRI has to blatantly steal an election. Once that occurs, it's likely the situation spirals out of control with widespread violence and civil disorder making Mexico ungovernable.
Such a situation, by default, would be intolerable for the United States because of the risk of violence spilling across the border, waves of refugees and the fact Mexico completely defaulting on its loan repayments would create a 2008-style crash in the Banking Industry, creating an intense political need to do something and do it now. This would likely require some sort of intervention, as the ruling PRI-regime is discredited but the opposition would not offer a meaningful alternative at this point, at least from U.S. interests. Perhaps military, but also economic and political. As the U.S. goes about the difficult task of propping Mexico up, it's likely the annexationist sympathies would come to the fore because it would be clear to the average Mexican that Mexico as an entity has failed while the U.S. provides a meaningful degree of security and prosperity. From there, you get a cascade effect, with Mexican States increasing petitioning for annexation.
For a real world model of this in action, see both the GOP and Democrats IOTL putting Puerto Rican Statehood on the Agenda. Unlike Puerto Rico, however, Mexican-Americans compose a major political bloc, especially in major states like Texas and California, while the financial classes would be more apt to push for it in order to ensure repayment of the debt, at least in some form. With this confluence of incentives, I see annexation being achieved by the early 1990s, likely on the basis of a national vote within the rebuilding Mexico.
History Learner
Well-known member
Up to this point I've mainly been focused in on the North American side of things, so I wanted to take a second to consider the wider ranging ramifications while also tying it into my current research about the late Cold War. An obvious question about a scenario in the 1980s-1990s is the impact on the USSR and the East Bloc. To answer that, we must first understand what exactly happened in the first place. To answer that, I quote from Gorbachev vs. Deng: A Review of Chris Miller’s The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy:
So, obviously the collapse in oil prices being much deeper from 1985 onwards would be disastrous, but it doesn't need to be fatal for the Soviets. Without the ability to stabilize living standards and/or buy off interest groups, it's likely Gorbachev will have a short tenure as General Secretary, perhaps being ousted by 1987 or 1988. The key difference between this ATL effort and the OTL 1991 coup will be that Gorby will not have yet destroyed the CPSU as an entity nor is there been years for Glasnost to take root. Most likely Gorbachev would be replaced by Ligachev or maybe Ryzhkov, who are still economically reformist but differ in the ways and hows; Ryzhkov, for example, was against the Anti-Alcohol campaign because of its impact on excise taxes. We will go with Ligachev, however, for the sake of the argument.
With the authority of the CPSU still in effect, the new General Secretary will be able to use force to suppress dissent like Deng did in China while using the organs of the party to hold the nation together while reforms are conducted. Anti-Gorbachev putsch could open the way for renewed Anti-Corruption purges as occurred under Andropov, which in of itself would boost economic growth by removing deadweight so to speak, while also allowing Ligachev to combat the interest groups in a way Gorbachev was never able to/tried to. Likewise, the removal of Mexico from oil markets for a time from 1988 on will help alleviate some of the stress, as would the ability to cut defense spending because of the shifting U.S. focus from Europe to the Homeland to deal with the Mexican situation. Thus, it's entirely possible this would result in the USSR economically reforming successfully and surviving.
I feel like it is too late, however, to save the East Bloc as a whole although Ligachev can manage to extend things out; instead of it all collapsing from 1987-1989, perhaps it's a more drawn out process extending from 1990 to 1995. The loss of the East Bloc would probably sufficiently tarnish the CPSU that real political reforms following this event would have to come, which would probably require something like the New Union Treaty with several of the SSRs (Baltics, Caucasus and Ukraine) breaking off. Still, a core USSR of the RSFSR, Central Asia and Belarus could be retained.
As oil prices fell, Gorbachev tried to maintain living standards which resulted in major growth in the budget deficit. Before Gorbachev came to power, the budget was balanced or even had a small surplus. In 1985, the deficit grew to 2% GDP, by 1990, it reached 10% GDP. In 1991, the last year of the Soviet Union, the deficit exceeded astronomical 30% GDP (p. 152).
The fiscal crisis was partly explained by a collapse in global oil prices but was partly handmade. First, Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign reduced revenues from excise taxes. Second, in order to keep the industrial and agricultural lobbies happy, the government continued to subsidize their inputs and raise prices for their outputs. At the same time, in order to pacify the general public, consumer prices were kept low. Gorbachev also avoided cutting expenditure on public goods and tried to maintain living standards. He decided that–unlike Deng–he would not use force to suppress protesters and therefore tried to avoid the situation where people took to the street to voice their economic grievances.
To fund the deficit, the government resorted to borrowing. The foreign debt increased from 30% of GDP in 1985 to 80% of GDP in 1991 (p. 152). As the markets were growing increasingly reluctant to lend, the government funded the deficit by printing money. The official prices were still controlled, so the monetization of budget deficit resulted in “repressed inflation”, increased shortages and higher prices in black markets. Eventually the Soviet Union ran out of cash and collapsed. Miller’s account shows that both oil price shock and the impact of the anti-alcohol campaign were not the major drivers of the fiscal crisis. The main factors were lack of resolve in tackling the interest groups and in maintaining fiscal discipline as well as incompetence in basic economics.
So, obviously the collapse in oil prices being much deeper from 1985 onwards would be disastrous, but it doesn't need to be fatal for the Soviets. Without the ability to stabilize living standards and/or buy off interest groups, it's likely Gorbachev will have a short tenure as General Secretary, perhaps being ousted by 1987 or 1988. The key difference between this ATL effort and the OTL 1991 coup will be that Gorby will not have yet destroyed the CPSU as an entity nor is there been years for Glasnost to take root. Most likely Gorbachev would be replaced by Ligachev or maybe Ryzhkov, who are still economically reformist but differ in the ways and hows; Ryzhkov, for example, was against the Anti-Alcohol campaign because of its impact on excise taxes. We will go with Ligachev, however, for the sake of the argument.
With the authority of the CPSU still in effect, the new General Secretary will be able to use force to suppress dissent like Deng did in China while using the organs of the party to hold the nation together while reforms are conducted. Anti-Gorbachev putsch could open the way for renewed Anti-Corruption purges as occurred under Andropov, which in of itself would boost economic growth by removing deadweight so to speak, while also allowing Ligachev to combat the interest groups in a way Gorbachev was never able to/tried to. Likewise, the removal of Mexico from oil markets for a time from 1988 on will help alleviate some of the stress, as would the ability to cut defense spending because of the shifting U.S. focus from Europe to the Homeland to deal with the Mexican situation. Thus, it's entirely possible this would result in the USSR economically reforming successfully and surviving.
I feel like it is too late, however, to save the East Bloc as a whole although Ligachev can manage to extend things out; instead of it all collapsing from 1987-1989, perhaps it's a more drawn out process extending from 1990 to 1995. The loss of the East Bloc would probably sufficiently tarnish the CPSU that real political reforms following this event would have to come, which would probably require something like the New Union Treaty with several of the SSRs (Baltics, Caucasus and Ukraine) breaking off. Still, a core USSR of the RSFSR, Central Asia and Belarus could be retained.
History Learner
Well-known member
I acquired a copy of In the Shadow of the Giant: The Americanization of Mexico by Joseph Contreras, who was Newsweek’s editorial bureau chief in Mexico City during the 1980s, and then was made their Latin America regional editor in 2005. To quote directly from his book:
During the PRI’s long hegemony, the orthodox gospel preached by Mexico’s political and cultural establishments championed the country’s lower classes as the purest repository of national character. “The lower the station,” wrote one film scholar, “the more genuine the Mexicanness.”39 But as market research firms would later discover, the country’s lower classes have never fully shared the elites’ penchant for anti-Americanism—and over time, the chest-pounding nationalism that typified PRI politicians throughout most of the party’s reign became increasingly out of step with the evolving viewpoints of ordinary Mexicans
That was documented by a series of opinion surveys that uncovered surprisingly benign views of the United States among the population at large. A poll published in the magazine Este País in 1991 asked people whether they would support a political union of the United States and Mexico if that would improve their living standards, and fully 59 percent answered yes.40 Nine years later an almost identical percentage of Mexican respondents answered the same question in the affirmative. During the decade that witnessed the beginning of the NAFTA era, the percentage of Mexicans who endorsed greater economic ties with the United States rose significantly, from 57 percent in 1990 to 63 percent ten years later.
In the aftermath of another collapse in the value of the Mexican peso in 1994, the firm Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) asked respondents whom they blamed for the country’s latest financial debacle. Nearly half held their government responsible, 18 percent pointed a finger at the leader of the recent Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, another 7 percent mentioned unspecified “foreign investors”—and only one in twenty blamed the United States.41 When a third poll asked people which country would they most like Mexico to resemble, the United States topped the list. “The idea of a fervent nationalism and anti-Americanism has been exploited by the Mexican government [in the past] to enhance its negotiating position,” said MORI pollster Miguel Basañez. “It’s a myth. . . . It has been a weapon used by Mexican governments time and again, but is not supported by the facts.”42
Further:As we shall see in subsequent pages of this book, not all Mexicans view these policies as a positive development. But the implications of Salinas de Gortari’s policy shifts for official and unofficial perceptions of the United States were vast and are still being felt years later. “Nationalism and sovereignty were redefined so that the United States became an ally rather than the enemy,” wrote the Mexican American political scientist Rodolfo O. de la Garza.46 The sociologist María García Castro agreed, stating that “in the last few years the State has begun erasing the nationalist discourse.”47 In the process, Morris writes, the Mexican government has redefined its role as one “of a far less activist State, relieved in a sense of the burden of having to mobilize to defend the nation against U.S. influence or to create and assert nationalist identity.”48
Recent polling data have revealed some striking similarities between American and Mexican views of democracy and foreign policy issues. A 2004 binational opinion survey sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and two Mexican nongovernmental organizations found that an overwhelming majority of Mexicans (81 percent) and Americans (75 percent) regarded international terrorism as a critical threat to their vital interests. Nearly two-thirds of both Americans and Mexicans disagreed with the notion that rich countries play fair in trade negotiations with poor nations. A majority of Americans and Mexicans agreed that the United States should not play the role of world policeman and believed the United Nations should be strengthened, in part by giving the U.N. Security Council the right to authorize the use of force in the face of various security, political, and humanitarian crises. Mexican and American participants said they had generally favorable opinions of each other and also held positive opinions of Canada and friendly European countries. Solid majorities among both nationalities expressed support for a quid pro quo agreement that would give Mexicans more opportunities to work and live in the United States in exchange for a greater effort by Mexico to reduce illegal immigration and drug smuggling across the border.49
Chiron
Well-known member
It would add two new parties to the House and Senate and break the establishment for a decade or more. Also there is massive difference in bureaucratic attitudes and procedures.
It takes two to tango. While Mexicans might have been interested in this, I doubt that Americans would have been. For one, the US would have likely needed to subsidize Mexico for a very long time, possibly indefinitely. Secondly, the demographic effect could be perceived as being a big deal by many Americans. You need to keep in mind that even in 2006-2007 and 2013, amnesty for undocumented immigrants was defeated due to efforts by the Republican Party base. Here, we're talking about an absorption of 10+ times that many Latin Americans. If anything, I suspect that any such attempt might very well trigger a huge upsurge of white nationalism in the US earlier. It wouldn't necessarily always be phrased in racial terms, of course, but I could certainly see a lot of conservative Americans saying something along the lines of "Well, if Mexico is a dysfunctional country, and we're going to annex them, how exactly do we know that they're not going to bring their dysfunction over here?" or something like that.
The US previously absorbed Puerto Rico and the Danish West Indies (US Virgin Islands), but those involved much smaller populations. Ditto for the Mexican Cession.
A US union with Canada could be more popular among Americans since Canada has a comparable quality of life to the US and also comparable demographics. Still, I wonder if conservative Americans might oppose even this since Canadians are notable for their liberalism--except to some extent on immigration policy.
Americans were relatively hostile towards immigration in the 1990s, and you expect them to be OK with the absorption of 100+ million Mexicans? :
As for the Soviet Union, Russian leader Boris Yeltsin had absolutely no interest in a union without Ukraine, which is ironic considering that his successor Vladimir Putin currently has a Eurasian Economic Union without Ukraine, though not for a lack of trying!
History Learner
Well-known member
Americans were relatively hostile towards immigration in the 1990s, and you expect them to be OK with the absorption of 100+ million Mexicans? :
Worth noting Reagan got through an amnesty in 1986 without noticeable political blowback. Undoubtedly the U.S. public is broadly Anti-Immigration in general, especially the illegal variety, but even in present times there tends to be a mollified attitude towards legal immigration and directly annexing-and thus not only legal but citizens-certainly qualifies. It's worth noting both parties since 2016 have directly in their campaign platforms calls to admit Puerto Rico in as a state.
Yeltsin here is either a good member of the CCCP not raising issues in this regard or he has been removed.
History Learner
Well-known member
I think a lot of the modern or near recent exploits on immigration have to be considered in the vein of the times. For example, see Nixon:
The United States of America is witnessing a growing Latin American voting demographic, and many might be surprised to learn that the first “Latino” President was, in fact, Richard Nixon. In 1969, his first year in office, he established the Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish Speaking People.
Throughout his Presidency, he appointed more Latinos than any preceding President, including John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. He remained unsurpassed in those numbers until Bill Clinton’s Presidency in the 1990’s.
Over four decades ago, Hispanics in the United States found themselves exercising more power in a Presidential campaign that at any other time in American history.
Seeking re-election, President Nixon reached out to the Latino community by discussing his strategy for funding education, health, small businesses and other programs in Latin American communities in areas like Texas, California, and in the Southwest. Some called it the Nixon Hispanic Strategy.
Nixon received 40 percent of the Latino vote, by most estimates, in the 1972 re-election.
Nixon was often joined in his campaign by some of his most prominent Latino appointees, including Cabinet Committee Chairman Henry Ramirez, U.S. Treasurer Ramona Banuelos, and Office of the Economic Opportunity head Phillip Sanchez.
Even today, after recent Presidents such as Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama made a substantial effort to appeal to Latin American communities, Presidents Nixon’s historic appointments still warrants a singular recognition.
Reagan supported amnesty in 1986 but this didn't help the GOP afterwards, which might have caused the GOP base to learn the lesson that the GOP is unlikely to get more than 40% of the Hispanic vote even in a very good year.
As for Puerto Rico, you're talking about three million Puerto Ricans, which is a very far cry from 100+ million Mexicans.
The polling that I showed you appears to pertain to immigration in general rather than exclusively to the illegal variety. But if you're curious, the GOP might have become more hostile to large-scale legal immigration as well over the last several years, in part due to political concerns (immigrants and their descendants voting for the Left) and in part due to their base's fears of the "Great Replacement".
AFAIK, Gorbachev didn't want a union without Ukraine either.
Yes, the GOP tried to appeal to Hispanic voters over the last several decades. But still, those voters were already US citizens and thus the US already invested in them either way. But when you annex a 100+ million-strong middle-income country, well, that's going to require a lot of subsidies for decades, even if one completely ignores the demographic aspect of it (and the GOP base has an element that does appear to care about the US's demographics).
History Learner
Well-known member
I think that requires both a high degree of foresight and an estimation of what the relevant political factions are at the time. The element of the GOP base that you cite, which stopped Bush's efforts in 2006-2007, was not able to do so with Reagan in 1986; this suggests to me it had yet to congeal politically or was yet to be influential enough. Certainly, that Bush felt he could try this again in the late 2000s suggests it was an open question to leaders then, and the fact Reagan is lionized to this day by a large segment of the GOP suggests they've not begrudged him for that. Certainly, they didn't reject Bush in 1988 in reaction either.
Understandably true, but Mexican Americans even back in the early 1990s were a much larger and politically powerful voting bloc than Puerto Ricans are and are ever likely to be. MAs have been a keen factor in California going to the Democrats, and are politically powerful in Texas, Arizona and New Mexico. That's eight senators and two of the three largest States by population, not counting the business community given the position of Mexico in U.S. trade in 1990.
This I see as possible, or even that the Democrats might become the party hostile to immigration; regardless, a large scale reduction in such post annexation could definitely happen and I don't see that as an issue personally.
I thought your argument was a Union with Ukraine would be rejected?
This is just a hunch, but I suspect that the post-Trump GOP might be willing to reconsider their views of Reagan as well. They certainly don't like the Bushes all that much anymore, especially the younger ones (GWB and Jeb!).
Fair points.
Yes, it would be, by either Gorbachev or Yeltsin, depending on whose opinion here is actually relevant. And if Gorby gets overthrown by hardliners, then they will certainly use force to keep Ukraine in the Union.
History Learner
Well-known member
Again, I'm confused by your argument; Gorby wanted to keep Ukraine in the Union and Yeltsin historically favored breaking up the Union. These are different positions?
AFAIK, Yeltsin only favored breaking up the Union after it became clear that Ukraine was not going to participate in any (new) Union. Had Ukraine been willing to participate, so would Yeltsin.
History Learner
Well-known member
My basic assumption here is that Yeltsin is a non-factor; he was on the verge of being sidelined in 1988 and it's really only luck he in position to assert the influence he historically did.
OK, but even so, you need either a Soviet or a Russian leader who would actually be willing to have a (new) Union without Ukraine in order for the Soviet Union to survive.
History Learner
Well-known member
Gorbachev wanted Ukraine in the Union, but I doubt he would use force to do so; the Union would continue on without it.
No, the issue was that without Ukraine, the Slavic percentage in the Soviet Union would become too small and diluted. You'd see a union that was only 60% or so Slavic, which is too close for comfort for Russian nationalists.
History Learner
Well-known member
What Russian Nationalists, Comrade?