sillygoose
Well-known member
On January 1st 1944 Hitler agreed to let AG-North retreat from its positions around Leningrad to avoid the huge offensive that was coming on the 14th, but ultimately he changed his mind and forced them to stay in place, which ultimately resulted in over 90,000 unnecessary losses and the drop of infantry strength from 70,000+ to about 17,000 in 2 weeks of combat in January.
But what if he hadn't changed his mind and let the January 1st order stand?
There were any number of switch lines behind the front that were built up to allow a phased fallback to the Panther Line around Narwa and Pskov, so had they chosen to they could have pulled another Operation Buffalo like their retreat from Rzhev and avoided significant casualties while inflicting heavy disproportionate ones on the Soviets:
ru.wikipedia.org
Assuming they were able to maintain that ratio, which they should be given how poorly the Soviets ran their OTL offensive in January 1944, by trading ground for time and lives, while avoiding the massive loss of equipment that happened IOTL they should have been able to free up about 8 divisions once they eventually reached the Panther Line (as had been planned before the heavy losses of the retreat IOTL) as well as bled out the Leningrad and Volkov Fronts quite badly not to mention let the 12th Panzer division remain with AG-Center (transferred to AG-North after the situation had become dire). Even with the situation in Ukraine remaining per OTL and AG-Center was stripped of their reserves per OTL, the reserves freed up by AG-North would be able to compensate for the loss of AG-Center's reserves, especially if 12th Panzer also stayed with Center.
Granted other than 12th Panzer the 8 divisions freed up then would be infantry divisions, but any reserves would have been better than no reserves. Given the ability of infantry divisions to man defensive positions more effectively than panzer divisions they might have been more effective in the role anyway, as they could the 2nd line defensive positions and hold open routes needed for retreat of the first line divisions. Plus AG-North had experienced much less attrition than the other army groups so the troops were disproportionately 1941 veterans, which means they'd be much more effective in their roles given their long experience in positional fighting as well as pre-Barbarossa training. Bagration was able to succeed due to 2nd line positions not being adequately manned, so that 1st line divisions couldn't leap frog back to safety and set up on shorter rearward positions since Hitler forced them to stay in line to the last second.
Given all that how does 1944 then play out if AG-North is much more intact and AG-Center has enough reserves to avoid being wiped out in June and can hold on the Beaver Line east of Minsk? I'm assuming D-Day plays out roughly the same, but Ukraine is somewhat different because rather than strip AG-North Ukraine of reserves to help make good Bagration losses AG-North's reserves save AG-Center, so AG-North Ukraine's reserves are in place to counter the Soviet Lwow-Sandomierz offensive.
But what if he hadn't changed his mind and let the January 1st order stand?
There were any number of switch lines behind the front that were built up to allow a phased fallback to the Panther Line around Narwa and Pskov, so had they chosen to they could have pulled another Operation Buffalo like their retreat from Rzhev and avoided significant casualties while inflicting heavy disproportionate ones on the Soviets:
Операция «Бюффель» — Википедия
ru.wikipedia.org
Assuming they were able to maintain that ratio, which they should be given how poorly the Soviets ran their OTL offensive in January 1944, by trading ground for time and lives, while avoiding the massive loss of equipment that happened IOTL they should have been able to free up about 8 divisions once they eventually reached the Panther Line (as had been planned before the heavy losses of the retreat IOTL) as well as bled out the Leningrad and Volkov Fronts quite badly not to mention let the 12th Panzer division remain with AG-Center (transferred to AG-North after the situation had become dire). Even with the situation in Ukraine remaining per OTL and AG-Center was stripped of their reserves per OTL, the reserves freed up by AG-North would be able to compensate for the loss of AG-Center's reserves, especially if 12th Panzer also stayed with Center.
Granted other than 12th Panzer the 8 divisions freed up then would be infantry divisions, but any reserves would have been better than no reserves. Given the ability of infantry divisions to man defensive positions more effectively than panzer divisions they might have been more effective in the role anyway, as they could the 2nd line defensive positions and hold open routes needed for retreat of the first line divisions. Plus AG-North had experienced much less attrition than the other army groups so the troops were disproportionately 1941 veterans, which means they'd be much more effective in their roles given their long experience in positional fighting as well as pre-Barbarossa training. Bagration was able to succeed due to 2nd line positions not being adequately manned, so that 1st line divisions couldn't leap frog back to safety and set up on shorter rearward positions since Hitler forced them to stay in line to the last second.
Given all that how does 1944 then play out if AG-North is much more intact and AG-Center has enough reserves to avoid being wiped out in June and can hold on the Beaver Line east of Minsk? I'm assuming D-Day plays out roughly the same, but Ukraine is somewhat different because rather than strip AG-North Ukraine of reserves to help make good Bagration losses AG-North's reserves save AG-Center, so AG-North Ukraine's reserves are in place to counter the Soviet Lwow-Sandomierz offensive.
