Hitler avoids going for Prague in March 1939 and instead focuses on vassalizing Czechia

[WolfBear]

What if Hitler avoids going for Prague in March 1939 and instead focuses on vassalizing Czechia while also allowing Czechia to retain its independence? Slovakia would of course still be broken off from Czechia and form its own state, and Hungary would still annex Subcarpathian Ruthenia.

In such a scenario, will Hitler have much more Western goodwill after March 1939?

 

[sillygoose]

What if Hitler avoids going for Prague in March 1939 and instead focuses on vassalizing Czechia while also allowing Czechia to retain its independence? Slovakia would of course still be broken off from Czechia and form its own state, and Hungary would still annex Subcarpathian Ruthenia.

In such a scenario, will Hitler have much more Western goodwill after March 1939?

He kind of couldn't because the Czechs were going to find a way to get revenge eventually and the Czechs were an aircraft carrier 40 minutes from Berlin by air; there is evidence the Soviets were sending in hundreds of aircraft in 1938-39 and sending aviators into the country as well as the Czechs, Soviets, and French were still all technically allied.
So for all the moralizing about Hitler establishing a protectorate (which was vassalizing them) from a hard-nosed strategic perspective he really had no choice but to entirely control the Czech territories; just like Britain would never accept Germany basing aircraft in Ireland there is no way any sane leader of Germany could accept the Soviets basing aircraft in Czechia especially when Stalin was already behaving aggressively at that time towards Germany.

Certainly the west would have less excuse for confronting him over Poland, but they'd find a reason anyway because Roosevelt was putting the screws to the British and French to confront Germany ASAP or they would get no more aid/ability to purchase from the US until they did after the Munich Deal. Contrary to what most pop histories claim Chamberlain really didn't care about the Czechs being taken over and never actually guaranteed the integrity of Czechoslovakia except in principle (aka a non-legally binding declaration of an idea), which incidentally none of the Munich treaty signees ever did either.

Chamberlain would have more domestic cover not to be confrontational, but Poland was always going to fight over Danzig (they said so in 1938 even though it was the Polish ambassador who initially brought up a deal on Danzig in September 1938 in a meeting with Hitler to which Ribbentrop then formally responded with a proposal in October). Especially after Kristalnacht Hitler was on the shit-list of all the western powers anyway.

 

[WolfBear]

He kind of couldn't because the Czechs were going to find a way to get revenge eventually and the Czechs were an aircraft carrier 40 minutes from Berlin by air; there is evidence the Soviets were sending in hundreds of aircraft in 1938-39 and sending aviators into the country as well as the Czechs, Soviets, and French were still all technically allied.
So for all the moralizing about Hitler establishing a protectorate (which was vassalizing them) from a hard-nosed strategic perspective he really had no choice but to entirely control the Czech territories; just like Britain would never accept Germany basing aircraft in Ireland there is no way any sane leader of Germany could accept the Soviets basing aircraft in Czechia especially when Stalin was already behaving aggressively at that time towards Germany.

Certainly the west would have less excuse for confronting him over Poland, but they'd find a reason anyway because Roosevelt was putting the screws to the British and French to confront Germany ASAP or they would get no more aid/ability to purchase from the US until they did after the Munich Deal. Contrary to what most pop histories claim Chamberlain really didn't care about the Czechs being taken over and never actually guaranteed the integrity of Czechoslovakia except in principle (aka a non-legally binding declaration of an idea), which incidentally none of the Munich treaty signees ever did either.

Chamberlain would have more domestic cover not to be confrontational, but Poland was always going to fight over Danzig (they said so in 1938 even though it was the Polish ambassador who initially brought up a deal on Danzig in September 1938 in a meeting with Hitler to which Ribbentrop then formally responded with a proposal in October). Especially after Kristalnacht Hitler was on the shit-list of all the western powers anyway.

Interesting response. The one thing that I will specifically comment on is that there could be the option of regime change in Czechia to a more pro-German regime while keeping Czechia independent--think of Iraq 2003, for instance.

But Yeah, I'll have to think about the rest of what you wrote here.

 

[sillygoose]

Interesting response. The one thing that I will specifically comment on is that there could be the option of regime change in Czechia to a more pro-German regime while keeping Czechia independent--think of Iraq 2003, for instance.

But Yeah, I'll have to think about the rest of what you wrote here.

Not sure how that would be. Hacha was pretty compliant and anything to do with regime change would have no better results in terms of Western opinion than puppetization like what happened IOTL.

 

[WolfBear]

Not sure how that would be. Hacha was pretty compliant and anything to do with regime change would have no better results in terms of Western opinion than puppetization like what happened IOTL.

Is there any way to get Hacha to comply without imposing a protectorate? Because that would be ideal, frankly. German troops can still enter Czechia but they'd need to withdraw afterwards--after a day or two, tops.

 

[sillygoose]

Is there any way to get Hacha to comply without imposing a protectorate? Because that would be ideal, frankly. German troops can still enter Czechia but they'd need to withdraw afterwards--after a day or two, tops.

To get the security Hitler felt he needed to keep the Soviets or French out? Not really. Plus there was the war the massive draw of getting their mitts on all the Czech weapons, removing the Czech army entirely from the equation, and of course gaining control over the weapons industry and natural resources of Czechia. IMHO the real reason so much of the West freaked out over it was it allowed the German army to equip either fully or partially 22 division and gain a massive jump over everyone else in the armaments race that was going on as well as remove the best site they would have for intelligence gathering against Germany (the Czechs had an Abwehr colonel feeding them info) and a potential airbase as well as an additional army on their side.

 

[WolfBear]

To get the security Hitler felt he needed to keep the Soviets or French out? Not really.

Intriguing. And Yeah, interesting point about the Czech salient:

Did Hitler ever make any arguments to Western audiences along these lines? As in, "We occupied Czechia because it formed a giant salient within our Reich, and we didn't want to take any risks here?"

Of course, a friendly Poland and Hungary would have made the Czech salient irrelevant because they would have stood in the way between Germany and the Soviet Union. And in any case, the Czech salient was completely indefensible.

 

[sillygoose]

Intriguing. And Yeah, interesting point about the Czech salient:

Did Hitler ever make any arguments to Western audiences along these lines? As in, "We occupied Czechia because it formed a giant salient within our Reich, and we didn't want to take any risks here?"

Not sure to be honest. Not that they cared, it was all about power politics and their own narrow national viewpoints. Churchill for instance told Ribbentrop in 1937 that Britain would never tolerate Germany expanding eastwards.
Interestingly if you go by the Hossbach memo Austria and Czechia were what Hitler meant by Lebensraum. No mention of Poland and since it appears his offers to Poland were sincere (he warned them about Austria and the Sudetenland before moving on them to avoid conflict) arguably until April 1939 when it was clear no deal was possible, it seems like he was actually going to be satisfied with just getting back Danzig, the extraterritorial RR, and at least a non-aggression pact for 25 years. Of course he'd prefer they joined the anti-comintern pact as well, but he did tell Lipski (Polish ambassador) that wasn't vital. Force only came into the equation was it was clear Poland refused to budget one bit and had been double dealing with the French earlier.

Of course, a friendly Poland and Hungary would have made the Czech salient irrelevant because they would have stood in the way between Germany and the Soviet Union. And in any case, the Czech salient was completely indefensible.

You can still fly over and there are ways of infiltrating. Of course if you're going to resort to a blockade, the political fall out is going to be the same regardless. I think Hitler bullied Hacha into the protectorate because he realized that was really his only play anyway and 'slow walking it' would result in at least the same or worse political fall out. By getting Hacha to sign he seems to have actually thought the piece of paper would mollify the world and was actually mystified by the British reaction. Supposedly through a third party Chamberlain had assured Hitler he didn't actually care, but had to put up a front for public consumption. The guarantee to Poland then was a shock.

Also Poland and Hungary weren't really friendly to Germany, especially after Hitler guaranteed the independence of Slovakia, as Hungary and Poland planned to divide the state between them and achieve a common border; Hitler of course wanted to prevent them from being able to unite and plot together since by March Poland was trying to put together a 'Third Way' alliance in eastern Central Europe to counter balance Hitler and Stalin. Ironically this actually helped bring Hitler and Stalin together against Poland.

 

[WolfBear]

Not sure to be honest. Not that they cared, it was all about power politics and their own narrow national viewpoints. Churchill for instance told Ribbentrop in 1937 that Britain would never tolerate Germany expanding eastwards.
Interestingly if you go by the Hossbach memo Austria and Czechia were what Hitler meant by Lebensraum. No mention of Poland and since it appears his offers to Poland were sincere (he warned them about Austria and the Sudetenland before moving on them to avoid conflict) arguably until April 1939 when it was clear no deal was possible, it seems like he was actually going to be satisfied with just getting back Danzig, the extraterritorial RR, and at least a non-aggression pact for 25 years. Of course he'd prefer they joined the anti-comintern pact as well, but he did tell Lipski (Polish ambassador) that wasn't vital. Force only came into the equation was it was clear Poland refused to budget one bit and had been double dealing with the French earlier.


You can still fly over and there are ways of infiltrating. Of course if you're going to resort to a blockade, the political fall out is going to be the same regardless. I think Hitler bullied Hacha into the protectorate because he realized that was really his only play anyway and 'slow walking it' would result in at least the same or worse political fall out. By getting Hacha to sign he seems to have actually thought the piece of paper would mollify the world and was actually mystified by the British reaction. Supposedly through a third party Chamberlain had assured Hitler he didn't actually care, but had to put up a front for public consumption. The guarantee to Poland then was a shock.

Also Poland and Hungary weren't really friendly to Germany, especially after Hitler guaranteed the independence of Slovakia, as Hungary and Poland planned to divide the state between them and achieve a common border; Hitler of course wanted to prevent them from being able to unite and plot together since by March Poland was trying to put together a 'Third Way' alliance in eastern Central Europe to counter balance Hitler and Stalin. Ironically this actually helped bring Hitler and Stalin together against Poland.

In Mein Kampf, Hitler made it clear that he was talking about the Russian lands as Lebensraum as well. Hitler did favorably speak about the Ostsiedlung in Mein Kampf and said that it should be revived after a 600-year pause. The fact that Hitler didn't mention attacking the Soviet Union in his official papers until late 1940 or whatever might have simply meant that he had other, bigger issues to worry about at that specific point in time.

Even without Slovakia, Poland and Hungary still had a common border due to the latter's March 1939 expansion in the north.

And Yeah, it does seem like both Hitler and Chamberlain miscalculated in regards to 1938-1939. Of course, it also didn't help that the French subsequently screwed things over in 1940.

 

[sillygoose]

In Mein Kampf, Hitler made it clear that he was talking about the Russian lands as Lebensraum as well.

Hitler did disavow his positions taken in the book as relevant only at the time it was written, but things had changed as of the 1930s.

Hitler did favorably speak about the Ostsiedlung in Mein Kampf and said that it should be revived after a 600-year pause. The fact that Hitler didn't mention attacking the Soviet Union in his official papers until late 1940 or whatever might have simply meant that he had other, bigger issues to worry about at that specific point in time.

I give more wait to things he said in the late 1930s while in power than what he said while in prison in the early 1920s after a failed coup.

Even without Slovakia, Poland and Hungary still had a common border due to the latter's March 1939 expansion in the north.

The mountains were in the way; if Slovakia had been partitioned they'd have a RR link.

And Yeah, it does seem like both Hitler and Chamberlain miscalculated in regards to 1938-1939. Of course, it also didn't help that the French subsequently screwed things over in 1940.

Britain was culpable in that too since they were in on the planning and when things started going bad retreated without telling anyone and screwed their allies the Belgians and French. Then they refused to send more planes to help France when requested. Plenty of blame to go around.

 

[WolfBear]

Hitler did disavow his positions taken in the book as relevant only at the time it was written, but things had changed as of the 1930s.


I give more wait to things he said in the late 1930s while in power than what he said while in prison in the early 1920s after a failed coup.


The mountains were in the way; if Slovakia had been partitioned they'd have a RR link.


Britain was culpable in that too since they were in on the planning and when things started going bad retreated without telling anyone and screwed their allies the Belgians and French. Then they refused to send more planes to help France when requested. Plenty of blame to go around.

When did he disavow it? I mean sincerely disavow it as opposed to merely doing this tactically.

Personally, I tend to look at the big picture here, you know? I also use his Second Book from the late 1920s as a reference.

And a new railroad could not be built through Subcarpathian Ruthenia?

Screwed their allies in what sense? Because the Dunkirk retreat saved the BEF.

 

[sillygoose]

When did he disavow it? I mean sincerely disavow it as opposed to merely doing this tactically.

Not sure on the specific date/speech, but I'll do some research and get back to you.

Personally, I tend to look at the big picture here, you know? I also use his Second Book from the late 1920s as a reference.

I have my doubts about the second book being real or that it was any more valid than MK for his late 1920s views.

And a new railroad could not be built through Subcarpathian Ruthenia?

I don't think so.

Screwed their allies in what sense? Because the Dunkirk retreat saved the BEF.

The BEF yes, but not the French army or Belgians, who had to surrender when they got put in a really bad position when the British ran. Like they did in 1914 too...

 

[History Learner]

He kind of couldn't because the Czechs were going to find a way to get revenge eventually and the Czechs were an aircraft carrier 40 minutes from Berlin by air; there is evidence the Soviets were sending in hundreds of aircraft in 1938-39 and sending aviators into the country as well as the Czechs, Soviets, and French were still all technically allied.
So for all the moralizing about Hitler establishing a protectorate (which was vassalizing them) from a hard-nosed strategic perspective he really had no choice but to entirely control the Czech territories; just like Britain would never accept Germany basing aircraft in Ireland there is no way any sane leader of Germany could accept the Soviets basing aircraft in Czechia especially when Stalin was already behaving aggressively at that time towards Germany.

Certainly the west would have less excuse for confronting him over Poland, but they'd find a reason anyway because Roosevelt was putting the screws to the British and French to confront Germany ASAP or they would get no more aid/ability to purchase from the US until they did after the Munich Deal. Contrary to what most pop histories claim Chamberlain really didn't care about the Czechs being taken over and never actually guaranteed the integrity of Czechoslovakia except in principle (aka a non-legally binding declaration of an idea), which incidentally none of the Munich treaty signees ever did either.

Chamberlain would have more domestic cover not to be confrontational, but Poland was always going to fight over Danzig (they said so in 1938 even though it was the Polish ambassador who initially brought up a deal on Danzig in September 1938 in a meeting with Hitler to which Ribbentrop then formally responded with a proposal in October). Especially after Kristalnacht Hitler was on the shit-list of all the western powers anyway.

IIRC, weren't the Czechs working up some sort of deeper protectorate status in early 1939 before Hitler sent in the troops? I might be mis-remembering though.

 

[WolfBear]

Not sure on the specific date/speech, but I'll do some research and get back to you.


I have my doubts about the second book being real or that it was any more valid than MK for his late 1920s views.


I don't think so.


The BEF yes, but not the French army or Belgians, who had to surrender when they got put in a really bad position when the British ran. Like they did in 1914 too...

OK; please do so.

AFAIK, Hitler's publisher confirmed it as being real after the end of WWII, which is good enough for me, TBH.

Why not?

But keeping the BEF in France in 1940 would not have actually saved France, would it? Rather, it would have merely delayed the inevitable.

 

[sillygoose]

OK; please do so.

The original source that I saw this claimed in was a 1930 book called "Hitler's Way" by Theodor Heuss who was the first German Federal President after WW2 (in 1930 he was an elected Reichstag member of the DDP, a left wing party), with a 1968 reprint and new intro explaining the context of the older book. It is claimed Hitler in speeches and letters repeatedly said the book was a product of his reaction to the situation in the early 1920s and by 1930 no longer subscribed to many of the views therein, with France being mentioned specifically. Understandable given the relations with France in the early 1920s and the dramatic change by 1930. After all he went from staging a coup and sitting in prison to getting elected in that period.

Of course Hitler could have been lying, but people do change. I myself don't think the same way I did 10 years ago, in part due to very different world circumstances.

AFAIK, Hitler's publisher confirmed it as being real after the end of WWII, which is good enough for me, TBH.

Someone who worked for the publisher claimed it was true according to the guy who found the manuscript, Gehrard Weinberg. I've never seen it confirmed anywhere else that this guy actually said that, just people repeating the claim by Weinberg. Even if this one guy did actually claim that, you can pay off anyone to say anything. BTW Weinberg was one of the guys who thought the faked Hitler Diaries were actually real. Not only that, but when he tried to shop around the 2nd book to publishers he couldn't find a single one who would publish it except for a friend of his who had just set up a publishing house. Unfortunately that is how BS gets laundered in the historical community, get published and no one tends to criticize it unless what is being published goes against the mainstream viewpoint.

Not only that, but if you read the intro to the 2nd book Weinberg even describes his obsession with finding Hitler's other work based on finding a couple extremely limited references to an unpublished work of Hitler's. Motivated people tend to find the things they were looking for one way or another. Wouldn't be the first time someone has forged history. Again see the Hitler diaries that Weinberg certified as authentic when he was one of two experts called in to assess it. That was only one of several faked diaries and documents that have come out after WW2. Frankly that severely undermines his credibility, especially given that an army intel officer supposedly had left a note about where it was found in the file it was discovered in, but no one else had ever seem to have seen it before. Given the content of the 2nd book you'd have thought the war crimes trials could have used that document as proof of Hitler's intentions.

But I could be wrong.

BTW speaking of forgeries one of Hitler's interpreters (Dollman) who translated in meetings with Mussolini wrote in his memoirs that while in British custody he was asked to review a doctored copy of Ciano's diaries to see if the forgeries looked believable; Dollman said yes, but only to anyone who didn't know Ciano personally. Supposedly the diaries available today are the doctored ones and were used as evidence of Hitler's intentions during war crimes trials.

Why not?

Not all terrain is good for it. They might be able to blast through some mountains, but that can take several years and a lot of money. More than either had it turned out.

But keeping the BEF in France in 1940 would not have actually saved France, would it? Rather, it would have merely delayed the inevitable.

We won't even know.

IIRC, weren't the Czechs working up some sort of deeper protectorate status in early 1939 before Hitler sent in the troops? I might be mis-remembering though.

Not exactly sure what you mean. Hacha was still demanding independence when he met Hitler until Hitler just flat out told him no, if you want a deal there is only a single option on the table. He wanted some sort of deal, after all it was he who requested the meeting in the first place, but he wanted a deal that favored Czechia as of course anyone in his position would try to negotiate.