raharris1973
Well-known member
The Kwangtung Army begins planning in earnest to accomplish the occupation of Manchuria and establishment of a separatist “Manchukuo” state as soon as possible after Jan 1929, sparked by Zhang’s flag replacement and his purge of pro-Japanese officials at that time. [This is the PoD. In OTL (our timeline) although there were advocates of this course from June 1928 or earlier, the Kwangtung Army did not move until September 1931]
Plot launched in March 18, 1929, the bombing on Shenyang/Mukden railroad happens and invasion begins then. China appeals to League, March 19, League resolution Apr 24
OTL – Tanaka he was not out till July 1929, maybe that changes here with spring 1929 fighting, and he gets fired early.
OTL – Japan’s Jinan occupation was continuing through March 28, 1929
July – Stimson doctrine declares no-recognition of territorial change by force. (OTL this is what Stimson really did when Japan eventually really invaded Manchuria)
July 28-Sep 3 1929, Shanghai incident of Sino-Japanese fighting
Manchukuo declared – 1 Sep 1929
Sep 1929- launch of US sanctions on Japan, Boycott on Imports and Embargo on Exports and Credit
Apr 1930 – Lytton Report on League of Nations, mainly unsympathetic to Japan
Japan gives up and begins , by April 1930, a withdrawal to positions held as of January 1 1929- an epic climbdown due to massive economic isolation
The London Naval Conference is cancelled over this.
Additional details, and longer term projection:
Embargo and humiliation- The US sets up embargo and boycott in September 1929. Third parties’ responses vary. Britain may go along. Dutch don’t. Soviets don’t. China doesn’t have time to mess with the USSR on the CER (Chinese Eastern Railway - in OTL, there was a Sino-Soviet war over it in the summer of 1929, there is no time for that here). Boycott alone devastates Japanese textile sector and export earnings. Iron, steel, and oil imports cannot be entirely made up for by non-US producers, nor paid for. If third country sellers are still to willing to sell to Japan, US can begin to take steps of preclusive purchasing and outbidding Japan in the markets. While succeeding militarily within Manchuria, the Japanese economy and finances are crumbling. Japan agrees to back down by April 1930 and withdraws troops back to SMR (South Manchuria Railway) zones and garrisons, their initial starting positions guaranteed by treaty and custom. With military successes overshadowed by the need to back down, and the Manchukuo project crumbling with Pu Yi fleeing or him or collaborators being executed when Chinese troops reenter Manchuria’s cities, Japan is humiliated.
Aftermath - Civilian leaders in Japan face right-wing violence. Japanese refuse to attend London naval talks, leftists in Japan are emboldened along with Korean activists and possibly Taiwan Chinese. Japan goes through urban and rural turbulence with coups and counter-coups for the years 1930-1935. Japan is cautious internationally. The embargo and boycotts are lifted from the time Tokyo backs down in spring 1930, but consequent economic relief and recovery is minimal, because American consumer spending is dropping like a rock and only getting worse, because, America is starting to fall into Depression. What Japan settles down to is an authoritarian regime that holds the empire together and focuses on self-sufficiency, industrial development, and military-naval strength. Possibly retention of coal-use instead of oil wherever applicable in industry and military. But having been burned by its Manchukuo adventure, Japan is too cautious to commit to foreign aggression again for decades.
In China, Chiang Kai-shek's/Jiang Jieshi's KMT consolidates power, and becomes as concerned about its Soviet borderlands as its Japanese ones. In 1929-1930 the regime may not do much about the Communists, they may even have a formal cease-fire and united front depending on the COMINTERN and CCP line while fighting Japan, but the Nanjing regime can repudiate any coexistence ideas and resume trying to exterminate Communists after 1931. Longer term, as 1930s wear on, Europe proceeds as OTL, and the Depression-wracked west is unable to do much about Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. With the Depression, American doesn’t dare play the economic warfare card against Italy, and France and Britain don’t dare it because of concerns about containing Germany and keeping Italy onside for that.
WWII happens, but with no Asia-Pacific front. China leverages Soviet distress to reclaim the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), Xinjiang, and possibly Outer Mongolia, while also reducing western treaty ports. Japan, is a rhetorically anti-colonial advocate during and after the war, cough cough, despite its Korea problem. The European Axis is defeated, presumably this is with eventual American participation. Chinese and Japanese will have made some money on war orders. After Barbarossa starts, Chinese and Japanese exports only can go to the Allies. Some Axis war criminals may flee to Japan and China. Japan probably cycles through a mixture of more or less authoritariation and democratic governments in the succeeding decades. If there is any "Cold War', Japan and China are highly independent, nationalistic free agents, always anti-communist domestically, usually wary of the USSR internationally, but not necessarily signed up in lockstep with any western coalitions.
So the underlying logic here is that a Japan that tries it's Manchurian adventures not during the Depression, but when the US is riding high and economically self-confident is far more likely to get confronted by vigorous US economic measures.
Of course some of the measures are only underway when the early stages of the Depression are in motion, but the thing is, in it first months, even year, people at the time didn't know how bad or long the Depression would be.
Furthermore, I estimated that the economic measures are so powerful that the Japanese back down instead of lashing out in the near-term.
Do y'all buy that?
My thought is also that Japan had not been committed to this expansionist path as long, opponents of adventure were not yet as intimidated, and there's no window of opportunity to seize the resources of Southeast Asia like OTL (which was created by the German successes in Europe of 1940) militarily as a way to break out of military pressure. I figure even if people get assassinated over it, the ruling class and Emperor will back down pretty quickly.
For the medium-term perspective
From there, I projected that the world still proceeds into the depths Depression.
I figured the most reasonable straight line extrapolation would be what I outlined in the OP:
In Europe, I think it's Germany and Italy still test and break the limits of the Versailles and League of Nations systems eventually. And their timing is better than Japan. Since they are doing it in deep Depression, the democracies are no longer ready to coordinate vigorous sanctions. However, Japan does not go back to aggressive adventuring in that decade because, once bitten twice shy.
Do you agree that's more logical than Japan getting zany expansionist ideas again by 1941 or so?
Plot launched in March 18, 1929, the bombing on Shenyang/Mukden railroad happens and invasion begins then. China appeals to League, March 19, League resolution Apr 24
OTL – Tanaka he was not out till July 1929, maybe that changes here with spring 1929 fighting, and he gets fired early.
OTL – Japan’s Jinan occupation was continuing through March 28, 1929
July – Stimson doctrine declares no-recognition of territorial change by force. (OTL this is what Stimson really did when Japan eventually really invaded Manchuria)
July 28-Sep 3 1929, Shanghai incident of Sino-Japanese fighting
Manchukuo declared – 1 Sep 1929
Sep 1929- launch of US sanctions on Japan, Boycott on Imports and Embargo on Exports and Credit
Apr 1930 – Lytton Report on League of Nations, mainly unsympathetic to Japan
Japan gives up and begins , by April 1930, a withdrawal to positions held as of January 1 1929- an epic climbdown due to massive economic isolation
The London Naval Conference is cancelled over this.
Additional details, and longer term projection:
Embargo and humiliation- The US sets up embargo and boycott in September 1929. Third parties’ responses vary. Britain may go along. Dutch don’t. Soviets don’t. China doesn’t have time to mess with the USSR on the CER (Chinese Eastern Railway - in OTL, there was a Sino-Soviet war over it in the summer of 1929, there is no time for that here). Boycott alone devastates Japanese textile sector and export earnings. Iron, steel, and oil imports cannot be entirely made up for by non-US producers, nor paid for. If third country sellers are still to willing to sell to Japan, US can begin to take steps of preclusive purchasing and outbidding Japan in the markets. While succeeding militarily within Manchuria, the Japanese economy and finances are crumbling. Japan agrees to back down by April 1930 and withdraws troops back to SMR (South Manchuria Railway) zones and garrisons, their initial starting positions guaranteed by treaty and custom. With military successes overshadowed by the need to back down, and the Manchukuo project crumbling with Pu Yi fleeing or him or collaborators being executed when Chinese troops reenter Manchuria’s cities, Japan is humiliated.
Aftermath - Civilian leaders in Japan face right-wing violence. Japanese refuse to attend London naval talks, leftists in Japan are emboldened along with Korean activists and possibly Taiwan Chinese. Japan goes through urban and rural turbulence with coups and counter-coups for the years 1930-1935. Japan is cautious internationally. The embargo and boycotts are lifted from the time Tokyo backs down in spring 1930, but consequent economic relief and recovery is minimal, because American consumer spending is dropping like a rock and only getting worse, because, America is starting to fall into Depression. What Japan settles down to is an authoritarian regime that holds the empire together and focuses on self-sufficiency, industrial development, and military-naval strength. Possibly retention of coal-use instead of oil wherever applicable in industry and military. But having been burned by its Manchukuo adventure, Japan is too cautious to commit to foreign aggression again for decades.
In China, Chiang Kai-shek's/Jiang Jieshi's KMT consolidates power, and becomes as concerned about its Soviet borderlands as its Japanese ones. In 1929-1930 the regime may not do much about the Communists, they may even have a formal cease-fire and united front depending on the COMINTERN and CCP line while fighting Japan, but the Nanjing regime can repudiate any coexistence ideas and resume trying to exterminate Communists after 1931. Longer term, as 1930s wear on, Europe proceeds as OTL, and the Depression-wracked west is unable to do much about Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. With the Depression, American doesn’t dare play the economic warfare card against Italy, and France and Britain don’t dare it because of concerns about containing Germany and keeping Italy onside for that.
WWII happens, but with no Asia-Pacific front. China leverages Soviet distress to reclaim the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), Xinjiang, and possibly Outer Mongolia, while also reducing western treaty ports. Japan, is a rhetorically anti-colonial advocate during and after the war, cough cough, despite its Korea problem. The European Axis is defeated, presumably this is with eventual American participation. Chinese and Japanese will have made some money on war orders. After Barbarossa starts, Chinese and Japanese exports only can go to the Allies. Some Axis war criminals may flee to Japan and China. Japan probably cycles through a mixture of more or less authoritariation and democratic governments in the succeeding decades. If there is any "Cold War', Japan and China are highly independent, nationalistic free agents, always anti-communist domestically, usually wary of the USSR internationally, but not necessarily signed up in lockstep with any western coalitions.
So the underlying logic here is that a Japan that tries it's Manchurian adventures not during the Depression, but when the US is riding high and economically self-confident is far more likely to get confronted by vigorous US economic measures.
Of course some of the measures are only underway when the early stages of the Depression are in motion, but the thing is, in it first months, even year, people at the time didn't know how bad or long the Depression would be.
Furthermore, I estimated that the economic measures are so powerful that the Japanese back down instead of lashing out in the near-term.
Do y'all buy that?
My thought is also that Japan had not been committed to this expansionist path as long, opponents of adventure were not yet as intimidated, and there's no window of opportunity to seize the resources of Southeast Asia like OTL (which was created by the German successes in Europe of 1940) militarily as a way to break out of military pressure. I figure even if people get assassinated over it, the ruling class and Emperor will back down pretty quickly.
For the medium-term perspective
From there, I projected that the world still proceeds into the depths Depression.
I figured the most reasonable straight line extrapolation would be what I outlined in the OP:
In Europe, I think it's Germany and Italy still test and break the limits of the Versailles and League of Nations systems eventually. And their timing is better than Japan. Since they are doing it in deep Depression, the democracies are no longer ready to coordinate vigorous sanctions. However, Japan does not go back to aggressive adventuring in that decade because, once bitten twice shy.
Do you agree that's more logical than Japan getting zany expansionist ideas again by 1941 or so?
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He would fail even if the US, on whom Britain would still depend economic, for whatever reason didn't put a giant spanner in the works but it could be both very bloody, possibly worse than OTL partition even as well as very damaging for Britain in multiple areas. [Then it could leave the sub-continent in an even greater mess than OTL possibly. 