raharris1973
Well-known member
Been thinking about the inter-war Polish 2nd republic lately.
1. The usuals: There's been several interesting discussions/TLs on what if the Poles lost their war with the Soviets, some on the what if the Poles had gotten a boundary further east, and others asking if the Poles and Soviets had settled the border at the Curzon Line, usually because of the Soviets opting to restrain themselves rather than go for Warsaw in 1920. A notable knock-on consequence of the last one, the more western than OTL, Curzon Line border is a common Soviet-Czechoslovak border, which might come in handy later.
With the scenarios discussing the Curzon Line type border, the majority view tends to be Soviet Russia would end up less anti-Polish and ultimately less inclined to partition Poland with the Germans later. However, a partition can't be ruled out either if the Soviets find that is their best option.
One line of inquiry though is how much more anti-Soviet does losing the war (for the Kresy territories) with the Soviets make the Poles and is it to the point where they are likely to ally with the Germans? I think that makes at least surface sense, despite the probable weakening of Pilsudski's promethean view (which saw Russia as prime enemy) and strengthening of Dmowski's more ethnonationalist views (which saw Germany as top enemy) with a defeat and loss of the Kresy. Dmowski was still an anti-communist and hoped to align with a White Russia.
However, he and the Endeks still always saw the Germans as the prime enemy, even associated them with the Jews, another perceived enemy. That makes me think that to the extent losing the Kresy encourages Endek dominance over Pilsudski's PSP, it makes alliance or even nonaggression pacts with Germany all the more difficult.
A Poland denied the Kresy would probably be harder on its Jewish minority for two reasons - 1. it would likely have many ethnic Poles from lands lost to the USSR as refugees needing accommodation, and 2. Dmowski had anti-semitic views. Now these were not of the exterminations or necessarily the eliminationist variety, but Endek policy probably would include anti-Jewish quotas for universities and professions, like a 'reverse affirmative action' policy. This would probably lead to increase in Polish Jewish emigration. In the first years of the 1920s, to the USA, as that door shut, to other places like France, the Netherlands, and the British Palestine Mandate.
Notable increases of Jewish emigration from Poland, arriving in the Palestine Mandate, in multiple tens of thousands, would be well-noticed by the later 1920s by all and would offset the minor net Jewish outflow that was occurring during some of those late 1920s years. That could easily spark something like the 1936 Arab Revolt happening nearly a decade early.
Britain would put it down, because that's what empires do. Afterwards, it could, like after OTL's revolt, put very tight limits on Jewish immigration to the mandate to reduce irritation of Muslim and Christian natives. On the other hand, in the late 1920s-1930 era, unlike 1939, the inconvenience & fear of native unrest is not compounded by fear of an imminent outbreak of another great power war, and revolt in Palestine may not have spread unrest as far in other Arab capitals, so the British government may be less desperate to contain it and find it more convenient to keep satisfying still well-heeled advocates of Zionism.
Later in the 1930s, a Dmowski/Endek dominated Poland may be more cooperative with Czechoslovakia. In any case, with its eastern border on the Curzon Line, the USSR would have a common border with both Lithuania and Czechoslovakia. That would at least give the Soviets the option of providing armed support for the Czechs against a German move against Sudetenland, or of providing support for the Lithuanians against a German move against Memel, *without* having to touch Polish territory. Whether the Soviets would take up such an opportunity it a whole other question. Whether the Czechs, for example, would come around to as positive view of the Soviets by the mid-30s if the two countries had a common border in the interwar, and there had been probable Soviet agitation over the Carpatho-Ukraine in the interim, would be yet another interesting question.
There is a common reflex to say that little Poland's instinct in these circumstances of Soviet - Czech or Soviet - Lithuanian alignment would be to alignment with Germany, but I doubt it, at least unless its under a very eastwardly ambitious Sanacja regime that decides to become very naive to Germany.
2. What is rarely discussed are PoDs from Pilsudski's invasion of Russia and march to Kyiv. But Poland's eastern border before then was also all sorts of weird shapes and sizes, with at times Red and White regimes in Belarus and Lithuania, and various other regimes in Galicia/Ukraine.
What if Poland stuck with its pre-1919 or 1920 invasion border? What if perhaps Pilsudski died before then? Would another leader in his place have taken as vigorous an initiative to the east?
You could get various effects if Pilsudski was removed from the picture at different times between 1917 and 1919. Were he removed late, either before or after the Bolshevik war, could that have doomed Polish resistance and made eventual Red takeover likely? Or is that giving too much credit to one famous guy?
Another potential PoD would be what if the Haller Army was able to transit it by rail and have a civil war with Pilsudski's group. How would that leave things for Poland?
These times, before the classic Soviet-Polish war, are particularly under explored, and deserve more.
1. The usuals: There's been several interesting discussions/TLs on what if the Poles lost their war with the Soviets, some on the what if the Poles had gotten a boundary further east, and others asking if the Poles and Soviets had settled the border at the Curzon Line, usually because of the Soviets opting to restrain themselves rather than go for Warsaw in 1920. A notable knock-on consequence of the last one, the more western than OTL, Curzon Line border is a common Soviet-Czechoslovak border, which might come in handy later.
With the scenarios discussing the Curzon Line type border, the majority view tends to be Soviet Russia would end up less anti-Polish and ultimately less inclined to partition Poland with the Germans later. However, a partition can't be ruled out either if the Soviets find that is their best option.
One line of inquiry though is how much more anti-Soviet does losing the war (for the Kresy territories) with the Soviets make the Poles and is it to the point where they are likely to ally with the Germans? I think that makes at least surface sense, despite the probable weakening of Pilsudski's promethean view (which saw Russia as prime enemy) and strengthening of Dmowski's more ethnonationalist views (which saw Germany as top enemy) with a defeat and loss of the Kresy. Dmowski was still an anti-communist and hoped to align with a White Russia.
However, he and the Endeks still always saw the Germans as the prime enemy, even associated them with the Jews, another perceived enemy. That makes me think that to the extent losing the Kresy encourages Endek dominance over Pilsudski's PSP, it makes alliance or even nonaggression pacts with Germany all the more difficult.
A Poland denied the Kresy would probably be harder on its Jewish minority for two reasons - 1. it would likely have many ethnic Poles from lands lost to the USSR as refugees needing accommodation, and 2. Dmowski had anti-semitic views. Now these were not of the exterminations or necessarily the eliminationist variety, but Endek policy probably would include anti-Jewish quotas for universities and professions, like a 'reverse affirmative action' policy. This would probably lead to increase in Polish Jewish emigration. In the first years of the 1920s, to the USA, as that door shut, to other places like France, the Netherlands, and the British Palestine Mandate.
Notable increases of Jewish emigration from Poland, arriving in the Palestine Mandate, in multiple tens of thousands, would be well-noticed by the later 1920s by all and would offset the minor net Jewish outflow that was occurring during some of those late 1920s years. That could easily spark something like the 1936 Arab Revolt happening nearly a decade early.
Britain would put it down, because that's what empires do. Afterwards, it could, like after OTL's revolt, put very tight limits on Jewish immigration to the mandate to reduce irritation of Muslim and Christian natives. On the other hand, in the late 1920s-1930 era, unlike 1939, the inconvenience & fear of native unrest is not compounded by fear of an imminent outbreak of another great power war, and revolt in Palestine may not have spread unrest as far in other Arab capitals, so the British government may be less desperate to contain it and find it more convenient to keep satisfying still well-heeled advocates of Zionism.
Later in the 1930s, a Dmowski/Endek dominated Poland may be more cooperative with Czechoslovakia. In any case, with its eastern border on the Curzon Line, the USSR would have a common border with both Lithuania and Czechoslovakia. That would at least give the Soviets the option of providing armed support for the Czechs against a German move against Sudetenland, or of providing support for the Lithuanians against a German move against Memel, *without* having to touch Polish territory. Whether the Soviets would take up such an opportunity it a whole other question. Whether the Czechs, for example, would come around to as positive view of the Soviets by the mid-30s if the two countries had a common border in the interwar, and there had been probable Soviet agitation over the Carpatho-Ukraine in the interim, would be yet another interesting question.
There is a common reflex to say that little Poland's instinct in these circumstances of Soviet - Czech or Soviet - Lithuanian alignment would be to alignment with Germany, but I doubt it, at least unless its under a very eastwardly ambitious Sanacja regime that decides to become very naive to Germany.
2. What is rarely discussed are PoDs from Pilsudski's invasion of Russia and march to Kyiv. But Poland's eastern border before then was also all sorts of weird shapes and sizes, with at times Red and White regimes in Belarus and Lithuania, and various other regimes in Galicia/Ukraine.
What if Poland stuck with its pre-1919 or 1920 invasion border? What if perhaps Pilsudski died before then? Would another leader in his place have taken as vigorous an initiative to the east?
You could get various effects if Pilsudski was removed from the picture at different times between 1917 and 1919. Were he removed late, either before or after the Bolshevik war, could that have doomed Polish resistance and made eventual Red takeover likely? Or is that giving too much credit to one famous guy?
Another potential PoD would be what if the Haller Army was able to transit it by rail and have a civil war with Pilsudski's group. How would that leave things for Poland?
These times, before the classic Soviet-Polish war, are particularly under explored, and deserve more.