Decisive French Victory At Ligny

[History Learner]

Napoleon was actually pretty close to victory in the Hundred Days, with the decisive point probably being the "misfire" at Ligny. After having pinned the Prussians frontally, Napoleon had set the seeds of a devastating flanking attack upon the Blucher's exposed right flank with the I Corps of, which was 20,000 strong. Due to sudden communication from Marshal Ney, then engaged at Quatre Baas, requesting them, this engendered command confusion that resulted in said corps marching back and force ineffectually for most of the day and preventing serious French success at either battle. Had things progress as Napoleon intended, the Prussian field army would've been removed at Ligny. Now, in of itself, this does nothing to decisively win the campaign, but it does lay the pre-conditions for such. With the Prussians removed, Wellington has no reason to stand at Waterloo; his decision to do such was based on the expectation of Prussian support and the need to maintain communication between the two armies via Ostend.

With the Prussian Army effectively destroyed, Wellington has every reason to withdraw upon Antwerp. This would enable Napoleon to largely complete the conquest of Belgium, entering Brussels unopposed, and then turning his attention to the Austro-Russians marching for France through Germany. The strategic opening granted here also enables the French War Ministry to continue the mobilization of new French forces, with Napoleon plausibly expecting a field army of 200,000 men by August, backed up over another 200,000 men to be utilized as defensive garrisons for a total field force of roughly 440,000 total men. Now, it's worth noting that the 200,000 main field force is still smaller than the combined Russo-Austrian armies marching to France but Napoleon has the advantage in that they are not yet combined forces but rather separate field forces; the Russian crossing point is at the Saar while the Austrians would be separated from them by the Vosges Mountain range. This means that Napoleon could meet and defeat them in detail.

The Russians would be closer and number about 150,000 so Napoleon could bring about superior forces and his own skills to destroy them as he did at Austerlitz, and then rushing to engage the Austrians south of the Vosges. Even if he fails to achieve a decisive victory in the latter, removing the Russo-Prussian field armies effectively ends the Allied thread against him for another year, maybe more. Most likely then negotiations are resumed, as both sides had previously attempted during the War of the Seventh Coalition. Austria in particular has reasons for talks, given it wants France as a counter-weight to Russia and the fact that Napoleon's heir, the King of Rome Napoleon II, is half Austrian via his mother. Most likely then we see France leverage its victories with the tacit support of Austria to revive the Frankfurt Proposals as the basis of peace between France and the Coalition.

Spoiler: French Borders in this Peace Agreement

 

[History Learner]

Given a generation to consolidate their conquests, and the stability afforded by a Constitutional Monarchy under Napoleon II, I'd imagine France will surpass the UK quite handily as the power of the 19th Century and possibly beyond. Control of the iron ore and coal deposits of OTL Belgium and the Saar in of itself is a major power boost, while control over the lower and middle Rhine trade will afford it great influence in Central Europe. There's unlikely to be a unification of Germany here and I could see France drawing close to Austria in order to oppose the Russo-Prussian axis, as well as to manage events in Italy; probably no national unification there either. Would French demographics avoid their 19th Century collapse? If so, I'd imagine Algeria will become an integral part of France via settle colonialism and cultural assimilation of the natives.

This is not only a very different Concert of Europe, but a change that fundamentally alters the course of Human history.

 

[stevep]

Can Napoleon assemble such forces without introducing conscription again, which he feared doing OTL? He might gamble on a renewed desire for glory making it acceptable but by 1815 most of France was weary of war. Especially since in the last stages it had been fought on their own territory with the results than made it deeply unpopular, especially French forces 'foraging' in France.

Also what's to stop the allied powers raising new troops, which they can definitely do?

Ditto with managing to control so many foreign lands with the nationalist genie out of the bottle. Even assuming that Napoleon can break his habit of going on an invasion spree whenever he gets bored or starts running low on cash.

 

[History Learner]

Can Napoleon assemble such forces without introducing conscription again, which he feared doing OTL? He might gamble on a renewed desire for glory making it acceptable but by 1815 most of France was weary of war. Especially since in the last stages it had been fought on their own territory with the results than made it deeply unpopular, especially French forces 'foraging' in France.

Already being done; Napoleon invaded Belgium with about 130,000 troops and had 80,000 or so in France itself doing garrison duty in June, so it's not unreasonable to assume they would complete their planned mobilization totals by August. Certainly Clausewitz, writing after the fact a history of the campaign and being a Prussian with no particular sympathy for Napoleon, find it likely they would complete their levies.

Also what's to stop the allied powers raising new troops, which they can definitely do?

The same reasons you cite for France, but magnified many times given they had been having wars fought to their detriment on their soil for nearly two decades as this point, as well as the fact getting their armies shattered by Napoleon in 1815 would mean it would take time to rebuild them and be a costly affair; there's a reason everyone but Britain had to repeatedly seek peace with France. The Frankfurt Proposals already show the Allies were willing to come to terms with the Emperor on favorable compared to OTL terms and Clausewitz notes at the time there was great caution in dealing with Bonaparte that victories on the lower Rhine could've converted into the old fear; we know the Prince of Schwarzenberg commanding the Austrian Army privately expected to be defeated by the French.

Ditto with managing to control so many foreign lands with the nationalist genie out of the bottle. Even assuming that Napoleon can break his habit of going on an invasion spree whenever he gets bored or starts running low on cash.

The available evidence does not suggest any Nationalist discontent with the French regime and by ATL 1848 (Presuming said events occur), the left bank of the Rhine and Belgium will have been under French rule for 50+ years; almost no one will still be alive who remembers before the French annexation and two generals will have come of age under French rule. We know Germanic Alsace certainly wasn't a bastion of Anti-French/Pro-German activity.

As for Napoleon himself, the man was changed; the events of 1814 and his exile had shaken him greatly. The Champ de Mai is a case in point of this and his private statements are telling, in that he was directly saying he felt his age was starting to catch up with him and he intended for his son to enjoy being a Constitutional Monarch in following him.

 

[Buba]

the Austro-Russians marching for France through Germany

Weren't the Russians wintering in Westfalia? And thus close by?

IMO everybody was so fed with Napoleon (French populace and elites included) that he gets ground down by the end of the summer.
The terms France gets will be worse than in OTL - the borders will no longer be roughly from 1792 but from earlier.

 

[History Learner]

Weren't the Russians wintering in Westfalia? And thus close by?

Off the top of my head, I do not recall; they certainly had not yet crossed into France at the time of Waterloo historically.

IMO everybody was so fed with Napoleon (French populace and elites included) that he gets ground down by the end of the summer.
The terms France gets will be worse than in OTL - the borders will no longer be roughly from 1792 but from earlier.

If the Prussians, Russians and perhaps Austrians are destroyed, it will be at least or two to rebuild their armies. As it were, however, they historically were willing to offer France it's natural borders even after their victories in Germany in 1813 because of the cost and danger of Napoleon reversing their successes. The Austrians and Russians even floated in 1814, until the Allies jointly decided on a Bourbon restoration, letting Napoleon II sit on the the throne with a regency. If Napoleon defeats them militarily in 1815 and buys France a strategic space as a result, I can see all of these coming true since the Allies were already open to them historically and to do otherwise requires a serious prolonging of the war while France is likewise able to rebuild and thus be more dangerous in the interim.

 

[Buba]

If the Prussians, Russians and perhaps Austrians are destroyed, it will be at least or two to rebuild their armies.

IMO at this point Napoleon would have no army left.
But we will never know

 

[History Learner]

IMO at this point Napoleon would have no army left.
But we will never know

It definitely depends on the staying power of the War Ministry to continue the levies. For what it's worth Clausewitz was of the opinion that Napoleonic success in the initial phases would've ensured he (Napoleon) met his troop goals, given his extant progress but also the return of the Emperor with major victories solidifying his domestic support base.

 

[ATP]

Given a generation to consolidate their conquests, and the stability afforded by a Constitutional Monarchy under Napoleon II, I'd imagine France will surpass the UK quite handily as the power of the 19th Century and possibly beyond. Control of the iron ore and coal deposits of OTL Belgium and the Saar in of itself is a major power boost, while control over the lower and middle Rhine trade will afford it great influence in Central Europe. There's unlikely to be a unification of Germany here and I could see France drawing close to Austria in order to oppose the Russo-Prussian axis, as well as to manage events in Italy; probably no national unification there either. Would French demographics avoid their 19th Century collapse? If so, I'd imagine Algeria will become an integral part of France via settle colonialism and cultural assimilation of the natives.

This is not only a very different Concert of Europe, but a change that fundamentally alters the course of Human history.

Highly unlikely - but even if that occure,England would keep forming coalitions to destroy France as long as Napoleon and his line lived.They would eventually die.
Unless...Napoleon would built small fleet of steam ironclads,destroy RN and invade and occupy England.Only after that France would be save.

 

[stevep]

Highly unlikely - but even if that occure,England would keep forming coalitions to destroy France as long as Napoleon and his line lived.They would eventually die.
Unless...Napoleon would built small fleet of steam ironclads,destroy RN and invade and occupy England.Only after that France would be save.

First part agree on. Napoleon, as long as he was insistent that only his desires matters, was an existential threat, both to Britain and to every other state in Europe that wished to be independent.

Second part not a chance. The technology wasn't up to it at this point and most of what technology and capacity to produce it was in Britain.

 

[Atarlost]

First part agree on. Napoleon, as long as he was insistent that only his desires matters, was an existential threat, both to Britain and to every other state in Europe that wished to be independent.

Second part not a chance. The technology wasn't up to it at this point and most of what technology and capacity to produce it was in Britain.

Those statements contradict each other. If Napoleon doesn't have the ability to fight his way across the English Channel he can't possibly be an existential threat to Britain.

 

[stevep]

Those statements contradict each other. If Napoleon doesn't have the ability to fight his way across the English Channel he can't possibly be an existential threat to Britain.

He can't realistically develop and use ironclad steamers. However, if he secured a renewed military domination of the continent, which I think highly unlikely given the circumstances, he could eventually produce enough 'traditional' warships to overwhelm Britain. Which is something he continued to attempt long after Trafalgar. Or simply Britain knows the danger of one large autocratic state controlling most of the continent one way or another the longer term outlook for Britain is grim.

 

[Atarlost]

He can't realistically develop and use ironclad steamers. However, if he secured a renewed military domination of the continent, which I think highly unlikely given the circumstances, he could eventually produce enough 'traditional' warships to overwhelm Britain. Which is something he continued to attempt long after Trafalgar. Or simply Britain knows the danger of one large autocratic state controlling most of the continent one way or another the longer term outlook for Britain is grim.

You sure about that? Ships with landsmen for crews aren't much good. France can't put proper crews on the ships it has because the merchant marine that would be its source of trained seamen hasn't been sailing due to the blockade. He could try to use eg. Dutch sailors with French gun crews, but sailors that are competent but want to side with your enemy against you aren't really a better choice than sailors that are incompetent.

British warhawks say a large autocratic state controlling the continent is a threat, but I've never seen anything to convince me that British warhawks are providing an accurate assessment. Maybe after the financial strain of WWI the continent was finally able to threaten them, but in the early 19th century Britain and Russia can beat a continent spanning France that hasn't had the generations needed to integrate its conquests. They just got through proving that by forcing Napoleon into exile the first time.

 

[ATP]

Those statements contradict each other. If Napoleon doesn't have the ability to fight his way across the English Channel he can't possibly be an existential threat to Britain.

Becouse he was not.Britain from 17th century always made coalitions to cripple any state which could unite Europe.And Napoleon weakened Prussia,with was England tool in Europe/till they conqered rest of Germany - but it is another story/
So,in this scenario - England would still destroy Napoleon,only later.

 

[stevep]

You sure about that? Ships with landsmen for crews aren't much good. France can't put proper crews on the ships it has because the merchant marine that would be its source of trained seamen hasn't been sailing due to the blockade. He could try to use eg. Dutch sailors with French gun crews, but sailors that are competent but want to side with your enemy against you aren't really a better choice than sailors that are incompetent.

British warhawks say a large autocratic state controlling the continent is a threat, but I've never seen anything to convince me that British warhawks are providing an accurate assessment. Maybe after the financial strain of WWI the continent was finally able to threaten them, but in the early 19th century Britain and Russia can beat a continent spanning France that hasn't had the generations needed to integrate its conquests. They just got through proving that by forcing Napoleon into exile the first time.

I didn't say it would be easy but the threat continued to be there. The Walcheren campaign, as well as a belated attempt to aid Austria in its latest attempt to oppose Napoleon was also tasked with trying to destroy the warships under construction there. Ditto with the 2nd operation against Denmark to prevent their newer ships falling under French control.

Yes the French did have a serious problem with quality of men, which seems to have dated back before the revolution as I have read reports of one of the ships lost at the Battle of Quiberon Bay in 1759 because the unskilled pressed landsmen were too slow to close the gun ports in the storm that the battle occurred in. The loss of experienced officers after the revolution and Napoleon's hostility towards people disagreeing with him in areas he was ignorant were issues. However, apart from the fact that the British couldn't be certain of all those issues there was still the issue of the continued construction and threat from Napoleon.

True Britain and allies had defeated and exiled Napoleon once, but it took ~12 years of continued struggle and now he was back again. That's an excellent reason why Britain and other powers had every incentive to stop him gaining control of a large French empire again. Before he could get a year or two of peace that could enable France to replace some of its earlier losses and possibly he felt strong enough again to introduce conscription. I think its unlikely that he could have succeeded even if he was as successful as HL is suggesting in the campaign in Belgium but we're able to use a lot of hindsight.

That every autocratic state that has sought military control of the continent has been brought down or stopped from its expansion by other powers suggests that its a concern not just for England/Britain but also by other powers. The classic example is the one case that Britain wasn't involved in, the Hapsburg's during the 30YWs. Despite officially being a conflict over religion they were ultimately stopped by Catholic France, 1st by funding opponents of the empire and then when that ceased to be sufficient direct military intention.

Steve

 

[Atarlost]

Yes the French did have a serious problem with quality of men, which seems to have dated back before the revolution as I have read reports of one of the ships lost at the Battle of Quiberon Bay in 1759 because the unskilled pressed landsmen were too slow to close the gun ports in the storm that the battle occurred in. The loss of experienced officers after the revolution and Napoleon's hostility towards people disagreeing with him in areas he was ignorant were issues. However, apart from the fact that the British couldn't be certain of all those issues there was still the issue of the continued construction and threat from Napoleon.

The British can be certain of all those issues because they've been witnessing their impact on French naval efficiency since, as you point out, before the revolution. And those issues make new construction simply a waste of French timber, cannons, and landsmen. The French Navy can't do anything to address the training and experience gap while trapped in harbor by the British blockade no matter how many ships they build.

That every autocratic state that has sought military control of the continent has been brought down or stopped from its expansion by other powers suggests that its a concern not just for England/Britain but also by other powers. The classic example is the one case that Britain wasn't involved in, the Hapsburg's during the 30YWs. Despite officially being a conflict over religion they were ultimately stopped by Catholic France, 1st by funding opponents of the empire and then when that ceased to be sufficient direct military intention.

That explains why European nations might have concerns, but England is not in practical military terms an European nation. Hasn't been since the royals lost their holdings in France. It's on the same continental plate, but it's not accessible for continental armies.

 

[stevep]

The British can be certain of all those issues because they've been witnessing their impact on French naval efficiency since, as you point out, before the revolution. And those issues make new construction simply a waste of French timber, cannons, and landsmen. The French Navy can't do anything to address the training and experience gap while trapped in harbor by the British blockade no matter how many ships they build.


That explains why European nations might have concerns, but England is not in practical military terms an European nation. Hasn't been since the royals lost their holdings in France. It's on the same continental plate, but it's not accessible for continental armies.

It is accessible if either
a) There is a serious neglect of the navy, which occurred at times prior to ~1700.
b) A single nation/power gains control of the bulk of the continent and then is able to maintain that for any period beyond a few years. The latter is definitely an incentive to preventing that situation happening.
c) In theory at least from a surprise attack, especially if the potential threat controls the ports opposite the Dover straits and has a markedly larger military. This is an additional reason why a peace with an aggressive power is somewhat of a dubious option for Britain.

Point b) is the primary one here but point c) is also potentially relevant in much of this period and a) would be a factor in the wider historical period.

 

[Atarlost]

It is accessible if either
a) There is a serious neglect of the navy, which occurred at times prior to ~1700.
b) A single nation/power gains control of the bulk of the continent and then is able to maintain that for any period beyond a few years. The latter is definitely an incentive to preventing that situation happening.
c) In theory at least from a surprise attack, especially if the potential threat controls the ports opposite the Dover straits and has a markedly larger military. This is an additional reason why a peace with an aggressive power is somewhat of a dubious option for Britain.

Point b) is the primary one here but point c) is also potentially relevant in much of this period and a) would be a factor in the wider historical period.

a) This is a reason to invest in their navy and not divert their military budget or manpower to land warfare. I presume that the UK would not commit to something so trusting as naval budget cuts during Napoleon's lifetime. I don't think that historically they ever seriously cut the navy after the proposed divergence point until the 20th century naval limitation treaties.

b) The political class feared this, but I maintain that it was not a rational fear. France has just been smashed back to its own borders and the rest of continental Europe is already united against them. Napoleon will not conquer Europe as swiftly the second time and he's running out of years as an able field commander. His son is far too young to take over as his primary general and allowing anyone else the prestige of conquering much of Europe sets up a civil war. In any case it will provide plenty of time to adopt a more aggressive policy. Napoleon in 1815 is completely susceptible to military and diplomatic containment. I've emphasized the naval component of that because the discussion has been about Britain, but so long as most of the coalition against him commits to mutual defense against French aggression he can't conquer them piecemeal again. If I'm reading the map right he would have to build up enough to take on the Netherlands, Prussia, Bavaria, Sardinia, Spain, and Switzerland at the same time if they were in a "don't let Napoleon conquer Europe a second time" mutual defense treaty. If he ever looked like he might be able to win that arms race nations at risk of becoming his neighbors would start arming. Napoleon has a lot of rearming to do before he can be a threat to an Europe that remembers what he did before his exile. If Napoleon believed that he could while holding non-Russian Europe defeat Britain he would have dealt with Russia's refusal to cut trade with England by invading England, not Russia as invading England would also secure his colonies and end their support for Spanish guerillas.

c) This presumes that Britain's only options are to allow Napoleon completely unfettered action or to crush him utterly. Britain can demand restrictions on the French navy and merchant marine as a condition for lifting their blockade. They proved during Napoleon's first rule that they can blockade effectively and indefinitely. If Napoleon steps foot outside France with an army or begins a threatening naval buildup they can reinstitute a full blockade. If Napoleon does not accept restrictions on his navy and merchant marine sufficient to allay Britain's fears of a surprise invasion he can live with the Royal Navy sinking or seizing any French ship that sets sail and judging by precedents from the first Napoleonic war any threatening concentration that is built but doesn't set sail.

Some of these change with technology, but the era of rapid technological development is still in the future and is outside both the British or French contexts at this time.

 

[stevep]

a) This is a reason to invest in their navy and not divert their military budget or manpower to land warfare. I presume that the UK would not commit to something so trusting as naval budget cuts during Napoleon's lifetime. I don't think that historically they ever seriously cut the navy after the proposed divergence point until the 20th century naval limitation treaties.

Actually for most of the 19thC the RN was relatively small in terms of resources. Just a lot bigger than anyone else. There were a few naval 'scares', chiefly concerning France but also Russia at time and later Germany although prior to ~1900 Britain's industrial base and interest in the navy was enough that it could build enough quickly to meet any challenge. It was only with the powerful industrial base that imperial Germany had coupled with the relative decline of Britain's industrial and technological base that meant meeting the new challenge seriously stretched Britain's economic and fiscal resources.

The point here is that no one seriously challenged Britain at sea after the final defeat of Napoleon until Tirpitz and imperial Germany. However if Napoleon survives as emperor of France, let alone going on a new conquest spree, as suggested this dynamic changes. Note that even with the relatively limited empire proposed HL assumes in his 2nd post that imperial France will be a greater economic power that Britain. At the very least even if Napoleon's empire made a drastic change to some sort of partial constitutional monarchy under his son Britain is going to be in a position it was familiar with from ~1688 with a more populous and richer France just across the channel posing a continued threat. Plus with the development of new technology through the century its going to be harder to lay up ships in peace-time for rapid mobilizations in the event of war. So Britain at the very least will have to maintain a very large navy similar to the challenge posed by imperial Germany OTL but lasting throughout the 19thC unless the French empire collapses.

b) The political class feared this, but I maintain that it was not a rational fear. France has just been smashed back to its own borders and the rest of continental Europe is already united against them. Napoleon will not conquer Europe as swiftly the second time and he's running out of years as an able field commander. His son is far too young to take over as his primary general and allowing anyone else the prestige of conquering much of Europe sets up a civil war. In any case it will provide plenty of time to adopt a more aggressive policy. Napoleon in 1815 is completely susceptible to military and diplomatic containment. I've emphasized the naval component of that because the discussion has been about Britain, but so long as most of the coalition against him commits to mutual defense against French aggression he can't conquer them piecemeal again. If I'm reading the map right he would have to build up enough to take on the Netherlands, Prussia, Bavaria, Sardinia, Spain, and Switzerland at the same time if they were in a "don't let Napoleon conquer Europe a second time" mutual defense treaty. If he ever looked like he might be able to win that arms race nations at risk of becoming his neighbors would start arming. Napoleon has a lot of rearming to do before he can be a threat to an Europe that remembers what he did before his exile. If Napoleon believed that he could while holding non-Russian Europe defeat Britain he would have dealt with Russia's refusal to cut trade with England by invading England, not Russia as invading England would also secure his colonies and end their support for Spanish guerillas.

France was smashed back to its own borders but the TL assume its going to make substantial conquests and defeat every other power, at least their ready forces. Even the proposed greater French empire, if Napoleon suddenly decides his days as a conqueror are done will pose a continued threat to Britain as long as its perceived as hostile and while Napoleon is in charge there's good basis for those fears.

As I say I don't think HL's ideas are practical as France was tired of war and had suffered immensely in recent years while the other powers were angered at Napoleon's return and the defeat of the allied forces in Belgium is likely to make them more determined that he must be brought down. Coupled with his reluctance to reintroduce conscription due to the probable hostility it would generate even if he defeated - but not destroyed it should be noted - the British and Prussian armies in Belgium he's likely to run out of volunteers fairly quickly and then really faces problems.

c) This presumes that Britain's only options are to allow Napoleon completely unfettered action or to crush him utterly. Britain can demand restrictions on the French navy and merchant marine as a condition for lifting their blockade. They proved during Napoleon's first rule that they can blockade effectively and indefinitely. If Napoleon steps foot outside France with an army or begins a threatening naval buildup they can reinstitute a full blockade. If Napoleon does not accept restrictions on his navy and merchant marine sufficient to allay Britain's fears of a surprise invasion he can live with the Royal Navy sinking or seizing any French ship that sets sail and judging by precedents from the first Napoleonic war any threatening concentration that is built but doesn't set sail.

The problem with this, other than how you check on what France is building or not is can Britain continue a hugely expensive blockade if France makes peace with other powers? That's going to mean clashes with the merchants of those powers as well as that Britain can't blockade overland trade, albeit that other than by waterway that is still limited.

Not to mention giving Napoleon a change to consolidate his new empire - and given we know more about Napoleon's declining powers than people did at the time - what if say in another 3-4 years he then mobilizes large land forces and starts a major war again? Britain is then back where it is ~1810-1814.

Basically for obvious reasons no one really trusted Napoleon to keep his word and saw the best option was to remove him, this time for good rather than risk another wave of major wars.

Some of these change with technology, but the era of rapid technological development is still in the future and is outside both the British or French contexts at this time.

Agreed.

 

[Navarro]

This is all really just a setup for a War of the Eighth Coalition, which might even start in the same year.