raharris1973
Well-known member
A common view of the nullification crisis of 1833 is that if it had escalated further, to South Carolina forcefully defying the federal government or seceding, and the federal government suppressing South Carolinian rebellion, over the tariff issue, we should not expect the whole south to rally to South Carolina like it did in 1860-61. Instead, South Carolina would be isolated, rebelling on its own, and thus outnumbered, it would be suppressed far more quickly than OTL's Confederacy, and based on Jackson's rhetoric, South Carolinian state politicians responsible for nullification, secession, or armed resistance would have been hung as traitors.
The reason South Carolina will be so isolated is because the issue is the tariff and not slavery, and South Carolina is defying a popular, southern, slaveholding President.
The most straightforward extrapolation from all this, is that it sets a clear historical precedent, through blood and warfare, that also comes to be seen as a constitutional precedent, that secession is unconstitutional, so that when sectional tenses do later emerge over slavery, the south cannot play the secession card, and cannot use it as leverage, won't end up seceding, and also the anti-slavery side won't have the cover of Civil War to push their agenda as wartime measures.
However, I wonder if "Mr. Jackson's War" to suppress the South Carolina revolt, being such a curb stomp against the rebels, instead of mainly functioning as a forever-deterrent against secession, ends up doing more to to delegitimize federal use of force, thus weakening the resolve of the federal government, and encouraging dilution of the President's commander-in-chief powers in later generations?
"To the politicians of other states, the federal government actually going to war over the nullification crisis is going to look very bad. Andrew Jackson making tough speeches about deposing the treasonous South Carolinian government is one thing. Jackson was a tough talker, so a certain amount of machismo is expected. But actually waging war on a constituent state? Especially when the conflict is predicated on an idea like state's rights, which held a lot of cachet among the antebellum political class? Especially when done by a president as controversial as Jackson?
Looking back from our modern day, it's hard to really understand how differently people conceived of the relationship between FedGov and the states. No matter how prosecution of the war goes down, the idea of the federal government "nailing South Carolina to the Union with bayonets" is going to galvanize Jackson's opponents, and possibly turning the Southern wing of the Democrats against him. Depending on how the war is prosecuted, there may even be movements to get him impeached."
If the South Carolina rebels last only six months or less, it's true they won't be as much a militarily glorious "lost cause" as the Confederacy, but, they may seem like a non-threat in retrospect. If the defeat of the rebels is followed by martial law and hangings and prison sentences, rather than being seen as heroic and decisive, might Jackson be seen as cruel, vindictive, and tyrannical? Not just in the south, but in many states. Sentiment and worry about Presidential tyranny could easily spread to the north, which, although it will benefit from having a tariff enforced, will not have any of the moral satisfaction of seeing the institution of slavery wounded or weakened.
The Whig Party was organized around the various groupings of people dissatisfied by Jackson in OTL for various reasons. Whigs lampooned him as "King Andrew" and favored more Congressional checks on the President. In the ATL, with many people thinking of his South Carolina revolt suppression - "Holy Overreaction Batman" might states rights, or at least an opposition to federal military coercion, become a founding principal of American Whiggery and its successor political traditions?
Possibly, the next time there is a sectional crisis, the aversion to having a harsh crackdown is great enough that "go in peace" sentiment prevails.
The reason South Carolina will be so isolated is because the issue is the tariff and not slavery, and South Carolina is defying a popular, southern, slaveholding President.
The most straightforward extrapolation from all this, is that it sets a clear historical precedent, through blood and warfare, that also comes to be seen as a constitutional precedent, that secession is unconstitutional, so that when sectional tenses do later emerge over slavery, the south cannot play the secession card, and cannot use it as leverage, won't end up seceding, and also the anti-slavery side won't have the cover of Civil War to push their agenda as wartime measures.
However, I wonder if "Mr. Jackson's War" to suppress the South Carolina revolt, being such a curb stomp against the rebels, instead of mainly functioning as a forever-deterrent against secession, ends up doing more to to delegitimize federal use of force, thus weakening the resolve of the federal government, and encouraging dilution of the President's commander-in-chief powers in later generations?
"To the politicians of other states, the federal government actually going to war over the nullification crisis is going to look very bad. Andrew Jackson making tough speeches about deposing the treasonous South Carolinian government is one thing. Jackson was a tough talker, so a certain amount of machismo is expected. But actually waging war on a constituent state? Especially when the conflict is predicated on an idea like state's rights, which held a lot of cachet among the antebellum political class? Especially when done by a president as controversial as Jackson?
Looking back from our modern day, it's hard to really understand how differently people conceived of the relationship between FedGov and the states. No matter how prosecution of the war goes down, the idea of the federal government "nailing South Carolina to the Union with bayonets" is going to galvanize Jackson's opponents, and possibly turning the Southern wing of the Democrats against him. Depending on how the war is prosecuted, there may even be movements to get him impeached."
If the South Carolina rebels last only six months or less, it's true they won't be as much a militarily glorious "lost cause" as the Confederacy, but, they may seem like a non-threat in retrospect. If the defeat of the rebels is followed by martial law and hangings and prison sentences, rather than being seen as heroic and decisive, might Jackson be seen as cruel, vindictive, and tyrannical? Not just in the south, but in many states. Sentiment and worry about Presidential tyranny could easily spread to the north, which, although it will benefit from having a tariff enforced, will not have any of the moral satisfaction of seeing the institution of slavery wounded or weakened.
The Whig Party was organized around the various groupings of people dissatisfied by Jackson in OTL for various reasons. Whigs lampooned him as "King Andrew" and favored more Congressional checks on the President. In the ATL, with many people thinking of his South Carolina revolt suppression - "Holy Overreaction Batman" might states rights, or at least an opposition to federal military coercion, become a founding principal of American Whiggery and its successor political traditions?
Possibly, the next time there is a sectional crisis, the aversion to having a harsh crackdown is great enough that "go in peace" sentiment prevails.
