For a PoD, I would have Khrushchev overhaul his agricultural team and plans from the beginning of 1963. Have him drop and repudiate Lysenko, delegate and broaden responsibilities for agricultural outcomes, and minimize hype and promises, while making decisions, or allowing decisions to occur, that are superior under the conditions of the 1963 drought and make that's year's harvest more typical and not such a disastrous disappointment.
As for the consequences, Khrushchev uses his time to build up Podgorny and weaken Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Suslov.
The really dramatic divergences take place from 1965 on. Khrushchev escalates the Sino-Soviet split escalate even more, retains the policy of keeping distance from North Vietnam, writing it off as a Chinese ally, and moves towards rapprochement towards West Germany and the west, even to the point of permitting German reunification, and entertaining or suggesting joint strikes on China's nuclear capability to the Americans.
Gomulka feared that Khrushchev was so obsessed with the menace of China that he might make considerable concessions to West Germany--and there was some basis for this fear:
***
"Even worse, at the beginning of September 1964, the West German press announced that Khrushchev was planning to visit Bonn.[33] The announcement came after a series of denials by Khrushchev that he had any such plans. Both Gomulka and Ulbricht were worried that Khrushchev, given his concerns about a potential conflict with China, might compromise their security interests in order to reach an agreement with West Germany. The visit by Khrushchev's son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, to Bonn at the end of July 1964 confirmed their worst fears. Polish and East German intelligence, concerned that Khrushchev might be planning a radical departure in his West German policy, closely followed Adzhubei's movements.[34] They did not have to look far to find disturbing information. The West German newsmagazine, Der Spiegel, reported some of Adzhubei's more heterodox statements. Throughout his trip, he constantly warned against the "yellow peril."[35] China, he declared, would be Moscow's "first front" from now on. In order to have a free hand for dealing with the Chinese, Moscow sought a modus vivendi with Bonn in the "spirit of Rapallo."[36] In a private discussion over Bavarian beer with the bête noire of Soviet-bloc propaganda, Franz Josef Strauss, Adzhubei put it more bluntly. "We'd just as soon give you Germans a hundred hydrogen bombs, form a corridor through the Soviet Union, and let you mop up the Chinese."[37] When discussions turned to Ulbricht, Adzhubei stated point-blank: He would not live much longer, he suffered from cancer.[38] Polish intelligence succeeded in obtaining tapes from "Western journalists" of some of Adzhubei's choicer comments. The famous son-in-law apparently declared on tape that when his "papa" came to the FRG and saw how friendly everybody was, he would tear down the Berlin Wall.[39] Of greater interest to the Poles was his comment that under favorable conditions — for example, if Warsaw tried to leave the socialist bloc—land could be sliced off and returned to Germany, beginning with Szczecin.[40]
"After listening to the tapes of Adzhubei's comments, Gomulka was furious.[41] He fired off a protest to Moscow. On 30 September 1964, Yuri Andropov, the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee responsible for relations with the socialist states, arrived in Warsaw to discuss the situation.[42] Gomulka's trusted lieutentant, Zenon Kliszko, played for Andropov the Polish tape of Adzhubei's conversations. Andropov considered the tape to be authentic; he returned to Moscow with a transcript.[43] The fallout from Adzhubei's visit could not have come at a worse time for Khrushchev. In September 1964, his opponents in the Soviet leadership were already plotting to overthrow him.[44] The tape was used to further discredit Khrushchev and his policies and to help justify his removal from power in October 1964.
"In the end, Khrushchev's opponents in the Soviet politburo vindicated Gomulka and his policies. At the Central Committee plenum that removed Khrushchev, Politburo member Mikhail Suslov, who spearheaded the attack against Khrushchev, suggested that Adzhubei's visit and his comments reflected a lack of judgment on Khrushchev's part. "[O]ne found out ... from foreign newspapers," Suslov lectured the Central Committee, "that Alexei Adzhubei had made totally unrealistic predictions and unacceptable judgments about the future evolution of the Soviet Union's policy towards the German Democratic Republic, as well as the Bonn government, and also about possible negotiations over a settlement of the Berlin Question." He pointed out that Adzhubei's remarks had damaged Moscow's relations with both Poland and the GDR. Suslov even criticized Khrushchev for his condescending attitudes toward the other socialist states. He singled out Khrushchev's decision not to purchase fighter aircraft from Poland as particularly damaging to Polish-Soviet relations. Suslov summed up: "One should not offend the leaders of the fraternal parties. They are experienced and hardened people..."[45]
"More importantly, the new Soviet leaders, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin, reversed course and adopted a number of Gomulka's suggestions. Gomulka's perseverance under Khrushchev's pressure paid off at the January 1965 Warsaw Pact meeting in Warsaw. The assembled leaders, with the exception of Romania, approved a draft nonproliferation treaty that forbade joint nuclear forces, including the MLF.[46] More importantly, the Soviets reluctantly acquiesced in Gomulka's suggestion that preparations for a world communist conference proceed in two stages.[47] The new Soviet leaders even tried to repair relations with Beijing, but to no avail. Despite Gomulka's best efforts, the Chinese still refused to participate in preparations for a world communist conference..."
Poland and the Sino-Soviet Rift, 1963-1965