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German success on the Eastern Front in 1942-1943 would create a virtuous cycle in terms of fuel availability:

Yes, IIRC here the shortfall for military requirements would be 300,000 tons a month vs the historical 1.9 million in 1941.

To quote from the OP: In 1938, of the total consumption of 44 million barrels, imports from overseas accounted for 28 million barrels or roughly 60 percent of the total supply. An additional 3.8 million barrels were imported overland from European sources (2.8 million barrels came from Romania...

As specified in the OP, Matzen isn't discovered until the annexation of Austria which means the plans online by then or currently building as of 1939 would still be online or about to be. By 1941, Matzen would be built up and Schoonebeek, having been discovered in 1940, would also be starting to...

If we are taking 1939 synthetic production and then natural production rates achieved by around 1941 is sufficient to provide Germany with its historical fuel situation and still have enough to supply the Spanish. A Wolfram in Sheep's Clothing: U.S. Economic Warfare in Spain, 1940-1944 and The...

One thought that just came to mind: the Anglo-American economic warfare against Francoist Spain was based upon oil, and here the Germans would sufficient stocks to ameliorate Spanish losses should they be successfully enticed into the conflict. Gibraltar falling to Operation Felix in 1941 or so...

Beyond the fact that Britain was bankrupt in 1941 and was only saved with U.S. assistance? And then even with that assistance was hitting the absolute limit of what it could afford by late 1944? Or the fact that, to maintain such a blockade, would require a very serious decline in British living...

Even without it's Empire, by the 1960s Japan had equaled or surpassed the U.S. in ship building, steel output and automobiles. If you want an even more stark comparison, Mark Harrison does it well: Steel 1942: USSR: 8,100,000 tons Japan: 8,000,000 tons 1943: USSR: 8,500,000 tons Japan...

Okay, and as I said said, the onus is on you to prove such would contribute a meaningful increase in food supply. As it were, the only one bringing up the Highlands is you. Okay, first, that misses the very real issue that those troops are still eating the same amount of food, which the point...

I did read what you said and I find I am not at fault for anything. The onus for proving your argument is on you and solely you; you don't get to say I am wrong without providing evidence. If you are not interested in a good faith debate, then you are under no obligation to respond. As I said...

There was no spare capacity; the Bengal Famine was caused by how serious the shipping crisis alone had come. As for the idea of sending troops to the Middle East, that doesn't fix it because they still have to eat the same amount of food and sending them to the Middle East consumes more shipping...

I'm not sure why you disagree then, because those issues are still in play and, worse, they have not recovered the croplands of East Ukraine and the Kuban. Even worse, in 1943 there was a mass crop failure in the potato fields of the Urals, which further caused a decrease in food output to the...

Worth considering for the 1943 campaign season, is this secret report directly presented to Stalin concerning the manpower situation of the USSR as of September, 1942: I. Available by the start of the war: a) reservists of 1890-1921 classes (as of 1.01.41) - 20 230 800 b) officers of reserve...

No I am saying exactly what is cited, in that the only constraint on production in late 1941 was oil; the resources you cite for the Germans were already earmarked for them and if they weren't, Tooze would cite that as a factor in why truck production was halted. Likewise, I welcome you to make...

Wages of Destruction, Pages 412, by Adam Tooze: In late May 1941, General Adolf von Schell, the man responsible for the motor vehicle industry, seriously suggested that in light of the chronic shortage of oil it would be advisable to carry out a partial 'demotorization' of the Wehrmacht.68 It...

What's the air bases they could use? Honestly, that would a German benefit; if the Soviets have sabotaged Baku anyway, the USAAF wasting effort on it while enabling the Germans to use Ploesti unmolested is a serious benefit.

Adam Tooze, citing Wehrmact reports, found that most of the motor vehicle losses in the USSR in 1941 were due to mishandling, in particular accidents, instead of enemy action. With a much better trained driver cadre, a lot of these losses will thus be avoided and the Germans would also avert...

Reflecting on it, I think the main differences would become apparent in 1941 with much lower rates of vehicle loss in Russia combined with slightly higher production. There is a chance AGS might not over-extend itself as much either in the Ukraine, since there would be less of an emphasis to try...

This is the modern production rate; rates back in the 1940s and 1940s were higher since 70 years of extraction had not occurred.

You would think the people who had weathered an attempt in 1940 would realize how ineffective such a strategy would be, however. Revenge is a powerful motivator, indeed.