British and Americans armies of 1943 vs Soviet army of 1943

sillygoose said:

I'm not getting why you think the Allies don't have an army level structure at this point.

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I wrote "most would have to be set up".
You list four or five, yet - as IMO an Army is needed per every ten divisions or so - a few more (like in doubling or tripling their number) would be needed.

Very nice post, BTW

sillygoose said:

I'm not so certain.

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I'm not saying that the Wallies are doomed - but that they would have a hard time of it, at least initially while they get bearings and "organise things".
Later, with e.g. air superiority and more flexible artillery, things will get better, even with boots on the ground being sparse.
Long Tom vs. ML-20 - we can discuss their merits until the cows come home, yet what really matters is finding targets and reacting to them. A kilometre or two in theoretical range is irrelevant.

sillygoose said:

That I have to take issue with. The British and US learned VERY hard lessons in the desert about not doing that.

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I've read about tank charges in Normandy. And I'm fairly sure that on both sides. And in 1990s the Russians tried to take Grozniy with bare tanks - some lessons just keep on getting re-learned.

In 1943 soviets still do not knew how to attack properly - they had very good theory/amass artillery,use artillery observers on the front,and attack with infrantry supported by tanks/
But in practice - Prochorowka battle during Kursk battle in soviet propaganda was sovet and german tanks rushing each other.
In raelity - SS take 2 kolchoz,and was attacked by soviets - first by infrantry without tanks,later with tanks without infrantry.They lost 267 tanks for 5 german.
In both cases soviet artillery fired in general directions of german lines,becouse there were no artillery observers.

So, Allies should hold.
Add two more facts-
1.aoviet air forces was shitty - during Kursk battle Ju88 without escort attacked soviet rear lines,almost without casaulties.
2.Ther would be no "No retreat" order,and since all allied units were mechanized,soviet infrantry could not follow them.

So,i would say that soviets would gain some land,but bleed themselves dry in process.

ATP said:

But in practice - Prochorowka battle during Kursk battle in soviet propaganda was sovet and german tanks rushing each other.
In raelity - SS take 2 kolchoz,and was attacked by soviets - first by infrantry without tanks,later with tanks without infrantry.They lost 267 tanks for 5 german.

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The last I read was that there was no Battle of Prochorovka whatsoever - that it is entirely a Soviet fabrication. But the fuck I know ...

BTW - Rudel's claims are as close to the truth as editorials in Pravda, New York Times or Volkischer Beobachter ...
"No shit! I was out of ammo so I then overturned a T-34 with my penis ... no, wait, it wasn't a T-34, that was another time, here I flipped over an ISU-152!"

Buba said:

The last I read was that there was no Battle of Prochorovka whatsoever - that it is entirely a Soviet fabrication. But the fuck I know ...

BTW - Rudel's claims are as close to the truth as editorials in Pravda, New York Times or Volkischer Beobachter ...

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Soviets named their unsuccesfull attack on 2 kolchoz as Prochorowka battle.
Władimir Bieszanow wrote book about every year on East Front,i read about it in "1943-rok przełomu"./year of ..change i think/

Buba said:

I wrote "most would have to be set up".
You list four or five, yet - as IMO an Army is needed per every ten divisions or so - a few more (like in doubling or tripling their number) would be needed.

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Ok, I get you. Though I don't necessarily think 10 divisions per army is necessarily an issue. During the Battle of the Bulge the US First Army had 15 divisions under its command (not counting a heap of additional battalions and other small units) during the height of the offensive and defensive portions of the battle and did just fine after getting over the initial shock and confusion. One corps even had 6 divisions.

The issue is more one of the number of corps an army could handle. 3 is probably optimal, 4 is the limit for effective command IMHO. Number of divisions is more limited by corps command capabilities with 3-4 being optimal and 5 pushing the limits of what a good corps command could handle. 6 probably requires an exceptional and experienced corps command staff in addition to good division commands who can take some of the burden off of the corps by being highly experienced, though at that point you're basically an army detachment. I suppose we could quibble over what the actual difference then is at the command level between a corps and army detachment beyond the name.

Buba said:

Very nice post, BTW

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Thank you!

Buba said:

I'm not saying that the Wallies are doomed - but that they would have a hard time of it, at least initially while they get bearings and "organise things".

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Gotcha and agreed.

Buba said:

Later, with e.g. air superiority and more flexible artillery, things will get better, even with boots on the ground being sparse.

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Indeed. The Angolan Bush War had an excellent example of where a light force that is outnumbered using their power, artillery, and maneuver was able to stop several Soviet style heavy brigade at minimal cost:

Buba said:

Long Tom vs. ML-20 - we can discuss their merits until the cows come home, yet what really matters is finding targets and reacting to them. A kilometre or two in theoretical range is irrelevant.

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Agreed on the first part, but range is not as irrelevant as you think. The Germans actually put a fair bit of work into squeezing an extra KM out of their basic howitzers to compete with the Soviets since the Soviets actually did take advantage of that extra range to stay just outside of counter battery fire. Since they used the principle of mass in all things they accepted the inaccuracy that came with using the extreme range because they had so many batteries firing that the inaccuracy basically didn't matter due to saturation, while for the side with fewer guns that relied on accuracy that would be a problem.

Buba said:

I've read about tank charges in Normandy. And I'm fairly sure that on both sides. And in 1990s the Russians tried to take Grozniy with bare tanks - some lessons just keep on getting re-learned.

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Without a doubt they happened. War is messy and sometime you just have to use tanks without infantry support. Generally though it was tried not to do that without a combined arms operation.

The Grozny situation wasn't simply 'bare tanks' since there was mechanized infantry and lots of air and artillery support; it was quite a bit different as it wasn't really a major war to that point and the Russians thought they could intimidate the Chechens into surrender without a shot if they rolled in quick and heavy. Obviously the Chechens were made of tougher stuff than the Russians thought and the Russians botched the entire operation from start to finish. Friendly fire was a massive problem for the Russians in that battle even before they made contact with the Chechens:

Although the Russian forces enjoyed air superiority, weather prevented flight operations. Advancing troopers were supported only by Mi-24 attack helicopters, with the group "East" losing five vehicles to a Russian air-strike of 'friendly-fire'.[13] The previous day, the Russian Air Force bombed nearby villagers, including those anti-Dudayev and pro-Russian.[1]

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The key to the plan was all four columns reaching the center of the city simultaneously. However, the 19th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) was late arriving to the group West, commanded by Major General Ivan Babichev, and the bloated column could barely move, with disputed reports of friendly artillery fire. In the east, units of Major General Vadim Orlov's 104th Airborne Division did not join the 129th MRR from the Leningrad Military District after they moved on Grozny; and were subsequently hit by friendly artillery fire, the 129th regiment was badly demoralised and retreated the next day without accomplishing much.

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That let the Chechens concentrate against certain columns in a way that wouldn't have worked out for them had the Russian plan to converge four columns on the city center had actually worked properly and they didn't keep getting hit by their own artillery and air strikes.
Well, that and lack of basic driving experience:

At 2pm, the leading assault group reached the Mayakovskogo street objective. However, while the first echelon was conducting artillery fire, the 1st echelon vehicles (81st Gd MR Regt.) were stationary, and this caused the leading vehicles of the second echelon (2nd Bn., 131st IMR Br.) to mingle with them due to lack of coordination. This lack of experience, including by the individual vehicle drivers, caused a considerable traffic jam at the Mayakovskogo and Khmelnitzkogo intersection for much of an hour. However, that intersection represented the objective for the first day of operation, and both battalion commanders prepared their command for a defensive over-night position.

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The Russians had no operational plan for an advance that day. After the order from "Mramor" came to continue the advance toward the Presidential Palace, the advancing column quickly formed during the lingering confusion from the Mayakovskogo and Khmelnitzkogo intersection fiasco. The elements of 1st battalion departed first, but, with them, elements of the 2nd battalion and some vehicles from supporting sub-units. Meanwhile, more vehicles arrived in the intersection, mostly stray detachments left to guard the route earlier including single vehicles recovered from break-downs.
The traffic-jam was exacerbated by the elements of the 255th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment arriving as the second echelon of the "North" Group. This supported the decision for the first echelon to re-commence movement. The 255th proceeded to the Central Hospital Complex east of the Central Railway.

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People tend to forget how important traffic control and planning for route marches is for maneuver units, an issue that comes up over and cover again when reading about tactical/operational actions in modern warfare, and without that vital momentum is lost. Especially in a city fight that is fatal.

Buba said:

The last I read was that there was no Battle of Prochorovka whatsoever - that it is entirely a Soviet fabrication. But the fuck I know ...

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Oh there was:

Soviet personnel losses at Prokhorovka for 12 July were estimated by the historian Christer Bergström to have been as high as 5,500 men.[9] For equipment damaged or destroyed, David Glantz and Jonathan House estimate that the whole 5th Guards Tank Army lost at least 400 tanks in its attacks on 12 July.[198]

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Speaking of tank charges against enemy AT assets...
At one point the charging Soviet tanks literally drove into their own anti-tank ditch!
Apparently though things did get up close and personal and it was actually the Germans who rammed Soviet tanks...with halftracks:

The advance of Soviet armour down Hill 252.2 was disrupted when they reached the anti-tank ditch at the base of the hill. A number of tanks crashed into the 15-foot deep ditch while others moved along the edge looking for a way to cross. Heavy fire was exchanged between the Soviet tanks and two companies of a panzergrenadier battalion on the opposite side of the ditch.[135] Peiper's surviving panzergrenadiers engaged the Soviet infantry and attacked the Soviet tanks with Hafthohlladung magnetic anti-tank grenades. Twenty of his battalion's half-tracks were lost in the fighting, some destroyed in ramming the much heavier Soviet tanks in an effort to stop them.[136] Eventually, due to heavy Soviet pressure and dangerously exposed flanks, Leibstandarte withdrew from the Oktyabrsky State Farm and established firmer defensive lines 1 kilometre (0.62 mi) to the south.[137]

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The Soviets though completely lied about what happened to cover up how they effectively lost 2/3rds of an entire tank army in a single day due to massive fuckups that made the Grozny operation look professional.

German losses by comparison:

The II SS-Panzer Corps reported 842 soldiers killed, wounded, or missing for 12 July.
The II SS-Panzer Corps' logistics report for 12 July did not record any confirmed permanent tank losses.[190] Other German sources show that three tanks of the II SS-Panzer Corps (two Panzer IVs and a Tiger) that were immobilized in the battlefield could not be subsequently recovered and therefore the permanent losses can only be adjusted to a possible maximum of three tanks for 12 July.[190] A study by the US Army's Center for Strategy and Force Evaluation attributed six permanent tank losses, not counting Panzer I and Panzer II light tanks or German assault guns if any.[191]

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No wonder the Soviets wanted that covered up.

Buba said:

BTW - Rudel's claims are as close to the truth as editorials in Pravda, New York Times or Volkischer Beobachter ...
"No shit! I was out of ammo so I then overturned a T-34 with my penis ... no, wait, it wasn't a T-34, that was another time, here I flipped over an ISU-152!"

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LOL, ain't that the truth. At best the claims attributed to him were probably for the entire unit.

Ok how about a more specific scenario?
Rather than going over specific details to figure out what was where when the situation is this:
The US gets 50 divisions, of which 8 are armored (1943 structure) and 2 are airborne as well as the 3 Ranger battalions, while the British get 30 divisions including foreign divisions under their command.

edit: 2 British airborne divisions, 1 Free French infantry division and 1 FF armored division, 1 Polish armored division, 2 Polish infantry divisions + 1 armored brigade and 1 airborne brigade (those don't count toward division total), 2 Canadian infantry divisions and 1 Canadian armored division, 3 Indian infantry divisions, 5 British armored divisions, and 12 British infantry divisions. Commandos and other special forces don't count against the division total and are present and can use naval deployment.

Also the above doesn't count historical corps and army level artillery and various other non-divisions units like cavalry groups.

So the Waliles get 80 divisions total. No more since we'll assume that in lieu of more divisions the Wallied governments just have to use existing manpower to keep a steady flow of replacements so the divisions/armies are able to stay in action. Local manpower can be used to form divisions, but they will need to use the historical supply of equipment to do so factoring in equipment attrition rates. For the sake of argument we're assuming the Wallies have local support, so various national movements like the UPA secured the supply lines and rear areas, so partisan warfare isn't a significant issue, though spying by the Soviets is.

Soviet side is per OTL.

Command is clarified like this: ETOUSA/SHAEF is the theater command, 21st army group under Monty runs the British 1st and 8th armies and 1st Canadian (10 per army obviously), while the AFHQ becomes the US 1st army group and commands the US 1st, 3rd, 5th army, and 7th armies (so twelve divisions per army and enough for a two division detachment for Crimea). The British have the area north of the Pripyet Marshes down to Gomel, the US from Gomel to the Black Sea (including Crimea but not Taman).

The start line is the Panther Line, which in this scenario is completed:


Obviously both sides are ok fighting one another and everyone starts knowing the situation. Neither side is in a position to attack, so they have to start planning anything from the start of the scenario. It begins January 1st 1943 and both sides have winter gear and winterized equipment.

And then the Wallied air forces. They get these obviously:

The USAAF 8th Air Force (let's say roughly 560 bombers on hand (average for whole 1943):

RAF Bomber Command
RAF Fighter Command

That should even things up given that the ground forces are so badly lopsided.

And the Wallied bomber losses will be negligible compared to those in OTL.

According to your source, the 8th AF fielded a total of 2185 bombers and lost a total of 1236. That's a huge bomber advantage for the Wallied forces.

EDIT: how may escort aircraft do the Wallies have available for 8th Bomber?

sillygoose said:

And then the Wallied air forces. They get these obviously:

Mediterranean Air Command - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The USAAF 8th Air Force (let's say roughly 560 bombers on hand (average for whole 1943):

Eighth Air Force Losses 1943 - Axis History Forum

forum.axishistory.com

RAF Bomber Command
RAF Fighter Command

That should even things up given that the ground forces are so badly lopsided.

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They also get the Mediterranean Fleet!

Look out Black Seas Fleet!

And take that Montreux Convention! The Western Allies are a Black Seas State now!

Looking at things a little more you could also see the 9th, 12th and 15th Air Force Commands in this action as well.

9th AF was there

One thing we haven't really addressed is that the Wallies are going to likely achieve air superiority fairly rapidly. This means they'll be able to cut any rail lines the Russians build to extend their supply lines. The effects of this are likely to be extremely severe in the long run.

Additionally, any sort of massing that the Russians do with their artillery (or any other force) is going to be just begging for a thorough bombing. If the air superiority is sufficient, I could see orbiting squadrons of bombers just behind Wallied lines waiting to get called onto a target of opportunity.

Natural response would likely be night time musters and attacks by the Russians to deny easily found masses or troops in daylight.

The Whispering Monk said:

One thing we haven't really addressed is that the Wallies are going to likely achieve air superiority fairly rapidly. This means they'll be able to cut any rail lines the Russians build to extend their supply lines. The effects of this are likely to be extremely severe in the long run.

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Maybe. Remember they are taking over Luftwaffe bases, so they probably don't have nearly enough set up to support all the aircraft that are coming along. Initially. Over time though they could get there given Wallied resources to build up bases especially now that England is out of the picture.

The Whispering Monk said:

Additionally, any sort of massing that the Russians do with their artillery (or any other force) is going to be just begging for a thorough bombing. If the air superiority is sufficient, I could see orbiting squadrons of bombers just behind Wallied lines waiting to get called onto a target of opportunity.

Natural response would likely be night time musters and attacks by the Russians to deny easily found masses or troops in daylight.

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Indeed with the above caveat. Of course there is also the issue of there being a LOT more Russians than ground forces and a question of how many sorties could be generated. Soviet offensives are going to have some issues for sure, but that is something that will build with time because here at least initially the air bases won't be enough to manage what aircraft are available.

Night attacks were Soviet M/O when possible given the German advantages during daylight, so naturally that would make sense and exploit a weakness in Allied infantry from OTL, as they ceased patrolling from midnight to early morning generally. US and British infantry were not nearly as hardy as the Soviets and they'd find that out the hard way.

The Whispering Monk said:

And the Wallied bomber losses will be negligible compared to those in OTL.

According to your source, the 8th AF fielded a total of 2185 bombers and lost a total of 1236. That's a huge bomber advantage for the Wallied forces.

EDIT: how may escort aircraft do the Wallies have available for 8th Bomber?

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Probably given how the Soviets were not set up for high altitude operations. Still, average was about 560 bombers at any one time. Over the year that would build of course. However if you want to go by historical numbers they'd only have ~110 as of January and that would build over the year.

Not really sure how many fighters they could operate at one time.

In spite of Allied air supremacy German trains kept on running. Same will happen here.
With all those airplanes around, especially Bomber Command and the US strategic forces, how does the logistical pipeline cope?

Buba said:

In spite of Allied air supremacy German trains kept on running. Same will happen here.

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Until late 1944/early 1945. When the Wallies figured out the center of gravity in the German economy they smashed it and collapsed the transport system.

Buba said:

With all those airplanes around, especially Bomber Command and the US strategic forces, how does the logistical pipeline cope?

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That's the issue. The state of the rail system in the East in 1943 would mean it is not near enough. They'd have to make a major effort to build it up and expand bases to cope. That probably means drafting labor from the civilian population in addition to their own construction resources, but as they have more non-combat manpower than the Germans and no significant partisan threat they could make it work eventually. Question is when is 'eventually'?

sillygoose said:

When the Wallies figured out the center of gravity in the German economy they smashed it and collapsed the transport system.

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So ... the Allies need to figure out the relevance of the rail network for the Soviet war effort first
Otherwise the pursuit of the Holy Grail of Douhetist dogma i.e. winning a war by bombing alone will involve chasing the flavour of the week - first ball bearings, then pork bellies, then hydroelectric plants, then POL, then ...

Buba said:

So ... the Allies need to figure out the relevance of the rail network for the Soviet war effort first
Otherwise the pursuit of the Holy Grail of Douhetist dogma i.e. winning a war by bombing alone will involve chasing the flavour of the week - first ball bearings, then pork bellies, then hydroelectric plants, then POL, then ...

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Given the RAF is a major factor here it will be firebombing Leningrad and Moscow quite a bit. Though they'll find out that both of those cities were protected like Berlin...

Something to consider is the Soviets are much more vulnerable to bombing of factories, as unlike the Germans they focused on mass production in huge American style facilities; so while the German system was somewhat of a handicap to maximizing output it made them less vulnerable to American precision bombing of factories (British style carpet bombing did have the advantage of hitting everything in the area, so they got more spread on a bunch of facilities and supporting infrastructure in a way that precision bombing could miss). Just as the very limited Luftwaffe bombing of Grozny produced major impact relative to the committed bombers, US style bombing could theoretically work a lot better against Soviet industrial targets, especially as the Soviets lacked sufficient and quality gunnery radars and will be extra vulnerable to ECM given how far behind their electronics industry was (behind the Japanese actually).

sillygoose said:

Given the RAF is a major factor here it will be firebombing Leningrad and Moscow quite a bit. Though they'll find out that both of those cities were protected like Berlin...

Something to consider is the Soviets are much more vulnerable to bombing of factories, as unlike the Germans they focused on mass production in huge American style facilities; so while the German system was somewhat of a handicap to maximizing output it made them less vulnerable to American precision bombing of factories (British style carpet bombing did have the advantage of hitting everything in the area, so they got more spread on a bunch of facilities and supporting infrastructure in a way that precision bombing could miss). Just as the very limited Luftwaffe bombing of Grozny produced major impact relative to the committed bombers, US style bombing could theoretically work a lot better against Soviet industrial targets, especially as the Soviets lacked sufficient and quality gunnery radars and will be extra vulnerable to ECM given how far behind their electronics industry was (behind the Japanese actually).

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True,soviet factories was easier to destroy.And their night fighters were joke - when they besieged Wrocław in 1945,they could not prevent Ju52 from delivering supplies there.
So,Moscow would burn - but,so what? what important was rail hub near Moscow,not Moscow itself.

ATP said:

True,soviet factories was easier to destroy.And their night fighters were joke - when they besieged Wrocław in 1945,they could not prevent Ju52 from delivering supplies there.
So,Moscow would burn - but,so what? what important was rail hub near Moscow,not Moscow itself.

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Moscow city itself (not the entire oblast) accounted for something like 10% of the entire USSR's industrial output, with a much higher portion of high tech items produced there that weren't produced in any other part of the country. Smashing that (assuming they could in the face of Soviet AAA) would have massive impacts on the Soviet ability to supply the war. That's why the Luftwaffe's Operation Eisenhammer was focused on this region.

RAF bombing of the city center would actually damage to the rail system as well, much as it did to the cities in Germany it carpet bombed.