raharris1973
Well-known member
What would have happened differently in Europe and Russia between 1993 and 2000 if NATO had not expanded east of Germany?
Here's my interpretation of how NATO expansion could have been avoided at the end of the first Cold War. [It is based on my interpretation of what ultimately drove the process to completion, which might be idiosyncratic*, but I think is true, nevertheless].
In his first term, somebody besides Russia hand Strobe Talbott is Deputy Secretary of State, and unlike Strobe, this person, and Clinton's initial Russia advisors, are enthusiasts for NATO expansion.
Seems counter-intuitive that's how this begins, but I will get to it. NATO expansion is not a first-year priority item for the Clinton Administration, with the economy, domestic legislation, foreign policy trouble in Somalia being his focus, and troubles bleeding over into 1994, including the Haitian refugee crisis and eventual occupation, and the failed battle for health care reform.
Since Clinton rallies himself and his loyal partisan supporters (not all of his Dem partisans are loyal, this is the 1990s Dems we are talking about) to support the idea of NATO expansion, initially to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and discussion gets underway in media, think-tanks, and among pundits in 1994, [with Clinton and his supporters brushing aside Russia-hands worries about turning off Russia], Newt Gingrich, trying to create a strong, disciplined, oppositional brand for the Republican Party, to propose a Contract with America to justify a turnover in control of Congress in 1994, decides he hates the idea of NATO expansion, pretty much because Clinton likes it.* The strategic rationale Gingrich and most Republicans elaborate to justify their opposition to NATO opposition is that it is strategically living in the past, concerned with the obsolete threats of Russia or Germany [Pat Buchanan and supporters love this part too, though they don't see eye-to-eye with Newt on everything], and America's national security strategy should be focused on the threats of the future: China, North Korea, Iran.
Since the 1994 priority is healthcare, Clinton doesn't use the Democratic Congressional majority to get NATO expansion done that year, saving it for later. The Republicans take control of Congress with the 1994 elections, so NATO expansion is not a near-term possibility, and Clinton spends the rest of his term, and his second term, triangulating on policy for political survival. NATO expansion is off the table, and the former Warsaw Pact states of Central and Southeastern Europe have to figure out alternate future security arrangements for themselves.
Because of its headline grabbing nature, Bob Dole's interest, and even Newt's belief the US should still act like a superpower, the US still intervenes in Yugoslavia in 1995 like it did in our reality, and likely later on in Kosovo.
But in the meantime, how will the foreign policies, and economies, of Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltics, Ukraine, and Russia differ from our own world from 1995 to 2000? How will Russo-US relations differ. Will they get as tense over Kosovo, or less tense? Will Russia be more assertive relative to any of its immediate western neighbors, or Poland or Romania? Would Poland begin a covert or overt nuclear program in this time, if denied NATO membership or its prospect? Or would it adopt a less drastic coping mechanism, like a Swiss style, masss-mobilization militia system?
*What I describe in this scenario is pretty much a mirror opposite of what happened in the real-world Clinton Administration - when think-tanks and pundits in Washington in the 90s and Central European governments first started advocating for NATO expansion, Clinton Administration officials were worried about damage to relations with Yeltsin's Russia, were wary of the idea, and reluctant. In 1993, or 1994, in an effort to stall of, or triangulate to a policy they hoped would offend Russia less, or not at all, compared with NATO expansion, which Moscow vocally disapproved of, the Clinton Administration first proposed Partnership for Peace, a joint training and consultation program not including anything like NATO's Article 5. Sensing Clinton Administration reluctance, and seeing a vacuum to fill, Newt Gingrich rallied the Republicans to distringuish themselves by unreservedly *supporting* NATO expansion, It sat well with desires to *get* Clinton on something and their self-image as the "strong" Party. Although wary of NATO expansion, opposition to it, or fears of bad consequences in the top echelons of the Clinton Administration and in Clinton's own mind were never bad enough he saw it as an issue worth continuing to resist on, especially after the GOP took Congress, so he rolled. With so many domestic disagreements it was easier to roll with being more of a foreign policy President anyway. My view is the Central Europeans really wanted into NATO, the think-tankers and pundits who liked the idea were more passionate and persistent than those who opposed, despite reluctance, Clinton was roll-able either way, and Gingrich wanted to exert power and make Clinton squirm and dance to his tune on whatever issues he could, regardless of substance, so if Clinton said "po-tay-toe", he would say "po-tah-toe" *AND* vice versa. Or like Daffy Duck and Bugs Bunny debating Duck season versus Rabbit Season in front of each other and Elmer Fudd. Or in this case, "No NATO" "Yes NATO". Let's call the whole thing off.
Here's my interpretation of how NATO expansion could have been avoided at the end of the first Cold War. [It is based on my interpretation of what ultimately drove the process to completion, which might be idiosyncratic*, but I think is true, nevertheless].
In his first term, somebody besides Russia hand Strobe Talbott is Deputy Secretary of State, and unlike Strobe, this person, and Clinton's initial Russia advisors, are enthusiasts for NATO expansion.
Seems counter-intuitive that's how this begins, but I will get to it. NATO expansion is not a first-year priority item for the Clinton Administration, with the economy, domestic legislation, foreign policy trouble in Somalia being his focus, and troubles bleeding over into 1994, including the Haitian refugee crisis and eventual occupation, and the failed battle for health care reform.
Since Clinton rallies himself and his loyal partisan supporters (not all of his Dem partisans are loyal, this is the 1990s Dems we are talking about) to support the idea of NATO expansion, initially to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and discussion gets underway in media, think-tanks, and among pundits in 1994, [with Clinton and his supporters brushing aside Russia-hands worries about turning off Russia], Newt Gingrich, trying to create a strong, disciplined, oppositional brand for the Republican Party, to propose a Contract with America to justify a turnover in control of Congress in 1994, decides he hates the idea of NATO expansion, pretty much because Clinton likes it.* The strategic rationale Gingrich and most Republicans elaborate to justify their opposition to NATO opposition is that it is strategically living in the past, concerned with the obsolete threats of Russia or Germany [Pat Buchanan and supporters love this part too, though they don't see eye-to-eye with Newt on everything], and America's national security strategy should be focused on the threats of the future: China, North Korea, Iran.
Since the 1994 priority is healthcare, Clinton doesn't use the Democratic Congressional majority to get NATO expansion done that year, saving it for later. The Republicans take control of Congress with the 1994 elections, so NATO expansion is not a near-term possibility, and Clinton spends the rest of his term, and his second term, triangulating on policy for political survival. NATO expansion is off the table, and the former Warsaw Pact states of Central and Southeastern Europe have to figure out alternate future security arrangements for themselves.
Because of its headline grabbing nature, Bob Dole's interest, and even Newt's belief the US should still act like a superpower, the US still intervenes in Yugoslavia in 1995 like it did in our reality, and likely later on in Kosovo.
But in the meantime, how will the foreign policies, and economies, of Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltics, Ukraine, and Russia differ from our own world from 1995 to 2000? How will Russo-US relations differ. Will they get as tense over Kosovo, or less tense? Will Russia be more assertive relative to any of its immediate western neighbors, or Poland or Romania? Would Poland begin a covert or overt nuclear program in this time, if denied NATO membership or its prospect? Or would it adopt a less drastic coping mechanism, like a Swiss style, masss-mobilization militia system?
*What I describe in this scenario is pretty much a mirror opposite of what happened in the real-world Clinton Administration - when think-tanks and pundits in Washington in the 90s and Central European governments first started advocating for NATO expansion, Clinton Administration officials were worried about damage to relations with Yeltsin's Russia, were wary of the idea, and reluctant. In 1993, or 1994, in an effort to stall of, or triangulate to a policy they hoped would offend Russia less, or not at all, compared with NATO expansion, which Moscow vocally disapproved of, the Clinton Administration first proposed Partnership for Peace, a joint training and consultation program not including anything like NATO's Article 5. Sensing Clinton Administration reluctance, and seeing a vacuum to fill, Newt Gingrich rallied the Republicans to distringuish themselves by unreservedly *supporting* NATO expansion, It sat well with desires to *get* Clinton on something and their self-image as the "strong" Party. Although wary of NATO expansion, opposition to it, or fears of bad consequences in the top echelons of the Clinton Administration and in Clinton's own mind were never bad enough he saw it as an issue worth continuing to resist on, especially after the GOP took Congress, so he rolled. With so many domestic disagreements it was easier to roll with being more of a foreign policy President anyway. My view is the Central Europeans really wanted into NATO, the think-tankers and pundits who liked the idea were more passionate and persistent than those who opposed, despite reluctance, Clinton was roll-able either way, and Gingrich wanted to exert power and make Clinton squirm and dance to his tune on whatever issues he could, regardless of substance, so if Clinton said "po-tay-toe", he would say "po-tah-toe" *AND* vice versa. Or like Daffy Duck and Bugs Bunny debating Duck season versus Rabbit Season in front of each other and Elmer Fudd. Or in this case, "No NATO" "Yes NATO". Let's call the whole thing off.