raharris1973
Well-known member
What if the Russians in 1916 reinforced their already successful offensives in Asia Minor against the Ottomans under Yudenich, keeping them going longer with more men, supplies, and ammunition until winter absolutely halts operations, and stayed on the defensive on the fronts ]opposite the Germans and Austro-Hungarians?
(see the western limits of the Russian advance in eastern Turkey in
1916: http://www.conflicts.rem33.com/images/The Caucasus/Cauco_Mesopotamia_WWI/Nr2_May_Jun_1916.jpg
and 1917: http://www.conflicts.rem33.com/images/The Caucasus/Cauco_Mesopotamia_WWI/Nr3_Jan_Mar_1917.jpg)
Yudenich outclassed his Ottoman opponents as a commander, and the Russians were of higher morale on the Ottoman front than the other fronts because they were winning. The Armenians in the ranks and Armenian volunteers were especially motivated in fighting the Turks. With more resources poured in in 1916, a year in which the Ottomans were also busy in Mesopotamia and Gallipolli, how much further could the Russians occupy, and could the Ottomans take the strain and keep on fighting into 1917, or collapse before then? Could the Russians, who made it to Trebizond and Bitlis in OTL, make it further to Sinope, or Ankara or the Mediterranean coast around Alexandretta or Cilicia, cutting off western Turkey from the Fertile Crescent to the south.
Also, with a more defensive posture towards Germany and Austria, the butcher's bill for the Russian forces should be less. The Brusilov offensive, and the German-led counterattacks afterward, were very costly for the Russian Army. Without the Brusilov offensive, and its costs, is the likehihood of Russia's February revolution decreased a great deal?
This does not mean Russia yields all the initiative to the enemy in the 1916 campaign. There could be an offensive target in Europe, but against the weakest Central Powers' link, Bulgaria. This only becomes possible once Romania joins the war in August 1916.
The Russian forces not devoted to manning the defenses against the Germans and Austrians are sent southwest to focus on reinforcing Romanian frontiers to hold the passes against the Austro-Hungarians once the Romanians declare war on the CP, while deploying the Russian offensive reserve, and encouraging the initial Romanian offensive focus, to be all into knocking out Bulgaria from the war. Hit the weakest of the CPs on their flank, and protect the most productive parts of Romania.
Between combined heavy Russian and Romanian pressures from the north, and lesser pressures from the western allies from Salonika in the south, Bulgaria should be beatable in 1916, and once Bulgaria is bested, the way is opened for threatening Turkish Thrace/Constantinople and for reviving Serbia.
That's the potential upside for Russia and the Entente.
However, the Brusilov offensive of OTL did alot of damage to the Austro-Hungarians before it was over, and made it highly dependent on the Germans for the rest of the war. It also encouraged the Romanians to join the war on the Entente side. The French and Italians were very happy to see the Russians doing an offensive push in Europe in 1916 and thought it vital.
Without the Russians going on the offensive in Galicia in 1916, do the Austro-Hungarians have a serious chance of breaking the Italians? Could they inflict a Caporetto like defeat, or worse, knock the Italians out of the war? Would the Germans, lacking a need to save the Austrians, be able to damage the French more critically at Verdun?
What shape would all these changes in 1916 leave the combatants in for 1917 and 1918?
(see the western limits of the Russian advance in eastern Turkey in
1916: http://www.conflicts.rem33.com/images/The Caucasus/Cauco_Mesopotamia_WWI/Nr2_May_Jun_1916.jpg
and 1917: http://www.conflicts.rem33.com/images/The Caucasus/Cauco_Mesopotamia_WWI/Nr3_Jan_Mar_1917.jpg)
Yudenich outclassed his Ottoman opponents as a commander, and the Russians were of higher morale on the Ottoman front than the other fronts because they were winning. The Armenians in the ranks and Armenian volunteers were especially motivated in fighting the Turks. With more resources poured in in 1916, a year in which the Ottomans were also busy in Mesopotamia and Gallipolli, how much further could the Russians occupy, and could the Ottomans take the strain and keep on fighting into 1917, or collapse before then? Could the Russians, who made it to Trebizond and Bitlis in OTL, make it further to Sinope, or Ankara or the Mediterranean coast around Alexandretta or Cilicia, cutting off western Turkey from the Fertile Crescent to the south.
Also, with a more defensive posture towards Germany and Austria, the butcher's bill for the Russian forces should be less. The Brusilov offensive, and the German-led counterattacks afterward, were very costly for the Russian Army. Without the Brusilov offensive, and its costs, is the likehihood of Russia's February revolution decreased a great deal?
This does not mean Russia yields all the initiative to the enemy in the 1916 campaign. There could be an offensive target in Europe, but against the weakest Central Powers' link, Bulgaria. This only becomes possible once Romania joins the war in August 1916.
The Russian forces not devoted to manning the defenses against the Germans and Austrians are sent southwest to focus on reinforcing Romanian frontiers to hold the passes against the Austro-Hungarians once the Romanians declare war on the CP, while deploying the Russian offensive reserve, and encouraging the initial Romanian offensive focus, to be all into knocking out Bulgaria from the war. Hit the weakest of the CPs on their flank, and protect the most productive parts of Romania.
Between combined heavy Russian and Romanian pressures from the north, and lesser pressures from the western allies from Salonika in the south, Bulgaria should be beatable in 1916, and once Bulgaria is bested, the way is opened for threatening Turkish Thrace/Constantinople and for reviving Serbia.
That's the potential upside for Russia and the Entente.
However, the Brusilov offensive of OTL did alot of damage to the Austro-Hungarians before it was over, and made it highly dependent on the Germans for the rest of the war. It also encouraged the Romanians to join the war on the Entente side. The French and Italians were very happy to see the Russians doing an offensive push in Europe in 1916 and thought it vital.
Without the Russians going on the offensive in Galicia in 1916, do the Austro-Hungarians have a serious chance of breaking the Italians? Could they inflict a Caporetto like defeat, or worse, knock the Italians out of the war? Would the Germans, lacking a need to save the Austrians, be able to damage the French more critically at Verdun?
What shape would all these changes in 1916 leave the combatants in for 1917 and 1918?