ISOT What if the PRC from 1 October, 1950, is ISOT'ed back 20 years to 1 October, 1930?

raharris1973

Well-known member
What if the PRC from 1 October, 1950, is ISOT'ed back 20 years to 1 October, 1930?

This is the entire territory sovereignly controlled by the PRC, so the only exceptions are the remaining foreign leasehold territories, which in 1950 were the Portuguese leased Macau, British leased Hong Kong, and Soviet leased Dalian and Lushun/Port Arthur on the Guangdong peninsula. Those don't ISOT back, so they remain in their 1930 incarnations, which are controlled by Portugal, Britain, and Japan, respectively. However, by 1950 numerous other concession areas and leases throughout other Chinese cities and ports like Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhouan had been abolished, so their 1930 foreign owners/protectors will wonder where their property, expats, and regular contacts suddenly disappeared to.

The Chinese PLA is poised to begin the occupation of Lhasa, Tibet, establishing control over the core Tibetan region. It has also reconsolidated a great deal of armed forces in the Northeast Frontier Army north of the Yalu compared to their location earlier in the summer in the Taiwan straits, in readiness to intervene in Korea, where war has broken out, and the Americans intervened. Having strong PLA forces in the Northeast provinces is fortuitous when suddenly dropped in the international environment of 1930, since the Northeast provinces border irate Japanese formations of Kwangtung Army and Korea Army who wonder just why they aren't hearing from their troops in the South Manchuria Railway zone and why there's no routine traffic from there.

The PRC government has diplomatic ties to establish with the USSR (the Republic of China has broken diplomatic relations with the USSR and not restored them by 1930) and gets to surprise them by mentioning that the two countries have a treaty of alliance. Mao Zedong, his comrades, and likely Soviet personnel present in China likely have some "news from the future" they would like to convey to the USSR about the decade and a half ahead.

The PRC also would probably like to change the situation of having the Japanese Empire as a neighbor on land, ASAP, seeing the Japanese removed from the Guangdong peninsula and Korean Peninsula, in that order. Beijing also desires Japanese ouster from Taiwan and the Pescadores, but that is probably less strictly urgent, from a pure security POV, and probably also more difficult to accomplish.
 
What are the odds that Stalin would actually agree to an alliance with the PRC to expel the Japanese from Korea? And might Stalin be willing to listen to Mao about how the next 20 years are going to turn out?

I also wonder if Stalin might view Mao as a potential rival and thus might want to off him, but that's probably very risky since Mao is the leader of a large state, a state that would likely portray itself as being friendly towards the Soviet Union.

The West is likely to become very, very freaked out. "First Russia, and now China, they'll say!" What next? I expect the West to give much more support to Japan in this scenario if it will not go after any of the "white man's colonies" but will instead focus on the Eurasian Commies. Heck, I wonder if Japan could actually portray its war in China in this TL as actually being a liberation war. That is, if China fails to quickly expel Japan from Korea.
 
What if the PRC from 1 October, 1950, is ISOT'ed back 20 years to 1 October, 1930?

This is the entire territory sovereignly controlled by the PRC, so the only exceptions are the remaining foreign leasehold territories, which in 1950 were the Portuguese leased Macau, British leased Hong Kong, and Soviet leased Dalian and Lushun/Port Arthur on the Guangdong peninsula. Those don't ISOT back, so they remain in their 1930 incarnations, which are controlled by Portugal, Britain, and Japan, respectively. However, by 1950 numerous other concession areas and leases throughout other Chinese cities and ports like Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhouan had been abolished, so their 1930 foreign owners/protectors will wonder where their property, expats, and regular contacts suddenly disappeared to.

The Chinese PLA is poised to begin the occupation of Lhasa, Tibet, establishing control over the core Tibetan region. It has also reconsolidated a great deal of armed forces in the Northeast Frontier Army north of the Yalu compared to their location earlier in the summer in the Taiwan straits, in readiness to intervene in Korea, where war has broken out, and the Americans intervened. Having strong PLA forces in the Northeast provinces is fortuitous when suddenly dropped in the international environment of 1930, since the Northeast provinces border irate Japanese formations of Kwangtung Army and Korea Army who wonder just why they aren't hearing from their troops in the South Manchuria Railway zone and why there's no routine traffic from there.

The PRC government has diplomatic ties to establish with the USSR (the Republic of China has broken diplomatic relations with the USSR and not restored them by 1930) and gets to surprise them by mentioning that the two countries have a treaty of alliance. Mao Zedong, his comrades, and likely Soviet personnel present in China likely have some "news from the future" they would like to convey to the USSR about the decade and a half ahead.

The PRC also would probably like to change the situation of having the Japanese Empire as a neighbor on land, ASAP, seeing the Japanese removed from the Guangdong peninsula and Korean Peninsula, in that order. Beijing also desires Japanese ouster from Taiwan and the Pescadores, but that is probably less strictly urgent, from a pure security POV, and probably also more difficult to accomplish.

Poor Koreans.
And,if they gave soviet their stuff from WW2,Sralin could take on Europe in 1935,and nobody could stop him.
 
Poor Koreans.

Potentially, it is Japanese ousted, yayyyyyyy!

Then, Communist government, booooh! Wait, nobody said booooooh around here, we salute our Comrade leader and the global proletariat!

And,if they gave soviet their stuff from WW2,Sralin could take on Europe in 1935,and nobody could stop him.

Yeah, the Chinese at this time don't have real mass production capability for most of these WWII weapons systems or late 1940s weapons systems, but they have a decent inventory on hand of Soviet late model kit for armor, artillery, aircraft, and naval craft, instruction, and repair manual, Soviet instructional personnel trained in their use, plus a decent inventory of Soviet small arms and different sizes of artillery - probably some AK-47s already, and a decent inventory of WWII era US artillery, fighting vehicles, trucks, tanks, small arms, a few aircraft (captured from the Nationalists), and in Manchuria and North China probably some local manufacturing capability for Japanese WWII era small arms and small artillery tubes and shells, plus a decent inventory of that Japanese stuff left over from WWII plus leftover Japanese vehicles.

What are the odds that Stalin would actually agree to an alliance with the PRC to expel the Japanese from Korea?

He is going to be very skeptical about any proposals for launching unprovoked aggression on land against Japan, and he is going to try to talk Mao out of making any rash international moves like this against Japan or any other power. But he will want to tell Mao or Mao's envoys that the Soviet Union wants to be an ally and "objectively" the USSR and the new China are on the same historical-ideological side. He gains nothing by telling off a new mysterious power, of uncertain but possibly great strength, and picking ideological nits with it right away.

"alliance" yes, to a degree. Offensive plans, not so much.

And might Stalin be willing to listen to Mao about how the next 20 years are going to turn out?

He will find information exchange and technology demonstration with the Chinese immensely valuable, and discussion with uptime Soviet representatives in China immensely valuable, whatever parts of what they say he chooses to believe, or not. Some things they show technically will prove themselves. Some details people would know or anticipate could help prove future bona fides.

I also wonder if Stalin might view Mao as a potential rival and thus might want to off him, but that's probably very risky since Mao is the leader of a large state, a state that would likely portray itself as being friendly towards the Soviet Union.

Stalin will try to get independent spying going against Mao for sure, but the risks of openly breaking with Mao, acting consistently unfriendly or rude, or trying to overthrow or kill him far outweigh the benefits of cooperating with him at this stage. 1930 Stalin doesn't have the same easy ability to just snap his fingers and ensure somebody in the USSR ends up dead and denounced as 1936 and beyond Stalin did, much less in an unknown foreign country. Besides, at this point, the future existence of the PRC can be used to show that, in the long run, Comrade Stalin was *right* about everything, including even the revolutionary trends in China, for which he was criticized after the massacres of Communists in 1927-1928.

Stalin's downtime from China would probably say that his solo portrait is even more ubiquitous in party offices and enterprises in Manchuria than in Manchuria. Uptime Soviets who report from China would be even more starstruck and deferential than any of his 1930 lackeys.

Any uncomfortable details aside, the broad future is good news for Stalin, he industrializes and electrifies the country, he leads the country to defeat the big aggressive German threat that decadent capitalists allowed to rise, and saved the world, and made the USSR and Socialism and Russia stronger than ever, and also delivered the killing blows to Japan while helping push along the Chinese revolution.

The main thing Stalin will insist on with Mao is total editorial control by his office of Maoist "news from the future" releases to Soviet citizens and media outlets and about the Soviet Union's affairs. In the meantime, Mao, although a proud man and very self-confident, will want to cultivate Stalin's Russia as a reliable ally against Japanese aggression he knows is coming within a year at most. And he'll know Stalin. Mao and his representatives will probably feel really awkward if they ever meet Soviet "dead men walking" who later got purged and won't want to invest in relationships with them.

The West is likely to become very, very freaked out. "First Russia, and now China, they'll say!" What next? I expect the West to give much more support to Japan in this scenario if it will not go after any of the "white man's colonies" but will instead focus on the Eurasian Commies. Heck, I wonder if Japan could actually portray its war in China in this TL as actually being a liberation war. That is, if China fails to quickly expel Japan from Korea.

Yes, but the Great Depression is rather consuming for the capitalist world

And China, while still far from industrialized up to Japan's standard, especially a completely un-embargoed Japan, is far more cohesively organized and commanded than the China that Japan faced from OTL 1931-1945. Even a broad Japanese invasion of China's coast is likely to bog down with a much shallower penetration than Japan's operations in OTL's Sino-Japanese war.
 
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Potentially, it is Japanese ousted, yayyyyyyy!

Then, Communist government, booooh! Wait, nobody said booooooh around here, we salute our Comrade leader and the global proletariat!

As they say, the first person that stops clapping in a Communist country disappears very quickly, unfortunately. :(

Yeah, the Chinese at this time don't have real mass production capability for most of these WWII weapons systems or late 1940s weapons systems, but they have a decent inventory on hand of Soviet late model kit for armor, artillery, aircraft, and naval craft, instruction, and repair manual, Soviet instructional personnel trained in their use, plus a decent inventory of Soviet small arms and different sizes of artillery - probably some AK-47s already, and a decent inventory of WWII era US artillery, fighting vehicles, trucks, tanks, small arms, a few aircraft (captured from the Nationalists), and in Manchuria and North China probably some local manufacturing capability for Japanese WWII era small arms and small artillery tubes and shells, plus a decent inventory of that Japanese stuff left over from WWII plus leftover Japanese vehicles.



He is going to be very skeptical about any proposals for launching unprovoked aggression on land against Japan, and he is going to try to talk Mao out of making any rash international moves like this against Japan or any other power. But he will want to tell Mao or Mao's envoys that the Soviet Union wants to be an ally and "objectively" the USSR and the new China are on the same historical-ideological side. He gains nothing by telling off a new mysterious power, of uncertain but possibly great strength, and picking ideological nits with it right away.

"alliance" yes, to a degree. Offensive plans, not so much.



He will find information exchange and technology demonstration with the Chinese immensely valuable, and discussion with uptime Soviet representatives in China immensely valuable, whatever parts of what they say he chooses to believe, or not. Some things they show technically will prove themselves. Some details people would know or anticipate could help prove future bona fides.



Stalin will try to get independent spying going against Mao for sure, but the risks of openly breaking with Mao, acting consistently unfriendly or rude, or trying to overthrow or kill him far outweigh the benefits of cooperating with him at this stage. 1930 Stalin doesn't have the same easy ability to just snap his fingers and ensure somebody in the USSR ends up dead and denounced as 1936 and beyond Stalin did, much less in an unknown foreign country. Besides, at this point, the future existence of the PRC can be used to show that, in the long run, Comrade Stalin was *right* about everything, including even the revolutionary trends in China, for which he was criticized after the massacres of Communists in 1927-1928.

Stalin's downtime from China would probably say that his solo portrait is even more ubiquitous in party offices and enterprises in Manchuria than in Manchuria. Uptime Soviets who report from China would be even more starstruck and deferential than any of his 1930 lackeys.

Any uncomfortable details aside, the broad future is good news for Stalin, he industrializes and electrifies the country, he leads the country to defeat the big aggressive German threat that decadent capitalists allowed to rise, and saved the world, and made the USSR and Socialism and Russia stronger than ever, and also delivered the killing blows to Japan while helping push along the Chinese revolution.

The main thing Stalin will insist on with Mao is total editorial control by his office of Maoist "news from the future" releases to Soviet citizens and media outlets and about the Soviet Union's affairs. In the meantime, Mao, although a proud man and very self-confident, will want to cultivate Stalin's Russia as a reliable ally against Japanese aggression he knows is coming within a year at most. And he'll know Stalin. Mao and his representatives will probably feel really awkward if they ever meet Soviet "dead men walking" who later got purged and won't want to invest in relationships with them.



Yes, but the Great Depression is rather consuming for the capitalist world

And China, while still far from industrialized up to Japan's standard, especially a completely un-embargoed Japan, is far more cohesively organized and commanded than the China that Japan faced from OTL 1931-1945. Even a broad Japanese invasion of China's coast is likely to bog down with a much shallower penetration than Japan's operations in OTL's Sino-Japanese war.

Everything here makes sense, frankly. I just wonder if Mao kept lists of all of the Soviet officials whom Stalin has purged over the years.
 
They sweep into Korea and drive the Japanese home any further attempts for an invasion will fail.

You figure the 1950 Chinese Communist forces have the organization and cohesion, plus sufficient 1950 and WWII era Soviet weapons, plus stocks of WWII era American and Japanese weapons, and good positioning already in Manchuria, to surprise attack the 1930 Japanese in Korea and the Kwangtung peninsula, and sweep them off the mainlands, and then, when the pissed off Japanese try to reinvade those lands, or any other places on the China coast, the Chinese will be able to shift forces, contain, and crush any Japanese landing forces?

The Chinese don't have much of a Navy, so even the 20 year older Japanese Navy will still be able to bombard the China coast and transport new batches of troops. The Japanese Navy would also allow Japan to hold on to Cheju-Do island province of Korea.

Ironically, in this TL, it would be democratic 1930 Japan appealing to the League of Nations against Chinese aggression in violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

I do not think that the fighting would be once and done with a single Chinese offensive even if the Chinese stand a decent chance of grabbing the mainland territories in a single campaign season of a couple months. The Japanese have hope of a potentially successful response on Hainan island and Chousan island (east of Shanghai) where they can isolate the battlefield.

The humiliation would be too great for the Japanese not to rally around a militaristic response of try to recapture mainland territory by invasion. Japan will spend whatever it can afford (and scrape together some funds it can't or shouldn't) to fund the expedition. It may do it with mostly indigenous equipment, but Japan would not be adverse to buying weapons abroad if that would be useful, and at this point, with Japan the defender, not the aggressor, and the world free-falling into Depression, British, American, and European arms manufacturers won't hesitate to sell arms and war material that Japan can afford to buy.

Would Mao's China invade Hong Kong or Macau? I don't see why in particular, since they did not in OTL, and they want to resolve the Japan war first. For the same reason, open, blatant invasions of French Indochina, Burma, or India seem unlikely, as it would seem to multiply China's enemies, and the USSR would also advise against it. But, I could imagine China sponsoring Indochinese, Burmese, Siamese, and Indian Communist political movements that build up armed wings and gradually build up local terrorist and guerrilla campaigns.

In occupied/liberated Korea, the Chinese would sponsor a puppet people's government.

As for China-Japan, maybe after about 3 years or so of failed invasions getting thrown back, and increased pilot losses due to a build-up of Chinese air defenses, Japan's militarism toward China and the Communist powers specifically may be worn down by war-weariness.

It would be nice if militarists get scapegoated and this opens the way toward a return to fuller and more liberal democracy in Japan. That might happen. But it might not work that way. Defeat might be blamed instead on whatever democratic elements were left in Japan, preventing Japan from being as 'hardcore' as the Communist enemy, and could be used to justify an outright totalitarian Fascist dictatorship that is totalitarian and navalist-militarist even while being pretty cautious about what foreign conflicts it actually sticks its nose into.

Japan may spend the rest of the 1930s suffering in postwar humiliated poverty, or reorient toward navalism, leaving a door to becoming opportunistic if and when a European War puts the western colonial powers on the ropes.

China could lend the Soviets back their own weapons to get an edge on tech ahead of WWII, and I could imagine Mao offering training programs in 'People's War' for various groups, like Spanish leftists and even non-Communist and reactionary but anti-Fascist groups like Haile Selassie's Ethiopians.
 
You figure the 1950 Chinese Communist forces have the organization and cohesion, plus sufficient 1950 and WWII era Soviet weapons, plus stocks of WWII era American and Japanese weapons, and good positioning already in Manchuria, to surprise attack the 1930 Japanese in Korea and the Kwangtung peninsula, and sweep them off the mainlands, and then, when the pissed off Japanese try to reinvade those lands, or any other places on the China coast, the Chinese will be able to shift forces, contain, and crush any Japanese landing forces?

The Chinese don't have much of a Navy, so even the 20 year older Japanese Navy will still be able to bombard the China coast and transport new batches of troops. The Japanese Navy would also allow Japan to hold on to Cheju-Do island province of Korea.

Ironically, in this TL, it would be democratic 1930 Japan appealing to the League of Nations against Chinese aggression in violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

I do not think that the fighting would be once and done with a single Chinese offensive even if the Chinese stand a decent chance of grabbing the mainland territories in a single campaign season of a couple months. The Japanese have hope of a potentially successful response on Hainan island and Chousan island (east of Shanghai) where they can isolate the battlefield.

The humiliation would be too great for the Japanese not to rally around a militaristic response of try to recapture mainland territory by invasion. Japan will spend whatever it can afford (and scrape together some funds it can't or shouldn't) to fund the expedition. It may do it with mostly indigenous equipment, but Japan would not be adverse to buying weapons abroad if that would be useful, and at this point, with Japan the defender, not the aggressor, and the world free-falling into Depression, British, American, and European arms manufacturers won't hesitate to sell arms and war material that Japan can afford to buy.

Would Mao's China invade Hong Kong or Macau? I don't see why in particular, since they did not in OTL, and they want to resolve the Japan war first. For the same reason, open, blatant invasions of French Indochina, Burma, or India seem unlikely, as it would seem to multiply China's enemies, and the USSR would also advise against it. But, I could imagine China sponsoring Indochinese, Burmese, Siamese, and Indian Communist political movements that build up armed wings and gradually build up local terrorist and guerrilla campaigns.

In occupied/liberated Korea, the Chinese would sponsor a puppet people's government.

As for China-Japan, maybe after about 3 years or so of failed invasions getting thrown back, and increased pilot losses due to a build-up of Chinese air defenses, Japan's militarism toward China and the Communist powers specifically may be worn down by war-weariness.

It would be nice if militarists get scapegoated and this opens the way toward a return to fuller and more liberal democracy in Japan. That might happen. But it might not work that way. Defeat might be blamed instead on whatever democratic elements were left in Japan, preventing Japan from being as 'hardcore' as the Communist enemy, and could be used to justify an outright totalitarian Fascist dictatorship that is totalitarian and navalist-militarist even while being pretty cautious about what foreign conflicts it actually sticks its nose into.

Japan may spend the rest of the 1930s suffering in postwar humiliated poverty, or reorient toward navalism, leaving a door to becoming opportunistic if and when a European War puts the western colonial powers on the ropes.

China could lend the Soviets back their own weapons to get an edge on tech ahead of WWII, and I could imagine Mao offering training programs in 'People's War' for various groups, like Spanish leftists and even non-Communist and reactionary but anti-Fascist groups like Haile Selassie's Ethiopians.

So,Japan would hold part of Korea? And,no matter if they manage to do so,after 3-4 years of fighting they would capture enough soviet WW2 stuff to start making them on its own.
Well,not tanks or planes,but guns and fieldguns.And engines for both planes and tanks.
 
So,Japan would hold part of Korea? And,no matter if they manage to do so,after 3-4 years of fighting they would capture enough soviet WW2 stuff to start making them on its own.
Well,not tanks or planes,but guns and fieldguns.And engines for both planes and tanks.

Maybe - what would be the longer term consequences of all that?
 
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@raharris1973 1950 Manchuria was even more industrialized than 1930 Manchuria was, right? If so, could that make it an extremely tempting target for an extremely quick Japanese surprise attack? Though I'm not 100% sure that Japan can actually permanently hold it, though it would obviously be much easier for Japan if Japan actually succeeds in building its own nuclear weapons. Conquer Manchuria and then create a new defensive line to the south of it similar to the Korean DMZ. I think that engaging in conquests of China beyond Manchuria might be beyond 1930 Japan's capabilities, or at least permanently holding onto such conquests after they are made.
 
@raharris1973 1950 Manchuria was even more industrialized than 1930 Manchuria was, right? If so, could that make it an extremely tempting target for an extremely quick Japanese surprise attack? Though I'm not 100% sure that Japan can actually permanently hold it, though it would obviously be much easier for Japan if Japan actually succeeds in building its own nuclear weapons. Conquer Manchuria and then create a new defensive line to the south of it similar to the Korean DMZ. I think that engaging in conquests of China beyond Manchuria might be beyond 1930 Japan's capabilities, or at least permanently holding onto such conquests after they are made.

Conquering any of Manchuria or really grabbing any land north of the Yalu river in China is going to be impossible for 1930 Japan to do against the October 1950 version of China, no matter how fast and aggressive the Japanese try to be.

Remember, Japanese aggression even a year later in 1931-33 didn't have endorsement and concerted support from the national government and hq, it was field armies and commanders getting "entrepreneurial", being successful, and becoming immensely popular on the back of those successes.

The Japanese Armies in either Kwangtung or Korea try that against the ISOT'ed China (assuming China does not attack first, which we cannot guarantee), the Japanese will run headlong into the same prepared and well-armed Chinese troops who in OTL were about to enter Korea, infiltrate ROK and US positions, and chase those forces back down south of Seoul in three months in OTL's Korean War, and who were supported by MiG jet fighters with Soviet pilots. The Japanese forces that try to cross over will get smashed up, and Tokyo will try to deny it did anything.

Nuclear weapons aren't even entering into the mix for at least a decade for anyone.
 
Conquering any of Manchuria or really grabbing any land north of the Yalu river in China is going to be impossible for 1930 Japan to do against the October 1950 version of China, no matter how fast and aggressive the Japanese try to be.

Remember, Japanese aggression even a year later in 1931-33 didn't have endorsement and concerted support from the national government and hq, it was field armies and commanders getting "entrepreneurial", being successful, and becoming immensely popular on the back of those successes.

The Japanese Armies in either Kwangtung or Korea try that against the ISOT'ed China (assuming China does not attack first, which we cannot guarantee), the Japanese will run headlong into the same prepared and well-armed Chinese troops who in OTL were about to enter Korea, infiltrate ROK and US positions, and chase those forces back down south of Seoul in three months in OTL's Korean War, and who were supported by MiG jet fighters with Soviet pilots. The Japanese forces that try to cross over will get smashed up, and Tokyo will try to deny it did anything.

Nuclear weapons aren't even entering into the mix for at least a decade for anyone.

Makes sense. So, Japan should aggressively fortify Korea along the Yalu and also spend like crazy on its navy in order to protect Taiwan against any future Chinese invasion.

When do you think that China will acquire the capacity to launch a serious invasion of Japanese-ruled Taiwan?
 
Makes sense. So, Japan should aggressively fortify Korea along the Yalu and also spend like crazy on its navy in order to protect Taiwan against any future Chinese invasion.

When do you think that China will acquire the capacity to launch a serious invasion of Japanese-ruled Taiwan?

Probably not until the 1950s at the earliest even with maximal concentration on naval development. And by that point we cannot rule out either or both Japan or the PRC or both having nuclear weapons.

The Japanese can try to fortify Korea if they have time, but the Chinese will be in a position to overmatch them at the very start, and while if the Chinese hesitated or were distracted the Japanese could do a decent defensive catch-up through the 30s, by the 40s I think the balance of land power would swing irrevocably in China's favor for any conflict in Korea.
 

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