raharris1973
Well-known member
I read a couple articles lately describing the ultimate decision of the Ottoman Empire to align with Germany and go to war with the Entente as, strategically, a more broadly supported move, and a more considered choice rather than whimsical hijacking of national policy by Enver, or the Germans, or a mere momentary emotional reaction to Britain requisitioning ships the Ottomans had ordered and paid for.
Basically, in these articles I've been checking out, Ottoman siding with Germany against the Entente is described as a "rational catastrophe". It did not work out well for the empire, but from everything the Ottoman Empire was seeing, for the achievement of its national goals of increasing sovereignty, self-reliance, and self-preservation, and the diplomatic feedback it was getting from all powers, Entente and Central, siding with the CPs, made the most sense at the time.
Basically, none of the Entente powers were giving the Ottoman Empire a sufficiently good reason to *not side* with the Central Powers in the war, despite multiple Ottoman attempts and offers to align with each of the Entente powers in turn, Britain, France, and Russia.
Dissent within Ottoman circles about entering the war, in this interpretation wasn't really about the fundamental strategic decision and alignment, but about timing and method, only Enver and German Admiral Souchon knowing when the first strike on the Russians would be.
Both Germany and the Ottomans perceived themselves as having mutual interests, but negotiated carefully even as WWI approached and began to not become over-obligated to one another. The Ottomans secured monetary payments, the ability to get an alliance without *immediate* obligation to declare war, a pledge to protect their borders, and got increasing German assistance. As the German offensive in the west fell increasingly short of expectations, Germany became more impatient and keener to see the Ottomans activate anti-Entente belligerency, but Enver and the rest of the Ottoman leaders moved things at their own pace.
The Ottomans declared neutrality at first in August. In September, while still a neutral, they abolished the capitulations and raised tariffs, earning the protest of Entente and CPs alike (although Germany and Austria privately said they would not act on their protests). Also by the end of that month, the Ottomans used the excuse of the of the ongoing war to close the straits to international shipping -- while still a neutral. Then accepted the delivery of the two German warships and crews into the Ottoman naval service.
By late October, the Germans were pressing ever harder for an Ottoman declaration of war, and saying it was time for the Ottomans to move if they didn't want the alliance to fall apart. Some Ottomans took the Germans at their word.
Ultimately, with Enver's approval, Admiral Souchon took his dreadnoughts to bombard Odessa, and Enver had the Ottoman govt refuse to disavow the act and the Ottoman govt declared war.
Now getting to the speculative history part: It is conceivable to me that the Ottomans could have continued to string the Germans along. The Germans really wanted another ally to enter the fight, because their war was not going as well as expected, but the Ottomans, to a great extent, had them over a barrel, as a still neutral power.
The Germans could have carried out their threat to cancel the Ottoman alliance, stop sending funds and weapons to the Ottomans, and pull back their personnel from the country - but that would seem to hurt them at least as much as the Ottomans, since it was the Germans who still could use an ally to help weigh in the balance on their side. So, had the Ottomans waited, and directed to the German dreadnoughts formally under them to not take anti-Russian/Entente acton, German threats might have been exposed as a bluff, with Germany not wanting to ruin chances of a later Ottoman entry.
In such a situation, if the Germans had remained patient, the Ottomans might have joined the war in spring or summer 1915, inspired by the German turn to take offensive action against Russia in the east. Additionally, If the Ottoman Empire had not declared war until some point in calendar year 1915, even its early months, like Jan, Feb, Mar, or Apr, it likely would have been too late for the British Admiralty to base its spring planning around a campaign to assault the straits and Gallipolli, and Mesopotamia. What would the British have been doing with themselves, to what effect?
A delayed Ottoman entry could have been beneficial for the Ottomans (and thus CPs) if the Ottomans used the time to continue to arm and mobilize and ended up not declaring war and mounting a Caucasus offensive in mid-winter, but instead in spring or summer 1915. On the other hand, perhaps Britain, not doing Gallipolli, might have done something more dangerous to the CP [it depends what the Brits do, sending men to France or the Balkans might help the Entente, trying to land on the German coast would hurt themselves way more than the Germans]
The timing of Italian entry might or might not be affected. Italy's entry, if on time, and before an Ottoman declaration, might deter the Ottomans from entering the war altogether, and set-in-motion a chain of events leading to an eventual earlier Entente victory.
On the other hand, am I over-estimating Ottoman power to control events, even if Enver and other Ottoman leaders wanted to slow things down? And am I over-estimating German restraint? Liike perhaps Admiral Souchon could send the Goeben to attack Odessa against Turkish explicit instructions in an attempt to cause a fait accompli bringing the Ottomans into the war at the moment, ready and willing, or not? Or am I over-estimating Entente restraint? Even absent an Ottoman declaration of war at the beginning of November 1914, would Ottoman actions thus far, closure of the straits, and abolition of capitulations, and harboring/"purchase" of German ships have caused the Entente powers to have declared war on the Ottoman Empire of their own volition by the end of November or December 1914, refusing to let the empire continue to enjoy neutrality, and resulted in the Entente mounting its historical Gallipoli and Mesopotamia operations nearly on schedule with OTL?
Basically, in these articles I've been checking out, Ottoman siding with Germany against the Entente is described as a "rational catastrophe". It did not work out well for the empire, but from everything the Ottoman Empire was seeing, for the achievement of its national goals of increasing sovereignty, self-reliance, and self-preservation, and the diplomatic feedback it was getting from all powers, Entente and Central, siding with the CPs, made the most sense at the time.
Basically, none of the Entente powers were giving the Ottoman Empire a sufficiently good reason to *not side* with the Central Powers in the war, despite multiple Ottoman attempts and offers to align with each of the Entente powers in turn, Britain, France, and Russia.
Dissent within Ottoman circles about entering the war, in this interpretation wasn't really about the fundamental strategic decision and alignment, but about timing and method, only Enver and German Admiral Souchon knowing when the first strike on the Russians would be.
Both Germany and the Ottomans perceived themselves as having mutual interests, but negotiated carefully even as WWI approached and began to not become over-obligated to one another. The Ottomans secured monetary payments, the ability to get an alliance without *immediate* obligation to declare war, a pledge to protect their borders, and got increasing German assistance. As the German offensive in the west fell increasingly short of expectations, Germany became more impatient and keener to see the Ottomans activate anti-Entente belligerency, but Enver and the rest of the Ottoman leaders moved things at their own pace.
The Ottomans declared neutrality at first in August. In September, while still a neutral, they abolished the capitulations and raised tariffs, earning the protest of Entente and CPs alike (although Germany and Austria privately said they would not act on their protests). Also by the end of that month, the Ottomans used the excuse of the of the ongoing war to close the straits to international shipping -- while still a neutral. Then accepted the delivery of the two German warships and crews into the Ottoman naval service.
By late October, the Germans were pressing ever harder for an Ottoman declaration of war, and saying it was time for the Ottomans to move if they didn't want the alliance to fall apart. Some Ottomans took the Germans at their word.
Ultimately, with Enver's approval, Admiral Souchon took his dreadnoughts to bombard Odessa, and Enver had the Ottoman govt refuse to disavow the act and the Ottoman govt declared war.
Now getting to the speculative history part: It is conceivable to me that the Ottomans could have continued to string the Germans along. The Germans really wanted another ally to enter the fight, because their war was not going as well as expected, but the Ottomans, to a great extent, had them over a barrel, as a still neutral power.
The Germans could have carried out their threat to cancel the Ottoman alliance, stop sending funds and weapons to the Ottomans, and pull back their personnel from the country - but that would seem to hurt them at least as much as the Ottomans, since it was the Germans who still could use an ally to help weigh in the balance on their side. So, had the Ottomans waited, and directed to the German dreadnoughts formally under them to not take anti-Russian/Entente acton, German threats might have been exposed as a bluff, with Germany not wanting to ruin chances of a later Ottoman entry.
In such a situation, if the Germans had remained patient, the Ottomans might have joined the war in spring or summer 1915, inspired by the German turn to take offensive action against Russia in the east. Additionally, If the Ottoman Empire had not declared war until some point in calendar year 1915, even its early months, like Jan, Feb, Mar, or Apr, it likely would have been too late for the British Admiralty to base its spring planning around a campaign to assault the straits and Gallipolli, and Mesopotamia. What would the British have been doing with themselves, to what effect?
A delayed Ottoman entry could have been beneficial for the Ottomans (and thus CPs) if the Ottomans used the time to continue to arm and mobilize and ended up not declaring war and mounting a Caucasus offensive in mid-winter, but instead in spring or summer 1915. On the other hand, perhaps Britain, not doing Gallipolli, might have done something more dangerous to the CP [it depends what the Brits do, sending men to France or the Balkans might help the Entente, trying to land on the German coast would hurt themselves way more than the Germans]
The timing of Italian entry might or might not be affected. Italy's entry, if on time, and before an Ottoman declaration, might deter the Ottomans from entering the war altogether, and set-in-motion a chain of events leading to an eventual earlier Entente victory.
On the other hand, am I over-estimating Ottoman power to control events, even if Enver and other Ottoman leaders wanted to slow things down? And am I over-estimating German restraint? Liike perhaps Admiral Souchon could send the Goeben to attack Odessa against Turkish explicit instructions in an attempt to cause a fait accompli bringing the Ottomans into the war at the moment, ready and willing, or not? Or am I over-estimating Entente restraint? Even absent an Ottoman declaration of war at the beginning of November 1914, would Ottoman actions thus far, closure of the straits, and abolition of capitulations, and harboring/"purchase" of German ships have caused the Entente powers to have declared war on the Ottoman Empire of their own volition by the end of November or December 1914, refusing to let the empire continue to enjoy neutrality, and resulted in the Entente mounting its historical Gallipoli and Mesopotamia operations nearly on schedule with OTL?