The Anglo-American-Japanese v. German-Boer War of 1899 and its consequences

raharris1973

Well-known member
Our scenario begins with the Second Samoan Civil War of 1898-1899. Second Samoan Civil War - Wikipedia. This emerged when the Samoan King Malietoa Laupepa died, and his son Malietoa Tunamafili was recognized as King by an American judge on the island and the British, but a rival, Mata'afa Iosefo returned from exile and won support for his rival claim on the basis that Tunamfili was too young, and gained significant popular backing and backing from the Germans.

In OTL, the Mata'afa forces won some initial battles against Tunamafili forces, even when those were augmented by US and British Marines and ships, but he was contained, and by the end of the year, Samoa was partitioned.

In the ATL, the difference is some German ships from German New Guinea or Tsingtao and some Marines are in the region and steam toward Samoa in support of Mata'afa shortly after his own version of coronation.

With German ships & marines present, even while they're not offensively engaged, they become a tempting target after US and British Marines face some unexpected and embarrassing setbacks at the hands of the Mata'afa forces in March and April 1899. Things escalate, with US and British ships attacking the Germans, and the Germans defending and counter-attacking. Eventually each side takes some losses and it becomes impossible to contain. The British declare war on the Germans by May, and the Americans follow suit.

The Germans are in a defensive/reactive mode, with their deployed forces trying die bravely defending themselves and their colonies and attempting some daring raids, and their naval forces at home vainly trying to sortie, with those getting any distance to the channel or North Sea getting squashed.

The British objectives are to destroy the globally deployed and any other exposed portions of the German fleet, and rout the Germans in the colonial sphere from the South Pacific to West Africa. The Americans aim to participate in driving the Germans from the Pacific, in particular at Samoa, and points north of the equator, between Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines.

In the ensuing months, more Anglo-American ships come to grips in the Pacific, with the overmatched Germans inexorably losing more than they can replace to attrition, and losing more atolls and islands, and British, Australian, New Zealand, and American Marines overrunning those spots.

In Africa, in somewhat lengthier campaigns, British and Indian troops, augmented by troops from the Cape Colony and Rhodesia, are employed against Germany's African colonies while the US is absent.

Both the Anglo-American and German side find new allies joining them in the coming weeks and months.

By late summer of 1899, Japan, still bearing a grudge over Germany's role in the Triple Intervention of 1895, declares war on a clearly losing Germany and invades the Marianas islands north of Guam, while putting Tsingtao to siege.

No later than October 1899, feeling under siege by the British and demanding an end to it, the Boer Republics attack Britain, significantly complicating Britain's situation.

Some Frenchmen think about how to exploit the situation to possibly fight the Germans or otherwise gain back Alsace-Lorraine. At the same time, they are sympathetic to the Boers in the South African context, and the Anglo-Americans do seem quite high-handed.

Any French exploratory diplomatic soundings to Russia about going to war with Germany, or even threatening to go to war with Germany, to secure territorial concessions in Europe, are mercilessly shot down by appalled Russians who mostly look at the ongoing wars as examples of desperate German and Boer resistance against British high-handedness and bullying. Besides, at this moment, Russia has an agreement with Austria to maintain the Balkan status quo, and so has no desires to make territorial changes in Europe while it concentrates on Asia.

Any even more exploratory French diplomatic soundings to Britain and the US about France joining their coalition against Germany find a mildly positive reception to the idea of France joining the naval and colonial and economic war. However, Britain and the USA show practically zero interest in French ideas about raising British and American armies to base in France to join the French army for an assault on the German homeland. Both the British and Americans signal that such campaigns would be completely superfluous to their national requirements and interests.

Left with the prospect of basically attacking and bleeding all on their own against the German Army in Europe, and going through some of the most dramatic phases of the Dreyfuss Affair at the moment, even revanchist Frenchmen conclude circumstances are not presently good for attacking Germany.

The colonial war drags on through 1900 and into 1901. The Germans lose everything in the Pacific (New Guinea and the smaller islands) by very early 1900. African campaigns are what stretch out through 1900, and in some cases, 1901. British forces occupy Tanganyika and Namibia, and forces from the Gold Coast take Togo while forces from Nigeria take Kamerun. The Boer War, especially with its guerrilla phases, stretches on until 1902 or 1903.

The settlement with Germany basically recognizes the new reality. There are no indemnities paid or taken, but basically in territorial terms, Germany accepts the loss of its overseas empire in return for the end of blockade. In the Pacific, Japan gets Tsingtao and the Marianas, the USA, gets the Marshalls, Carolines, and Palau, and eastern Samoa, and Britain and the Dominions get Western Samoa, New Guinea, and the Bismarck Archipelago. The Cape Colony gets Namibia, and Britain gets the rest of the German African colonies. PoWs are returned. This is basically a one-way flow back to Germany. Everybody keeps any weapons/ships captured, pretty much a one-way flow against Germany. All properties, assets and patents of Americans and British in Germany and of Germans in America and Britain have been nationalized and won't be given back.

The British settlement with the Boers comes later, but it comes, and along similar lines to OTL.

Germany can come out of this two ways, angry and determined for a naval/colonial rematch, or determined that it is a land animal/land power that can't compete in that arena and shouldn't try. I think it will go for the latter, because even though there will be much anger at the Anglo-Americans, and examples of hyped up brave resistance, the battles or at least campaigns overseas will all be defeats. Plus, due to German inferiority, for most of the war, the majority of the fleet ships home based in the North Sea will be afraid to come out to face the British directly to either end the blockade or come to the rescue of beleaguered fleet detachments getting hammered around the world, which will be a bad look.

In turn, the easy victory, and the crushing of the German naval and colonial challenges won't leave much of a lasting bitterness against Germany in the UK and US.

It can 'clear the air' and make later wars between them and Germany quite unlikely. It could make 'splendid isolation' once more look like a sustainable approach for Britain.

If Skallagrim is correct, British indifference could even withstand a later German war against Russia and/or France.


Therefore, the thesis that I dispute -- that Britain was fated to be Germany's foe because Germany was looking for continental hegemony -- is simply false. Britain became Germany's foe because Germany took step after bloody step to make it so. All Germany would have to do to gain permanent peace was to spend all the OTL naval investments on the army; seek no colonies; and don't oppose British war aims in far-flung corners of the Earth that Germany shouldn't give a damn about anyway.

.......snip.....

Britain and Germany could easily be allies. One rules the waves, the other rules the land. One has the strongest army on the planet, the other has the strongest navy. They have their own spheres, and no conflicting interests at all. It makes perfect sense.
 
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Skallagrim

Well-known member
An early 'match' between these powers would be a very interesting way to prevent future European wars from escalating into global wars. Having clearly won, any British anxiety over the awful-terrible-very-oh-so-threatening German fleet would be gone. Having lost utterly, I don't think any serious German could entertain the notion of "we have to retake the colonies" or "we have to build a bigger fleet than Britain". If you'll forgive the lame joke... that ship has sailed.

The interesting thing is that since neither Russia nor France atacked Germany, it may therefore transpire that German anxieties are also reduced. Considering Wilhelm II's OTL response to major setbacks, I'd expect deep depression rather than fiery anger. He has, in his mind, lost his place in the sun. I think he'll sulk and retreat from much of public life, thus expiditing the process of the monarch's power being limited, and his government exercising more control over the course of the (another lame joke?) ship of state.

On the other hand, France and Russia may, in time, become eager to exploit the perceived weakness of Germany. It's not a given, of course. But if something akin to OTL's Great War is still sparked, and sees Austria-Hungary pitted against Russia, I think this'll draw in Germany and France as well, as in OTL. The thing is... yes, you're correct. The escalation probably stops there. And I think France and Russia will be over-confident, due to Germany being so soundly defeated earlier.

They'll get quite the surprise. The "War of 1914" (or whatever) may well stay a purely European-continental affair, and it may well end in German victory.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
An early 'match' between these powers would be a very interesting way to prevent future European wars from escalating into global wars. Having clearly won, any British anxiety over the awful-terrible-very-oh-so-threatening German fleet would be gone. Having lost utterly, I don't think any serious German could entertain the notion of "we have to retake the colonies" or "we have to build a bigger fleet than Britain". If you'll forgive the lame joke... that ship has sailed.

The interesting thing is that since neither Russia nor France atacked Germany, it may therefore transpire that German anxieties are also reduced. Considering Wilhelm II's OTL response to major setbacks, I'd expect deep depression rather than fiery anger. He has, in his mind, lost his place in the sun. I think he'll sulk and retreat from much of public life, thus expiditing the process of the monarch's power being limited, and his government exercising more control over the course of the (another lame joke?) ship of state.

On the other hand, France and Russia may, in time, become eager to exploit the perceived weakness of Germany. It's not a given, of course. But if something akin to OTL's Great War is still sparked, and sees Austria-Hungary pitted against Russia, I think this'll draw in Germany and France as well, as in OTL. The thing is... yes, you're correct. The escalation probably stops there. And I think France and Russia will be over-confident, due to Germany being so soundly defeated earlier.

They'll get quite the surprise. The "War of 1914" (or whatever) may well stay a purely European-continental affair, and it may well end in German victory.

You think that Britain would stay neutral in any future European continental war if the German fleet is no longer a problem for it?
 

Skallagrim

Well-known member
You think that Britain would stay neutral in any future European continental war if the German fleet is no longer a problem for it?
And the defeat of Germany in general. "Oh, look, they're not some huge, imposing threat after all." So when war breaks out on the continent, many will be expecting Franco-Russian victory anyway, and will simply care less about the outcome. "Let them fight it out, we'll stay in splendid isolation".

(And to be fair, that's the smart thing to do.)
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
And the defeat of Germany in general. "Oh, look, they're not some huge, imposing threat after all." So when war breaks out on the continent, many will be expecting Franco-Russian victory anyway, and will simply care less about the outcome. "Let them fight it out, we'll stay in splendid isolation".

Interesting analysis. In such a scenario, Germany might not win in 1914 due to logistics, but it might succeed in bleeding the French dry at Verdun in 1916. Of course, that's all assuming that FF is still assassinated on schedule in 1914, which he might not be.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
What do you think of my having the Japanese jump into this war, on the Anglo-American side?

My argument was rather straightforward, revenge for the Triple Intervention, against that Triplice's most vulnerable member, an implicitly, security for Japan with acquisition of the Marianas and Tsingtao.

But does that overestimate Japan's boldness? Might the Japanese fear that if they take on Germany, that Russia and France would fight become disturbed and fight Japan as well, and it would be too much to handle? Would Russia and France cry foul at Japan pouncing on the Germans? I had assumed not. I also assumed the Anglo-Americans would welcome Japanese assistance, as long as it's not accompanied by territorial ambitions that go beyond "reasonable" and Tsingtao and Marianas don't seem "unreasonable" or obstructive to US or UK goals or sea lanes.

In any case, I assume the Asia-Pacific situation also really does nothing to resolve the fundamental tensions which led to the Russo-Japanese war, so that is likely to remain on track to break out in 1904, and have a similar outcome to OTL. Is there any reason I should expect it to drastically change?

There's another thing I thought of. This war will overlap considerably with the Boxer Rebellion. The Boxer Rebellion in the ATL will likely take place shortly after the Japanese have finished taking Tsingtao. The international great powers I think will generally cooperate to suppress the Boxers like OTL. However, with their forces largely eliminated or on the run in the Far East, the Germans will be unable to participate in the Boxer Expedition, unlike OTL.


Also, would you concur with my choice to have the Boers attack in 1899 as they did in OTL, deciding that Britain was ultimately determined to subjugate them, a fight was inevitable, and it was best to do it while Britain had other fighting going on? Or would the Boers avoid attacking in October 99 for some reason if the British had been fighting the Germans since May?
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
What do you think of my having the Japanese jump into this war, on the Anglo-American side?

My argument was rather straightforward, revenge for the Triple Intervention, against that Triplice's most vulnerable member, an implicitly, security for Japan with acquisition of the Marianas and Tsingtao.

But does that overestimate Japan's boldness? Might the Japanese fear that if they take on Germany, that Russia and France would fight become disturbed and fight Japan as well, and it would be too much to handle? Would Russia and France cry foul at Japan pouncing on the Germans? I had assumed not. I also assumed the Anglo-Americans would welcome Japanese assistance, as long as it's not accompanied by territorial ambitions that go beyond "reasonable" and Tsingtao and Marianas don't seem "unreasonable" or obstructive to US or UK goals or sea lanes.

In any case, I assume the Asia-Pacific situation also really does nothing to resolve the fundamental tensions which led to the Russo-Japanese war, so that is likely to remain on track to break out in 1904, and have a similar outcome to OTL. Is there any reason I should expect it to drastically change?

There's another thing I thought of. This war will overlap considerably with the Boxer Rebellion. The Boxer Rebellion in the ATL will likely take place shortly after the Japanese have finished taking Tsingtao. The international great powers I think will generally cooperate to suppress the Boxers like OTL. However, with their forces largely eliminated or on the run in the Far East, the Germans will be unable to participate in the Boxer Expedition, unlike OTL.


Also, would you concur with my choice to have the Boers attack in 1899 as they did in OTL, deciding that Britain was ultimately determined to subjugate them, a fight was inevitable, and it was best to do it while Britain had other fighting going on? Or would the Boers avoid attacking in October 99 for some reason if the British had been fighting the Germans since May?

If Russia and France will fight the Japanese, then the Anglo-Americans should help out the Japanese, no? And the British Navy was truly supreme back then, which should significantly help Japan.

I think that the Boers would be more likely to attack a distracted Britain--as in, a Britain that is already fighting another Great Power, such as Germany. They would see it as a moment of opportunity for themselves.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
If Russia and France will fight the Japanese, then the Anglo-Americans should help out the Japanese, no? And the British Navy was truly supreme back then, which should significantly help Japan.

Nobody had binding alliance commitments to Japan at the time. I don't think the Russians and French would actually find it worth it wade into a Far Eastern naval shooting war in 1899, especially while US-UK versus German rough-housing is making it dangerous. However, Japan doesn't know that for sure, knows it doesn't have treaty allies, and might feel the whites will screw it over, especially if it hasn't decided to move until after the Boxer Rebellion starts.

Meanwhile, the British can handle the French and Russian navies, but they really don't want to widen the war with additional fronts. It could be tempting to let the Japanese hang out to dry. Because warring on the French and Russians multiplies the number of ships you have to deal with significantly, the length of coastline you have to blockade exponentially, and the number of land fronts you need to be concerned with exponentially. Your African war goes from a strategically easy, can't lose affair, to a pretty hard slog, once the French Empire there is against you. You have to worry a bit about defending Suez. There's an inconvenient Indochina front. Britain actually needs to get concerned about the defense of India from Russia.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
Nobody had binding alliance commitments to Japan at the time. I don't think the Russians and French would actually find it worth it wade into a Far Eastern naval shooting war in 1899, especially while US-UK versus German rough-housing is making it dangerous. However, Japan doesn't know that for sure, knows it doesn't have treaty allies, and might feel the whites will screw it over, especially if it hasn't decided to move until after the Boxer Rebellion starts.

Meanwhile, the British can handle the French and Russian navies, but they really don't want to widen the war with additional fronts. It could be tempting to let the Japanese hang out to dry. Because warring on the French and Russians multiplies the number of ships you have to deal with significantly, the length of coastline you have to blockade exponentially, and the number of land fronts you need to be concerned with exponentially. Your African war goes from a strategically easy, can't lose affair, to a pretty hard slog, once the French Empire there is against you. You have to worry a bit about defending Suez. There's an inconvenient Indochina front. Britain actually needs to get concerned about the defense of India from Russia.

So, maybe the Japanese would only move once they actually have written Anglo-American guarantees of protection, which for the reasons that you mentioned the Anglo-Americans might be loath to give to the Japanese?
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
@Skallagrim - what did you think of my PoD here? I chose the 2nd Samoan Civil War because it was actually one occasion where the British and Americans on the one hand, and the Germans, on the other, were backing opposing proxies in a local war, and I thought I could escalate it with enough encounters and getting pride involved.
This came shortly after the Americans were irritated by the Germans in Manila Bay in 1898. For the British, this came a couple years after the first Tirpitz Naval Law, which they probably didn’t like, and three years after the Kruger Telegram which they definitely didn’t like.

Not that German relations with either country were irrevocably bad at this time either. Around this time, and for the next couple years Britain was offering Germany an alliance, if Germany would accept Britain’s terms on the Far East. Britain and Germany also managed to cooperate in the blockade of Venezuela in 1902.

hopefully, my escalation isn’t too much of a stretch. As it was, the powers found Samoa not worth fighting a war over, and partitioned it and some other Pacific territories.

I had thought of other, earlier PoDs that might lead to a German naval-colonial ‘match’with Britain, but not the United States.

1 idea was that in the aftermath of the Jameson Raid, Kruger quickly holds a drumhead court martial for all the captured raiders and executed several of them, including British subjects. I think that’s enough to get an early British declaration of war on the Boers in 1896. However, the timing is unfortunate for Germany because he just sent the Kruger telegram, congratulating him on defeating the rss as raid, before even knowing the executions would happen. The British are outraged at the telegram(like OTL) even though it cheered Boer sef defense, not harsh capital punishment.

but, the timing and the overal jingo hysteria in Britain creates a feeling in the British yellow press and chattering public that Wilhelm’s attaboy ‘emboldened’ Kruger to be the bloody hangman, so it leads to calls for declaring war on Germany that Salisbury succumbs to.
That leads to the colonial war previously described where Britain sweeps up existing German colonies and German ships out at sea and exposed.

if that’s too much of a stretch we could have a German letter that Gave an undated ultimatum saying ‘hands of Transvaal’ that was apparently sent to the foreign office after the Jameson Raid in OTL get opened and read and leaked by FO staff and lead to war, instead of what happened in real life, which was that ambassador Hatzfeldt grabbed it from the foreign office, still unopened, and destroyed it before it could do any damage.
 

Skallagrim

Well-known member
I think the POD you went with is the more realistic one. A simple escalation that snowballs into a much bigger confrontation. That sort of thing just happens.

The alternative POD is the more narratively compelling one. If you're writing a novel, rather than a history, that one would be the obvious choice because of Drama™.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
@Skallagrim, regarding your comments on how after a defeat the Kaiser will sulk in Depression, Germans will be less aggressive, France and Russia will underestimate Germany, think it is weak, and in the war of 1914, or whenever, will be in for a surprise, and meanwhile, Britain won't be alarmed enough by Germany to intervene.

....Indeed, unless Germany post-1899 goes into hyper-passive funk, abandoning its remaining allies, I think matters could well come to a head a bit *sooner* than 1914.

As I mentioned, I think, all else being equal, the forces driving toward Russo-Japanese conflict remain in effect. Russia's taking of Port Arthur and drive to the Far East and meddling in Japan's Korean backyard, Japan's resentment and fear of Russia, desire to control Korea, and win back influence it won in the Sino-Japanese war.

Meanwhile, Japan will get a small confidence boost from the war with Germany. Russia won't regard it as deserved, assuming Japan is a cheap scavenging vulture riding British coattails, and that accounts for any of its winnings.

Britain will have some swagger after beating Germany and the Boers, but the anti-Boer effort will be tiring and have some controversy, and will wrack up some bills. With Germany out of the colonial picture, France and Russia will look the next most threatening to London. Obviously, a British-German alliance will be excluded for the next several years, so an Anglo-Japanese alliance is fairly likely on about the schedule of OTL. Comradeship in arms against the Germans won't have hurt in this either.

So, the Japanese will have the confidence by 1904 that they have a shot at winning versus Russia.

The Russo-Japanese War begins as OTL.

One thing that is different is that there is nothing like the 1st Morocco Crisis in OTL's form. France will be pushing on to take more control in Morocco like OTL, but Germany, feeling weak in the overseas sphere, won't push back and deploy the Kaiser by ship, to lead Germany into another possible humiliation. Also, Britain, with less worry about the Germans, may be less worried about French whining over Egypt, and thus less hurried about accepting the French bargain to recognize French Morocco for British Egypt. Britain might be the harder bargainer and source of friction for France's consolidation of Morocco than Germany. (Though I doubt the British will take it too far, wanting to save money and all, and having more African territory than they know what to do with).

I suspect at least a very limited Anglo-French Entente in 1904 based on Anglo-French agreement that neither wants to get drawn in to the Russo-Japanese war. France doesn't want to lose a big colonial war, and Britain doesn't want to pay the price of winning a colonial war to seize an empire four or five times larger than the German colonial empire.

Russia has a revolution, and loses the war with Japan like OTL, but the Tsar remains in power. Russia loses a lot of confidence and prestige.

Here is where European politics gets much different.

Both Germany and Russia have had their extra-European colonial dreams smashed, both have internal factions openly admitting weaknesses and need for change, and appear weaker to outsiders than they appeared before their respective defeats at the hands of Britain, the US and Japan. Both are drawn to focus closer to home, in Europe.

That could be conducive to peace, if their local environments remain placid.

But alas they won't.

Coming soon, there will be the Young Turk revolt, and then the Bosnian Crisis.

In OTL, when Germany stood by Austria against Serbia and Russia, the latter two backed down, with Russia in particular feeling weak and unready for conflict.

In the ATL, because Germany was defeated totally in 1899, and has been swagger-less on the international stage since then, the Russians miscalculate and think they can win or keep playing and wear down the Austrians and Germans through a war of nerves in the Balkans, and embroil France more deeply on their side.

The Germans are confident the Russians will back down, and have the Austrians stand firm, and then go on the offensive against the Serbs, leading the Russians to mobilize.

Once that is on, we're getting to spring 1909, and the Germans feel the need to counter-mobilize, but also move against Russia before they build up too much.

This leads to the Schlieffen-esque, Moltke-esque logic of better to have war now than later, so Germany attacks France via Belgium.

This leaves a bad impression in Britain but is not treated as a casus belli, because it is not regarded as a direct threat, especially because the German offensive falls short of Paris and the channel ports. With the French on the defensive at the start, the German bulge into occupied France is less.

However, the 1909 Austrian campaign crushes and occupies Serbia, which is much smaller in land area and population and arms stocks that year than it was in 1914. The Austrians finish their 1909 campaign occupying Serbia and sealing the borders with the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria, Romania and Montenegro. The Austrians also manage to defend all but the easternmost quarter of Galicia. The Germans also successfully defend East Prussia.

In the 1910 campaign, the Germans hold defensively in the west onto their captured 90% of Belgium and some border regions of France, and turn their offensive focus to the east. In a joint campaign with the Austrians, they drive the Russians out of Galicia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and most of Estonia, putting St. Petersburg under threat and swelling it with refugees. They also succeed in enlisting Romania and the Ottomans as allies, who each attack in the Bessarabia and Kars sectors respectively.

Germany successfully defends itself in the west from France.

Russia buckles under revolutionary pressure under the stress and peaces out before the year is over. By March 1911, Germany has imposed a Brest-Litovsk style peace on the Russian revolutionary regime.

In the west, Germany offers to relinquish Belgium and Luxembourg in return for a guarantee of their neutrality observed by military missions from other neutral European states (Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, Spain), and to relinquish occupied France except for Briey-Longwy. After a final set of costly failed French offensives in 1911, and a series of mutinies when more French offensives are attempted, France accepts terms.


-------

Now as an alternative to the above, it did occur to me I could have the continental war break out even sooner, with Germany having decided it's destined to be a land animal, decide to make an opportunistic war of aggression (along with the Austrians) against Russia in 1905 while the latter is getting beaten in the Russo-Japanese war and facing revolution. Germany would attack by land, and by the Baltic Sea with what's left of it's fleet, which should still be very technically efficient, especially since it won't be launched until after the Russian Baltic fleet has been sent around the Cape or been sunk at Tsushima.

It would be a dastardly backstab without a good excuse of course, and France would feel obligated to attack, and Germany would have to defend in the west (which it could do effectively).

I didn't go this route because it seemed a little too convenient, contrived, and rule of cool.

Going even further back, I suppose one could argue a knock-on effect of the war of 1899 could plausibly prevention of the Russo-Japanese War. Why? Because Japanese victory in Tsingtao and the Marianas against the Germans really could be a wake-up call to the Russians to take the Japanese seriously. So that when the Japanese propose one of their compromise offers, like Manchuria, with Port Arthur, wholly for Russia, but Korea, wholly for Japan, Russia says yes, and that pushes off confrontation for at least a decade if not more.


Regarding the effects of the 1890s German colonial shellacking on German internal politics, I think that Kaiser Wilhelm's reign could survive the 1899 Samoan scenario, though with diminished authority and prestige. That's because although the country has faced a humiliating loss, it's not so much his fault, as a local situation got out of control and escalated, and the opponent surprisingly escalated to the maximum level in a way that left Germany helpless.

Now in my 1895 scenarios, where it's based on executions and escalations after the Kruger Telegram, or a Kaiser approved ultimatum from Marschal over the Transvaal, the truth will inevitably get out, and the monarch's recklessness will get exposed, and the Kaiser will probably be forced to abdicate in favor of his 13 year old son, who will have to be guided by a regency of an adult male relative from the dynasty.
 

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