Did Russia make a huge mistake in not trying to dismember the Ottoman Empire in the mid-1890s during the Hamidian massacres?

WolfBear

Well-known member
Did Russia make a huge mistake in not trying to dismember the Ottoman Empire in the mid-1890s during the Hamidian massacres? One could make a very strong case that the Ottoman Empire's entry into World War I and the subsequent blockage of the Straits to Russia during wartime helped cause Russia to descend into revolution and to subsequently disintegrate during World War I. At the very least, it made trade with its Western allies much harder to conduct and also made it much harder for its Western allies to provide a lot of aid for it. It also resulted in the diversion of a lot of Russian troops to the Caucasian theater of World War I. But if Russia would have made a move to dismember the Ottoman Empire in the 1890s, during the Hamidian massacres, and the other Great Powers would have actually accepted such a Russian move back then (due to the Ottomans' extremely atrocious behavior towards the Armenians), then Russia could have permanently neutralized the Ottoman threat in the south in the event of a future war with Germany. This would have, of course, made it easier for Russia to wage a war with Germany in the future. This wasn't a purely hypothetical matter either since the Franco-Russian alliance was already signed and ratified by 1894, which is also when Russian Tsar Alexander III died and was replaced by his eldest son Russian Tsar Nicholas II. Back then, Russia was very Armenophobic and thus did not take advantage of the geopolitical situation that the Hamidian massacres might have presented it, but even from a pure geostrategic perspective, in hindsight, this seems like a huge missed opportunity for Russia, no? By the time that Russia acquired renewed interest in the Armenian question in the early 1910s, Germany was already building close ties with the Ottoman Empire, which made it much more likely that any future Russo-Ottoman war would also involve Germany (and possibly Austria-Hungary as well). But I'm unsure that this was already the case back in the mid-1890s.

Thoughts?
 
I agree - not partitioning the OE at that time was a mistake, for Russia.
For many different reasons.
WWI - if there was one - would be quite different.
 
If one assume's OTL's WWI line-up and outbreak as inevitable, it was a mistake to not break-up the Ottoman Empire beforehand.

The potential advantages of breaking up the Ottomans in the 1890s could have been:

Near-term- Not sure you thought of this, but maybe it distracts Russia (and powers trying to be friendly with Russia) from overextending themselves in the Far East, getting in Japan's face, Triply Intervening, and starting the countdown to the Russo-Japanese war

Longer-term - In the event of war against Germany and Austria-Hungary in the 20th century, the Ottomans are not an independent power capable of blockading the straits and fielding armies distracting multiple Russian armies, making things better for Russia's economic and military situation

The risk and uncertainty is:

With an early partitioned Ottoman Empire, European alignments may end up different, with more large powers aligned against Germany by the time great power coalition war breaks out.

But I don't think it is too bad a risk, the Armenian situation had turned British opinion, and PM Lord Salisbury's policy, so anti-Ottoman that the British probably would not be prepared to do a 180 degree turn and threaten war against the Russians before the Russians have made gains in the straits and greater Armenia. That leaves Germany and Austria-Hungary to potentially start a war to save the Ottomans, but that is also pretty doubtful, because the Germans have to worry about two-front war (with France) in this case and the Austrians can probably be bought off with offers of territory or spheres of influence (in the western Balkans), and their publics may not be immune to outrage over the Armenian massacres.

However, I would add that the Armenian crisis of the 1890s was hardly the last chance for Russia to make its position more secure on its southern, Ottoman, flank.

Later opportunities include:

Intervening in the Italo-Ottoman or Balkan wars, especially the latter, to either get the straits, or one side of the straits (the European side) for themselves, or for a weaker country like Bulgaria. I know the Russians hated the idea of a lesser country like Bulgaria or Greece getting the straits instead of Russia, but really, neither of those countries would have been likely to blockade Russian commerce. If the Bulgarians in particular tried it, Russia could easily get Romanian cooperation to send forces over land to pressure Bulgaria to open up.

Alternatively, Russia could have accepted Talaat Bey's offers of an Ottoman-Russian alliance in the 1913-1914 timeframe.

Or, Russia could have accepted the final Ottoman alliance offer from Enver Bey, after the outbreak of WWI, in Aug-Sep 1914, which involved Ottoman-Russian alliance, and Ottoman territorial expansion at Bulgarian expense, to be compensated at Serbian expense, to be compensated at Austrian expense.
 
If one assume's OTL's WWI line-up and outbreak as inevitable, it was a mistake to not break-up the Ottoman Empire beforehand.

The potential advantages of breaking up the Ottomans in the 1890s could have been:

Near-term- Not sure you thought of this, but maybe it distracts Russia (and powers trying to be friendly with Russia) from overextending themselves in the Far East, getting in Japan's face, Triply Intervening, and starting the countdown to the Russo-Japanese war

Longer-term - In the event of war against Germany and Austria-Hungary in the 20th century, the Ottomans are not an independent power capable of blockading the straits and fielding armies distracting multiple Russian armies, making things better for Russia's economic and military situation

The risk and uncertainty is:

With an early partitioned Ottoman Empire, European alignments may end up different, with more large powers aligned against Germany by the time great power coalition war breaks out.

But I don't think it is too bad a risk, the Armenian situation had turned British opinion, and PM Lord Salisbury's policy, so anti-Ottoman that the British probably would not be prepared to do a 180 degree turn and threaten war against the Russians before the Russians have made gains in the straits and greater Armenia. That leaves Germany and Austria-Hungary to potentially start a war to save the Ottomans, but that is also pretty doubtful, because the Germans have to worry about two-front war (with France) in this case and the Austrians can probably be bought off with offers of territory or spheres of influence (in the western Balkans), and their publics may not be immune to outrage over the Armenian massacres.

However, I would add that the Armenian crisis of the 1890s was hardly the last chance for Russia to make its position more secure on its southern, Ottoman, flank.

Later opportunities include:

Intervening in the Italo-Ottoman or Balkan wars, especially the latter, to either get the straits, or one side of the straits (the European side) for themselves, or for a weaker country like Bulgaria. I know the Russians hated the idea of a lesser country like Bulgaria or Greece getting the straits instead of Russia, but really, neither of those countries would have been likely to blockade Russian commerce. If the Bulgarians in particular tried it, Russia could easily get Romanian cooperation to send forces over land to pressure Bulgaria to open up.

Alternatively, Russia could have accepted Talaat Bey's offers of an Ottoman-Russian alliance in the 1913-1914 timeframe.

Or, Russia could have accepted the final Ottoman alliance offer from Enver Bey, after the outbreak of WWI, in Aug-Sep 1914, which involved Ottoman-Russian alliance, and Ottoman territorial expansion at Bulgarian expense, to be compensated at Serbian expense, to be compensated at Austrian expense.

Good analysis, Rob. Also, what about instead of having Ottoman territorial compensation at Bulgaria's expense, the Ottomans get Kars province (minus Batumi/Adjara) back instead? This would involve a minor territorial loss for Russia but Russia has only held this territory since 1877-1878 and Russia was willing to make territorial concessions when necessary (South Sakhalin in 1905).
 
Also, @raharris1973, I want to point something out here: The issue isn't merely Russian control of the Straits, but also the fact that the Caucasian Front diverted a lot of Russian troops that could have been used elsewhere--and the same is also true for Britain sending its own troops to fight the Ottomans in the Middle East when they could have otherwise been used to fight Germany and/or Austria-Hungary.

Honestly, since Russia wasn't interested in Ottoman Armenia in the mid-1890s, Russia had little to gain in the event of a victorious war against the Ottomans. The Straits by themselves were certainly not worth a huge loss in Russian lives, especially if the Ottomans were actually willing to negotiate with the Russians in exchange for an alliance or at least in exchange for neutrality. Such a scenario would have also been better for the Ottoman Armenians considering that they would not have been murdered in extremely massive numbers. Who exactly meaningfully benefitted from the Ottoman entry into World War I anyway? The Arabs? But they got to endure Anglo-French colonialism afterwards! The Zionists? Well, maybe, but was it really worth it?
 
In WWI the Russians had to man the Ottoman front. The British chose to do so.
I agree that the Zionists were the sole beneficiaries of the Ottoman entry into WWI on CP side.
 
In WWI the Russians had to man the Ottoman front. The British chose to do so.
I agree that the Zionists were the sole beneficiaries of the Ottoman entry into WWI on CP side.

Possibly, in an indirect manner, the Germans, Poles, Finns, and Balts were also beneficiaries. If you want to stretch it, perhaps the Irish too.

The Ottoman participation was obviously in the end self-destructive to the Ottoman Empire and its peoples. However, it was most damaging to the Russians among the Entente powers.

OTL's outcome of WWI, with Ottoman participation, featured a German and CP defeat, but only *after* a Russian revolution and defeat which ended up resulting in the independent of Poland, Finland, and the Baltics, and the negation of any Russian claim to German territory or reparations.

Without the weight of Ottoman participation the German/CP side, the extra Russian and British Empire forces freed up for use against Germany and Austria-Hungary probably results in German/CP defeat *before* any Russian revolution and defeat. This means that Poland, Finland and the Baltics don't have the opportunity to be independent of Russia (or whatever satellite status Russia wishes to concede) and Russia will have its own claims to reparations from German and possibly to demilitarizations and changes to Germany's eastern border, that might extend as far as "pushing Poland west" like in WWII with the transfer of East/West Prussian, Posen, Silesian lands to Romanov Poland. That's a worse outcome for Germany, and harder to reverse if Russia and France keep their partnership. Also, if the Germans are defeated earlier at less cost, there's a chance that the British don't have to concede as much in the Irish free state independence process.

The Turks lost their empire and tons of blood and treasure, but from a paranoid point of view, even they can justify their participation and say they were better off by participating. First of all, they never would have won Kars-Ardahan back without taking part in the wounding of the Russian Empire and occupying the disputed land. Second, in a negative sense, they could argue, based on 19th century experience, that the Russians and British were going to be biting off pieces of the Ottoman Empire one or two provinces every decade or two regardless of what the Ottomans did, so leaving the Russian Empire less injured by WWI and revolution would have just given it, and others the opportunity to dismantle the Ottoman Empire, and Turkish homeland, *more thoroughly* than OTL at its own leisure after WWI.
 
Without the weight of Ottoman participation the German/CP side, the extra Russian and British Empire forces freed up for use against Germany and Austria-Hungary probably results in German/CP defeat *before* any Russian revolution and defeat.
Maybe ...
However, for Poland only the 2nd Revolution counts. If Entente wins between March and October 1917, most Polish lands end up under the Russian Republic.

And remember - Stalin dug up the Oder-Neise Line in Tsarist time memorandums ... the "Sazanov Plan".
 
Maybe ...
However, for Poland only the 2nd Revolution counts. If Entente wins between March and October 1917, most Polish lands end up under the Russian Republic.

And remember - Stalin dug up the Oder-Neise Line in Tsarist time memorandums ... the "Sazanov Plan".

Kerensky agreed to Polish independence west of the Curzon Line, no?

Possibly, in an indirect manner, the Germans, Poles, Finns, and Balts were also beneficiaries. If you want to stretch it, perhaps the Irish too.

The Ottoman participation was obviously in the end self-destructive to the Ottoman Empire and its peoples. However, it was most damaging to the Russians among the Entente powers.

OTL's outcome of WWI, with Ottoman participation, featured a German and CP defeat, but only *after* a Russian revolution and defeat which ended up resulting in the independent of Poland, Finland, and the Baltics, and the negation of any Russian claim to German territory or reparations.

Without the weight of Ottoman participation the German/CP side, the extra Russian and British Empire forces freed up for use against Germany and Austria-Hungary probably results in German/CP defeat *before* any Russian revolution and defeat. This means that Poland, Finland and the Baltics don't have the opportunity to be independent of Russia (or whatever satellite status Russia wishes to concede) and Russia will have its own claims to reparations from German and possibly to demilitarizations and changes to Germany's eastern border, that might extend as far as "pushing Poland west" like in WWII with the transfer of East/West Prussian, Posen, Silesian lands to Romanov Poland. That's a worse outcome for Germany, and harder to reverse if Russia and France keep their partnership. Also, if the Germans are defeated earlier at less cost, there's a chance that the British don't have to concede as much in the Irish free state independence process.

The Turks lost their empire and tons of blood and treasure, but from a paranoid point of view, even they can justify their participation and say they were better off by participating. First of all, they never would have won Kars-Ardahan back without taking part in the wounding of the Russian Empire and occupying the disputed land. Second, in a negative sense, they could argue, based on 19th century experience, that the Russians and British were going to be biting off pieces of the Ottoman Empire one or two provinces every decade or two regardless of what the Ottomans did, so leaving the Russian Empire less injured by WWI and revolution would have just given it, and others the opportunity to dismantle the Ottoman Empire, and Turkish homeland, *more thoroughly* than OTL at its own leisure after WWI.

Good analysis, Rob. That said, though, it's worth noting that in the long(er)-run, the Germans, Poles, and Balts also ended up severely suffering from the effects of Communism, either directly or indirectly. The Finns less so, though.

As for the Ottomans, if Russia will attempt to spark a new war against the Ottomans in, say, the 1930s or 1940s after winning WWI with a neutral Ottoman Empire, then the Ottomans could count on Britain for support, no?

As for Kars region, it had a lot of Turks and Kurds but was also fairly small. That said, though, if one values a relatively homogeneous Turkey, then losing its Arab territories certainly helped. However, some of those territories, such as Iraq, also contained a lot of oil.
 
In WWI the Russians had to man the Ottoman front. The British chose to do so.
I agree that the Zionists were the sole beneficiaries of the Ottoman entry into WWI on CP side.

Not really as the Ottomans attacked the Suez canal and stirred up unrest in parts of Egypt and Libya as well as being a threat to the oil supply from Persia. Plus the impact on the Russians of the Ottoman dow both by the fighting and by cutting the primary Russian trade/supply route.

Think the Arabs also gained a fair bit as they got a much lighter yoke and some areas such as what became Saudi Arabia escaped foreign rule entirely, although whether that was worth falling under the Saudi dynasty and its extreme views could be a question.
 
Not really as the Ottomans attacked the Suez canal and stirred up unrest in parts of Egypt and Libya as well as being a threat to the oil supply from Persia. Plus the impact on the Russians of the Ottoman dow both by the fighting and by cutting the primary Russian trade/supply route.

Think the Arabs also gained a fair bit as they got a much lighter yoke and some areas such as what became Saudi Arabia escaped foreign rule entirely, although whether that was worth falling under the Saudi dynasty and its extreme views could be a question.

Re: Saudi Arabia: I think that the Ottomans would have done the world a huge favor had they survived, managed to conquer Saudi Arabia, and managed to fully crush Wahhabism in the Saudi heartland by the present-day.

As a side note, this is off-topic, but I figured that I might as well ask: What do you think the immigration policy of a surviving Ottoman Empire would have been over the last 100 years?
 
Not really as the Ottomans attacked the Suez canal and stirred up unrest in parts of Egypt and Libya as well as being a threat to the oil supply from Persia.
In both locations about three average quality Divisions are enough. Due to terrain - Suez in particular, the Turks cannot feed the battle in those areas.
 
Re: Saudi Arabia: I think that the Ottomans would have done the world a huge favor had they survived, managed to conquer Saudi Arabia, and managed to fully crush Wahhabism in the Saudi heartland by the present-day.

As a side note, this is off-topic, but I figured that I might as well ask: What do you think the immigration policy of a surviving Ottoman Empire would have been over the last 100 years?

On the latter it would depend on how the empire developed. If you still have the Young Turks gain power and grow increasingly xenophobic then the empire is unlikely to survive long but there could end up being massive massacres and deportations at least in Anatolia and possibly across parts of the northern Arabian parts of the empire. After this and to fill up some of the vacant lands developed you could see them seeking to import people from the Turkish parts of Central Asia. Might even see some agreement if the Soviet empire forms and is too strong to be fought between the two for population movements of Turks to the Ottoman empire.

Of course the empire could take a vastly different path. There are plenty of options over a different century.

On the 1st point the empire had tried to stamp out the Wahhabists before. With developments in modern weapons they might be more successful but reloigious fundamentalists are often difficult to stamp out, especially when their fellow Muslims so I wouldn't be certain of that. Plus they fill a 'need' so no doubt some other bunch of fanatics will emerge I fear.
 
On the latter it would depend on how the empire developed. If you still have the Young Turks gain power and grow increasingly xenophobic then the empire is unlikely to survive long but there could end up being massive massacres and deportations at least in Anatolia and possibly across parts of the northern Arabian parts of the empire. After this and to fill up some of the vacant lands developed you could see them seeking to import people from the Turkish parts of Central Asia. Might even see some agreement if the Soviet empire forms and is too strong to be fought between the two for population movements of Turks to the Ottoman empire.

Of course the empire could take a vastly different path. There are plenty of options over a different century.

On the 1st point the empire had tried to stamp out the Wahhabists before. With developments in modern weapons they might be more successful but reloigious fundamentalists are often difficult to stamp out, especially when their fellow Muslims so I wouldn't be certain of that. Plus they fill a 'need' so no doubt some other bunch of fanatics will emerge I fear.

The need that religious fundamentalists will feel could be less once the Ottoman Empire will become rich from its oil reserves, no?

Also, what about accepting a lot of South Asian immigrants into the Ottoman Empire? If necessary, the Ottomans could only allow South Asian Muslims in while excluding the Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Parsis, et cetera, I suppose.
 
The need that religious fundamentalists will feel could be less once the Ottoman Empire will become rich from its oil reserves, no?

Also, what about accepting a lot of South Asian immigrants into the Ottoman Empire? If necessary, the Ottomans could only allow South Asian Muslims in while excluding the Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Parsis, et cetera, I suppose.

Not really on the 1st part. After all Iran was pretty damned rich when the clerics took over, albeit that the wealth wasn't well destributed. Even more so with Saudi Arabia being the breeding ground for Al Quada. In fact the wealth that oil brought was a source of complains by the fundamentalists about it leading to corruption and the 'lack of Islamic values' which when your talking about what is still a strongly Wahhabists state.

Similarly with Boko Haram in Nigeria, the driver for that is to 'restore' traditional Islamic values with a deep hostility towards any alternatives, especially from the west for instance. Its hard to see a Turkish dominated Ottoman empire that is economically and militarily capable without accepting a lot of western ideas and that's likely to upset a fair number of Islamic reactionaries.

You could see Muslims encouraged in from India, which might also be popular in the latter country as possibly getting rid of some of its minority. However historically the very wealthy Arabs of the Gulf seem to prefer importing non-Muslim workers, largely from India or places like the Philippine, or in some cases west Africa. Possibly because the religious difference makes it easier to excuse their widespread exploitation and abuse. It would all depend on what the people in charge of the empire wanted in terms of migrants. Non-permanent cheap labourers or settlers who would stay and be absorbed into their culture.
 
Not really on the 1st part. After all Iran was pretty damned rich when the clerics took over, albeit that the wealth wasn't well destributed. Even more so with Saudi Arabia being the breeding ground for Al Quada. In fact the wealth that oil brought was a source of complains by the fundamentalists about it leading to corruption and the 'lack of Islamic values' which when your talking about what is still a strongly Wahhabists state.

Similarly with Boko Haram in Nigeria, the driver for that is to 'restore' traditional Islamic values with a deep hostility towards any alternatives, especially from the west for instance. Its hard to see a Turkish dominated Ottoman empire that is economically and militarily capable without accepting a lot of western ideas and that's likely to upset a fair number of Islamic reactionaries.

You could see Muslims encouraged in from India, which might also be popular in the latter country as possibly getting rid of some of its minority. However historically the very wealthy Arabs of the Gulf seem to prefer importing non-Muslim workers, largely from India or places like the Philippine, or in some cases west Africa. Possibly because the religious difference makes it easier to excuse their widespread exploitation and abuse. It would all depend on what the people in charge of the empire wanted in terms of migrants. Non-permanent cheap labourers or settlers who would stay and be absorbed into their culture.

FWIW, the Ottoman Empire was already relative progressive on certain questions; for instance, private acts of homosexuality were not illegal, in spite of Islam historically condemning such acts. So, the Ottoman Empire could be capable of going against tradition, so to speak. It can also claim that there is a vital state interest in doing this.

And Yeah, fair point about religious fundamentalism.

And Yeah, for what it's worth, I was thinking of the Ottomans recruiting South Asian Muslims if they wanted permanent settlers rather than just guest workers. In real life, the Gulf states do get some guest workers from places like Pakistan, but also from mostly non-Muslim places like India, Nepal, and the Philippines, as you said. When it comes to permanent settlers in order to boost the Ottoman Empire's population, though, I think that Muslims would be preferred since they won't alter the Ottoman Empire's religious character. Regardless of whether India still gets partitioned in this TL, South Asia is full of poverty and thus a lot of its Muslims (and others) could potentially be looking to emigrate. And the Ottoman Empire could eventually become very rich due to its extremely vast oil reserves, thus potentially causing it to need more workers and perhaps even a larger settled population as well. Seems like Muslim South Asians would be a good fit for permanent settlement in the Ottoman Empire and eventual subsequent naturalization. Just imagine all of the subsequent South Asian restaurants throughout the Ottoman Empire, for instance!
 

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