raharris1973
Well-known member
Could Japan have seized/kept Hainan island from 1931-33, without it turning into near-term all-out China War? Or more?
Could that island have been an additional territorial morsel, seized for the glory of the Imperial Japanese Navy more than the Army, complementing the the contemporaneous seizure of Manchuria?
To briefly recap the fate of Hainan island in the 1930s: There were rumors about and fears of Japanese plans to seize Hainan island in the 1931-1933 timeframe when Japan was completing its conquest of Manchuria and nearby northeast Chinese provinces. I'm almost certain Navy staff plans existed for it, but I don't know if any got close to consideration for implementation by Cabinet, Naval staff, or fleet forces commanders. Ultimately, Japan neglected to take Hainan island until early 1939, February-March, over a year and a half into the full-scale phase of Sino-Japanese War beginning in July 1937, after having seized all of China's major coastal cities down to Guangzhou. Chinese frontal resistance to the invasion of the island wasn't lengthy or impressive, although guerrillas fought on there throughout the war.
But if an IJN and Special Naval Landing Force seized the island early, by no later than the Tanggu truce of 1933, could Japan have held on to this land grab like it held on to Manchukuo and Mengjiang, while Chiang played for time ---never recognizing the conquest, but not physically opposing it, and instead concentrating for a few years on building up his forces, eliminating the Communists, and bringing warlords to heel in non-occupied China?
The good reasons to suppose so are that Hainan is an island, protected by water and the Japanese Navy while China has no Navy that can compete, so it is out of reach. The island is also mostly jungle and too inherently developed, productive or populous.
What might make a standing Japanese occupation of the island less tolerable to Chiang's regime than Japan's occupation of Manchukuo however though is the islands very close proximity, across only a very narrow strait, to the longtime Guangdong province base of the KMT Party and so many of its supporters, and Guangxi province, home to so many of the generals loyal to, or in coalition with, the regime.
In OTL, after the Japanese ended their brief 1932-33 Shanghai excursion, Chiang felt safe, once again, to concentrate his forces for anti-Communist encirclement campaigns against Communist Chinese base areas in south central China. If the Japanese are constantly sitting in Hainan, in easy "pouncing" distance, would he feel safe launching those campaigns, or be preoccupied guarding the coast? On the other hand, stationing forces around the ChiCom bases would do "double-duty" for anti-Communist, and potential anti-Japanese purposes, especially any forces in Guangxi and Guangzhou on the southern side of Communist territories.
From the Japanese perspective, Hainan is slightly bolder than Manchuria, because it further south, on the South China Sea, in closer proximity to major western colonies and bases. It is located extremely close to France's Guangzhouwan/Ft. Bayard leased port for example, and between French Indochina's Tonkin ports and Hongkong, and is not too far from the American Philippines and Manila Bay.
During the brief Japanese invasion of Shanghai in 1932-33, the western powers tried to mediate a solution and Japan's exit, and Japan did leave from sovereign Chinese districts, and westerners increased their naval forces in the area of that trade hub city. In the event of a Japanese occupation of Hainan around that time, might the Americans and Europeans reinforce the naval deployments in that area and press Japan to depart, out of concern for their own local colonies and China trading interests? Even if they never press the Japanese in any way that causes Japan to desist from Hainan, and the Chinese don't either, might the early strategic positioning of Japanese forces this far south cause France, Britain, and the USA to be concerned about and take some measures to improve their Far East defenses earlier than historical?
Could that island have been an additional territorial morsel, seized for the glory of the Imperial Japanese Navy more than the Army, complementing the the contemporaneous seizure of Manchuria?
To briefly recap the fate of Hainan island in the 1930s: There were rumors about and fears of Japanese plans to seize Hainan island in the 1931-1933 timeframe when Japan was completing its conquest of Manchuria and nearby northeast Chinese provinces. I'm almost certain Navy staff plans existed for it, but I don't know if any got close to consideration for implementation by Cabinet, Naval staff, or fleet forces commanders. Ultimately, Japan neglected to take Hainan island until early 1939, February-March, over a year and a half into the full-scale phase of Sino-Japanese War beginning in July 1937, after having seized all of China's major coastal cities down to Guangzhou. Chinese frontal resistance to the invasion of the island wasn't lengthy or impressive, although guerrillas fought on there throughout the war.
But if an IJN and Special Naval Landing Force seized the island early, by no later than the Tanggu truce of 1933, could Japan have held on to this land grab like it held on to Manchukuo and Mengjiang, while Chiang played for time ---never recognizing the conquest, but not physically opposing it, and instead concentrating for a few years on building up his forces, eliminating the Communists, and bringing warlords to heel in non-occupied China?
The good reasons to suppose so are that Hainan is an island, protected by water and the Japanese Navy while China has no Navy that can compete, so it is out of reach. The island is also mostly jungle and too inherently developed, productive or populous.
What might make a standing Japanese occupation of the island less tolerable to Chiang's regime than Japan's occupation of Manchukuo however though is the islands very close proximity, across only a very narrow strait, to the longtime Guangdong province base of the KMT Party and so many of its supporters, and Guangxi province, home to so many of the generals loyal to, or in coalition with, the regime.
In OTL, after the Japanese ended their brief 1932-33 Shanghai excursion, Chiang felt safe, once again, to concentrate his forces for anti-Communist encirclement campaigns against Communist Chinese base areas in south central China. If the Japanese are constantly sitting in Hainan, in easy "pouncing" distance, would he feel safe launching those campaigns, or be preoccupied guarding the coast? On the other hand, stationing forces around the ChiCom bases would do "double-duty" for anti-Communist, and potential anti-Japanese purposes, especially any forces in Guangxi and Guangzhou on the southern side of Communist territories.
From the Japanese perspective, Hainan is slightly bolder than Manchuria, because it further south, on the South China Sea, in closer proximity to major western colonies and bases. It is located extremely close to France's Guangzhouwan/Ft. Bayard leased port for example, and between French Indochina's Tonkin ports and Hongkong, and is not too far from the American Philippines and Manila Bay.
During the brief Japanese invasion of Shanghai in 1932-33, the western powers tried to mediate a solution and Japan's exit, and Japan did leave from sovereign Chinese districts, and westerners increased their naval forces in the area of that trade hub city. In the event of a Japanese occupation of Hainan around that time, might the Americans and Europeans reinforce the naval deployments in that area and press Japan to depart, out of concern for their own local colonies and China trading interests? Even if they never press the Japanese in any way that causes Japan to desist from Hainan, and the Chinese don't either, might the early strategic positioning of Japanese forces this far south cause France, Britain, and the USA to be concerned about and take some measures to improve their Far East defenses earlier than historical?
