What if the Germans under Gustav Bauer and Gen Groener tried to pull an Ataturk and defy Versailles in June 1919?

The Germans really hated signing that treaty. Chancellor Scheidemann (SDP) resigned, rather than sign it, leaving Gustav Bauer (SDP), holding the bag. The Germans put forth counterproposals and amendments, that the Allies slapped aside, saying sign it, unmodified, or we are at war again, or we march in, invading you, in 24 hours.

What if the Germans at this point "pulled an Ataturk" by reacting like the Turks did, refusing to sign, or resisting Treaty implementation? [the Turks actually did the former, not the latter, but we can make it the former for the Germans if we want] and ended up fighting forces trying to enforce the implementation of the Treaty of Sevres in their case, and since they succeeded and the Allies were tired and impersistent, they succeeded in getting agreement to signature of a new, revived, more Turkish-favorable treaty, the Treaty of Lausanne.

Now, the simplest answer to my query is, the Germans get invaded by the Allied forces, already occupying the Rhineland, get beaten rather swiftly, and the Allies dictate Versailles terms, indeed harsher ones, from Berlin and German soil, and extract the reparations they want, either gold from vaults, or reparations in kind, before leaving. This may indeed be the correct answer, in short form.

But I still think it is worth asking, and worth estimating at a more detailed level *how* this would play out, how long it would last, what challenges each side would face, and where all the various individual Allied and German players are left at the end of any fighting in 1919, and what this does to the politics of Germany and Europe and the USA in the 20s and beyond.

So from the German point of view, the objective in resisting the treaty is the finding above all some of the territorial clauses, those pertaining to the east, mandating territorial cessions of Danzig and a Reich-splitting corridor to the sea for Poland, and forbidding the self-determined desire of Austrian, Bohemian-Moravian, and
Tyrolese Germans from unifying with Germany from being realized are unacceptable. There is a German political consensus that the loss of Alsace-Lorraine is an acceptable price of peace, a plebiscite on adjusting the border in Schleswig is endurable, and while regrettable, territorial adjustments in favor of Belgium ---but not these territorial strictures designed to placate the Poles, Czechs, and Italians. The Germans also have objections to some of the war criminal aspects' one-sidedness, disarmament provisions, reparations, and alleged 'war-guilt'/responsibility clause.
German resistance to treaty terms/implementation is broadly supported by everyone from the far right in Germany to the moderate left in the SDP, with get-along-to-go-along pro-signature folks only isolated, sporadic voices shamed into mostly staying silent.

The remaining political faction, Spartakists/Communists, do not specifically support the national resistance effort, nor oppose it, they are "orthogonal" to it. It is 'sidewise' of their objective of national and global workers' revolution.

Militarily, the German Army had abandoned its western front fixed defenses and heavy arms, allowed the Allies to occupy the Rhineland and three strategic cities over the river, and done a substantial demobilization. It leaves forces under their command structure in the neighborhood of 400-500,000 men with miscellaneous arms, I do not know if any men, or how many had been furloughed back from Allied POW camps.

Germany was still under blockade and at Allied mercy in a maritime sense, crippling its foreign trade and limiting its food supplies and causing cases of starvation. But, food imports had restarted in March 1919 when an agreement was reached sending remaining German merchant ships from German to Allied ports. This provided some caloric relief to Germans through June, but made those ships vulnerable to quick seizure in the event of resumed hostilities.

So the Allies possessed key terrain further east into Germany in June 1919 than they had at the moment of armistice in Nov 11, 1918. They had been undergoing their own demobilization as well, but certainly had much more mechanized, motorized and heavily armed forces than the Germans, even if less numerous by June 1919 than in November 1918. In November 1918, the Allies also had Italian forces poised at the German (Bavarian) border at Innsbruck/Austrian Tyrol, and a French lead-multinational force strung across the Balkans from Slovenia and Croatia to southern Hungary and northern Transylvania, all poised to advance further north and west toward Germany. By June 1919, the French and British elements of this force were probably demobilized and gone, except for possibly some small advisory detachments, and mainly local forces of new countries like "Poland", "Czecho-Slovakia" and "The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" were mainly collected on their own newly defined national territories.

So I imagine, the campaign scheme of maneuver of a German vs. Allied and Associated Powers resumed fight after a nearly seven months hiatus would appear
somewhat different from a mere continuation of fighting straight from November 1918 onward. [This continuation scenario, and its schemes of maneuver, are being discussed in detail, here: Cool-Headed Ludy - let's mess with Germany's WWI endgame]

But we had a a forum member in the past, [that forum member is @History Learner] arguing on the authority largely of two books, Margaret MacMillan's Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed The World, and Elizabeth Greenhalgh's The French Army and the First World War that the demobilization process was actually, relatively *worse on Allied prospects than German* in a renewed fight in the summer of 1919, and militarily and politically, with the burden of the offensive, the Allies might not have found it possible to conduct an offensive, or sustain one, against German resistance! And thus, the Allies might soon have been forced to revise their terms in some manner, perhaps on objectives they did not physically hold, like eastern borders, or disarmament matters.

I will quote that poster's arguments at length, and you can respond on why his arguments and sources support his optimistic-for-German resistance conclusions, or why they fail to support those conclusions:

History Learner said:
It really wasn't by the Summer of 1919, the demobilization had been that intensive at that point; Foch was absolutely terrified the Germans would refuse and there was no desire left among the Entente public to fight to enforce the Treaty. Historical case in point of this was the Turks not only rejecting the Treaty but successfully fighting off the War weary Entente powers from their territories.

Poly said:
OK, so it's possible that Poland gets more land. So what ?
WWII still happens over German invasion of what country ?
The Germans reject the treaty and actually end up retaining more land than historically. From Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed The World, Pg 158:

History Learner said:
Among the Allied leaders only General Pershing, the top American military commander, thought the Allies should press on, beyond the Rhine if necessary. The French did not want anymore of their men to die. Their chief general, Marshal Foch, who was also the supreme Allied commander, warned that they ran the risk of stiff resistance and heavy losses. The British wanted to make peace before the Americans became too strong. And Smuts spoke for many in Europe when he warned gloomily that "the grim spectre of Bolshevist anarchy was stalking the front."
On Page 159:

And the Allied forces were shrinking were shrinking. In November 1918, there were 198 Allied Divisions; by June 1919, only 39 remained. And could they be relied upon? There was little enthusiasm for renewed fighting. Allied demobilization had been hastened by protests, occasionally outright mutiny. On the home fronts, there was a longing for peace, and lower taxes. The French were particularly insistent on the need to make peace while the Allies could still dictate terms.
Further:

While his pessimism was premature, it is true by the spring of 1919 Allied commanders were increasingly doubtful about their ability to successfully wage war on Germany. The German Army had been defeated on the battlefield, but its command structure, along with hundreds of thousands of trained men, had survived. There were 75 Million Germans and only 40 million French, as Foch kept repeating. And the German people, Allied observers noticed, were opposed to signing a harsh peace.

Poly said: Had the Germans refused the Versailles treaty, there would've been other Germans who could have been produced to sign. You say the allied armies, in the Summer of 1919, were a shadow of those that existed in November 1918, maybe so, but the German army was basically non-existent.
History Learner said:..... As noted by the sources, the Germany Army in 1919 was still about 500,000 men under Arms with their command staff still functioning and paramilitaries constituting another 500,000 or so; a million man force, should the need arise. ......We're talking about the situation in the Summer of 1919 and territories the Germans had yet to surrender as per the Treaty, such as their 1914 territories in the East or unification with Austria.

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What if David Lloyd George was killed by the Spanish Flu shortly before the Versailles Conference?

Poly said:
Where does it say he was "terrified" ?
History Learner said: While his pessimism was premature, it is true by the spring of 1919 Allied commanders were increasingly doubtful about their ability to successfully wage war on Germany. The German Army had been defeated on the battlefield, but its command structure, along with hundreds of thousands of trained men, had survived. There were 75 Million Germans and only 40 million French, as Foch kept repeating. And the German people, Allied observers noticed, were opposed to signing a harsh peace.

For further evidence, The French Army and the First World War by Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Page 375

What gave the post WWII Nuremburg war crimes trials "legal authority"? They were legal because the allies said they were.

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Key difference being that Allied Armies were in Berlin in 1945 but halted at the Rhine in 1919. They could impose their will on the former because they had eliminated all German means of resistance after six years of warfare that concluded in Germany itself, something they failed to achieve in 1919.

The fact is that the Versailles treaty was heavily punitive, if the allies were so impotent to impose the terms of the peace, why would the Germans sign it at all ?
They signed it, because just like the Japanese aboard the USS Missouri, in 1945, they had no other option.

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They signed it because they misunderstood the military balance of power; there are several examples of this in history where sheer bluff or failures of intelligence have led to bad diplomatic deals being accepted because of a perceived choice. Again, we can turn this around and ask why Foch agreed to a Treaty that, in his own words, meant another war in 20 years instead of fighting on to forever remove Germany as a power?

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Germany beaten,as you said.Better world,becouse nobody could start WW2 with "knife in the back" myth.
If Allies were smart and made Bavaria,Saxony and other german states great again,we would be normal Europe.

Prussia - occupy it with colonial troops till they pay for WW1.

Could go either way. It's true that the Germans -- even most of the far left -- hated the dictates of Versailles. (Opportunistically, some of the left also anticipated that continued war would lead to as Bolshevik revolution-style scenario for them to exploit; so rather than purely neutral, some were actively in favour of letting his happen. If the choice is made to fight on, it's quite credible that this becomes the main strategy on the left.) If the German military leadership can convince the populace that it's fight or perish, then the Germans will fight. If they hesitate or try to "just" use this renewed mobilisation and fighting as a "lever" to get somewhat better terms, then most Germans will abandon them.

Basically: the narrative needs to be "Germany must fight, lest we perish!" -- and the average German must be made to believe it.

I think the average German can be made to believe it, simply because the Entente powers were being such intolerable dicks.

Now here's the crux: occupying Germany is impossible at this stage. There is no manpower to do it, there is no will to do it, the Entente is ruined, too... the only power vaguely able to do it would be the USA. If they do it, they'll mostly be throwing their own guys into the meat-grinder, all on behalf of what by now looks mightily like a "War of Western Aggression". The revanchist European Entente powers wanted to skewer Germany, and the idiots pushed too hard. There's a pretty decent chance that America says: fuck you, bunch of idiots, you either offer Germany a good deal and a place at the table... or all our forces are gone from Europe by the end of this month.

Which means that the Entente might actually lose, if they perpetuate the war. So they have no choice. They keel over. They offer Germany a better proposal, and they invite Germany to the table.



Outcome:

-- End of all occupation of German territory.

-- France does keep Alsace-Lorraine.

-- Germany keeps all or most of its lands in the East, on the basis of "fuck Poland, what do they mean to us anyway?"

-- Germany doesn't have to accept war guilt; nobody accepts war guilt.

-- Germany only has to accept guilt for specifically invading Belgium and violating its neutrality.

-- German indemnities and such are lowered subtantially.

-- German military restrictions are largely lifted, but naval restrictions stay.

-- Germany is allowed to united with Austria if it so wishes.



This is by no means a "win" for Germany. They still have to pay an indemnity, and they still face some slight land loss. The war has been even more destructive to them. But they have kept their honour. They have, in their eyes, averted the apocalypse. They stared a French-speaking devil in the eye, and they didn't blink. The socialist ambitions probably don't pay off, and if any kind of "socialistic" ideas break through, it'll be "soldiers' socialism" pushed by veterans. In the same league as Oswald Spengler's Prussianism, and not that different from certain aspacts of OTL national socialism. (But without the wound of humiliation, it'll lack the insane revanchism.)

Europe rebuilds. The Entente powers are far worse off. To them, this does feel like a defeat. The lesson is that they can't beat Germany without America, and America said "go fuck yourself". They've lost more men, their economies are more thoroughly ruined, they can't fleece Germany without mercy... they're screwed. Radical (attempts at) revolutionary action across the board.

Soon enough, in the East, it may transpire that Germany and Russia have shared ambitions. They may work together to erase Poland, and Germany may recognise other Soviet annexations, while the USSR recognises an much-quicker Anschluss and later a German annexation of Czechia. (The USSR, presumably, would take Slovakia.)

Europe would fall into two camps, both with major leftist strains. The aggressive Eastern bloc that runs on Stalinism and... whatever the Germans end up calling their "ism", and the Western bloc that may see more traditional socialist-leaning governments take over. Note that Italy will end up in the second bloc, and that the Germans will have designs on South Tirol. (It was a particular quirk of Hitler that he didn't care about South Tirol.)

America would retreat into far more thorough isolationism, set on never wasting any effort on helping ungrateful Europeans again. If anything, Germany might become a bigger trade partner, while the Entente powers are snubbed.

Everything would be set for a renewed European war, this time to be fought by the Europeans themselves. Depending on how things went, Stalin would either back Germany or limit his support, all to have Germany and the West bleed each other dry. This was his plan in OTL, but the Nazis kept winning against the West. Things may go more along the lines of his expectations in this ATL, or thay may not. His desire, in any case, would be to have the Europeans butcher each other, and then piunce on the winner.

Result: USSR to the North Sea coast.

Skallagrim said:

Could go either way. It's true that the Germans -- even most of the far left -- hated the dictates of Versailles. (Opportunistically, some of the left also anticipated that continued war would lead to as Bolshevik revolution-style scenario for them to exploit; so rather than purely neutral, some were actively in favour of letting his happen. If the choice is made to fight on, it's quite credible that this becomes the main strategy on the left.) If the German military leadership can convince the populace that it's fight or perish, then the Germans will fight. If they hesitate or try to "just" use this renewed mobilisation and fighting as a "lever" to get somewhat better terms, then most Germans will abandon them.

Basically: the narrative needs to be "Germany must fight, lest we perish!" -- and the average German must be made to believe it.

I think the average German can be made to believe it, simply because the Entente powers were being such intolerable dicks.

Now here's the crux: occupying Germany is impossible at this stage. There is no manpower to do it, there is no will to do it, the Entente is ruined, too... the only power vaguely able to do it would be the USA. If they do it, they'll mostly be throwing their own guys into the meat-grinder, all on behalf of what by now looks mightily like a "War of Western Aggression". The revanchist European Entente powers wanted to skewer Germany, and the idiots pushed too hard. There's a pretty decent chance that America says: fuck you, bunch of idiots, you either offer Germany a good deal and a place at the table... or all our forces are gone from Europe by the end of this month.

Which means that the Entente might actually lose, if they perpetuate the war. So they have no choice. They keel over. They offer Germany a better proposal, and they invite Germany to the table.



Outcome:

-- End of all occupation of German territory.

-- France does keep Alsace-Lorraine.

-- Germany keeps all or most of its lands in the East, on the basis of "fuck Poland, what do they mean to us anyway?"

-- Germany doesn't have to accept war guilt; nobody accepts war guilt.

-- Germany only has to accept guilt for specifically invading Belgium and violating its neutrality.

-- German indemnities and such are lowered subtantially.

-- German military restrictions are largely lifted, but naval restrictions stay.

-- Germany is allowed to united with Austria if it so wishes.



This is by no means a "win" for Germany. They still have to pay an indemnity, and they still face some slight land loss. The war has been even more destructive to them. But they have kept their honour. They have, in their eyes, averted the apocalypse. They stared a French-speaking devil in the eye, and they didn't blink. The socialist ambitions probably don't pay off, and if any kind of "socialistic" ideas break through, it'll be "soldiers' socialism" pushed by veterans. In the same league as Oswald Spengler's Prussianism, and not that different from certain aspacts of OTL national socialism. (But without the wound of humiliation, it'll lack the insane revanchism.)

Europe rebuilds. The Entente powers are far worse off. To them, this does feel like a defeat. The lesson is that they can't beat Germany without America, and America said "go fuck yourself". They've lost more men, their economies are more thoroughly ruined, they can't fleece Germany without mercy... they're screwed. Radical (attempts at) revolutionary action across the board.

Soon enough, in the East, it may transpire that Germany and Russia have shared ambitions. They may work together to erase Poland, and Germany may recognise other Soviet annexations, while the USSR recognises an much-quicker Anschluss and later a German annexation of Czechia. (The USSR, presumably, would take Slovakia.)

Europe would fall into two camps, both with major leftist strains. The aggressive Eastern bloc that runs on Stalinism and... whatever the Germans end up calling their "ism", and the Western bloc that may see more traditional socialist-leaning governments take over. Note that Italy will end up in the second bloc, and that the Germans will have designs on South Tirol. (It was a particular quirk of Hitler that he didn't care about South Tirol.)

America would retreat into far more thorough isolationism, set on never wasting any effort on helping ungrateful Europeans again. If anything, Germany might become a bigger trade partner, while the Entente powers are snubbed.

Everything would be set for a renewed European war, this time to be fought by the Europeans themselves. Depending on how things went, Stalin would either back Germany or limit his support, all to have Germany and the West bleed each other dry. This was his plan in OTL, but the Nazis kept winning against the West. Things may go more along the lines of his expectations in this ATL, or thay may not. His desire, in any case, would be to have the Europeans butcher each other, and then piunce on the winner.

Result: USSR to the North Sea coast.

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There would be Europe suicide by germans.They really supported soviets becouse their mad hate of Poland,so they would erase Poland - and then soviets would take them,and then entire Europe.
After that,Africa and Asia would follow.

You just created scenario in which soviet fleet invade USA about 1940.Congraculation,you damned world.

But,since average bavarian or saxonian do not want to die so prussians could murder poles,there is good chance that they simply walk from war,and let prussians be crushed.

Which would lead to standing peace.

ATP said:

Germany beaten,as you said.Better world,becouse nobody could start WW2 with "knife in the back" myth.
If Allies were smart and made Bavaria,Saxony and other german states great again,we would be normal Europe.

Prussia - occupy it with colonial troops till they pay for WW1.

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The problem with making Bavaria and Saxony and other German states "great again" - you mean independent, is that the minute Allied troops leave, their people will choose to reunify with Germany.

I think Bavarian and Saxon separatism has a somewhat better chance of its people taking it seriously in my other end of war for Germany scenario: Cool-Headed Ludy - let's mess with Germany's WWI endgame. I say that because, in that scenario, there is every chance the burghers und fraulein citizens of Bavaria and Saxony will be very surprised over the winter of 1918-1919 to have their completely defenseless home states, home towns, and homes invaded by Italian and French troops coming across the borders from Austria and Bohemia, unopposed by any real Army forces, while all their fine young men drafted in and serving in the Army are dutifully stuck on the western front in Belgium/Luxemburg/Alsace/Rhineland/Ruhr.

That experience of the enemy walking in the unguarded back door while all the boys were sent to barricade the front-door can create damage to the central national contract of a federalist state like Germany.

Prussia has limited ability to pay for WWI through ongoing exports or ongoing economic activity, unless we count Silesia and Silesian coal- but how much of that are we granting to Poland, and does that count against German totals owed? And I assume you are not counting Rhineland and Ruhr as part of Prussia, which it was technically, but making them separate states? The only thing about occupation of Prussia of economic advantage is if you could grab the various vaults in Berlin, Konigsberg, and other locations for various treasure and hard currency before it is hidden or moved or looted, apparently:

When well over 75% of germany's silver/gold/platinum/diamond's and other hard currencie's in it's treasurie's/coffer's/purse's and any other reserve's were hold by the prussian's in the city's of berlin/konigsberg and elsewhere in greater prussia during the year's of 1871-1918,

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The same user said the other 25% of such "treasure" was in the banks of neutral neighbors by this point.

Small, light, mobile, high-value, high liquidity items like this are an easier resource to liquidate for reparations and reconstruction purposes than fiat currency or bulk reparations in-kind.

Skallagrim said:

Could go either way. It's true that the Germans -- even most of the far left -- hated the dictates of Versailles. (Opportunistically, some of the left also anticipated that continued war would lead to as Bolshevik revolution-style scenario for them to exploit; so rather than purely neutral, some were actively in favour of letting his happen. If the choice is made to fight on, it's quite credible that this becomes the main strategy on the left.)

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Well, the main strategy of the Spartakist/Communist left, not the barely left Social Democrats, who will want to look more straightforwardly patriotic and want broad-based democratic government with worker's right, not class warfare or social revolution. The Social Democrats will support armed resistance until the invaders see reason and renegotiate and favor opportunities to do so.

So the SDP types will militarily, just be like any middle-of-the road German who goes along with continuing resistance, whether relunctant or not.

The Spartakist/Communists will opportunistically cheerleading continued war for the chances it can advance for revolution in Germany, and globally. But they will not be particularly useful to the German national armed resistance movement. But they certainly won't be useful at all to the Allied invaders as any sort of helpers for an occupation administration either. They'll be an independent chaos factor, mostly looking to make propaganda, leave graffiti, keep and hide weapons, ensure personal survival, and keep shit stirred up by occasionally sniping or booby-trapping stuff on invading troops path but avoiding close-quarters engagement, and propagandizing by prostitute and the like.

Skallagrim said:

If they hesitate or try to "just" use this renewed mobilisation and fighting as a "lever" to get somewhat better terms, then most Germans will abandon them.

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Ahh, so the German command/government can screw that up, if its effort is too transparently 'theatrical' or gimmicky and appears unserious in any manner. I guess then the effort would get 'abandoned' which would mean most citizens disengage, lay low, and just work toward personal survival. Actually, that would be the kind of environment best for Communists' better long-term political prospects.

So, it is interesting though how it shows the tightrope that a resistance government/force needs to walk. Because symbolic acts are part of resistance, but you don't want to look like *just* spectacle or theater. That puts a premium on resistance force commanders demonstrating maximum competence and professionalism and security. Also on striking hard blows demonstrating fearlessness and determination. Ability to protect and hide its own leadership. Ability and willingness to eliminate collaborators/defectors/traitors ruthlessly. And also probably a willingness to commit terrorism and atrocity on invading Allied forces/support forces to show the German populace there is no going back.

Of course that last is a double-edged sword. It is wearing on the Allied personnel and home public's patience long-term, but they can use outrage at particular actions as motivation fuel in the short-run, and they may only need a short time to stamp out many of the resistance cells in key areas.

Germans aren't like Pashtuns or Arab tribesmen living in old villages, mountains, deserts or slums, they like to live some lives with order and predictability eventually, and want may end up conducting themselves in good order under occupation in spite of themselves, producing an occupation-funding surplus, just because they have all the skills of civilization and want to live life tolerably.

Skallagrim said:

Which means that the Entente might actually lose, if they perpetuate the war.

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So interesting, you're not disagreeing with many of @History Learner 's points.

Skallagrim said:

This is by no means a "win" for Germany. They still have to pay an indemnity, and they still face some slight land loss. The war has been even more destructive to them. But they have kept their honour. They have, in their eyes, averted the apocalypse. They stared a French-speaking devil in the eye, and they didn't blink. The socialist ambitions probably don't pay off, and if any kind of "socialistic" ideas break through, it'll be "soldiers' socialism" pushed by veterans. In the same league as Oswald Spengler's Prussianism, and not that different from certain aspacts of OTL national socialism. (But without the wound of humiliation, it'll lack the insane revanchism.)

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This all adds up to redemption by Ataturkism, like Turkey after fending off the Greeks and getting the revised Treaty of Lausanne. Note Turkey went on to be a *very* geopolitically careful country after this, did not get into revanchist political schemes, carefully and stubbornly guarded its neutrality, and opportunistically 'improved' its border against an opposing claimant that was feeling vulnerable through diplomatic bargaining.

Skallagrim said:

Soon enough, in the East, it may transpire that Germany and Russia have shared ambitions. They may work together to erase Poland,

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Skallagrim said:

and later a German annexation of Czechia.

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Whoa, wait - this sounds like a whole different level of ambition. It sounds substantial geopolitical (on the European scale at least) revisionism, Greater Germany-ism. The train has clearly left the modest station of Ataturkism here.

Also, aren't the aims, desires, and annexations described here, of two national erasures, contradictory with what was earlier described:

Skallagrim said:

(But without the wound of humiliation, it'll lack the insane revanchism.)

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...sounds like they're going back to insane revisionism.

Sure Poland's reestablishment was an unwelcome development, and it didn't exist as an independent, non-puppeted thing for 125 years before 1919. But in history, over the last millennium, *a* Poland existed more often than *no* Poland existed.

And abetting parallel expansion of the Soviets, especially to places beyond the Curzon line Slovakia, just seems nutty and dangerous and wholly unnecessary.

Skallagrim said:

The Entente powers are far worse off. To them, this does feel like a defeat. The lesson is that they can't beat Germany without America, and America said "go fuck yourself". They've lost more men, their economies are more thoroughly ruined, they can't fleece Germany without mercy... they're screwed. Radical (attempts at) revolutionary action across the board.

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They may tell American to effin' forget about getting loans ever getting paid back. In which case the world credit system can lock up and we can cue the Great Depression about nine years early.

Revolutionary attempts would still get suppressed.

Skallagrim said:

Europe would fall into two camps, both with major leftist strains. The aggressive Eastern bloc that runs on Stalinism and... whatever the Germans end up calling their "ism", and the Western bloc that may see more traditional socialist-leaning governments take over. Note that Italy will end up in the second bloc, and that the Germans will have designs on South Tirol. (It was a particular quirk of Hitler that he didn't care about South Tirol.)

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Hmm, so the western governments might be New Dealing their way to some reform and relief of poor economic conditions, and possible gradual economic recovery.

Germans and their South Tyrol. That insane revisionism again, wanting to fight against somebody with modern weapons in the Alps. Then again maybe not that crazy, it's only the Italians, so the effort to take the limited amount of territory desired is finite and not that crazy and can be made to stick.

If the West Europeans by the way are jaded by being ditched by the Americans, and unable to finish the Germans and forced to back off on them, there is a really good chance they will swallow their pride and be open to collaborative trade and diplomacy with the Soviets all along. All the more so if the 20s are mostly a Depression decade. Which, incidentally, would make western expertise and machinery cheaper for the USSR to hire [that happened in the OTL 30s].

If even this alternate Germany did go Nazi or Notzi aggressive, West Europeans and Soviet could have an easier time humbly coming to agreement on containing Germany.

Skallagrim said:

America would retreat into far more thorough isolationism, set on never wasting any effort on helping ungrateful Europeans again. If anything, Germany might become a bigger trade partner, while the Entente powers are snubbed.

Everything would be set for a renewed European war, this time to be fought by the Europeans themselves.

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I don't think you could infer what American policy would be for all time or even for all two decades ahead just based on a major policy disagreement in 1919. Major policy reversals happen based on circumstance and politics. Look at the changes in Soviet foreign policy in this time. Japanese behavior over this period. A USA that decides its gonna bounce out of any plan to occupy Germany in 1919 does not have to be foreordained to be pleased to see Europe from Poland to France all occupied by Germany in 1940 while bombarding and submarining Britain and invading Russia and the Middle East-North Africa. Nor does it have to be pleased to see the USSR occupied all Germany and the Middle East and threatening to invade France and Belgium next.

raharris1973 said:

Ahh, so the German command/government can screw that up, if its effort is too transparently 'theatrical' or gimmicky and appears unserious in any manner. I guess then the effort would get 'abandoned' which would mean most citizens disengage, lay low, and just work toward personal survival.

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They can quite easily screw it all up. They're very much in a bad position. But the point is that in no small part, it's so bad because they were pushed into a corner. They blinked first, when it came to the War itself, and the Entente sought to punish them cruelly. This is what can activate a national sentiment of "fight or die". If you get that, you can actually win, because it's not fight or die for the enemy-- and they are bone-tired, too.

But if you fail, you swing from a lamp-post and your country gets dismembered.

raharris1973 said:

Actually, that would be the kind of environment best for Communists' better long-term political prospects.

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Possibly, although they'd be competing with other elements. The far left did require a degree of organisation, particularly to get their propaganda out there, in OTL. In actual pure chaos, they may get outcompeted by other radicals.

I think their main strategy would be to welcome a perpetuation of hostilities, and hope for a German "victory", followed by them capitalising (or, as it were, anti-capitalising) on the destitute state the country. Foreign threat over, and now loads of people are jobless, homeless, Germany is economically isolated... TIME FOR A REVOLUTION!

This is not automatically a viable path, but it fits with how the far left viewed the course of events.

raharris1973 said:

Germans aren't like Pashtuns or Arab tribesmen living in old villages, mountains, deserts or slums, they like to live some lives with order and predictability eventually, and want may end up conducting themselves in good order under occupation in spite of themselves, producing an occupation-funding surplus, just because they have all the skills of civilization and want to live life tolerably.

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On the other hand: the Entente is not a modern-day power with massive air supremacy, either. They're not capable of occupying Germany at all, even. They're on the brink of economic collapse anyway-- all the more so if America takes its ball and goes home. (Which would assuredly mean: no easy loans anymore, fellas!) Britain and France need their men back home to do their regular civilian jobs. They can't spare all those warm bodies on interminable occupation duty.

The only way an occupation pays even a bit for itself is by stripping Germany of everything, and turning the populace into -- basically -- slaves to work in some form of concripted duty, all profits being immediately shipped away to the Entente.

In other words: great, you've turned the Germans into Pashtun! (Well, not exactly, but you get the picture. If France is allowed to try blasting Germany back to the Dark Ages, they're going to find themselves in a very savage situation.)

raharris1973 said:

So interesting, you're not disagreeing with many of @History Learner 's points.

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If we assume that the Germans manage to pull it together and fight, then I think the premise of German success being quite likely is indeed correct.

But I do stress that the Germans managing this is not a given.

raharris1973 said:

This all adds up to redemption by Ataturkism, like Turkey after fending off the Greeks and getting the revised Treaty of Lausanne. Note Turkey went on to be a *very* geopolitically careful country after this, did not get into revanchist political schemes, carefully and stubbornly guarded its neutrality, and opportunistically 'improved' its border against an opposing claimant that was feeling vulnerable through diplomatic bargaining.

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raharris1973 said:

Whoa, wait - this sounds like a whole different level of ambition. It sounds substantial geopolitical (on the European scale at least) revisionism, Greater Germany-ism. The train has clearly left the modest station of Ataturkism here.

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Germany isn't Turkey, and not in the same position. Mustafa Kemal had very specific goals about getting Turkey on its feet, and getting rid of the old Ottoman pretensions. He managed that, and then he wisely set about consolidating-- because he knew that if he pushed further, he'd lose.

In this scenario, Germany has just turned a defeat into a... not-defeat. After a failed attempt at occupation, there is exactly zero chance of the Entente trying again within the next twenty years. Germany is in ruins, but they're some pretty untouchable ruins right now.

The main difference with OTL is that Germany has no short-term ambitions in the West. Anything about South Tirol is for two decades from then, and aything else (like maybe reclaiming Alsace-Lorraine and ravaging France in Pranco-Prussian War 2.0: genocide boogaloo will be nothing but vague dreams on the extreme fringes of politics).

In practice, the Great War turned into a nightmare, Germany was left alone in a room with the monsters, Germany fought he monsters alone, and Germany defeated the monsters. That's the matter settled. They can be proud.

But Eastern Europe... oh, that's another thing. You know who despises those weak Westerners and hates that fucking Poland exists?

"I DO!" screamed Germany and the USSR, at the same time.

(And then they looked at each other, surrise fading into intrigue...)

raharris1973 said:

Also, aren't the aims, desires, and annexations described here, of two national erasures, contradictory with what was earlier described

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raharris1973 said:

...sounds like they're going back to insane revisionism.

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Which brings us to this. The Germany described here doesn't want to march into Paris, but since both it and Russia are considered "the barbaric enemy" by the West, and since both have ambitions in Eastern Europe that can be made to fit together... well. Why not? We deserve this. We've paid for this in blood and iron. Forget "Strassbourg", if it must be called that. We'll take our pound of flesh in the East.

We'll do it with Stalin. He gets it. He's not some weak fuck, like those idiots in Paris and London. He is the kind of bastard we can work with...

raharris1973 said:

Sure Poland's reestablishment was an unwelcome development, and it didn't exist as an independent, non-puppeted thing for 125 years before 1919. But in history, over the last millennium, *a* Poland existed more often than *no* Poland existed.

And abetting parallel expansion of the Soviets, especially to places beyond the Curzon line Slovakia, just seems nutty and dangerous and wholly unnecessary.

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It's not like Germany is beholden to what the West thinks about the matter. Remember: although it won't be Adolf, I do think the Germans will be under a fairly militaristic, "Prussianist" regime that is in practice quite accurately described as "military socialism". They'll have some common ground with Stalin.

It won't be Generalplan Ost, of course. More like: Polish Partition - The Long-Awaited Sequel!

raharris1973 said:

They may tell American to effin' forget about getting loans ever getting paid back. In which case the world credit system can lock up and we can cue the Great Depression about nine years early.

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I don't think they'd do this, because the economic downturn would hurt them more than they could conceivably stand to benefit. Also, actively turning the USA into your enemy is probably a bad move.

raharris1973 said:

Hmm, so the western governments might be New Dealing their way to some reform and relief of poor economic conditions, and possible gradual economic recovery.

Germans and their South Tyrol. That insane revisionism again, wanting to fight against somebody with modern weapons in the Alps. Then again maybe not that crazy, it's only the Italians, so the effort to take the limited amount of territory desired is finite and not that crazy and can be made to stick.

If the West Europeans by the way are jaded by being ditched by the Americans, and unable to finish the Germans and forced to back off on them, there is a really good chance they will swallow their pride and be open to collaborative trade and diplomacy with the Soviets all along. All the more so if the 20s are mostly a Depression decade. Which, incidentally, would make western expertise and machinery cheaper for the USSR to hire [that happened in the OTL 30s].

If even this alternate Germany did go Nazi or Notzi aggressive, West Europeans and Soviet could have an easier time humbly coming to agreement on containing Germany.

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If we look at the sentiments in OTL, it's far more probable that the Western powers view and treat the USSR and the German post-war regime as "cut from the same cloth", and try to contain such "Huns". I don't see the West just cozying up with the USSR. They didn't want to in OTL, even when the clear alternative was that Nazi Germany would do it in their stead.

Regarding South Tirol: that's mainly a thing for the next war, which Germany may feel ready for two decades later, but of course not at once. But there would be resentment, and I don't think we'll see Berlin and Rome forming an axis in this scenario. That was my point there.

(Also, Italy may well go leftist, along with France, than turn to fascism. But that's another story.)

raharris1973 said:

I don't think you could infer what American policy would be for all time or even for all two decades ahead just based on a major policy disagreement in 1919.

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If the Western European powers basically bungle things so badly that them American pull out? The obvious outcome is iolationism, which was a powerful force in interbellum American politics anyway. It's almost a given that they'd go in that direction. The basic shape of the resulting period is evident.

raharris1973 said:

Major policy reversals happen based on circumstance and politics. Look at the changes in Soviet foreign policy in this time. Japanese behavior over this period.

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The USSR was pretty clear about its broad goals, and pursued them with a lot of consistency. Methodology and specific alliances/partnerships shifted, but the underlying geo-politics were pretty fixed. For Japan, this is even more the case. Certainly, you can see the shape of the next half-century of Japanese history (albeit not its scope) in the course and outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. I'd go so far as to say that the astute observer would be able to get the gist of things to come even before that, purely from the implication of the Meiji Restoration.

(One such astute observer being Halford Mackinder, who published The Geographical Pivot of History in 1904, before the Russo-Japanese War was over, and in fact wrote it before said war even began. He basically outlines the concept of the Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere right there!)

Skallagrim said:

They can quite easily screw it all up. They're very much in a bad position. But the point is that in no small part, it's so bad because they were pushed into a corner. They blinked first, when it came to the War itself, and the Entente sought to punish them cruelly. This is what can activate a national sentiment of "fight or die". If you get that, you can actually win, because it's not fight or die for the enemy-- and they are bone-tired, too.

But if you fail, you swing from a lamp-post and your country gets dismembered.




Possibly, although they'd be competing with other elements. The far left did require a degree of organisation, particularly to get their propaganda out there, in OTL. In actual pure chaos, they may get outcompeted by other radicals.

I think their main strategy would be to welcome a perpetuation of hostilities, and hope for a German "victory", followed by them capitalising (or, as it were, anti-capitalising) on the destitute state the country. Foreign threat over, and now loads of people are jobless, homeless, Germany is economically isolated... TIME FOR A REVOLUTION!

This is not automatically a viable path, but it fits with how the far left viewed the course of events.




On the other hand: the Entente is not a modern-day power with massive air supremacy, either. They're not capable of occupying Germany at all, even. They're on the brink of economic collapse anyway-- all the more so if America takes its ball and goes home. (Which would assuredly mean: no easy loans anymore, fellas!) Britain and France need their men back home to do their regular civilian jobs. They can't spare all those warm bodies on interminable occupation duty.

The only way an occupation pays even a bit for itself is by stripping Germany of everything, and turning the populace into -- basically -- slaves to work in some form of concripted duty, all profits being immediately shipped away to the Entente.

In other words: great, you've turned the Germans into Pashtun! (Well, not exactly, but you get the picture. If France is allowed to try blasting Germany back to the Dark Ages, they're going to find themselves in a very savage situation.)




If we assume that the Germans manage to pull it together and fight, then I think the premise of German success being quite likely is indeed correct.

But I do stress that the Germans managing this is not a given.





Germany isn't Turkey, and not in the same position. Mustafa Kemal had very specific goals about getting Turkey on its feet, and getting rid of the old Ottoman pretensions. He managed that, and then he wisely set about consolidating-- because he knew that if he pushed further, he'd lose.

In this scenario, Germany has just turned a defeat into a... not-defeat. After a failed attempt at occupation, there is exactly zero chance of the Entente trying again within the next twenty years. Germany is in ruins, but they're some pretty untouchable ruins right now.

The main difference with OTL is that Germany has no short-term ambitions in the West. Anything about South Tirol is for two decades from then, and aything else (like maybe reclaiming Alsace-Lorraine and ravaging France in Pranco-Prussian War 2.0: genocide boogaloo will be nothing but vague dreams on the extreme fringes of politics).

In practice, the Great War turned into a nightmare, Germany was left alone in a room with the monsters, Germany fought he monsters alone, and Germany defeated the monsters. That's the matter settled. They can be proud.

But Eastern Europe... oh, that's another thing. You know who despises those weak Westerners and hates that fucking Poland exists?

"I DO!" screamed Germany and the USSR, at the same time.

(And then they looked at each other, surrise fading into intrigue...)





Which brings us to this. The Germany described here doesn't want to march into Paris, but since both it and Russia are considered "the barbaric enemy" by the West, and since both have ambitions in Eastern Europe that can be made to fit together... well. Why not? We deserve this. We've paid for this in blood and iron. Forget "Strassbourg", if it must be called that. We'll take our pound of flesh in the East.

We'll do it with Stalin. He gets it. He's not some weak fuck, like those idiots in Paris and London. He is the kind of bastard we can work with...




It's not like Germany is beholden to what the West thinks about the matter. Remember: although it won't be Adolf, I do think the Germans will be under a fairly militaristic, "Prussianist" regime that is in practice quite accurately described as "military socialism". They'll have some common ground with Stalin.

It won't be Generalplan Ost, of course. More like: Polish Partition - The Long-Awaited Sequel!




I don't think they'd do this, because the economic downturn would hurt them more than they could conceivably stand to benefit. Also, actively turning the USA into your enemy is probably a bad move.




If we look at the sentiments in OTL, it's far more probable that the Western powers view and treat the USSR and the German post-war regime as "cut from the same cloth", and try to contain such "Huns". I don't see the West just cozying up with the USSR. They didn't want to in OTL, even when the clear alternative was that Nazi Germany would do it in their stead.

Regarding South Tirol: that's mainly a thing for the next war, which Germany may feel ready for two decades later, but of course not at once. But there would be resentment, and I don't think we'll see Berlin and Rome forming an axis in this scenario. That was my point there.

(Also, Italy may well go leftist, along with France, than turn to fascism. But that's another story.)




If the Western European powers basically bungle things so badly that them American pull out? The obvious outcome is iolationism, which was a powerful force in interbellum American politics anyway. It's almost a given that they'd go in that direction. The basic shape of the resulting period is evident.




The USSR was pretty clear about its broad goals, and pursued them with a lot of consistency. Methodology and specific alliances/partnerships shifted, but the underlying geo-politics were pretty fixed. For Japan, this is even more the case. Certainly, you can see the shape of the next haff-century of Japanese history (albeit not is scope) in the course and outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. I'd go so far as to say that the astute observer would be able to get the gist of things to come even before that, purely from the implication of the Meiji Restoration.

(One such astute observer being Halford Mackinder, who published The Geographical Pivot of History in 1904, before the Russo-Japanese War was over, and in fact wrote it before said war even began. He basically outlines the concept of the Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere right there!)

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Problem with soviets - they wanted entire world,and their current allies are always their future victims.
Germans in your scenario would murder Poland - but then go to the same mass graves they put us.

To be honest,Hitler compared to german democrats who allied with soviets was lesser devil,becouse if they ruled,soviets would take entire Europe.

Since you are weighing in with your opinions on this German resistant to Versailles in 1919 scenario, @Skallagrim, and giving the Germans a chance of success in it, you and @ATP should also weigh in on this scenario of reactionary political success in Germany in the 1920s, and prospects for possibly standing up to the Ruhr occupation then in Alternate History Challenge: European War again in the 1920s,
and the previously mentioned Cool-Headed Ludy - let's mess with Germany's WWI endgame, where the Germans do not even sue for an armistice in November, 1918.