raharris1973
Well-known member
What if Sassanid Persia contained Arabic-Islamic conquest at the Zagros, holding the early invaders, Rashidun and Umayyad Caliphs off from the Iranian plateau, Caucasus, Kordestan, and Caspian Sea?
The most the Arabs conquer from the Persians are the rich and fertile lowlands of Mesopotamia, and Khuzestan.
At the same time, the Arabs succeed at the battle of Yarmouk and in driving the Byzantines from the Levant, and back into Asia Minor up to the Taurus mountains. From the Levant and Arabia, they cross into Sinai and Egypt and Libya like OTL. Like in OTL, once in Egypt and Libya, there is nothing stopping them over subsequent decades from making a permanent conquest of North Africa, and a bit later Spain, and a bit later, a temporary conquest of Sicily.
So we have early Islamic expansion towards the west/northwest and Christendom basically matching OTL history, but hitting stiffer resistance in the Zagros mountains/Persian highlands/Iranian plateau, and thus subsequently on to the lands beyond it in the Caucasus and Central Asia, inhabited by mainly Indo-Iranian and Turkic peoples.
This should short-circuit historic events like the Arab-Tang Chinese clash at the battle of Talas.
This should not stop Arab Muslim maritime and coastwise expansion. Certainly any of that which happens southwestward in the direction of Africa's eastern coast should still happen. Oman, the homeland of Sinbad, should still be a center Islamic maritime voyaging and trade, leading to long term commercial voyaging are far as China and Southeast Asia and merchant colonies and small scale proselytization in southern coastal India, and eventually Indonesia. Possibly, colonization/conquest/proselytization via Oman to the coastal Sindh or Baluchistan could gradually make inroads 'outflanking' Zoroastrian Persia to its east into Afghanistan and then Central Asia, but I don't think Islam would have anything like its historic advantages even if it has some presence, and it will have to compete with Zoroastrianism and other Iranic-derived competitors like Manichaeism, Mazdakism, and Mithraism, and well as Indian Buddhism and Hinduism, plus local polytheism and the Tengrism of nomads, and Nestorian Christianity and Judaism. As well as Armenian Monophysite Christianity and Orthodox Christianity.
What circumstances and governing reforms and self-strengthening measures would the Persians need to take to maintain the strength to hold off Arab conquest? Especially the kind of thing I am looking for, a defensive holding off of the tide, not an early offensive preemption.
Keeping the Persian core and points north and east of it out of Caliphal hands is quite a big deal for Islamic history. While events in the Mediterranean and Africa for awhile and in some places, will bear a passing resemblance to OTL, most of the big geopolitical muscle moves of the great Islamic empires, especially after the Umayyads, will be quite different, to outright non-existent, due to this 'Persian chokepoint'.
The most the Arabs conquer from the Persians are the rich and fertile lowlands of Mesopotamia, and Khuzestan.
At the same time, the Arabs succeed at the battle of Yarmouk and in driving the Byzantines from the Levant, and back into Asia Minor up to the Taurus mountains. From the Levant and Arabia, they cross into Sinai and Egypt and Libya like OTL. Like in OTL, once in Egypt and Libya, there is nothing stopping them over subsequent decades from making a permanent conquest of North Africa, and a bit later Spain, and a bit later, a temporary conquest of Sicily.
So we have early Islamic expansion towards the west/northwest and Christendom basically matching OTL history, but hitting stiffer resistance in the Zagros mountains/Persian highlands/Iranian plateau, and thus subsequently on to the lands beyond it in the Caucasus and Central Asia, inhabited by mainly Indo-Iranian and Turkic peoples.
This should short-circuit historic events like the Arab-Tang Chinese clash at the battle of Talas.
This should not stop Arab Muslim maritime and coastwise expansion. Certainly any of that which happens southwestward in the direction of Africa's eastern coast should still happen. Oman, the homeland of Sinbad, should still be a center Islamic maritime voyaging and trade, leading to long term commercial voyaging are far as China and Southeast Asia and merchant colonies and small scale proselytization in southern coastal India, and eventually Indonesia. Possibly, colonization/conquest/proselytization via Oman to the coastal Sindh or Baluchistan could gradually make inroads 'outflanking' Zoroastrian Persia to its east into Afghanistan and then Central Asia, but I don't think Islam would have anything like its historic advantages even if it has some presence, and it will have to compete with Zoroastrianism and other Iranic-derived competitors like Manichaeism, Mazdakism, and Mithraism, and well as Indian Buddhism and Hinduism, plus local polytheism and the Tengrism of nomads, and Nestorian Christianity and Judaism. As well as Armenian Monophysite Christianity and Orthodox Christianity.
What circumstances and governing reforms and self-strengthening measures would the Persians need to take to maintain the strength to hold off Arab conquest? Especially the kind of thing I am looking for, a defensive holding off of the tide, not an early offensive preemption.
Keeping the Persian core and points north and east of it out of Caliphal hands is quite a big deal for Islamic history. While events in the Mediterranean and Africa for awhile and in some places, will bear a passing resemblance to OTL, most of the big geopolitical muscle moves of the great Islamic empires, especially after the Umayyads, will be quite different, to outright non-existent, due to this 'Persian chokepoint'.
- Firstly, there may be no Abbasid takeover. Or if there is one, it is quite different, and cannot depend on Persian support, because so few ethnic Persians are incorporated under the Umayyad Caliphate. At most, there are a large population of Mesopotamian Semites who have absorbed many Persian cultural traits in Iraq, and scattered enclaves of Persians in Mesopotamian cities and towns. Neither the Abbasids, nor if a Shia Caliphate were earlier butterflied into victory after the Rashidun, would be likely to place their capital in Iraq, with it being so close to the still embattled Persian frontier. Damascus is likelier to stay capital than Baghdad is ever to be made one. The Caliphs may be antsy about Damascus' proximity to the Byzantine frontier too, possibly leading to later Caliphs preferring to use Jerusalem, Alexandria, or Cairo as their capital.
- Iraq could end up as a bitterly contested Arab-Persian frontier, reducing Arab ability to draw revenue from it and enjoy their golden age; Syria could end up a more bitterly contested Byzantine-Arab frontier as well.
- Without an Islamic Persia/Iran, the Central Asian Turks are not being enslaved and converted to Islam, or hired as mercenaries surrounded by a set of clients who all encourage conversion to Islam. Indeed, the Persians who get the first crack at the capturing or hiring the Turks, or losing pieces of their territory to strong groups of migrating Turks, are predominantly practicing Zoroastrianism and related Iranic religions instead of Islam, with some others practicing Christianity or Judaism, at least as often as Islam. Migrating Turks also would tend to run a gauntlet of Christian Armenia or eastern Byzantine Anatolia before reaching Arab Islamic territory.
- So given the above, the whole foundation for the great Oghuz Turk migration into the Middle East and the political rise to power of the Seljuk Turks and their great Sultanate in the 11th century, which in OTL overthrew Shia dynasties and restored Sunni orthodoxy, and was part of a movement crushing Byzantine strength in Anatolia, and increasing violence and alarm in Europe over the Holy Land, will not be happening as it did historically. - The lack of the Central Asian Turkic manpower reservoir being put into the service of Islamic imperialism will be huge.
- If the Turks do a combination migration-invasion of the Middle East by the 900s/1000s as an organized mass, that the Persians are unable to stop, they won't do it as Muslims in all likelihood, but as Tengrists, possibly later on amenable to conversion to the various religions of their subject peoples, or they'll quickly adopt Zoroastrianism or Iranic religions, and possibly try to extend their reach in new conquests, probably only with limited success, or they may have adopted Buddhism, and patronize temples wherever they conquer. - so we cannot rule aid Crusaders being sent against the 'cruel Turk' and the depredations he and his Magi or Monks or Yogi's have done to Christian pilgrims, or however they tell the stories back in European churches.
- Without an Islamic Persia on the Caspian, there's no reason to think Islam would appeal to peoples in the area that became Russia. It wouldn't draw the interest of the Volga Bulgars, who may hold on to their old religion, or perhaps adopt an Iranic or Indian religion, or perhaps, eventually become amenable to Orthodox Christian missionaries from their Danubian Bulgarian brethren. This is turn shifts the religious winds blowing on the Khazars, perhaps making it less likely for their Khans to adopt Judaism as their triangulation between Christianity and Islam.
- A 900s, 1000s Turkic overrunning of Persia has the potential to finally destroy Sassanid Zoroastrian Persian culture and religion, or rejuvenate it. It could destroy it if the Turks do not find Persianate religion and culture or even language worthy of adoption and are more attracted to Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, or Judaism whenever considering something beyond Tengrism. Or their manpower and numbers could rejuvenate embattled Persians and add new Turkic vocabulary and crafts if they develop a passion for Persian Gods, dualism, and religion, and choose to champion it.
- I don't know if the lack of the Umayyad-Abbasid advance into Central Asia and the Battle of Talas would allow the era of Tang Dynasty influence in Central Asia/Afghanistan to last any longer than historical.
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