How about instead of saying it's a debated point, you actually show where the debate is with sources? If you feel my sources are in error, instead of posting aspersions without supporting evidence, you explain with your own citations what you find problematic about their historical analysis? Are they misquoting German statistics? If so, that' easy to prove with countering sources of yours so lets see them.
You've made arguments, yes, but not provided evidence. That's why you have to try to spin it as I "assume" such while ignoring that between the two of us I'm the only one that can cite both Western and Eastern historians supporting my conclusions. Germany was able to overrun much of the USSR's economic basis in 1941 despite fighting a two front war; I don't see anyway being reduced to a one front war with the ability to focus their resources would prevent this given the strategic balance in forces has massively shifted to them. To quote from Denis Havlat (2017)
Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part I,
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies -
With Britain’s refusal to make peace with Germany, the Luftwaffe was forced to commit substantial forces into the bombing of Britain, and later into the Mediterranean, resulting in costly losses. From 1 July 1940 to 22 June 1941, the Luftwaffe lost 4,313 aircraft, including 1,688 bombers and 1,100 fighters.108 Additionally, not all available aircraft could be used against the USSR. By 22 June 1941 a total of 1,561 German aircraft were stationed at other fronts in Europe and in the Mediterranean fighting against Britain, as compared to 3,104 stationed at the Eastern Front.109 German historian Rolf Dietrich-Müller concludes that if Britain had arranged itself with Hitler in the summer of 1940, the Luftwaffe could have used up to 9,640 aircraft at the start of Barbarossa, which would have resulted in a quick victory over the USSR.110 In the second half of 1941, Luftwaffe losses against the Royal Air Force (RAF) remained far lower than the losses sustained against the Soviet air force; however, they were still substantial. By 27 December 1941 the Germans had lost 2,505 aircraft in the East, while losses on all other fronts since June 1941 amounted to 779 aircraft.111
The allocation of the majority of the Luftwaffe to the Eastern Front gave Britain the opportunity to build up its bomber force; this meant that with each passing month the RAF grew stronger and more capable of launching largescale bomber attacks against German industry. After British forces had been kicked out of Europe in France and Greece, this form of warfare had remained the only possible way in which Britain could strike against Germany. Another reason for this approach was the hope to aid the Soviet Union by keeping away large German forces, as well as the desire to end the war without the necessity of costly land warfare. The bomb load dropped by the RAF on Germany and German-occupied territories rose from 13,037 tons in 1940 to 31,704 tons in 1941.112 At this stage of the war bombing was still too imprecise and the bomb load too small to cause any substantial damage to German industry; however, fighting over the skies of Western Europe and the Mediterranean resulted in costly losses for the Luftwaffe. During the second half of 1941 the Royal Air Force was responsible for roughly one-quarter of all German aircraft losses; additionally, large numbers of German aircraft were sent to these fronts to replenish and reinforce the Luftwaffe formations fighting the RAF. By October 1941 there were 642 German aircraft stationed in the Mediterranean theater of war alone.113
Continued British resistance after the summer of 1940 denied the Germans the ability to reorganize and replenish their air forces; instead it forced them into a costly campaign that greatly decimated the Luftwaffe. Without British resistance in the year leading up to Barbarossa and the necessity to keep substantial amounts of aircraft in Western Europe and the Mediterranean, the Luftwaffe could have attacked the USSR with a force up to three times as strong as it actually did. On top of that, German stocks of aviation fuel would have been substantially higher because in case of a British withdrawal or surrender, fuel consumption would have stood at a fraction of the historical level. Even in the second half of 1941, at a time when the majority of the Luftwaffe fought in the East, Britain contributed greatly to Soviet survival by engaging and destroying hundreds of German aircraft, thus preventing the Luftwaffe from creating reserves that could have been used to keep up the strength of German air forces in the East.
Further:
In order to counter possible British landings in Northern France and Norway, the Germans had to keep substantial mechanized forces in these areas. In April 1940 the total German tank stock numbered 3,387 units, of which 2,580, or 76 percent, were used in the invasion of Western Europe.120 By the beginning of June 1941, the German tank stock had increased to 5,639 machines, but only 3,580, or 63.5 percent, were used against the USSR.121 Without British resistance, Germany should have been able to use against the USSR the same percentage of tanks as used against Western Europe, or an additional 700 machines. A thousand German tanks, supported by the hundreds of French, British, and Polish tanks captured during 1939–1940, would have been enough to perform effective occupation duties throughout Europe, had the British been knocked out of the war in 1940.