raharris1973
Well-known member
I am referring to the argument of the late Paul Schroeder, and will cite some key passages from his argument.
He argues that under the conditions as they developed by around 1914, WWI was pretty much inevitable fairly soon. Heroic, creative, self-sacrificial diplomatic action on somebody's part would have been required to avert it, and since that wasn't part of how anybody was playing the game anymore, it was just a matter of the next crisis.
Interestingly, this is contrary to the argument of political scientist Richard Ned Lebow, who see WWI as *not* overdetermined, and highly contingent, sees Europe as passing through. a relatively brief "danger zone" that would have closed no later than 1917, after which a great power war would have become very unlikely.
I begin, citing Schroeder's argument about the pause in July, and his view that two common counterfactual what-if ideas a) if the Austrians had gone in right away in a heat without the pause and b) the fact there was a pause proves the war wasn't inevitable, are both BS in his view:
He goes on to argue that fundamentally nobody on either side, Central or Entente, was willing to say "no" to an ally anymore or even to risk displeasing an ally by offering to help a member of the opposite coalition with its problems:
He argues that was a crucial difference, from earlier eras, when Europe still had Congresses:
So essentially his idea is that expecting war not happen is like expecting car crashes not to happen when you have drivers moving at high speed, and let all the signs and painted lane lines fade and concrete barriers fall.
Your thoughts?
He argues that under the conditions as they developed by around 1914, WWI was pretty much inevitable fairly soon. Heroic, creative, self-sacrificial diplomatic action on somebody's part would have been required to avert it, and since that wasn't part of how anybody was playing the game anymore, it was just a matter of the next crisis.
Interestingly, this is contrary to the argument of political scientist Richard Ned Lebow, who see WWI as *not* overdetermined, and highly contingent, sees Europe as passing through. a relatively brief "danger zone" that would have closed no later than 1917, after which a great power war would have become very unlikely.
I begin, citing Schroeder's argument about the pause in July, and his view that two common counterfactual what-if ideas a) if the Austrians had gone in right away in a heat without the pause and b) the fact there was a pause proves the war wasn't inevitable, are both BS in his view:
Every account of the July Crisis discusses the delay between July 5, when Austria-Hungary received Germany's support for its ultimatum to Serbia, and July 23 when the ultimatum was actually delivered. Some have speculated that the delay was fateful in allowing the initial shock of the assassination to wear off (which is doubtful-the Serbian and Russian reactions, the decisive ones, would have been the same earlier). Another delay, more fateful and inexplicable, is hardly mentioned or discussed in the vast literature. For a full month after the assassination, the powers did absolutely nothing in concert to prepare for or deal with the possible or likely consequences of this sensational incident. Everyone knew that Austria-Hungary and Serbia were mortal enemies, that they had gone to the brink of war at least four times in the past five years, three of them in the past year, and that Russia was Serbia's ally and protector and Austria-Hungary's main enemy. Yet when something occurred that anyone could see might set off this long-envisioned war, the Entente powers averted their eyes, went about their other business, waited for whatever Austria-Hungary and Germany might do, and hoped for the best. And of course Austria-Hungary and Germany took the very action that did set off the war.
This argument seems paradoxically to prove the precise opposite of what was promised and intended: that the war was avoidable. If the means for a serious attempt at avoiding it were known and available, then the root cause of the war was contingent, a collective failure to apply them.
He goes on to argue that fundamentally nobody on either side, Central or Entente, was willing to say "no" to an ally anymore or even to risk displeasing an ally by offering to help a member of the opposite coalition with its problems:
But of course that collective inaction was neither inexplicable nor really contingent.
I contend only that the pressure of events did not make war objectively so, by making peaceful choices impossible in the face of hard realities like security threats, alliance commitments, and arms races, but subjectively so, by fatally constricting what all the actors would entertain as a conceivable, rational course of action in the face of this crisis or any like it.
Austria-Hungary and Germany were determined to reverse the existing trend considered fatal to them, and saw in this crisis a good, possibly final, chance to do so. The Entente power equally saw in this crisis a danger to the existing trend and were equally determined not to allow it to be reversed. Russian policy, seen by Russians as a defense against German and Austro- Hungarian aggression, was resolutely determined to maintain and extend Russia's control over the Balkans. French policy was rigidly fixed on maintaining the existing alliances and therefore doing nothing to weaken the Franco-Russian one.(33) Britain's was fixed on maintaining its ententes, both in order to check Germany in Europe and avoid threats to the British Empire-the latter aim, the primary one, requiring maintaining the entente with Russia at all cost.(34)
He argues that was a crucial difference, from earlier eras, when Europe still had Congresses:
But behind these familiar positive reasons for failure to act collectively, there was a still more fundamental negative one. No one believed that a sane, rational policy allowed any longer for this kind of collective response. Anyone who tried to suspend the rules of power politics, of "every man and every alliance for himself, and the devil take the hindmost," was a fool and would earn the fool's reward. Hence to ask any British, French, Russian, Italian, or even German leader to sacrifice or subordinate particular interests and opportunities of theirs for the sake of some sort of collective action to stabilize the international position of Austria-Hungary so as to lessen the chances of a general war was to ask the impossible and absurd-to ask them to commit political suicide at home and to be laughed at and swindled abroad. Stabilizing Austria- Hungary's position was really not anyone's business except that of Austrians and Hungarians, or perhaps Germans if they wished to do so for their own power-political reasons. This profound practical indifference to the survival of a vital actor such as the Habsburg Monarchy was, to repeat, a break with tradition-not normal Realpolitik, but a different concrete definition of it, a different collective attitude toward international politics.(35) The power whose final break with the Concert principle proved decisive, Austria-Hungary, was also the last and most reluctant to abandon it, because it was the one most dependent it and on collective international support and restraint to survive.
So essentially his idea is that expecting war not happen is like expecting car crashes not to happen when you have drivers moving at high speed, and let all the signs and painted lane lines fade and concrete barriers fall.
Your thoughts?