raharris1973
Well-known member
In OTL, Japan solicited and received a request from Britain for naval assistance against the Germans in the Pacific within about 3 or 4 days of Britain declaring war on Germany. Japan issued an ultimatum to Germany to send all its ships away from Japanese and Chinese waters and yield its fortifications at the Qingdao leasehold to Japan on August 23rd. In 48 hours, Japan declared war on Germany, and began the siege of Qingdao.
The Japanese Navy, without civilian government orders, even against civilian government orders, began to sail to and occupy German occupied islands in Micronesia about two weeks later in September. The Japanese government accepted the Navy's fait accompli, Japan ended up occupying all of the German Pacific north of the equator, and the Peace Treaty granted these island chains to Japan as a League of Nations mandate.
What if the U.S. Administration of time, goaded by the U.S. Navy, was more alert to the negative strategic implications of Japanese Pacific expansion for both hopelessly entangling US southwest lines of communication from Hawaii to Guam and the Philippines and Japanese lines of communication from Tokyo to the Carolines and Marshalls, and for the encouragement/justification this provides for further Japanese naval expansion?
And what if in it's alarm, the U.S. took a more proactive stance?
Despite vast distances, and the current distraction of the epic conflict in Europe, the idea of a US-Japanese conflict wasn't unthinkable. The first drafts of War Plan Orange had been worked on since 1907, which was around the same time Japan had first made some planning assumptions about the US being the primary antagonist. 1907 featured the voyage of the Great White Fleet, and President Roosevelt had privately expressed anxiety about the vulnerability of the Philippines before leaving office.
In this ATL, while watching the western front and the North Sea fleet actions with interest, one or more US fleet or Navy Department higher-ups, pay close attention to the Asia-Pacific theater especially once Japan declares war on Germany. Aide for Operations (the proto-CNO) Adm Bradley Fiske, or Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, or his Assistant Secretary Franklin Roosevelt, between witnessing the siege of Tsingtao and wondering where in the Pacific the German squadrons are and getting reports of the New Zealanders occupying Western Samoa quickly realize how vulnerable the German-held Micronesian islands are to Japanese naval occupation putting Japanese naval control astride the route to the Philippines.
They in turn raise the alarm quickly, that a Japanese Micronesia is strategically unacceptable, to President Wilson, Secretary of State Bryan, and other Cabinet members.
As a neutral nation determined to remain neutral, American options are limited. But the Americans can increase Pacific and Asiatic fleet maneuvers around Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, and points between.
Washington doesn't want Tokyo to grab these islands, but it doesn't want open hostility or undue tension with Japan either. So the Wilson Administration will have to settle on a diplomatically communicated approach to Britain and its Dominions. Britain, or its Dominions like Australia, New Zealand, or Canada occupying the Micronesian islands is a far less worrisome or troublesome prospect for the U.S. than Japanese occupation.
The U.S. communicates its satisfaction with British Empire occupation of all the German Pacific islands, but resolute opposition to Japan occupying any of them. Britain would probably say, and could say with all sincerity, that they've heard of no Japanese plans to take those islands. (Because even Tokyo didn't know yet!). But Washington could underline that the British Empire has to make sure Japan doesn't get there.
The British have plenty of better uses for their globally deployed fleet units and won't like to feel so obligated, but to underline their point, the Americans could say that if they can't count on the British to preempt the Japanese, Washington will have to work out a deal, maybe a purchase deal, with the Germans, to keep the islands out of Japanese hands and move them into American hands.
Suppose this pressure works and the British announce their intent to have their own forces or the Australians keep advancing north from northern New Guinea to occupy German Micronesia, and this is accomplished by the end of autumn 1914, keeping Japan out.
What are the subsequent impacts of a British or Australian Micronesia? What are the impacts on Japan at the Versailles Treaty and Washington Treaty? Can the Japanese be persuaded to get out of Shandong by 1922 as they were in OTL, if that is now the *only* thing they grabbed in WWI?
If they don't leave then, what are the consequences for China, Japan, and the west in the 1920s?
Even if that does not change, how do US, UK, and Japanese naval planning and expenditures change in the 1920s, 30s and 40s?
The Japanese Navy, without civilian government orders, even against civilian government orders, began to sail to and occupy German occupied islands in Micronesia about two weeks later in September. The Japanese government accepted the Navy's fait accompli, Japan ended up occupying all of the German Pacific north of the equator, and the Peace Treaty granted these island chains to Japan as a League of Nations mandate.
What if the U.S. Administration of time, goaded by the U.S. Navy, was more alert to the negative strategic implications of Japanese Pacific expansion for both hopelessly entangling US southwest lines of communication from Hawaii to Guam and the Philippines and Japanese lines of communication from Tokyo to the Carolines and Marshalls, and for the encouragement/justification this provides for further Japanese naval expansion?
And what if in it's alarm, the U.S. took a more proactive stance?
Despite vast distances, and the current distraction of the epic conflict in Europe, the idea of a US-Japanese conflict wasn't unthinkable. The first drafts of War Plan Orange had been worked on since 1907, which was around the same time Japan had first made some planning assumptions about the US being the primary antagonist. 1907 featured the voyage of the Great White Fleet, and President Roosevelt had privately expressed anxiety about the vulnerability of the Philippines before leaving office.
In this ATL, while watching the western front and the North Sea fleet actions with interest, one or more US fleet or Navy Department higher-ups, pay close attention to the Asia-Pacific theater especially once Japan declares war on Germany. Aide for Operations (the proto-CNO) Adm Bradley Fiske, or Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, or his Assistant Secretary Franklin Roosevelt, between witnessing the siege of Tsingtao and wondering where in the Pacific the German squadrons are and getting reports of the New Zealanders occupying Western Samoa quickly realize how vulnerable the German-held Micronesian islands are to Japanese naval occupation putting Japanese naval control astride the route to the Philippines.
They in turn raise the alarm quickly, that a Japanese Micronesia is strategically unacceptable, to President Wilson, Secretary of State Bryan, and other Cabinet members.
As a neutral nation determined to remain neutral, American options are limited. But the Americans can increase Pacific and Asiatic fleet maneuvers around Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, and points between.
Washington doesn't want Tokyo to grab these islands, but it doesn't want open hostility or undue tension with Japan either. So the Wilson Administration will have to settle on a diplomatically communicated approach to Britain and its Dominions. Britain, or its Dominions like Australia, New Zealand, or Canada occupying the Micronesian islands is a far less worrisome or troublesome prospect for the U.S. than Japanese occupation.
The U.S. communicates its satisfaction with British Empire occupation of all the German Pacific islands, but resolute opposition to Japan occupying any of them. Britain would probably say, and could say with all sincerity, that they've heard of no Japanese plans to take those islands. (Because even Tokyo didn't know yet!). But Washington could underline that the British Empire has to make sure Japan doesn't get there.
The British have plenty of better uses for their globally deployed fleet units and won't like to feel so obligated, but to underline their point, the Americans could say that if they can't count on the British to preempt the Japanese, Washington will have to work out a deal, maybe a purchase deal, with the Germans, to keep the islands out of Japanese hands and move them into American hands.
Suppose this pressure works and the British announce their intent to have their own forces or the Australians keep advancing north from northern New Guinea to occupy German Micronesia, and this is accomplished by the end of autumn 1914, keeping Japan out.
What are the subsequent impacts of a British or Australian Micronesia? What are the impacts on Japan at the Versailles Treaty and Washington Treaty? Can the Japanese be persuaded to get out of Shandong by 1922 as they were in OTL, if that is now the *only* thing they grabbed in WWI?
If they don't leave then, what are the consequences for China, Japan, and the west in the 1920s?
Even if that does not change, how do US, UK, and Japanese naval planning and expenditures change in the 1920s, 30s and 40s?
