You are in charge of armored vehicle doctrine and design in 1939...

sillygoose

Well-known member
The Wehrmacht could have made a cavalry mechanized division in 1941 based on their 1st cavalry division, which IOTL was withdrawn and upgraded to the 24th panzer division during the campaign. Could have partially done it before the invasion instead.
The Soviets innovated such a division during WW2:

Just as the 22nd Panzer division was formed with obsolete panzers, they could have instead used those to 'armor up' the cavalry by converting 1 of the 4 cavalry regiments into an armored unit much like the later structure of panzergrenadier divisions. Or just assigning it the 101st panzer brigade instead of forming the 23rd panzer division.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
I edited my post FYI.
Also I think the strategic/operational errors Hitler made in 1941 were much more decisive than having more AFVs. Not saying having more AFVs would have been bad (should have partially mechanized the 1st Cavalry division IMHO and included AFVs in motorized infantry divisions in 1941 instead of waiting until 1942), just that throwing them at existing units wasn't much help, as Marcks Plan acknowledge in your link. Given that motorized infantry divisions were used as spearhead units anyway having a battalion of AFVs would have been a huge help for them and since that was recognized after the fact and Panzergrenadier divisions created (added a panzer abteilung) from 1942 on, why not do that in 1941 instead of forming new Panzer divisions?

You can even forget making more panzers, just give them a StuGs. Even easier to make than panzers.

All valid ideas, and definitely worth it; I'm mainly just throwing out the ideas I know of, not "do this and no more". I'm also focusing in on the grand strategic level, because 400k additional casualties by early 1942 means the Soviets have to be weak somewhere in late 1941 and we can be sure that won't be Moscow. That means a sacrifice of either Leningrad or setbacks in Ukraine, with either having possibly decisive effects for the 1942 campaign season; no Kerch landings and AGS holding onto Rostov would given the Germans a better jumping off point for Fall Blau as well as free up forces to do Operation Nordlicht much, much earlier than OTL.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
All valid ideas, and definitely worth it; I'm mainly just throwing out the ideas I know of, not "do this and no more". I'm also focusing in on the grand strategic level, because 400k additional casualties by early 1942 means the Soviets have to be weak somewhere in late 1941 and we can be sure that won't be Moscow. That means a sacrifice of either Leningrad or setbacks in Ukraine, with either having possibly decisive effects for the 1942 campaign season; no Kerch landings and AGS holding onto Rostov would given the Germans a better jumping off point for Fall Blau as well as free up forces to do Operation Nordlicht much, much earlier than OTL.
Sure and the easiest way to incorporate more AFVs would be making more StuGs instead of Panzers and giving them to motorized infantry divisions and the single cavalry division. That way you enhance the combat power of those divisions and don't have to mess around with the existing panzer divisions.

In fact even forming more StuG detachments to issue to various units as needed or permanently would be very helpful too and avoids the entire 'ideal AFV' design/manufacturing argument. More StuGs with the 75mm L41 in June 1941 would have been supremely useful, inexpensive, and flexible relative to the existing designs.

That and a Dicker Max design with the 88mm L56 as the cannon would have been ideal as a long range tank hunter. Early Hornisse.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Sure and the easiest way to incorporate more AFVs would be making more StuGs instead of Panzers and giving them to motorized infantry divisions and the single cavalry division. That way you enhance the combat power of those divisions and don't have to mess around with the existing panzer divisions.

In fact even forming more StuG detachments to issue to various units as needed or permanently would be very helpful too and avoids the entire 'ideal AFV' design/manufacturing argument. More StuGs with the 75mm L41 in June 1941 would have been supremely useful, inexpensive, and flexible relative to the existing designs.

That and a Dicker Max design with the 88mm L56 as the cannon would have been ideal as a long range tank hunter. Early Hornisse.

Why not have it all? If you standardize on the Panzer IV in 1938, you get the economies of scale to enable more StuGs like you say while enabling better logistics overall via the standardization as well as higher output to enable a quicker modernization of the existing divisions/keep pace with losses.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Why not have it all? If you standardize on the Panzer IV in 1938, you get the economies of scale to enable more StuGs like you say while enabling better logistics overall via the standardization as well as higher output to enable a quicker modernization of the existing divisions/keep pace with losses.
Agreed.
 

SpicyJuan

Active member
Not sure greatly is what I would say the proper adjective there. Keeping to the original 60mm frontal armor design would have been better. Reliability, ease of maintenance, and speed were probably more important, hence the post-war Leopard 1 design with less armor and weight than the Panther.
That extra 20mm of armor is the difference between a T-34 knocking you out at 1km vs it having to try to close the distance in vain to 100 meters. How much lighter and more reliable would the Panther have been without the extra armor? I have no idea, but frankly that protection difference sounds extremely significant, especially considering how much of the Panther's problems were teething issues and the lack of proper maintenance crew for the Germans late in the war. I forget the source and the specifics, but I remember a late '44/early '45 report showing that a higher proportion of Panthers were operational than Panzer IV's at any given time, thus showing that the Panther was more reliable than previously thought.

Frankly I think the OTL vk3002db should have been adopted with the existing 75mm L48 gun, which was plenty for the period and then add in the heavier gun later.
Nah it's too ugly!😉

Why wait on the L/70? It would have been interesting to know what the German late war designs would have looked like after successful experiences with rear transmissions with an in-service VK 30.02

The expansion of industry had been ongoing since 1932 and it was only in 1942 that the AFV production lines were fully completed based on the pre-war armaments industry expansion plan. Hitler launched the world war earlier than industrial preparations were prepared to handle. IIRC this is covered in Wage of Destruction and several German language books if you can read German.
Which German books do you suggest? I recall reading that in late 1941, in anticipation of a successful Barbarossa, Hitler ordered production of AFVs cut in favor of increased air and sea production. Do you know if that’s accurate and what effect it had? In any case, given Tooze's vehemence, I do question if the Germans truly couldn't have found a way to squeeze out more sooner, and what sort of inefficiencies could have been solved early in the war.

Available via interlibrary loan.
That link is broken for me, can you please send an Amazon link?

No I don't believe the VK3001 was viable in 1939/40 given that the Pz III only entered production in 1939 and it took until 1942 to get enough Pz IIIs and IVs in production to phase out the Pz Is and IIs and most of the 38ts. Still though in 1942 there were at least two new Panzer divisions (IIRC the 23rd and 24th) that mostly used French and Czech panzers until 1943. So output over plethora of designs is the way to go, especially given that existing production lines were not set up to handle 30+ ton tanks yet. That is part of the industrial expansion, making sure there are production lines with the equipment to make heavier AFVs. Hence why Henschel made the Tiger tanks, they had the equipment to handle very heavy equipment since they made locomotives primarily.
That's pretty convincing, but if we're playing what ifs, why not cancel the Pz III and start with a 30 ton tank? Is the extra 10 tons really enough to need very heavy equipment?

They really should have up-armed the Pz I to a 20mm (some were converted with Oerlikon in the SCW) and converted the Pz IIs to Jagdpanzers or some sort of StuG.

It wasn't German designers, it was military spec issued by the Waffenamt.
German army planners were less innovative in the interwar period than commonly thought.
Plus it's not like sloped armor didn't have its own drawbacks in term of design.
What specs exactly are you referring to which limited the designers? What innovations were being introduced on German tanks either structurally (like pike nose) or internally (like stabilizers) in late 1944/45? The Soviets managed to squeeze extreme protection and heavy armament on the IS-2 mod. 1944 which compared extremely favorable to the Tiger II, and the T-44-100 was probably better than the Panther Ausf. G.

Sloped armor might have its own issues, sure, but by 1941 it was easy for all to see that it was worth it and the only viable path forward.

The Pike nose was a flawed concept in the end and never even saw combat use.
The IS-3 and its derivatives threw the US and UK in such a frenzy until they developed the M103 and Conqueror. The pike nose decreased internal volume and was less effective off-axis, definitely, but I wouldn't say the concept was flawed, rather that dart developed became so advanced it rendered armor pretty much ineffective, hence the Leopard.

Meanwhile post-war the US copied the Tiger II for their heavy tank design before deciding to just go for the universal tank concept.
I would love to learn more about this.

The Jagdpanzers I think didn't have the cupola due to the problems of incorporating it into the design and the vulnerability it left for the commander if hit. After all it was a feature in regular AFVs, but commander casualties made an impression on German design philosophy. Soviets didn't care about casualties nearly as much.
Interesting, I didn't know that, thank you.

I disagree about the Germans not having much going in terms of armor design, the E-series was quite innovative.
The IS-7 was largely a postwar design and was dumped in favor of the T-10.
It was dumped because the Soviets didn't want to dedicate the logistics required to field it during peacetime. If there had been a war going on who knows, maybe it would have seen service? It was fairly fast and reliable for such a large and heavy tank. It was honestly pretty much better in every way than the T-10A.

What do you think was innovative about the E-series tanks (not tank destroyers)? The E-100 had extremely thin turret sides and the E-50/E-75 was essentially the Tiger II with thicker, better angled front armor.
 
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sillygoose

Well-known member
That extra 20mm of armor is the difference between a T-34 knocking you out at 1km vs it having to try to close the distance in vain to 100 meters.
Got a source on that? Doesn't seem like it 20mm would make it that much less vulnerable from 1000-100m.

How much lighter and more reliable would the Panther have been without the extra armor? I have no idea, but frankly that protection difference sounds extremely significant, especially considering how much of the Panther's problems were teething issues and the lack of proper maintenance crew for the Germans late in the war. I forget the source and the specifics, but I remember a late '44/early '45 report showing that a higher proportion of Panthers were operational than Panzer IV's at any given time, thus showing that the Panther was more reliable than previously thought.
The lack of 20mm of armor at the front would save at least 1 ton of weight.
20mm wasn't worth all the trouble that came with it. The teething issues came from being overweight and not upgrading the parts to handle said new weight due to the lack of time before rushing it into production. The Panther was supposed to be a 35 ton design originally. The 1943-44 issues weren't truly caused simply by normal teething issues or poor maintenance, it was an overweight design and it took until 1944 to fix the parts being overloaded...at least to a tolerable degree.
I mean the Panthers catching fire coming off the train at Kursk weren't the fault of lack of proper maintenance since they were brand spanking new.
The first Panthers saw combat at Kursk in summer 1943, revealing reliability issues beyond that typically expected for a new weapon system. This was improved through 1943; the Panther's operational rate went from 16 percent at the end of July 1943 to 37 percent by December 1943.

An improved version, the Panther Ausf. A, entered production in August 1943. This received improvements from the Panther Ausf. D, including a better turret with a new commander's cupola and increased turret traverse speed. More improvements began to have an effect on the combat-ready rate of the tanks deployed on the Eastern Front, which increased from 37 percent in February, to 50 percent in April, and 78 percent by the end of May 1944.[116]

General Heinz Guderian reported on 5 March 1944:

The frontline reports said service life of the tank's engine had increased up from 700 to 1,000km [435 to 621 miles]. Plus, the same Panther tank-equipped units reported that failures regarding final drive, transmission and steering gears were within a suitable range.[117]
They eventually became more reliable with later marks, though 'suitable range' of failures in late 1944 is something quite a bit different than in say 1941.

Why wait on the L/70? It would have been interesting to know what the German late war designs would have looked like after successful experiences with rear transmissions with an in-service VK 30.02
Because it was largely unnecessary until late 1944. T-34s, even the /85 was killable with the L/48 75mm at 1000m. Most kills by any 75mm were at ranges within 1000m. The longer gun was really only necessary to try and slug it out at long range with the JS-series and various SP guns the Soviets had, which was still not a great idea. In 1943-most of 1944 the L48 was more than enough to deal with the Soviet's main tank model, while in Western Europe and Italy the long range potential of the L70 was wasted as something like 90% of all kills happened within 800m and again the 75mm L48 could kill an M4 Sherman at 1000m at least. Against Churchill tanks you might need the L70, but those were comparatively rare and could be handled by dedicated TDs.

I'd imagine late war German designs with a rear drive would look like the Leopard 1 with an 88mm gun.

Which German books do you suggest? I recall reading that in late 1941, in anticipation of a successful Barbarossa, Hitler ordered production of AFVs cut in favor of increased air and sea production. Do you know if that’s accurate and what effect it had? In any case, given Tooze's vehemence, I do question if the Germans truly couldn't have found a way to squeeze out more sooner, and what sort of inefficiencies could have been solved early in the war.
Not off hand, but it wouldn't surprise me given that he started forming new Panzer divisions in September instead of reinforcing his units in the East and pulled out the 2nd air fleet in November right as the battle for Moscow was peaking.

Of course Germany could have cut more corners to squeeze out more, but still in terms of AFVs the big increase came with the introduction of the mass production optimized Panther and the completion of more panzer production lines in 1942.

BTW the biggest and most modern tank factory, the St. Valentin works in Austria (I have an excellent book about it) only reached full operational status in 1943. It started with very basic production in 1941 after breaking ground in 1938. In fact that is where the Elefant TDs were made.

That link is broken for me, can you please send an Amazon link?
Not sure why it isn't working. Title is this:
Panzerfertigung im Zweiten Weltkrieg

That's pretty convincing, but if we're playing what ifs, why not cancel the Pz III and start with a 30 ton tank? Is the extra 10 tons really enough to need very heavy equipment?
Because German industry had no experience with 20 ton tanks or the set up to make 30 ton tanks, as that required special production equipment rated to do so. Yes 10 tons makes a huge difference. That's by the Pz38t chassis stayed in production for the entire war, the lines couldn't be upgraded without significant expense and interruption of the production lines. Same with the Pz II chassis and it being used for all manner of designs, including the famous Wespe SP artillery.
I'm all for canceling the Pz III in 1938 and focusing on the Pz IV design.

They really should have up-armed the Pz I to a 20mm (some were converted with Oerlikon in the SCW) and converted the Pz IIs to Jagdpanzers or some sort of StuG.
Not sure the Pz I could mechanically speaking have been used thusly. Eventually using them as munitions carriers or SP rocket artillery wouldn't be a bad idea, but honestly they were most useful as they were originally intended: as training vehicles.

The Pz II however I totally agree on. Should have been a StuG (yes I know that's a Pz38t derivative, but it was in the same weight class as the PzII):

However the Pz II was needed as a chassis for artillery:

What specs exactly are you referring to which limited the designers? What innovations were being introduced on German tanks either structurally (like pike nose) or internally (like stabilizers) in late 1944/45? The Soviets managed to squeeze extreme protection and heavy armament on the IS-2 mod. 1944 which compared extremely favorable to the Tiger II, and the T-44-100 was probably better than the Panther Ausf. G.
No rear drive, no leaf spring suspension, for a while no sloped armor, etc. until later on.

Newly introduced innovations in 1944-45? Maybe the bellville washer suspension of the E-series. Standardization of parts between designs. The E-10 had a hydraulic suspension to make it a smaller target.

The IS-2 was also severely outclassed by the Tiger II in rate of fire, protection (see the weld and armor quality problems of the JS-2s), mobility, etc. The IS-2 was a turreted heavy StuG, not a tank. It was meant for breakthrough operations, not tank combat. Also the JS-3's pike nose was ultimately pointless, as it was never used in combat and designing it ultimately set the design back far enough that it was never to see combat.

The T-44-100 was never used either (and IIRC the gun was too big for the turret for practical combat use) and swiftly replaced by the T-54. Interesting ideas, but they never went anywhere useful other than provide experience for the T-54 design. In practice it is questionable whether the T-44/100 would have been better than the Panther 2, which would have been its true equivalent/contemporary had the war went on. But again rather irrelevant to a discussion about 1939 designs.

Sloped armor might have its own issues, sure, but by 1941 it was easy for all to see that it was worth it and the only viable path forward.
Sure, but it had to be proven in combat first before everyone recognized that as a fact.

The IS-3 and its derivatives threw the US and UK in such a frenzy until they developed the M103 and Conqueror. The pike nose decreased internal volume and was less effective off-axis, definitely, but I wouldn't say the concept was flawed, rather that dart developed became so advanced it rendered armor pretty much ineffective, hence the Leopard.
In the end all the heavy tank concepts proved to be a fool's errand for everyone. During WW2 those designs were maxing out the potential of the heavy tank concept. As it was they were viable as boutique breakthrough weapons given the weapons mix they were facing, but as you say technology swiftly made them redundant post-war.

I would love to learn more about this.
Not much to say really, the M103 and Conquerer were to counter Soviet heavy tanks, but they also learned from the German heavy designs, since the US never designed anything over 45 tons during WW2.

It was dumped because the Soviets didn't want to dedicate the logistics required to field it during peacetime. If there had been a war going on who knows, maybe it would have seen service? It was fairly fast and reliable for such a large and heavy tank. It was honestly pretty much better in every way than the T-10A.
Why did they continue developing the T10 then? Why did the Soviets consider the T-10 more production worthy?

What do you think was innovative about the E-series tanks (not tank destroyers)? The E-100 had extremely thin turret sides and the E-50/E-75 was essentially the Tiger II with thicker, better angled front armor.
Mentioned above: commonality of parts, cheap/reliable suspension, more powerful guns than any exist AFVs.
I mean you don't need radical new innovations if the existing concepts were enough for the design goals.
 

SpicyJuan

Active member
Got a source on that? Doesn't seem like it 20mm would make it that much less vulnerable from 1000-100m.

60mm at 55 degrees from vertical gives you 105mm of effective armor. 80mm at the same angle gives you 140mm. The Soviet 85mm AP could penetrate up to 107mm at 1km, but could only pen 140mm at 100m for AP, and even closer for APBC.

This extra 20mm difference also determines whether or not...a US 90mm pens at 1500m or closer to 750m, a US 76mm APC will pen you at 1750m or not at all, 17 pounder at 2000m or 1000m, etc.
 
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SpicyJuan

Active member
The lack of 20mm of armor at the front would save at least 1 ton of weight.
20mm wasn't worth all the trouble that came with it. The teething issues came from being overweight and not upgrading the parts to handle said new weight due to the lack of time before rushing it into production. The Panther was supposed to be a 35 ton design originally. The 1943-44 issues weren't truly caused simply by normal teething issues or poor maintenance, it was an overweight design and it took until 1944 to fix the parts being overloaded...at least to a tolerable degree.
I mean the Panthers catching fire coming off the train at Kursk weren't the fault of lack of proper maintenance since they were brand spanking new.
I guess one counterpoint to adding the extra armor would be that, according to one HSTV-L engineer, most tanks were knocked out from the side during WW2. But then again, how many Panthers were NOT knocked out from the front because of the extra 20mm?
 

Buba

A total creep
I took a look at Italy.
Hmm ... my ideas:
1 - start spamming Semovente 75/18 or - better - 75/34 in late '39;
2 - kill the L6/40;
3 - kill the M11/39 or use it for training. Put the M13/40 into production ASAP to train tankers and keep industry busy while I grasp for something better.
4 - I'm not sure whether to beg, steal, borrow or licence a design for a medium - the candidates being, inorder of preference, the Pz.IV, Valentine or T-34 - or to embark on Progetto Carro Armato Italiano Potente e Invincibile (note to self - rip off Girls und Panzer terminology and call it Pio-Pio as part of maskirovka to confuse the enemy). Either way I should have something in production by mid '40 ...
5 - demand a belt fed version of the Breda 37 MG;
6 - make Funiculi! Funicula! the hymn of the Tank Corps;

That's for starters ...
 
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sillygoose

Well-known member
I guess one counterpoint to adding the extra armor would be that, according to one HSTV-L engineer, most tanks were knocked out from the side during WW2. But then again, how many Panthers were NOT knocked out from the front because of the extra 20mm?
I don't think that is accurate. Maybe among German tanks, but I swear I've seen operations research from WW2 that showed US and British armor was knocked out from the front more than any other angle. Certainly the most hits received were frontal.
 

Sixgun McGurk

Well-known member
The Germans have been well covered, but from the US side, I would try to skip the whole idiotic Priest and go straight to the Sherman, but with better radios, wider tracks and a bigger motorized turret. I would try to introduce a 105 mm smoothbore sabot AT gun with a good infantry killer shell and wolfram armor appliques. If that failed I would force a Firefly version.

The Chaffee would be rushed into production with the smoothbore, hopefully replacing the Staurt, which could go as lend lease and to the Pacific.

If I could get Continental into overdrive and get the AV1790 into production early I would aim for an M48A3 by January 1943, except it would carry either a 105 smoothbore or a dead ringer for the 8.8 KwK 43, but 1mm bigger so it could use captured ammo. Wouldn't really expect too much though. There would be a production simplification committee of outside engineers brought in cold on every project, making sure that no unneccisary fiddly bits or stupid bottlenecks got by planning.

I would absolutely steal the BTR 80 hull and running gear, producing as many as possible, along with a lot more halftrack fuel trucks and bowser trailers for fuel, water and ammo. There would be no US motor vehicle shipped without a trailer and proper jerrycans. Not the inferior US knockoffs, exact copies of the German jerrycan.

I would heartily congratulate the inventors of the Bazooka and tell them to make it much bigger or they were going to be assigned as weathermen in the Aleutians.

The Carl Gustav recoiless rifle would make a much earlier entrance, along with its jeep mount and rockets would be a priority for development.

I would also try to eliminate all large towed artillery and put all of my Long Tom's, hurried up Long Tom's and howitzers on Sherman tracks.

I like the Stridsvagn 103 with the dozer blade. Something like that but more primitive could replace all those shitty unsurvivable tank destroyers and serve as engineering vehicles in a pinch.
 
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sillygoose

Well-known member
I don't think it could be accomplished in time not to adversely effect Sherman production. The learning curve is already very steep.
I'm assuming January 1st 1939 is the start date, so the M4 wasn't in production before February 1942. The design wasn't even submitted before April 1940, so there is plenty of time to design the T20 analogue:
Given the timeline of the development of that tank that should fit nicely into the time between January 1st 1939 and February 1942 to get it into production. It would be lighter, more compact, had thicker frontal armor (63mm vs 50 of the M4) and have a heavier gun.
 

Sixgun McGurk

Well-known member
AV1790
I'm assuming January 1st 1939 is the start date, so the M4 wasn't in production before February 1942. The design wasn't even submitted before April 1940, so there is plenty of time to design the T20 analogue:
Given the timeline of the development of that tank that should fit nicely into the time between January 1st 1939 and February 1942 to get it into production. It would be lighter, more compact, had thicker frontal armor (63mm vs 50 of the M4) and have a heavier gun.
The engine, transmission are the problem. None of them existed off the shelf. The Sherman's Wright R950 and Spicer 5 speed were simple, reliable and available aircraft and truck variants.
If there was a way to back mount them then sure, but I'm sure there was a good reason we're stuck with that drive shaft tunnel.

If I could get a good enough engine and transmission out of industry I'd copy the T34-80 hull profile and big bogy track layout but with a smooth bore in a large turret, but not if they had to go into battle with spare transmission strapped on like a Russian.

The T20 and its variants were never considered really suitable for service due to bad transmissions, weak engines and ground pressure issues until the line of development culminated at the M48A3, with its AV1790 V12 turbodiesel and cross drive hydraulic transmission. Neither had been invented in 1939. This is a twenty year leap, with exotic mechanical and metallurgical requirements. I wouldn't want to be an idiot like Hitler, stopping good enough for perfect, but yes, if it could be done then sure. But I'd still make the Sherman early. They were needed NOW. They could be forgotten like the Priest but if the rear drive was a bust the upgunned and reactive armored Sherman would soldier on.
 

LordSunhawk

Das BOOT (literally)
Owner
Administrator
Staff Member
Founder
You mean the Grant/Lee? The M3? The Priest was a SPG 105mm howitzer on the M3 chassis.

The Ford GAA was already well into development in 39, same with the hydromatic gearbox.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
AV1790
The engine, transmission are the problem. None of them existed off the shelf. The Sherman's Wright R950 and Spicer 5 speed were simple, reliable and available aircraft and truck variants.
If there was a way to back mount them then sure, but I'm sure there was a good reason we're stuck with that drive shaft tunnel.
You have two years or more to design it and then several more to perfect it in the course of service. The US didn't get Shermans into combat until 1943. And to honestly say that the Sherman's engine and transmission couldn't be made to work in a different layout isn't likely accurate. The T-20 was designed as a replacement to the Sherman, so was conceived of as a totally new model, which meant the US designers opted for brand new parts as it was a long term project with upgrade potential rather than something to get into service quickly. If there was the will I'm sure they could have made the parts shoehorned into the Sherman into something that would work with a lighter design.

If you can find a reason that they could not have been I'm all ears.

The T20 and its variants were never considered really suitable for service due to bad transmissions, weak engines and ground pressure issues until the line of development culminated at the M48A3, with its AV1790 V12 turbodiesel and cross drive hydraulic transmission. Neither had been invented in 1939. This is a twenty year leap, with exotic mechanical and metallurgical requirements. I wouldn't want to be an idiot like Hitler, stopping good enough for perfect, but yes, if it could be done then sure. But I'd still make the Sherman early. They were needed NOW. They could be forgotten like the Priest but if the rear drive was a bust the upgunned and reactive armored Sherman would soldier on.
Because it was a totally new design with upgrade potential, but most of those issues you mention are also mostly just in the very first T-20 design, not the direct follow ons prior to the M26:
Like the T20 and T22, T23s with the 75 mm automatic gun and 3 inch gun were planned but never constructed. The T23 was actually the first of the T20 series prototypes completed and was found to be highly maneuverable. The design was classified "limited procurement" in May 1943 and 250 T23's were ordered, although the design was never standardized or issued to front line units. Production models featured the T80 turret that would later be used in modified form on the upgunned M4 variants. The T23 was not adopted for service partly because of its untried transmission system and partly because the design had poor weight distribution and excessive ground pressure. In an attempt to rectify this, two further variants were ordered, the T23E3 with torsion bar suspension and the T23E4 with horizontal volute suspension. The T23E4 was cancelled before the design was completed, but the T23E3 prototype was completed and the torsion bar suspension was found to have reduced the ground pressure by 20% compared to the T23.
That was after less than a year's development. The T-20 wasn't even started until May 25th 1942 and in May 1943 was ordered. Literally about 12 months of development from spec being issued to being ordered.

on the basis that the M4 was becoming obsolete, the Ordnance Department requested the T23E3 and the T20E3 be standardized as the M27 and M27B1 in July 1943. However, the request was rejected and neither design was ever mass-produced. The reason for this lay partly in Army Ground Forces (AGF) not recognising the growing obsolescence of the M4 design. Accordingly, the US Army did not consider it necessary to interrupt M4 production for a vehicle for which they did not perceive a requirement.
Two months later the designed were ordered to be standardized.

With the timeline I laid out in my original post they have at least 24 months to go from spec to production. Interestingly that is nearly the timeline (closer to 2.5 years) it took to go from the spec from the T-20 to getting the M26 into production after jumping up from 29 ton to 46:

That was because of army indecision and infighting:
From mid-1943 to mid-1944, development of the 90 mm up-armored T26 prototype continued to proceed slowly due to disagreements within the U.S. Army about its future tank needs. The accounts of what exactly happened during this time vary by historian, but all agree that Army Ground Forces was the main source of resistance that delayed production of the T26.

They only needed less than a year to get prototypes of the more developed T-23 model into production:
After the initial prototypes were built in early 1943, an additional 250 T23 tanks were produced from January to December 1944. These were the first tanks in the U.S. Army with the 76 mm M1A1 gun to go into production.[20]

I'd say if they really wanted to they could have gone hard on getting the T-23 into production with the 76mm cannon within 2 years had they decided that is what they wanted to do, it was just that IOTL they kept changing the T-20 into increasingly large and heavy and novel prototypes that ultimately became the M26 since they didn't think the M4 needed replacing and just wanted to make a heavy tank with a 90mm gun so they could have their Tiger analogue.

I think you're making a mistake of determinism: "if it wasn't done IOTL it couldn't have been done" rather than it wasn't done because the motives were different. Why use the M4 parts for a novel design when said novel design was to be a total replacement for the M4? Or why bother really making the novel design work as quickly as possible if they didn't perceive the need to have a direct M4 replacement?
 
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BlackDragon98

Freikorps Kommandant
Banned - Politics
If I was in charge of AFV development and purchasing for Nationalist China, I'd just buy a plane ticket to India and from there, fly to Turkey.
The KMT is hopeless and the CCP are the epitome of evil, so I'mma head out ASAP.
 

Sixgun McGurk

Well-known member
You have two years or more to design it and then several more to perfect it in the course of service. The US didn't get Shermans into combat until 1943. And to honestly say that the Sherman's engine and transmission couldn't be made to work in a different layout isn't likely accurate. The T-20 was designed as a replacement to the Sherman, so was conceived of as a totally new model, which meant the US designers opted for brand new parts as it was a long term project with upgrade potential rather than something to get into service quickly. If there was the will I'm sure they could have made the parts shoehorned into the Sherman into something that would work with a lighter design.

If you can find a reason that they could not have been I'm all ears.


Because it was a totally new design with upgrade potential, but most of those issues you mention are also mostly just in the very first T-20 design, not the direct follow ons prior to the M26:

That was after less than a year's development. The T-20 wasn't even started until May 25th 1942 and in May 1943 was ordered. Literally about 12 months of development from spec being issued to being ordered.


Two months later the designed were ordered to be standardized.

With the timeline I laid out in my original post they have at least 24 months to go from spec to production. Interestingly that is nearly the timeline (closer to 2.5 years) it took to go from the spec from the T-20 to getting the M26 into production after jumping up from 29 ton to 46:

That was because of army indecision and infighting:


They only needed less than a year to get prototypes of the more developed T-23 model into production:


I'd say if they really wanted to they could have gone hard on getting the T-23 into production with the 76mm cannon within 2 years had they decided that is what they wanted to do, it was just that IOTL they kept changing the T-20 into increasingly large and heavy and novel prototypes that ultimately became the M26 since they didn't think the M4 needed replacing and just wanted to make a heavy tank with a 90mm gun so they could have their Tiger analogue.

I think you're making a mistake of determinism: "if it wasn't done IOTL it couldn't have been done" rather than it wasn't done because the motives were different. Why use the M4 parts for a novel design when said novel design was to be a total replacement for the M4? Or why bother really making the novel design work as is if they didn't perceive the need to have a direct M4 replacement?

No, I have until December 1941 to get large numbers of Shermans to the Philippines, Wake and Guam. I'm not going to fuck around with plans while the Japanese are killing my peopIe.

I know the M4 Sherman works reliably and can be made in numbers with common industrial components in time to make a difference. I don't know if the T20 would work or not, since it never did. I would strive to do better, to run a design team without the usual REMF army tards meddling and have something great to replace the M4 with by 1943, but you fight with what you have and we truly had nothing in January 1939. The M4 took 10 months from final design to rolling tracks. If I could hand the factory the Sherman drawings in early 39 and have the M4 training in the Phillipines by march 1941 then that's what would happen no matter who got shot.

Before the M4 was the M3, a true piece of shit that was a waste of metal but served to get industry organized for military AFV production. It actually went into battle and served as a great nuisance throughout the war. I would build the M4 in its place for the insurance before meddling with fate. The Ideal Tank To Be Named Later could go to Europe while the M4 did an island tour if all was well. But if IT was a temperamental and unreliable dog that was often incapable of movement, then the crappy old long running reliable Sherman could still save the day.

The Soviets could afford to have bad running tanks. They could have two new transmissions per tank per week trucked or railroaded direct from the factory without a long double run through torpedo alley. Same with the Germans. US equipment on two very distant fronts had to work or be abandoned.
 

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