WI the Imperial Japanese Warships of Operation Ten-Go was ISOT to the Battle of Jutland

ATP

Well-known member
Good point. They would assume they have a speed edge over the Japanese ships and expect to be able to get away if they have to.
And rightly so.They do not have radars,so they would assume that they face 30-35k BB.Nobody hear about Yamato class BB in their times,after all.
People usually see what they expect to see,they go for sailors,too.

Yamato is an outside context problem for the Kaiserliche Marine.

From their perspective upon seeing her at very long range based on what they know about the IJN: "She's probably a battlecruiser packing 6x15in in twin turrets or 9x14" in triples."

Until she's close enough for them to discern the number of guns per turret and get a rangefinder on her they'll be blissfully unaware that a) those aren't 14" or 15" and b) she's a whole heck of a lot bigger than anything they've got.

All true.Probably they would be unaware of reality till Yamato start firing.
 

ShadowArxxy

Well-known member
Comrade
@ShadowArxxy All true, but we are in 1916, not 18-20.

The existence of Yamato shouldn't result in any changes to battleship fleet compositions in 1916, because no one is going to be in a position to lay down new battleship designs until postwar.

5:5:3 was not bad. It was the 15:15:10 which was bad. 18:18:12 better

Japan nearly walked on the treaty in our timeline because of the US and Great Britain ganging up to insist on the 5:5:3 ratio, and this betrayal pretty much single-handedly caused them to break off their longstanding alliance with Great Britain. There is absolutely no way they're going to allow 5:5:3 in an alternate history when they have the upper hand. Indeed, the only reason they'd actually allow a parity ratio in "superheavy battleships" is that they're justifiably confident that neither the United States nor Great Britain can build a battleship on par with the literally divinely granted Yamato.

And even with Japan being willing to allow parity, the U.S. and Great Britain are going to have to make numerous secondary concessions to get there as opposed to something like a 3:2:2:1:1 battleship ratio in Japan's favor. Literally the only way Japan would even consider conceding 5:5:3 in this timeline is if they're fielding three Yamatos while the USN and RN are restricted to 16" guns and 35,000 tons.
 
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stevep

Well-known member
The existence of Yamato shouldn't result in any changes to battleship fleet compositions in 1916, because no one is going to be in a position to lay down new battleship designs until postwar.

True for the RN and lesser powers in Europe, although it will set designers and shipyards think. The US might decide its 1916 programme isn't enough - if it does get anything like accurate details of the size of the Yamato. What they will come up with and how practical it would be could be interesting. ;)

Japan nearly walked on the treaty in our timeline because of the US and Great Britain ganging up to insist on the 5:5:3 ratio, and this betrayal pretty much single-handedly caused them to break off their longstanding alliance with Great Britain. There is absolutely no way they're going to allow 5:5:3 in an alternate history when they have the upper hand. Indeed, the only reason they'd actually allow a parity ratio in "superheavy battleships" is that they're justifiably confident that neither the United States nor Great Britain can build a battleship on par with the literally divinely granted Yamato.


Good point on what stance Japan might take. Especially if the DT government is persuaded by the UP people that they have a clear technological lead for at least a decade or so. Although if they learn what happened to UT Japan they might be more cautious about the idea of too much tension with the US. Mind you what they might do is agree terms say on a 5:5:3 ratio but avoid any agreement on other classes, other than definitions and secretly do as much work as they can on carriers, aircraft and related technology. Have the US and possibly the UK spending massive amounts on very large and expensive ships which quickly become obsolete.

Actually Japan wanted to maintain the alliance, both because it gave some safeguards and also diplomatic prestige. It was the US that insisted on the alliance - despite it being clearly defensive and the US even then having a loop-hole for an attack on Japan not triggering a Britain response. Britain was divided on the issue as were the dominion - Australia and New Zealand wanted it to continue and Canada wanted it ended for better relations with the US and it was the US insistence that it ended as part of the terms of the WNT.

And even with Japan being willing to allow parity, the U.S. and Great Britain are going to have to make numerous secondary concessions to get there as opposed to something like a 3:2:2:1:1 battleship ratio in Japan's favor. Literally the only way Japan would even consider conceding 5:5:3 in this timeline is if they're fielding three Yamatos while the USN and RN are restricted to 16" guns and 35,000 tons.

I can't see either US or UK being willing to accept parity as they still see themselves as world wide power while their view of Japan is as a purely region one, plus it would definitely be a red flag for the fire-eaters in the US. Also while the Yamato is a big boost, probably most in terms of the knowledge it presents rather than the ship itself the DTs should fairly quickly be aware that there might be problems maintaining some aspects of the ship and also that while its a very powerful ship its a single one.
 

stevep

Well-known member
Was it the ratio itself, or the 315k tons limit?

To the best of my knowledge it was the ratio itself. For one thing a matter of face as Japan wanted equality.

I have also read that both the IJN and the USN were ardent followers of Mahan's ideas and that the reading of his work at the time suggested that you needed a 7:10 ratio to successfully defend against an attack. That's why the IJN fought so hard to get a 7:10 ratio before their politicians stepped in and forced them to accept a 6:10 one. In their eyes and probably at least some USN ones it meant that the US could attack them and win with the initial standing forces in place once the treaty was in place.

Not saying this was accurate as I have seen the suggestion that Mahan [ or at least some of his followers] paid too much attention to the 'decisive battle' and less to its purpose - winning control of the seas for your use and denying it to enemies. Also as the Japanese showed you can do quite a lot to improve quality to try and gain an edge, such as in night fighting, improved torpedoes and that sort of thing. While in the US case - having to project power across the world's largest ocean and also maintain some presence in the Atlantic - it was never likely it would be able to concentrate its entire battlefleet against Japan.
 

Buba

A total creep
It's a long way to Washington - there might be no WNT in this TL.
The war may end in 1917, USA might not join the war, Wilson might not win in 1916, Congress may tell the USN to go pound sand instead of wanking over dreams of having ten battleships with 16" guns AND six battlecruisers, the UK can be in better shape and not keen on a treaty etc. etc.

In the shorter term - do the Japanese destroyers have any ASW capability, besides carrying depth charges? Hydrophones, at least? Can they sweep the North Sea and/or the Western Approaches of KM u-boots? Radars help in pushing u-boots under water instead of allowing them surface passage at night.
 
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stevep

Well-known member
It's a long way to Washington - there might be no WNT in this TL.
The war may end in 1917, USA might not join the war, Wilson might not win in 1916, Congress may tell the USN to go pound sand instead of wanking over dreams of having ten battleships with 16" guns AND six battlecruisers, the UK can be in better shape and not keen on a treaty etc. etc.

In the shorter term - do the Japanese destroyers have any ASW capability, besides carrying depth charges? Hydrophones, at least? Can they sweep the North Sea and/or the Western Approaches of KM u-boots? Radars help in pushing u-boots under water instead of allowing them surface passage at night.

Very true. Butterflies are unclear as to what the Battle of Jutland would look like here let alone what will happen in the rest of the war. I would suspect that the US will still enter the war as the worse position of the HSF resulting from the emergence of the Yamato would prompt an even bigger push for German to move to USW and keep to it. It might be that the war ends somewhat earlier which could have a lot of butterflies - including quite possibly a non-communist Russia. Quite possibly a WNT doesn't take place or fails due to the differences between the assorted powers.

Good point on the Japanese DDs. They would at least know something of hydrophones at least as Japan both had connections with WWII Germany and also painful experience of its own losses at allied - overwhelmingly US - hands. Probably can give the allies some good ideas and I think its likely they would as the Germans subs are a serious problem for the allies and a potential one for any Japanese shipping in the region or the Med.
 

ATP

Well-known member
It's a long way to Washington - there might be no WNT in this TL.
The war may end in 1917, USA might not join the war, Wilson might not win in 1916, Congress may tell the USN to go pound sand instead of wanking over dreams of having ten battleships with 16" guns AND six battlecruisers, the UK can be in better shape and not keen on a treaty etc. etc.

In the shorter term - do the Japanese destroyers have any ASW capability, besides carrying depth charges? Hydrophones, at least? Can they sweep the North Sea and/or the Western Approaches of KM u-boots? Radars help in pushing u-boots under water instead of allowing them surface passage at night.
Very good questions.They should have be capable of killing submarines.
 

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