WI: Operation Nordlicht instead of Störfang

History Learner

Well-known member
Original idea is by @sillygoose

What if, after the Kerch Straits are cleared in May of 1942 by Operation Trappenjagd, the Germans elect to cancel the attack on Sevastopol in favor of Operation Nordlicht against Leningrad? The port of Sevastopol will stall fall later, due to the ongoing water shortages, and until then can be screened by existing Axis forces. This, however, frees up 11th Army with four divisions and its extensive siege train to conduct Nordlicht against Leningrad in June or July, which can probably compel the surrender of said city by the Fall of 1942 due to starvation. In addition, VIII Air Corps under Richthofen is free for use in the aftermath of Second Kharkov, instead of being tied down in Crimea until the start of July. The Luftwaffe will have saved the resources used to make 20k sorties as well as 20k tons of bombs during the Crimean operation.

For reference, here is what Operation Nordlicht would do:

nordlicht-jpg.287576
 
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PsihoKekec

Swashbuckling Accountant
While siege artillery train would surely be sent to Leningrad, it's possible that divisions would be retained in the South for Fall Blau. If they are not, then even without the siege artillery, the four extra divisions, with full engineering and logistics support would be probably enough to push over Neva and sever the Lake Ladoga supply line, starving the city into surrender, so the remaining population can be exterminated.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
While siege artillery train would surely be sent to Leningrad, it's possible that divisions would be retained in the South for Fall Blau. If they are not, then even without the siege artillery, the four extra divisions, with full engineering and logistics support would be probably enough to push over Neva and sever the Lake Ladoga supply line, starving the city into surrender, so the remaining population can be exterminated.

Historically they were sent North anyway in July/August.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
So, to generate some further discussion, I am adding my own thoughts to this.

Specifically as it pertains to Leningrad and Nordlicht, the window for operations is from May 20th until August 19th, which is when the Sinyavino Offensive historically kicked off. This is a three month period, giving a month to rest and transfer from AGS to AGN and then six weeks to conduct the attack based off their historical performance against Sevastopol. This then gives them a further a two week rest period before turning to deal with the aforementioned Soviet offensives in late August. Stalin, obviously, could order an earlier attack but the problem with such is that the Soviet historical performance in 1942 repeatedly showed that poorly planned and logistically supplied efforts would not work; thus, I feel significantly moving up the timeframe of their attack would result in an even worse outcome for them then historically. Likewise, to strip resources from other sectors in this timeframe isn't really possible, as Stalin's fundamental assumption for 1942 was an attack on Moscow. By the time that has been proven wrong, AGS is in full swing with Fall Blau.

Speaking of Fall Blau, the addition of VIII Air Corps from the beginning, undiminished from Storfang, is a great boon for German efforts in the immediate aftermath of Kharkov but also going into the running of Fall Blau. For one, powerful German tactical air support would strongly influence the course of fighting around Voronezh:

Reacting to the German onslaught, Stalin ordered the Briansk and Southwestern Fronts to respond immediately with counterattacks and counterstrokes. Underscoring his belligerence, he reminded Golikov at the Briansk Front: “You now have 1,000 tanks and the enemy has no more than 500. . . . On the operational front of three enemy tank divisions, you have assembled more than 500 tanks, and the enemy has at the most 300–350 tanks.” 16 Stalin then released Lieutenant General A. I. Liziukov’s new 5th Tank Army to Golikov’s control and directed the front to mount a counterstroke west of Voronezh. Powerful on paper, with a strength of more than 640 tanks, Liziukov’s tank army began its counterstroke on 5 July. 17 Inexperienced in conducting large mobile operations, Liziukov committed his army’s three tank corps to combat piecemeal. Although Fourth Panzer Army’s 9th Panzer Division later destroyed two of Liziukov’s tank brigades in several days of fighting, the uncoordinated but tenacious Soviet force tied 9th and 11th Panzer Divisions down in heavy fighting west of Voronezh throughout much of July. Meanwhile, Fourth Panzer Army’s Grossdeutschland Motorized and 24th Panzer Divisions seized Voronezh, precipitating an intense fight for a bridgehead around the city east of the Don. 18 This went beyond Hitler’s instructions and resulted in several days’ delay before the two divisions were able to break contact and join Fourth Panzer’s advance to the southeast; Bock’s decision ultimately cost him his job. 19​
From When Titans Clashed, by David Glantz.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
How about instead of moving the 11th army divisions north just moving the siege train and dispatching new divisions that would have otherwise been sent to AG-South to Leningrad and having the 11th army divisions that were to be transferred north remain in AG-South instead? That would be quite a bit more efficient as far as transportation goes and speed up the process of getting Nordlicht underway.

It's been a while since I looked at this situation, but wasn't VIII air corps supposed to provide the air support for the Nordlicht operation?

Plus there is the option of not going right at the city (a post of mine on another site):
I got my hands on a Glantz book on Leningrad and it seems based on the Moorbrand option there was another way to get Leningrad without attacking it at all. Since Manstein's plan was to take Leningrad by starving it out through taking the Ladoga port...after Operation Moorbrand, the destruction of the Soviet 54th Army's bulge shoved in the German Volkhov line, there would be a major weakness in the Soviet lines west of the Volkov so they could roll that up and reclaim the west bank of the river completely, which would cut off the supply routes to Leningrad. It would also give defensible lines and eliminate two Soviet armies. With 2nd Shock army just destroyed the Soviet Volkov Front wouldn't be able to held, and the NOG wasn't strong enough to help the Soviet units outside the Leningrad pocket.

And a response from another poster:
I have a hard time envisioning Leningrad surviving if the Germans manage to clear the area west of the Volkhov river.
So if the losses sustained by the Volkhov Front in this ATL is large enough; going for this alternative might very well be the best option.

On a tanget - given that AG North got all the way to the outskirts of Volkhov in November '41, one might wonder how far they would have gotten if they had dropped the rather hopeless attempt to link up with AG Center in mid-October, and instead focused on capturing that city and beyond.

To summarize; this ATL provides AG North with a big boost in strength by the second half of June.
Given the rather convoluted shape of the frontline, they had numerous alternatives to inflict substantial losses on the Red Army.

With regards to the effect this would have on the rest of the frontline - it depends a bit on some unanswered questions from the original assumption.
How long would the Sevastopol garrison hold out without an Axis attack? And how many Axis troops would it tie down before that happened? An even bigger Romanian component in the siege would probably be considered.

Generally, the Soviets had pretty much exhausted their strategic reserves by the start of September.
Any scenario that inflicts more losses on the Soviets in the summer could thus have a big effect by that time.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
How about instead of moving the 11th army divisions north just moving the siege train and dispatching new divisions that would have otherwise been sent to AG-South to Leningrad and having the 11th army divisions that were to be transferred north remain in AG-South instead? That would be quite a bit more efficient as far as transportation goes and speed up the process of getting Nordlicht underway.

It's definitely a possibility to do, although it comes with some disadvantages. For one, 11th AOK was triangular divisions with the nine battalion structure as well as experienced. The 300-series divisions, I'm assuming you're referring to the 4-5 that became available in June/July, are not and waiting until they are available significantly reduces the window of time to act before Stalin's August offensive.

It's been a while since I looked at this situation, but wasn't VIII air corps supposed to provide the air support for the Nordlicht operation?

Plus there is the option of not going right at the city (a post of mine on another site):


And a response from another poster:

I'm not aware of VIII Air Corps being in Nordlicht; I'm assuming this is based on something Glantz states in his Leningrad book? I'm also not sure what you mean about attacking the city, unless you are talking about the plan before Manstein modified it:

In light of Führer Directive 41, Küchler’s staff developed three main offensive plans regarding Leningrad for the summer of 1942: Operation Nordlicht (northern lights), Operation Bettelstab (beggar’s staff) and Operation Moorbrand (moor fire). The last two were both relatively small- scale offensives, employing only three divisions; the first aimed at eliminating the Oranienbaum bridgehead and the other a pincer attack against the Pogost’e salient. However, Nordlicht was a major undertaking and would not be feasible until Manstein’s AOK 11 arrived. On 23 July, Führer Directive 45 specified that Leningrad should be captured by early September and recommended that the two smaller operations should be completed first to free up reserves for the main event.​
Despite a window of opportunity in July-August, Heeresgruppe Nord remained on the defensive and decided to forego even a limited offensive until significant reinforcements arrived. Owing to transportation difficulties, Manstein’s headquarters did not arrive on the Leningrad front until 27 August and his four infantry divisions (24., 132. and 170. Infanterie-Divisionen, and 28. Jager-Division) began trickling in shortly afterwards. These AOK 11 divisions still retained the triangular nine- battalion structure and were much stronger than most of the reduced-size divisions in AOK 18. Küchler also received the 3. and 5. Gebirgsjager- Divisionen from Norway and the Spanish 250. Infanterie-Division. Luftflotte I was reinforced to over 250 operational aircraft in July 1942. Once the forces began to assemble on the Leningrad front, Hitler decreed that Manstein’s AOK 11 would conduct Operation Nordlicht with a total of nine divisions, while AOK 18 held the Volkhov. The offensive was tentatively expected to begin on 14 September and conclude by the end of the month.​
After his costly victory at Sevastopol, Manstein was not sanguine about fighting his way into a major city like Leningrad defended by more than 200,000 Soviet troops. In particular, he lacked sufficient assault pioneers and assault guns – two of the critical force multipliers used at Sevastopol – to conduct effective urban combat operations. The original Nordlicht plan developed by AOK 18 staff called for a major breakthrough attack conducted by four divisions out of Pushkin – basically a continuation of the September 1941 attack – followed by a direct assault into the southern end of Leningrad. Instead, Manstein altered the plan by emphasizing envelopment rather than assault. In Manstein’s revised Nordlicht plan, five German divisions would seize the Pulkovo Heights and then snip off the Kolpino salient, followed by an assault crossing of the Neva River. Once bridgeheads were established across the Neva, Manstein intended to push the 12. Panzer-Division and four infantry divisions across the river to roll up the Soviet 55th Army and then advance northwards towards the Leningrad-Osinevets railway line. If successful, Manstein’s forces would cut all Soviet supply links across Lake Ladoga, thereby ensuring the rapid starvation of Leningrad’s garrison. As usual, there was a great deal of risk in Manstein’s plan since he had to strip Heeresgruppe Nord of virtually all reserves, leaving the Volkhov sector vulnerable to attack.​
 
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sillygoose

Well-known member
It's definitely a possibility to do, although it comes with some disadvantages. For one, 11th AOK was triangular divisions with the nine battalion structure as well as experienced. The 300-series divisions, I'm assuming you're referring to the 4-5 that became available in June/July, are not and waiting until they are available significantly reduces the window of time to act before Stalin's August offensive.
The divisions shipped east in the 300s series were all triangular too. Not sure why you think they weren't.

The 6 battalion structure only came later. The only significant difference was they were at full strength compared to 11th army divisions and less experienced. There were several waves, including units dispatched in May. They could start an offensive outside the city against either the Soviet positions west of the Volkhov river, as referenced above, or with some of the minor other offensives like Bettelstab or Moorbrand to free up other divisions.

Regardless the 300s series would be available before it was possible to get the 11th army moved north even without attacking Sevastopol. At best the 11th could arrive in mid-July. These 300 series divisions could be there by mid-June and the 11th army units used to replace them in Ukraine much more easily.

I'm not aware of VIII Air Corps being in Nordlicht; I'm assuming this is based on something Glantz states in his Leningrad book? I'm also not sure what you mean about attacking the city, unless you are talking about the plan before Manstein modified it:

In light of Führer Directive 41, Küchler’s staff developed three main offensive plans regarding Leningrad for the summer of 1942: Operation Nordlicht (northern lights), Operation Bettelstab (beggar’s staff) and Operation Moorbrand (moor fire). The last two were both relatively small- scale offensives, employing only three divisions; the first aimed at eliminating the Oranienbaum bridgehead and the other a pincer attack against the Pogost’e salient. However, Nordlicht was a major undertaking and would not be feasible until Manstein’s AOK 11 arrived. On 23 July, Führer Directive 45 specified that Leningrad should be captured by early September and recommended that the two smaller operations should be completed first to free up reserves for the main event.​
Despite a window of opportunity in July-August, Heeresgruppe Nord remained on the defensive and decided to forego even a limited offensive until significant reinforcements arrived. Owing to transportation difficulties, Manstein’s headquarters did not arrive on the Leningrad front until 27 August and his four infantry divisions (24., 132. and 170. Infanterie-Divisionen, and 28. Jager-Division) began trickling in shortly afterwards. These AOK 11 divisions still retained the triangular nine- battalion structure and were much stronger than most of the reduced-size divisions in AOK 18. Küchler also received the 3. and 5. Gebirgsjager- Divisionen from Norway and the Spanish 250. Infanterie-Division. Luftflotte I was reinforced to over 250 operational aircraft in July 1942. Once the forces began to assemble on the Leningrad front, Hitler decreed that Manstein’s AOK 11 would conduct Operation Nordlicht with a total of nine divisions, while AOK 18 held the Volkhov. The offensive was tentatively expected to begin on 14 September and conclude by the end of the month.​
After his costly victory at Sevastopol, Manstein was not sanguine about fighting his way into a major city like Leningrad defended by more than 200,000 Soviet troops. In particular, he lacked sufficient assault pioneers and assault guns – two of the critical force multipliers used at Sevastopol – to conduct effective urban combat operations. The original Nordlicht plan developed by AOK 18 staff called for a major breakthrough attack conducted by four divisions out of Pushkin – basically a continuation of the September 1941 attack – followed by a direct assault into the southern end of Leningrad. Instead, Manstein altered the plan by emphasizing envelopment rather than assault. In Manstein’s revised Nordlicht plan, five German divisions would seize the Pulkovo Heights and then snip off the Kolpino salient, followed by an assault crossing of the Neva River. Once bridgeheads were established across the Neva, Manstein intended to push the 12. Panzer-Division and four infantry divisions across the river to roll up the Soviet 55th Army and then advance northwards towards the Leningrad-Osinevets railway line. If successful, Manstein’s forces would cut all Soviet supply links across Lake Ladoga, thereby ensuring the rapid starvation of Leningrad’s garrison. As usual, there was a great deal of risk in Manstein’s plan since he had to strip Heeresgruppe Nord of virtually all reserves, leaving the Volkhov sector vulnerable to attack.​
Must be misremembering then, it has been a while since I got into the specifics of this operation.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
The divisions shipped east in the 300s series were all triangular too. Not sure why you think they weren't.

A source I had read said they weren't, so thank you for the correction.

The 6 battalion structure only came later. The only significant difference was they were at full strength compared to 11th army divisions and less experienced. There were several waves, including units dispatched in May. They could start an offensive outside the city against either the Soviet positions west of the Volkhov river, as referenced above, or with some of the minor other offensives like Bettelstab or Moorbrand to free up other divisions.

Can you go over this Volkhov option more; I assume it's something similar to what could've been done in December of 1941? Would it also have been an obvious opportunity to the Germans?

Regardless the 300s series would be available before it was possible to get the 11th army moved north even without attacking Sevastopol. At best the 11th could arrive in mid-July. These 300 series divisions could be there by mid-June and the 11th army units used to replace them in Ukraine much more easily.

One thing about the logistical difficulties 11th AOK had IOTL is that their operation against Sevastopol finished up in early July, by which time Fall Blau was underway. Not only then were the Germans trying to logistically support a major offensive by Army Group South, they were also trying to move the 11th to AGN's front, which obviously would cause transportation difficulties. Here, however, 11th AOK would be transferred starting in late May, almost six weeks before the start of Fall Blau and thus at a time with significantly less stress on the railway network.

Must be misremembering then, it has been a while since I got into the specifics of this operation.

No problem, I'm still trying to track down the planning you said for VIII Air Corps.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Can you go over this Volkhov option more; I assume it's something similar to what could've been done in December of 1941? Would it also have been an obvious opportunity to the Germans?
Pretty much. I think I might have even talked about it in the thread on that forum.

One thing about the logistical difficulties 11th AOK had IOTL is that their operation against Sevastopol finished up in early July, by which time Fall Blau was underway. Not only then were the Germans trying to logistically support a major offensive by Army Group South, they were also trying to move the 11th to AGN's front, which obviously would cause transportation difficulties. Here, however, 11th AOK would be transferred starting in late May, almost six weeks before the start of Fall Blau and thus at a time with significantly less stress on the railway network.
The logistical burden wasn't really any better given that 2nd Kharkov was ongoing, same with the Taman battles, and of course the major refit and stockpiling of supplies prior to the offensive. May or July it's just about the same in terms of logistical burden.

No problem, I'm still trying to track down the planning you said for VIII Air Corps.
Don't waste your time, I probably misremembered.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Pretty much. I think I might have even talked about it in the thread on that forum.

I didn't know if it would be an obvious opening, or something that's only clear to us in hindsight. From what I've read, AGN had sufficient force on hand before 11th AOK arrived to do either Operation Bettelstab and Operation Moorbrand, so that if the opportunity is clear, 11th AOK could go immediately into moving on the Volkhov while using their siege train against Oranienbaum or Kronstadt maybe?

The logistical burden wasn't really any better given that 2nd Kharkov was ongoing, same with the Taman battles, and of course the major refit and stockpiling of supplies prior to the offensive. May or July it's just about the same in terms of logistical burden.

2nd Kharkov finished up on May 28th, so maybe if 11th AOK is kept with AGS they could be used to effect better counter-attacks after May 20th? Otherwise, the Germans can just wait until things finish up and then send them after; besides Taman, not much would be going on and German divisions even stockpiling logistics use less than when in intense combat.

Don't waste your time, I probably misremembered.

Presumably, Luftflotte I was to be used for air support, given its July 1942 reinforcements. One thing that has occurred to me is that, with much better air support for Voronezh operations, Bock staying in command means Hitler can't divert 4th Panzer Armee to Rostov, with all of the implications of that.
 
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History Learner

Well-known member
Operation Trappenjagd ended on May 19th historically, and thus the freeing up of VIII Air Corps would probably allow for a quicker liquidation of 57th Army in the end stages of Second Kharkov. This frees up 1. Gebirgs-Division and 100. leichte Infanterie-Division sooner, as well as reducing the burden on the Romanians and the Italians, enabling for a quicker and more effective encirclement of the Barvenkovo salient. German/Axis losses will obviously be less, while the escapees from the salient will be far fewer; Soviet sources claim 22,000 men escaped the pocket-almost assuredly an exaggeration-but here it is doubtful if more than a handful will. Operating under the assumption Manstein's 11th AOK is kept in the South sans its siege train while VIII Air Corps remains too, it is likely Kleist in Operation Fridericus II will succeed in his goal of not only bagging the Soviet 9th Army but also Moskalenko’s 38th Army as was intended.

To the North, with the siege train of 11th AOK, Army Group North will probably be forced into conducting Operation Bettelstab against the Oranienbaum bridgehead. Once that is liquidated, Operation Moorbrand against the against the Pogost’e salient can occur, during which or soon after the four or five 300 series Divisions will have arrived, enabling their use against either the Volkhov (If the situation by that point is still conducive for such) or for use directly against Leningrad in Operation Nordlicht. Regaradless of which direction of attack is used, the successful completion of such results in the loss of supply to Leningrad, ensuring its inevitable surrender no later than early 1943 but most likely sometime in the fall as starvation sets in.

This creates immediate problems for STAVKA and Stalin, especially once Fall Blau sets off and it will be more successful here given the better position of AGS from our Alt-ending in Second Kharkov. Stalin historically was convinced the German main effort would be against Moscow, not changing his opinion until after Voronezh and even then he kept the Soviet main effort in 1942-the disastrous Operation Mars-focused against Army Group Center. Thus, the two strong, strategic offensives by AGN and AGS would serve to essentially overload Soviet defensive capabilities, as they could only afford to effectively respond to one or the other without weakening their forces opposing AGC. Losing Leningrad or the vital strategic industries of the South would be a blow the USSR could ill afford in 1942, with the latter in particular offering decisive end results for the Germans vis-a-vis the Soviets. Stalin could, of course, abandon his focus against Army Group Center in order to achieve the forces necessary to respond to both, but that results in a wash because it frees the Germans to do the same by drawing forces away from AGC to respond to the situations on the other fronts. Alternatively, AGC still has the jumping off points for operations against Moscow and if the Soviets have sufficiently diluted the Fronts opposing them, there is nothing to stop AGC from seizing the initiative and attempting a new drive on the Soviet capitol.

Outside of the immediate battles of the Eastern Front, wider geo-political issues would be underway. The larger disaster of Second Kharkov and its aftermath, followed shortly by Fall Blau, the surrender of Sevastopol and then the effective encirclement of Leningrad would probably crystalize opinion in Anglo-American circles that the USSR is in collapse. Marshall was already calling for a Japan First strategy anyway since London had vetoed an invasion of France and as the OTL situation developed, JPS 43 was created, ‘‘Strategic Policy of the United Nations and the United States on the Collapse of Russia,’’ Aug. 7–8, 1942. The assessment was that, in the event of a Russian collapse, they'd abandon all offensive actions against Germany; this would include TORCH. According to American Popular Opinion and the War Against Germany: The Issue of Negotiated Peace, 1942 by Richard W. Steele, The Journal of American History , Dec., 1978, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Dec., 1978), pp. 704-723, American popular opinion was also firmly in support of such:

On concentrating on the Japanese, the question asked was: "Granting that it is important for us to fight the Axis every place we can, which do you think is more important for the United States to do right now: put most of our effort into fighting Japan or put most of our effort into fighting Germany?" 62 percent responded Japan, and 21 percent Germany. Bureau of Intelligence, OFF, "Survey of Intelligence Materials," No. 21 (April 29, 1942), PSF "OWI," Roosevelt Papers.​
 
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SpicyJuan

Active member
Operation Trappenjagd ended on May 19th historically, and thus the freeing up of VIII Air Corps would probably allow for a quicker liquidation of 57th Army in the end stages of Second Kharkov. This frees up 1. Gebirgs-Division and 100. leichte Infanterie-Division sooner, as well as reducing the burden on the Romanians and the Italians, enabling for a quicker and more effective encirclement of the Barvenkovo salient. German/Axis losses will obviously be less, while the escapees from the salient will be far fewer; Soviet sources claim 22,000 men escaped the pocket-almost assuredly an exaggeration-but here it is doubtful if more than a handful will. Operating under the assumption Manstein's 11th AOK is kept in the South sans its siege train while VIII Air Corps remains too, it is likely Kleist in Operation Fridericus II will succeed in his goal of not only bagging the Soviet 9th Army but also Moskalenko’s 38th Army as was intended.

To the North, with the siege train of 11th AOK, Army Group North will probably be forced into conducting Operation Bettelstab against the Oranienbaum bridgehead. Once that is liquidated, Operation Moorbrand against the against the Pogost’e salient can occur, during which or soon after the four or five 300 series Divisions will have arrived, enabling their use against either the Volkhov (If the situation by that point is still conducive for such) or for use directly against Leningrad in Operation Nordlicht. Regaradless of which direction of attack is used, the successful completion of such results in the loss of supply to Leningrad, ensuring its inevitable surrender no later than early 1943 but most likely sometime in the fall as starvation sets in.

This creates immediate problems for STAVKA and Stalin, especially once Fall Blau sets off and it will be more successful here given the better position of AGS from our Alt-ending in Second Kharkov. Stalin historically was convinced the German main effort would be against Moscow, not changing his opinion until after Voronezh and even then he kept the Soviet main effort in 1942-the disastrous Operation Mars-focused against Army Group Center. Thus, the two strong, strategic offensives by AGN and AGS would serve to essentially overload Soviet defensive capabilities, as they could only afford to effectively respond to one or the other without weakening their forces opposing AGC. Losing Leningrad or the vital strategic industries of the South would be a blow the USSR could ill afford in 1942, with the latter in particular offering decisive end results for the Germans vis-a-vis the Soviets. Stalin could, of course, abandon his focus against Army Group Center in order to achieve the forces necessary to respond to both, but that results in a wash because it frees the Germans to do the same by drawing forces away from AGC to respond to the situations on the other fronts. Alternatively, AGC still has the jumping off points for operations against Moscow and if the Soviets have sufficiently diluted the Fronts opposing them, there is nothing to stop AGC from seizing the initiative and attempting a new drive on the Soviet capitol.

Outside of the immediate battles of the Eastern Front, wider geo-political issues would be underway. The larger disaster of Second Kharkov and its aftermath, followed shortly by Fall Blau, the surrender of Sevastopol and then the effective encirclement of Leningrad would probably crystalize opinion in Anglo-American circles that the USSR is in collapse. Marshall was already calling for a Japan First strategy anyway since London had vetoed an invasion of France and as the OTL situation developed, JPS 43 was created, ‘‘Strategic Policy of the United Nations and the United States on the Collapse of Russia,’’ Aug. 7–8, 1942. The assessment was that, in the event of a Russian collapse, they'd abandon all offensive actions against Germany; this would include TORCH. According to American Popular Opinion and the War Against Germany: The Issue of Negotiated Peace, 1942 by Richard W. Steele, The Journal of American History , Dec., 1978, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Dec., 1978), pp. 704-723, American popular opinion was also firmly in support of such:

On concentrating on the Japanese, the question asked was: "Granting that it is important for us to fight the Axis every place we can, which do you think is more important for the United States to do right now: put most of our effort into fighting Japan or put most of our effort into fighting Germany?" 62 percent responded Japan, and 21 percent Germany. Bureau of Intelligence, OFF, "Survey of Intelligence Materials," No. 21 (April 29, 1942), PSF "OWI," Roosevelt Papers.​
Really interesting quotes and sources you compiled there. Are you well versed on the Pacific War? How do you think it would unfold in a Japan First scenario?
Do the Americans cut Lend-Lease from the Soviets? That, if nothing else, would be the death blow.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Really interesting quotes and sources you compiled there. Are you well versed on the Pacific War? How do you think it would unfold in a Japan First scenario?
Do the Americans cut Lend-Lease from the Soviets? That, if nothing else, would be the death blow.

I'd imagine Lend Lease would continue on until it becomes impossible to do so or has a declining benefit, probably by the end of 1943 because Operation Lachsfang against the Murmansk Railway and AGS moving up to Astrakhan in that campaign season would shut down everything but the Pacific Route. Speaking of the Pacific, it's an open question although I doubt much would change until 1944 given most U.S. resources continued to go into said theater in 1943 anyway. Come 1944, however, there will be serious changes, up to and including an earlier Iwo and Okinawa if I had to guess.
 
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