WI American-occupied Japan & Okinawa ISOT from Feb. 1, 1946 to Feb. 1, 1943?

[raharris1973]

What if American occupied Japan & Okinawa (with its over 430,000 American troops), American-occupied South Korea, American-occupied Micronesian islands and atolls, and the liberated Philippines from Feb.1, 1946, and their surrounding waters out to 200 km, were all ISOT back 3 years to Feb. 1, 1943?

To the surprised 1943 American public in the US and in Britain and the North African theater, and surprised downtime Japanese forces in Sakhalin, the Kuriles, northern Korea, occupied Manchuria, China, and Southeast Asia, various Pacific islands, and IJN units at sea, and remainder of the downtime world, the surprising news begins to filter through that Japan has surrendered to the Americans, its Emperor has submitted to American occupation, ordered Japanese armed forces to lay down their arms, and said he is not divine. MacArthur is the ruler on the ground in Japan, to the astonishment of 1943 MacArthur and the rest of the US military establishment.

How does the 1943 world react to this situation? And how do the downtime lands and the deployed out-of-time forces fit in to the 1943 world?

There will be shock and disbelief to get past, but I imagine MacArthur's priority will be establishing a line of food supplies for his forces and for Japan in general, and American commanders throughout the Pacific would be seeking to reestablish communications and supply flows. 1946 American-occupied central and western Pacific territorities hosting American commanders and forces would have to coordinate with 1943 Washington and Honolulu and Sydney to reestablish safe sea routes, and secure the surrender of or destroy at-large IJN fleet units. The Allies would have to radio out recordings of the imperial surrender message to downtime Japanese forces Asia and Pacific wide to secure those forces capitulation and obedience to MacArthur's commands. This would have to be backed up likely by air-dropping film reels or landing mixed Japanese-Allied teams where the Japanese members consist of the classmates, superior officers or uptime versions of the downtime commanders they are trying to persuade to surrender.

The American forces in the Pacific and the Japanese population will know that atomic bombs were used in the defeat of Japan, so that knowledge will not be contained and will spread to downtime people. But without CONUS, the laboratories, and the scientists, nobody, uptime or downtime, has an an atomic bomb on hand or the recipe to make another one.

So the atomic bomb is not around as an automic war ender, or 'easy button' for the United States against Hitler and Mussolini. Knowledge that it *would be possible* to make and deliver two atomic bombs by two methods in 30 months, along with whatever fragmentary details that people may remember can spur both the Manhattan Project and adversary programs. But with the Americans knowing that the Germans now know it can be done, the Americans cannot follow the temptation of just waiting for it to be ready, even if they try to accelerate that program to maximum speed.

So how will the rest of the war be fought, with the Pacific turning into mainly a relatively lower intensity round-up of fugitives, occupation, and humanitarian situation, while Allied combat power can be concentrated against Europe for most of 1943 and all of 1944?

With the Pacific War winding down, is there enough assault shipping and supply shipping and troops to go around for everybody, from Churchill to Marshall, to get their wish? A lavishly supplied Overlord and a wide-ranging Mediterranean and Balkan campaign?

 

[ATP]

What if American occupied Japan & Okinawa (with its over 430,000 American troops), American-occupied South Korea, American-occupied Micronesian islands and atolls, and the liberated Philippines from Feb.1, 1946, and their surrounding waters out to 200 km, were all ISOT back 3 years to Feb. 1, 1943?

To the surprised 1943 American public in the US and in Britain and the North African theater, and surprised downtime Japanese forces in Sakhalin, the Kuriles, northern Korea, occupied Manchuria, China, and Southeast Asia, various Pacific islands, and IJN units at sea, and remainder of the downtime world, the surprising news begins to filter through that Japan has surrendered to the Americans, its Emperor has submitted to American occupation, ordered Japanese armed forces to lay down their arms, and said he is not divine. MacArthur is the ruler on the ground in Japan, to the astonishment of 1943 MacArthur and the rest of the US military establishment.

How does the 1943 world react to this situation? And how do the downtime lands and the deployed out-of-time forces fit in to the 1943 world?

There will be shock and disbelief to get past, but I imagine MacArthur's priority will be establishing a line of food supplies for his forces and for Japan in general, and American commanders throughout the Pacific would be seeking to reestablish communications and supply flows. 1946 American-occupied central and western Pacific territorities hosting American commanders and forces would have to coordinate with 1943 Washington and Honolulu and Sydney to reestablish safe sea routes, and secure the surrender of or destroy at-large IJN fleet units. The Allies would have to radio out recordings of the imperial surrender message to downtime Japanese forces Asia and Pacific wide to secure those forces capitulation and obedience to MacArthur's commands. This would have to be backed up likely by air-dropping film reels or landing mixed Japanese-Allied teams where the Japanese members consist of the classmates, superior officers or uptime versions of the downtime commanders they are trying to persuade to surrender.

The American forces in the Pacific and the Japanese population will know that atomic bombs were used in the defeat of Japan, so that knowledge will not be contained and will spread to downtime people. But without CONUS, the laboratories, and the scientists, nobody, uptime or downtime, has an an atomic bomb on hand or the recipe to make another one.

So the atomic bomb is not around as an automic war ender, or 'easy button' for the United States against Hitler and Mussolini. Knowledge that it *would be possible* to make and deliver two atomic bombs by two methods in 30 months, along with whatever fragmentary details that people may remember can spur both the Manhattan Project and adversary programs. But with the Americans knowing that the Germans now know it can be done, the Americans cannot follow the temptation of just waiting for it to be ready, even if they try to accelerate that program to maximum speed.

So how will the rest of the war be fought, with the Pacific turning into mainly a relatively lower intensity round-up of fugitives, occupation, and humanitarian situation, while Allied combat power can be concentrated against Europe for most of 1943 and all of 1944?

With the Pacific War winding down, is there enough assault shipping and supply shipping and troops to go around for everybody, from Churchill to Marshall, to get their wish? A lavishly supplied Overlord and a wide-ranging Mediterranean and Balkan campaign?

FDR still ruled,so notching change.Half of Europe would be given to sralin.
Only difference - if some good polish-american soldier told polish goverment that we are sold and there is notching to fight for,polish soldiers could toss their weapons and seek future in South Africa,Spain,or Portugal - only places which take polish exiles after war.

 

[raharris1973]

Here is a map for reference:



So, all the IJN forces bases in the home islands (except Kuriles/Hitokappu Bay), Micronesia (the base at Chuuk, aka Truk, lagoon are disappeared. That is about half of the IJN, and more of the Admirals and shore support and Naval related manufacturing and training/educational complex.

The other half of the force is based out of South China Sea and East Indies archipelagic waters, and remains, as well as scattered vessels in various parts of the orange Pacific, the Kuriles, the China Seas, and northern Korean waters.

US forces in the Pacific in the green lands and blue seas consist of whatever was there in February 1946 - no doubt massively drawn down from what it had been in August and September 1945 and the last months of the war, but still non-trivial. Mainland Japan would have vast need for food imports - South Korea, the Philippines, and all the other 1946 archipelagoes, I'm not sure of their food deficit status.
The modern but depleted 1946 US forces would have to work with the Feb 1943 US forces, significantly enlarged since Pearl Harbor, but nothing like the full battle-line and fleet train that had rolled off the slips by the Fall of 1943 or early 1944.

If the downtime Japanese commanders are not listening to uptime imperial surrender orders, it will be up to the two modest American forces to keep the downtime IJN and air forces and China and Southeast Asia forces in check.

The most sensitive uptime/downtime point of contact will be the 38th parallel in Korea, with the 1943-Japanese occupied north, and the 1946-American occupied south, followed as a close second by the narrow straits between the 1943 Japanese controlled Kuriles and South Sakhalin and the 1946 US occupied Hokkaido. The narrow strait between the 1946 liberated Philippines and 1943 occupied Sarawak-Borneo will also be a tension point.

 

[ATP]

Here is a map for reference:



So, all the IJN forces bases in the home islands (except Kuriles/Hitokappu Bay), Micronesia (the base at Chuuk, aka Truk, lagoon are disappeared. That is about half of the IJN, and more of the Admirals and shore support and Naval related manufacturing and training/educational complex.

The other half of the force is based out of South China Sea and East Indies archipelagic waters, and remains, as well as scattered vessels in various parts of the orange Pacific, the Kuriles, the China Seas, and northern Korean waters.

US forces in the Pacific in the green lands and blue seas consist of whatever was there in February 1946 - no doubt massively drawn down from what it had been in August and September 1945 and the last months of the war, but still non-trivial. Mainland Japan would have vast need for food imports - South Korea, the Philippines, and all the other 1946 archipelagoes, I'm not sure of their food deficit status.
The modern but depleted 1946 US forces would have to work with the Feb 1943 US forces, significantly enlarged since Pearl Harbor, but nothing like the full battle-line and fleet train that had rolled off the slips by the Fall of 1943 or early 1944.

If the downtime Japanese commanders are not listening to uptime imperial surrender orders, it will be up to the two modest American forces to keep the downtime IJN and air forces and China and Southeast Asia forces in check.

The most sensitive uptime/downtime point of contact will be the 38th parallel in Korea, with the 1943-Japanese occupied north, and the 1946-American occupied south, followed as a close second by the narrow straits between the 1943 Japanese controlled Kuriles and South Sakhalin and the 1946 US occupied Hokkaido. The narrow strait between the 1946 liberated Philippines and 1943 occupied Sarawak-Borneo will also be a tension point.

1943 Navy is not big problem,just like forces on Kuriles and Sakhalin.
But,if Japan forces in China and North Korea do not listen to emperor,they could take South Korea.
Do not matter in long run - they would be defeated.

What next? USA wanted gave half of Europe and China to commies,so they do that again.Notching change there - with possible exception of smarter poles who volunteer for slave lavor in Germany,and survivors after war could go to South Africa and Australia.

If you want another outcome,you must ISOT 1953 USA/at least part with Washington/ to 1943.
Ten ,after defeating Japan and germans,we could have normal Europe and China.

 

[raharris1973]

Actually, the most convenient neutral location for senior delegations of the downtime Japanese military commands, especially ground forces in Manchuria, northern Korea, and China, and representatives of MacArthur's and Hodge's uptime occupation regimes in Japan and Korea, SCAP and AMGIK, and the uptime subordinate Japanese government representing the Diet and Emperor, would be Vladivostok in the Soviet Union. There the uptime Americans and Japanese would present proofs of the time travel and end results of the war, the downtime Soviet hosts and downtime Japanese would demonstrate their own subjective 1943 reality. To add maximum authenticity, I think the 1946 Americans would set up a radio link with the Emperor in Tokyo and his Lord Privy Seal, and if they can swing it with the equipment they have on hand in 1946 Japan in terms of cameras, sets and sufficiently powerful transmitting stations, they may try for a television link on one of those giant cabinet tiny screen TVs.

 

[ATP]

Actually, the most convenient neutral location for senior delegations of the downtime Japanese military commands, especially ground forces in Manchuria, northern Korea, and China, and representatives of MacArthur's and Hodge's uptime occupation regimes in Japan and Korea, SCAP and AMGIK, and the uptime subordinate Japanese government representing the Diet and Emperor, would be Vladivostok in the Soviet Union. There the uptime Americans and Japanese would present proofs of the time travel and end results of the war, the downtime Soviet hosts and downtime Japanese would demonstrate their own subjective 1943 reality. To add maximum authenticity, I think the 1946 Americans would set up a radio link with the Emperor in Tokyo and his Lord Privy Seal, and if they can swing it with the equipment they have on hand in 1946 Japan in terms of cameras, sets and sufficiently powerful transmitting stations, they may try for a television link on one of those giant cabinet tiny screen TVs.

considering how fucked soviets were ,they would demand Manchuria,Kuriles,and North Korea.
Considering that FDR was useful idiot,he would agree.

 

[raharris1973]

The sheer number of American soldiers who would now exist twice makes this quite a unique ISOT scenario.

The Academy Award Best Picture winning film of 1947 in this TL was an action-drama-romance called 'The Spare' - It was about 1946 American soldier who started a correspondence with her 1943 wife stateside that turned into an emotional affair that starting wracking the wife, played by Myrna Loy, with guilt. The romantic tension and competitive love triangle involving the 1943 and 1946 versions of the soldier husband, both played by Henry Fonda, end up resolved in a tragic yet bittersweet, yet oh too tidy manner with the death of the 1943 version of the husband in combat in Europe.

Among the nominees that year, this wasn't the only drama dealing with the 'doubling' effect, many critics and latter-day auteurs now argue that another Best Picture nominee 'The Ghost who Loves Me' starring Bette Davis, Cary Grant and Ronald Reagan was the better film. It was centered around the dilemmas of Davis's character, an 'uptime' occupation officer's accompanying formerly-widowed wife who returns with her 1946 husband (Grant) from Japan occupation duty right after the end of the of the war (consensus calendar), only to find that her originally deceased first husband (Reagan) survived the war (D-Day) this time,and won't let her go. The film did decently at the box office but some of the implied Davis-Reagan scenes and Davis's ultimate choices tested the Code censors and caused some controversy.


- - - - -

ISOT'ed 1946 Occupied Japan will be in pickle in terms of requiring continuous emergency food deliveries to avoid starvation. American occupation authorities, the Japanese government under them, and the Japanese populace all have a common interest in getting everyone fed. But they stand at the edge of a precipice and panic with individuals, families, and communities fighting for food and survival. Those in a position to help, in proximity order, are other 1946 US occupied Western Pacific territories like South Korea and the Philippines, on this margins of their own, and the 1943 Japanese occupied mainland and Southeast Asia, which isn't even certain to make up its mind to surrender or to not try to use the fleet to 'liberate' the Emperor and home islands' much less let US/western supply shipping go unimpeded or actively send supplies to Allied controlled areas. And the Allies don't want occupied peoples to suffer even more.

Then there's the 1943 Allied supply sources like North America, the Antipodes, and Latin America - they are rather committed to war right now. Then again the need for combat operations in the Pacific might, *might* evaporate soon, so there could be some fungibility between war shipping needs and humanitarian needs. 1943 Americans wants its boys in Japan and over there fed - although the idea of feeding the Japanese doesn't quite sit well with the average person.

Some of the US-Japanese face-to-face discussion in 1946 as people realize what is going in would be quite the sight to see and words to hear.
MacArthur and the Americans, with the genuine cooperative desire of most Japanese placed in government at the time, would want to go all in on securing surrender of the Japanese downtimers, not only for ending the war's sake, the occupied populations' sake, and recovery of POWs and civilian internees, but to protect the safety, stability, and flow of food to Japan, and make for peaceful safe shipping corridors from the Americas and Antipodes to Japan.

They'll try their best. The Americans who would/should know, know they can't invoke invoke the threat of instant atomic destruction or an instant overwhelming Trans-Pacific American fleet push to intimidate either the 1946 or the 1943 Japanese [they won't share their specific weaknesses of course]. The 1946 Japanese may suspect as much. But both uptime and downtime Japanese can always be reminded that no matter what, the Americans are guaranteed to be producing atomic bombs within 30 months. Japan can't. It can only determine if it makes itself a target or not. And the Japanese can be given reminders of US chemical warfare capability.

MacArthur and co will be ready to work for the positive, survival and health of the population, peace, and this time around, if the 1946 Japanese can help get a surrender of the 1943 Japanese done, no Soviet grabbing Japanese territory or prisoners. MacArthur - because of his knowledge and distance will have a lot of autonomy from Roosevelt, and will be persuasive with Washington, even if FDR tries to send over some 'minders'.

But the dark parts and threats may be spoken out loud to the 1946 Japanese. SCAP expects total cooperation, expects all Japanese police and men in arms and members of the public to cooperate with SCAP forces to oppose and resist and help terminate any downtime invaders, infiltrators or 1946 insurgents against the occupation. Non-resistance to invasion-insurgency is insurgency and fatal. If, miracle or miracles, invaders/uprisers win, blunt indiscriminate destruction methods will be used sooner or later. The more they win, the more Japan loses.

The truth this conveys is that if any downtimer invasion or uptime native uprising or combination gets beyond local containment, the US plan is to consolidate its people and forces offshore, let the home islands starve, chem attack them, nuke them when ready, and rebuild Asia out of its pieces other than Japan.

Now if downtime 1943 Japanese forces are a problem in occupied lands but the 1946 Japanese people have nothing to do with it, they aren't going to be punished for it or shot as hostages. [just second order effects, IJN forces staying hostile and at large may end up making food less available for everyone by slowing deliveries]. And even MacArthur and co are probably willing to encourage Soviet involvement if Japanese forces Manchuria-Korea make themselves a truly lethal and determined threat to US forces South Korea or Japanese forces Kuriles-Sakhalin threaten to force costly operations.

Of course Stalin would only do what he thinks is good for Stalin, but the fate of American garrisons in the Far East directly influences how much aid he gets against Germany. And he gets to keep whatever his folks march into.


As far as sources of information about uptime, in early 1946, the Japanese did not have much presence in occupied Japan. They withdrew their diplomats on declaring war, and the first meetings of the Allied Joint Council in Tokyo, on which they were represented, didn't start happening until April 1946.

But they easily could have had some sort of lower level consular officer around by Feb 1946, or some lower-level liaison officer attached to MacArthur's staff, or at a minimum, some sort or foreign intel illegal in the country.

Similar situation in southern Korea. Not sure if they had a consulate in 1946 Manila.

But even lacking that, 1946 Japan, southern Korea, and the Philippines didn't lack for Communists, who were legally free now from prison and most police surveillance, many of whom may have desired contact with the Soviet Union, and some of whom may have had short-wave radios or radio transmission equipment.

So the bottom-line is that Stalin won't be going too many weeks at least without hearing much 'news from 1946' from 1946 Soviet or at least Communist sources.

That is going to be the case, even if, for instance, if the 1946 Americans and 1946 meet the 1943 Japanese in Vladivostok for 1943 Soviet-hosted talks, the 1946 uptimers say nothing to the 1943 parties about the USSR's eventual entry into the war, out of basic discretion and politeness. [It would be rude to rat out your hosts that they will sneak attack another party in the room in a couple years, and expose them to getting hit first].

 

[ATP]

Do not matter,japaneese forces would be defeated or surrender,and sralin would get from FDR whatever he want.
I only hope,that polish soldiers,instead of dying for nothing,would toss their weapons instead.

P.S USA would get soldiers from 1943 and 1946,who would be married to the same 1943 waifu and have the same 1943 property.
It would be...not funny.

That is why i prefer ISOTS at least 80 years - so,there would be no versions of the same person there.