raharris1973
Well-known member
What if China and Abyssinia joined the Central Powers in WWI?
Both countries were surrounded by Entente powers, with Central Powers either weak or non-existent in their neighborhood. That probably would have made it a poor gamble on their part.
On the other hand, it also meant they had built up more grievances against the Entente, and their tormentor/threat # 1 (Japan for China, and Italy for Abyssinia) was on the Entente side.
The Germans had smacked and stolen from the Chinese once, but the British, French and Russian had done it more often. The Abyssinians had a prior war with Britain in addition to Italy.
Plus, both countries were riven by internal factions, and could have had an individual or faction claiming leadership see it in their personal interest to align with the Central Powers and conflate their personal interest with the national interest.
Anyway, I'm not so interested in every last detail of how it could happen, but supposing it happens over the course of WWI, I imagine that Chinese riots against non-Central Powers foreigners and attacks on Treaty ports and concessions and borderlands, and Abyssinian attacks along the border, probably focused on Eritrea, will be no more than a low-grade distraction and nuisance for the Entente powers.
There's no way this is tipping the balance in favor of the European Central Powers by itself. At moments Italy may be hard-pressed to afford full on offensives into the heart of Abyssinia and its full European war effort, but it will prioritize Europe, and always be able to hold on to its main forts and ports in East Africa to take care of that problem later. Japan will relish being the Entente deputy with all the time and forces in the world to smack down China.
The way I see it, China and Abyssinia go down with the Central Powers by no later than November 1918 and pay dearly for it. Abyssinia ends up totally occupied, and under the Versailles Treaty, gets placed under a League of Nations mandate, with Italy as the mandatory power. Maybe some small slices go to France and Britain as mandatories.
As for China, it is too big to all be occupied, or to be treated as completely irredeemable and nobody wants any power to gain too much, and outright partition and foreign rule is against the spirit of the times, so it faces severe, but limited, punishment. Manchuria and Mongolia are broken off as League of Nations mandates with Japan as the mandatory power, with administration through Manchu and Mongol princes. Russia might have been considered eligible to be a mandatory power for part of this land and perhaps Xinjiang, but its revolution has made it ineligible. Tibet, without the Dalai Lama or his system being overthrown, is pulled from Chinese suzerainty and its external relations and oversight placed under Britain.
Postwar China likely falls into warlordism as in OTL. Xinjiang ends up as another Chinese warlord province simply by default.
These generous League of Nations Mandates largely for Japan and Italy have very interesting consequences in the postwar decades.
After Japan terminates its involvement in the Russian Civil War that feels a bit over-extended, Japan has a nation-building project to keep itself busy for the 1920s and 1930s. America, and China, have another reason to not sign the Versailles Treaty and not join the League. With "boots on the ground" in Manchuria and Mongolia and Taisho democracy opening up in the 1920s, Japanese patriotism is sated, and as the 1920s turn to the 1930s, the last thing the Japanese public and army want to do is take on more international security burdens or break out of the League of Nations framework.
Japan goes through the 1930s a determined status quo power, guarding its position against Chinese resurgences, but friendly and sympathetic to Britain, France, and Italy on the League Council.
Meanwhile, in Italy, mutilated victory or not, happiness with the border of Dalmatia or not, Fascist or not, it already has boots on the ground de facto in Abyssinia, and Adua is basically avenged.
This means that this issue can't emerge as a wedge to drive Italy apart from Britain and France and towards Germany.
So supposing we still have Hitler, Nazism, and German revanchism in Europe, or something very close to it, Britain and France can deal with it with the Stresa Front intact, and not panicking about a three front war like OTL. Could this lead even Britain to act more firmly, earlier, against Germany? Could it lead Germany to be more cautious? Who knows. Just a thought.
Both countries were surrounded by Entente powers, with Central Powers either weak or non-existent in their neighborhood. That probably would have made it a poor gamble on their part.
On the other hand, it also meant they had built up more grievances against the Entente, and their tormentor/threat # 1 (Japan for China, and Italy for Abyssinia) was on the Entente side.
The Germans had smacked and stolen from the Chinese once, but the British, French and Russian had done it more often. The Abyssinians had a prior war with Britain in addition to Italy.
Plus, both countries were riven by internal factions, and could have had an individual or faction claiming leadership see it in their personal interest to align with the Central Powers and conflate their personal interest with the national interest.
Anyway, I'm not so interested in every last detail of how it could happen, but supposing it happens over the course of WWI, I imagine that Chinese riots against non-Central Powers foreigners and attacks on Treaty ports and concessions and borderlands, and Abyssinian attacks along the border, probably focused on Eritrea, will be no more than a low-grade distraction and nuisance for the Entente powers.
There's no way this is tipping the balance in favor of the European Central Powers by itself. At moments Italy may be hard-pressed to afford full on offensives into the heart of Abyssinia and its full European war effort, but it will prioritize Europe, and always be able to hold on to its main forts and ports in East Africa to take care of that problem later. Japan will relish being the Entente deputy with all the time and forces in the world to smack down China.
The way I see it, China and Abyssinia go down with the Central Powers by no later than November 1918 and pay dearly for it. Abyssinia ends up totally occupied, and under the Versailles Treaty, gets placed under a League of Nations mandate, with Italy as the mandatory power. Maybe some small slices go to France and Britain as mandatories.
As for China, it is too big to all be occupied, or to be treated as completely irredeemable and nobody wants any power to gain too much, and outright partition and foreign rule is against the spirit of the times, so it faces severe, but limited, punishment. Manchuria and Mongolia are broken off as League of Nations mandates with Japan as the mandatory power, with administration through Manchu and Mongol princes. Russia might have been considered eligible to be a mandatory power for part of this land and perhaps Xinjiang, but its revolution has made it ineligible. Tibet, without the Dalai Lama or his system being overthrown, is pulled from Chinese suzerainty and its external relations and oversight placed under Britain.
Postwar China likely falls into warlordism as in OTL. Xinjiang ends up as another Chinese warlord province simply by default.
These generous League of Nations Mandates largely for Japan and Italy have very interesting consequences in the postwar decades.
After Japan terminates its involvement in the Russian Civil War that feels a bit over-extended, Japan has a nation-building project to keep itself busy for the 1920s and 1930s. America, and China, have another reason to not sign the Versailles Treaty and not join the League. With "boots on the ground" in Manchuria and Mongolia and Taisho democracy opening up in the 1920s, Japanese patriotism is sated, and as the 1920s turn to the 1930s, the last thing the Japanese public and army want to do is take on more international security burdens or break out of the League of Nations framework.
Japan goes through the 1930s a determined status quo power, guarding its position against Chinese resurgences, but friendly and sympathetic to Britain, France, and Italy on the League Council.
Meanwhile, in Italy, mutilated victory or not, happiness with the border of Dalmatia or not, Fascist or not, it already has boots on the ground de facto in Abyssinia, and Adua is basically avenged.
This means that this issue can't emerge as a wedge to drive Italy apart from Britain and France and towards Germany.
So supposing we still have Hitler, Nazism, and German revanchism in Europe, or something very close to it, Britain and France can deal with it with the Stresa Front intact, and not panicking about a three front war like OTL. Could this lead even Britain to act more firmly, earlier, against Germany? Could it lead Germany to be more cautious? Who knows. Just a thought.