Morals must be axiomatic: debate

JagerIV

Well-known member
By Axiomatic, I mean "true without proof".

Whether or not the above is true I think is at the heart of the argument "can atheists have a grounded moral preference" that was diverting a conversation in another thread.

Morality being axiomic means it's based on something you can't rationally prove. You can't prove that killing is wrong, or that lying is immoral.

Without a rational, empirical basis for morality, morality becomes nothing more than mere subjective taste: it is purely subjective for example whether it's moral or immoral to steal from the rich.

Thus, since moral principles can't be proven in the physical world, the only way to get them is as received wisdom. You can't determine moral principles, but you can receive them.

The state, or a philosopher, can declare what is moral. However, that grounds morality, fundamentally, merely on a smaller group of people.

Only by received wisdom from a divine can one ground morality in a way as to not be simply subjective human preference.

That's my understanding of the argument.
 

Captain X

Well-known member
Osaul
And my take on this is that there seems to be some pathological need on the part of some people to paint atheists as amoral, simply because their morality is not based in religion. As if to try to invalidate it. Much like how the lefties like to try to do with any person who has a viewpoint that is different from their own. The other side of this, of course, is that you're basically saying that the only thing keeping you and other religious people from being horrible people is because you fear punishment from what in all likelihood is an imaginary being. My morality, on the other hand, is not based in fear of punishment. I have a feeling a big part of this little ... "disagreement" is that you can't seem to understand that. You also don't seem to understand what ethics are, because for you, everything just goes back to religion. It's weird, because I kind of feel like I'm arguing with someone about how I can empathize with the victims of mass shootings but still refuse to support curtailing the right to keep and bear arms. They'd insist that this refusal means I am unempathetic.
 

The Name of Love

Far Right Nutjob
So what's the basis for that reason? That the world is fundamentally understandable? That individuals matter?
The natural law is based on this foundation: that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided." The will has as its telos what appears to be good to the intellect, and the intellect has as its telos what is true, so the rational mind (which is intellect + will) has as its telos what is actually good. If you aren't pursuing what is actually good, then you are acting in a manner contrary to reason, which is irrational by definition. There can be no rational justification for behaving irrationally. So, if the telos of reason is what is actually good, then you have no rational justification for not doing and pursuing good and avoiding evil. Now, one can choose to be irrational, but we tend to put the stubbornly irrational in the madhouse for a reason.

It cannot be doubted that the intellect has truth as its telos because there is no other way one could justify believing what conclusions your mind comes to are true. Without final causation, efficient causes become "loose and separate" (as David Hume would put it). But if that were the case, then there would be nothing inherent to the intellect that would make any of its products true. To entertain the notion of the intellect being in some way "neutral" to truth would cause us to doubt the truth of every single one of our thoughts, including the thoughts that led us to believe the intellect is "neutral" to truth, which would render this belief incoherent. Therefore, we must believe the intellect has truth as its telos on pain of incoherence.

It cannot be doubted that the will has what appears to be good as its telos because the end of every act an agent (a being that makes decisions through movements of will) makes is some good. Now we know that every agent tends towards something definite. But an agent would not be inclined to something unless that something was appropriate to the agent by nature of what it was. But, what is appropriate for something is considered what is "good" for something. Therefore, every act is made towards a good, so the telos of the will is whatever appears to be good to the intellect.

The question now is "okay, but what is actually good?" When we look at things we consider good - such as friendship, ice cream, or medicine - we see that all of these things are desirable. Now the subjectivist might say "therefore, goodness only consists in what is desirable to me." But this cannot be right. Consider how medicine is always good for a child even if the child doesn't want it. Or how friendship is good for a person even if that person is a curmudgeon who'd prefer to be alone most of the time. What is good is not determined by what we desire; rather, a good is something that is worthy of desire. But what could be worthy of desire? Well, if we look at the norms that exist within natural things like plants, animals, etc., we find that each of these things desire in their own perfection. The same can be seen of things humans consider worth of desire - medicine and friendship help complete us, make us more self-actualized as humans. Therefore, what is good is what will bring us perfection.

This summarizes the Natural Law position according to the Perennial Philosophy generally endorsed by Platonists, Aristotelians, and Scholastics. Does this seem right, @Captain-General?
 

Doomsought

Well-known member
Morals pretty much have to be mathematical axioms, since they have no physical structure and can only be described using various forms of propositional logic. Proving morality is the same type of endevor as proving that 1+1 must equal 2, it sounds simple but is in no way trivial, the opposite really.
 

ShieldWife

Marchioness
Morality is an emergent property of humanity. The root causes of morality can be observed and historically have been, because humanity really exists and so too does human nature. Because human nature exists we can reasonably deduce from studying humanity what codes of behavior are conducive to human flourishing and which kind of behavior leads to suffering. The objective foundation for morality exists and it lies within us.
 

Doomsought

Well-known member
If we accept that morality is formed of (mathematical) axioms, we actually learn quite a few things about morality do to the study of axioms. Foremost is that morality is either finite and inconsistent (which would also make it invalid) or the rules of morality are infinite and uncountable. Only an omniscient god could know all of the laws of morality as there is no path to learn all of them.
 

JagerIV

Well-known member
And my take on this is that there seems to be some pathological need on the part of some people to paint atheists as amoral, simply because their morality is not based in religion. As if to try to invalidate it. Much like how the lefties like to try to do with any person who has a viewpoint that is different from their own. The other side of this, of course, is that you're basically saying that the only thing keeping you and other religious people from being horrible people is because you fear punishment from what in all likelihood is an imaginary being. My morality, on the other hand, is not based in fear of punishment. I have a feeling a big part of this little ... "disagreement" is that you can't seem to understand that. You also don't seem to understand what ethics are, because for you, everything just goes back to religion. It's weird, because I kind of feel like I'm arguing with someone about how I can empathize with the victims of mass shootings but still refuse to support curtailing the right to keep and bear arms. They'd insist that this refusal means I am unempathetic.

Well, to clear up a potential misunderstanding, I'm pretty close to being effectively an atheist. I also think of morals as being more or less a collection of "arbitrary" goals and lines. I'm just more or less comfortable with that, but understand the problems that can come from morality basically being a series of preferences.

For example, lets say someone cheats in a relationship.

1) By what basis is it immoral?

2) What is a proportional response to it?

For most people, the immorality of the action is more or less intuited out, rather than reasoned out. Same with what is a proportional punishment. Culturally accepted responses to cheating have varied throughout cultures and history between a month of cold shoulder to execution. Where that line is is in some ways arbitrary, built upon (if thought about at all) somewhat arbitrary axioms.

Now, as a sorta atheist, my preferred solution to the arbitrary varriableness of morals is local government, so the moral order being enforced can be reasonably closely attuned to the moral preferences of the greater variety of local people. But, I also see that that also leads to "your truth" and "my truth", and without some moral arbiter moral disagreements can spiral out of control.
 

Sol Zagato

Well-known member
Is cannot be the sole basis for ought. There has to be st least one assumption made somewhere along the line. Whether the assumption(s) is/are based on emotional intuitions, traditions, laws or some combination, they are assumptions.

Hence, morality is axiomatic.

The impact on atheists is less clear. There are plenty of atheistic systems of morality, but they also adhere to assumptions that change only slowly over time.
 

The Name of Love

Far Right Nutjob
Is cannot be the sole basis for ought. There has to be st least one assumption made somewhere along the line. Whether the assumption(s) is/are based on emotional intuitions, traditions, laws or some combination, they are assumptions.

Hence, morality is axiomatic.

The impact on atheists is less clear. There are plenty of atheistic systems of morality, but they also adhere to assumptions that change only slowly over time.
This is actually not true. The is/ought gap is an innovation of modern philosophy. As I laid out, you can get an ought from an is because the oughts are baked into the is.
 

Captain X

Well-known member
Osaul
For example, lets say someone cheats in a relationship.

1) By what basis is it immoral?

2) What is a proportional response to it?
1) You'd have some variation here, but I'm guessing the most overlap would be the aspect of the person lying or otherwise betraying trust.

2) My take is that the relationship should simply end and that each person takes their own stuff and moves on with their lives. This is an aspect of modern divorces that needs to change, IMO, in that men often get treated unfairly here.

I know you weren't asking for my specific opinion, but I thought I'd give it anyway.

For most people, the immorality of the action is more or less intuited out, rather than reasoned out. Same with what is a proportional punishment. Culturally accepted responses to cheating have varied throughout cultures and history between a month of cold shoulder to execution. Where that line is is in some ways arbitrary, built upon (if thought about at all) somewhat arbitrary axioms.
Except that in modern first world secular countries, it's already pretty well sussed out. Violence is frowned upon and will probably lead to jail time, vandalism and destruction of property is frowned upon and will probably lead to fines and/or jail time, and it is not the kind of thing that people are executed for.

Now, as a sorta atheist, my preferred solution to the arbitrary varriableness of morals is local government, so the moral order being enforced can be reasonably closely attuned to the moral preferences of the greater variety of local people. But, I also see that that also leads to "your truth" and "my truth", and without some moral arbiter moral disagreements can spiral out of control.
Which is why things like constitutional protections and a well-defined legal system are so important.
 

JagerIV

Well-known member
Except that in modern first world secular countries, it's already pretty well sussed out. Violence is frowned upon and will probably lead to jail time, vandalism and destruction of property is frowned upon and will probably lead to fines and/or jail time, and it is not the kind of thing that people are executed for.

Well, violence is not exactly frowned upon. fines/jail time is the violence. That's our general preference for violence to be done by the state rather than private actors, rather than an aversion to violence. And that itself is hardly a hard and fast rule. Some private violence is tolerated, even praised.

And, well, your basically saying the preferences of the current western elite is enforced. Whether or not that preference is arbitrary or not, or basically built upon the axioms of their preferences, is not proven one way or the other there.


Which is why things like constitutional protections and a well-defined legal system are so important.

Well, that's basically just putting the state in the role of god, which doesn't answer any of the questions: its just saying there's the state's truth, and you will at least act as if you believe it, at pain of punishment.

With that your basically just grounding morality in punishment, specifically that the moral force rests with the one capable of dishing out punishment, which you were criticizing the religious for allegedly doing.

In that case, you seem to be suggesting morality isn't even axiomatic, but simply the dictates of the state, however contradictory the logic of the various statutes of the state.
 

Captain X

Well-known member
Osaul
Well, that's basically just putting the state in the role of god, which doesn't answer any of the questions: its just saying there's the state's truth, and you will at least act as if you believe it, at pain of punishment.
And it's always been that way, even when states were feudal and far more theocratic. At least now there's theoretically some input from the people who make up the country rather than just the leadership.

With that your basically just grounding morality in punishment, specifically that the moral force rests with the one capable of dishing out punishment, which you were criticizing the religious for allegedly doing.
No, I'm just pointing out that these things are already pretty well worked out, and how offenses are usually handled given the example you used.
 

JagerIV

Well-known member
And it's always been that way, even when states were feudal and far more theocratic. At least now there's theoretically some input from the people who make up the country rather than just the leadership.


No, I'm just pointing out that these things are already pretty well worked out, and how offenses are usually handled given the example you used.

Hm. I guess I don't feel completely comfortable simply defining morality as legality, if that is what your suggesting. I guess its a pragmatic argument, but it really leaves no place to criticize anything, say, the Nazis or Communists did within the context of their own state: once either seizes control of the law, then what they do simply becomes moral because they say what the law is.

A lot of people hope that, if say we did have a communist world government, with no other legal system to point to, that there would be some basis that one could argue the government and its enablers morally wrong.

I think this video made some points in the general direction of what I think this argument was about, maybe making it better than I did.



note: it being about universal basic income is sorta a lie.
 

The Name of Love

Far Right Nutjob
Morality is not legality because the positive law is created by the state while the natural law was created by God. Positive law also differs from place to place and era to era according to political circumstances while the natural law is based on human nature and will last so long as humans remain human.
 

Captain X

Well-known member
Osaul
I never made the argument that morality = legality. It's like you aren't reading what I actually wrote.
 

*THASF*

The Halo and Sonic Fan
Obozny
Meta-ethics is actually one of my favorite topics. I’m a moral anti-realist. I believe that morals are not real things, and that they contain no cognitive content. Emotivism, the idea that morals represent emotional states, seems like the most sensible position. This is also referred to as the “boo-hurrah” theory. When we say “stealing is wrong”, it’s the same as saying “I don’t like stealing”. It’s an emotional state. There is no such thing as an axiomatic morality. Even theology provides no real respite; if we assume morals are non-cognitive (that is to say, there is no way to determine the objective rightness or wrongness of a thing), then it is impossible for any cognitive entity, even a hypothetical god, to make morals into facts. That’s what non-cognitivism actually means; it means that even an omniscient being cannot know a moral fact, because moral facts are impossible. If God says murder is wrong, it is no more or less an opinion than if someone else does.

One argument I’ve made on SB numerous times (one that pissed a lot of people off on a regular basis) is that debt is a moral construct, and the purpose of money is to settle debts, therefore, money isn’t real, because debt isn’t a real thing, and therefore, the price system isn’t real, and so on.

Our entire economy is based on quid pro quo, our notions of subjective value, and the vague feeling of indebtedness to one another. In order for stealing to exist, property must exist, and property is literally inside your head (there is no actual physical difference between a claimed and unclaimed hectare of unimproved land) so on and so forth.

Even if I may have an amoral meta-ethical view, I feel personally obligated to behave in a moral way because I think it is better to minimize harm than the alternative, which is hedonism and egoism without limit.

Point is, our value systems are very strange and often irrational.
 
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Morphic Tide

Well-known member
Current morality, due to a lack of properly hammered-out psychology interfacing with ethical philosophy, very much does come down to axioms as a necessity from lack of applicably data. We quite simply don't have a "base truth" that we can build morality out of without resorting to a moral axiom. We don't know enough about the human mind to say "This Is What Is Desired" as a general habit of humans as a whole.

There's also the matter that desires, while not worked out precisely enough to found morality on, are biased by sex, so there's a lot to be discussed with regards to how to weigh the conflicts of interest. Further compounded by variances with age and, to a certain degree owing to genetics-based personality characteristics, also possessing varying values.

While the data to get into what things to promote and forbid in particulars for the sake of personal good is absent, what is present, following from wholly material and observable nature, is that humans, as propagating organisms, necessarily have a "pillar" of long-term reproductive success. Not merely single individuals, but the persistence and growth of populations, in that order. This is further reinforced by social mentalities, which further suggest that the group take priority over the individual.

However, as a contrary factor, and where it comes to working out solutions to conflicts of interest where the absent data on human nature is needed, humans don't cope well with a full absence of personal control, though it takes a vast displeasure to instigate outright rejection of authority on a larger scale. Slave rebellions are relatively commonplace throughout history, alongside many other deprived lower classes, despite stability and, in some cases, outright improvement in standing of the overall population. Therefor, there's some necessary degree of personal value.

More bluntly, the most readily apparent basis for a non-axiomatic morality is maximum average happiness, within a social order that will be stable for prolonged periods. The latter having priority before the former, thus the mere desires of the individuals are subservient to the needs of the group in abstract, and as such outlier cases like the "Happiness Monster" that are destructive to the overall group if desires are met are deprived of those group-destructive desires, but once those needs are handled in a sustainable fashion, it turns to the maximizing of desires being met on average.

The exact nature of the social structure, the desires to meet themselves, what desires are destructive to the wider society and thus should not be met, and basically everything about the details are reliant on data beyond my personal knowledge, and I expect beyond the knowledge of the scientific community, even if they could pull their heads out of their assess and accept that the nuclear family is at least the best starting point we have, for just how dominant it's been across the whole planet, and thus practices that impede it should be weighted against by the selection pressures of society.

I'll also admit that this very much fits the "skeleton" of my own idea of ethics, where stability of needs is the first priority, upon which virtually all other things may be sacrificed. I'll take a thousand President Pinochets over a Chairman Mao. The former is still fewer deaths and less economic destruction (Pinochet's Chile was almost perfectly stagnate, economically, neither improving nor decaying in any critical fashion. Mao, meanwhile, managed to fuck up economically to the point of millions of famine deaths when he started with a sizable food surplus). Of course, I'll also similarly take a dozen of modern Communist China over a single Wiemar Germany, as the latter imploded spectacularly despite its many attractive second and third order qualities for its extreme failure of first-order qualities, while the former is quite possibly the single best state in first-order qualities standing today.

Though indications are that the balancing act involved is breaking down quickly, now that the problems of narrow-authority, low-freedom societies are rearing their head once more. A single mistake, from a very small organization, spells enormous damage to the vastly larger group. And that One Child Policy's demographic implosion is closing in, while the catchup benefits of the global economy run out and the debts are coming due, because that enormous power of central planning didn't look far enough ahead to predict its slowdown and be prepared for growth to need to give way to stability.

Keynesian Economics, lads, never forget to bank your gains today to cover for your losses tomorrow! The lack of this is the central flaw of modern economies, as a whole, since almost every particular thing bricks the moment things start going downhill for it.
 
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The Name of Love

Far Right Nutjob
@Train Dodger I'm confused. You said that you don't believe moral statements have any cognitive content, yet you say that certain things are "better" or "worse." On what grounds could something be "better" or "worse" in a moral anti-realist framework?

@Morphic Tide If you think the best basis for "non-axiomatic morality" (whatever that means) is "maximized average happiness", I have to ask this question: how do you define happiness?
 

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