If the Anglo-French fight over Czechoslovakia in 1938, just how easy would it be for the USSR to create a corridor thru Poland or Romania?

[WolfBear]

If the Anglo-French fight over Czechoslovakia in 1938, just how easy would it be for the USSR to create a corridor thru Poland or Romania so that it could move its troops to help Czechoslovakia? The goal would be to create this corridor as narrow as possible in order to avoid seeming threatening while also allowing Soviet troops and supplies to easily move through this corridor in large amounts/numbers. And obviously the intention here would be to demonstrate that the Soviet Union will withdraw from this corridor after the end of this war.

Based on the map above, it seems like a Soviet occupation of southeastern Poland would be the best way to go about this since that would secure the major railroad running between the USSR and Czechoslovakia and which runs through Lviv, which was a part of Poland back then. But if the USSR does this, do the Nazis subsequently decide to occupy the rest of Poland? What do you think?

 

[raharris1973]

Well, from a railway perspective, a corridor through southern Poland, through old Austrian Galicia, makes the most sense. Riding the rails all the way to Czechoslovakian territory would take the Soviet riders through Cracow and Auschwitz to cross into Moravia, skipping over Slovakia entirely. Detraining just inside Czechoslovakia's Moravian or Silesian province allows the Soviet ground forces to get into tactical battle formation uncomfortably late, and close to German Silesia, where the Germans will be attacking from, and well within Luftwaffe range.

Your map also illustrates that direct rail transit from the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia through Romania is impossible, which is disappointing because allegedly the Romanians were possibly receptive to the idea as opposed to the Poles who were completely opposed. Rails extended decently from Odessa across northern Romania, but they extended into anti-Czechoslovakian, pro-German Hungary, before any branch lines turned north into Slovakia.

It would be nice if you had a highway map, to see if the network of modern paved roads capable of bearing trucks, APCs, and tanks or tank-carriers was any more diverse or extensive than what we see for rail.

Of course the whole question is not just logistical and military, it is also political.

We know the Polish 2nd Republic was not open to the idea of permit Soviet transit through its spaces by land or air, even carefully circumscribed. Unilateral Soviet attempts to cross without an agreement would have been resisted militarily by the Poles. But, to humor the original question, if the Poles allowed the Soviets to move through Galicia to Czechoslovakia unopposed, I imagine the Germans would take that as a casus belli against Poland, and Germany's operational objectives would includes conquering Bohemia-Moravia (using combined arms with the Luftwaffe in support), using some forward Luftwaffe operations against the rail junctions incoming Soviet forces might use, and attacking the Polish corridor and Posen area to sort of unite the German territories and create a continuous front on a diagonal northeast to southwest line from East Prussia to Vienna.

Now that would be Germany's *goal* if stuck in a fight where the Germans have started in on the Czechs, and the west and Soviets have surprised them and decided to help the latter, and Poland is letting transportation happen. Germany succeeding in straightening out this eastern front like desired is far more doubtful and could easily fail. But it's still in the realm of the possible, unlike say, throwing the Wehrmacht west in the autumn or winter of 1938 and conquering France.

 

[WolfBear]

Your map also illustrates that direct rail transit from the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia through Romania is impossible, which is disappointing because allegedly the Romanians were possibly receptive to the idea as opposed to the Poles who were completely opposed. Rails extended decently from Odessa across northern Romania, but they extended into anti-Czechoslovakian, pro-German Hungary, before any branch lines turned north into Slovakia.

Maybe this map only shows the major railroads and not the minor railroads; not sure. But re: Hungary: Soviet troops could have forcibly invited themselves into Hungary, I suppose, if absolutely necessary.

It would be nice if you had a highway map, to see if the network of modern paved roads capable of bearing trucks, APCs, and tanks or tank-carriers was any more diverse or extensive than what we see for rail.

I'll see what I can find.

Of course the whole question is not just logistical and military, it is also political.

We know the Polish 2nd Republic was not open to the idea of permit Soviet transit through its spaces by land or air, even carefully circumscribed. Unilateral Soviet attempts to cross without an agreement would have been resisted militarily by the Poles. But, to humor the original question, if the Poles allowed the Soviets to move through Galicia to Czechoslovakia unopposed, I imagine the Germans would take that as a casus belli against Poland, and Germany's operational objectives would includes conquering Bohemia-Moravia (using combined arms with the Luftwaffe in support), using some forward Luftwaffe operations against the rail junctions incoming Soviet forces might use, and attacking the Polish corridor and Posen area to sort of unite the German territories and create a continuous front on a diagonal northeast to southwest line from East Prussia to Vienna.

Now that would be Germany's *goal* if stuck in a fight where the Germans have started in on the Czechs, and the west and Soviets have surprised them and decided to help the latter, and Poland is letting transportation happen. Germany succeeding in straightening out this eastern front like desired is far more doubtful and could easily fail. But it's still in the realm of the possible, unlike say, throwing the Wehrmacht west in the autumn or winter of 1938 and conquering France.

What about if Poland won't be open to this Soviet move but the Soviet Union will insist on establishing a corridor to Czechoslovakia through Poland anyway, if necessary, by force, having to fight Poland in the process?

 

[stevep]

...

What about if Poland won't be open to this Soviet move but the Soviet Union will insist on establishing a corridor to Czechoslovakia through Poland anyway, if necessary, by force, having to fight Poland in the process?

In this case it makes Poland and Nazi Germany allies. Remember after all they still had a non-aggression pact until Hitler broke it in 1939 and both would be opposed to communist expansion.

The issue would be the timing and then the western reaction. The basic assumption is that they have decided to fight to protect the Czechs. As such have they still declared war in their support before this Soviet attack on Poland occurs? If not they might stand down - either because they don't want to be seen as allied to the Soviets or helping them gaining territory in eastern Europe or because the more realpolitik are happy to see the Nazis and Soviets tearing each other apart.

If they have declared was on Germany then their likely to repudiate the Soviet invasion of Poland which makes the political situation very complex. Possibly they might try a deal with Hitler along the lines of we will make peace with you if you stop your attack on Czechoslovakia and withdraw from any occupied territory. In which case it becomes a Nazi-Polish war with the Soviets but would Hitler accept that? He might do on the basis that if he could defeat the Soviets then the Czech would be defenseless.

 

[raharris1973]

German aggression s
Maybe this map only shows the major railroads and not the minor railroads; not sure. But re: Hungary: Soviet troops could have forcibly invited themselves into Hungary, I suppose, if absolutely necessary.



I'll see what I can find.



What about if Poland won't be open to this Soviet move but the Soviet Union will insist on establishing a corridor to Czechoslovakia through Poland anyway, if necessary, by force, having to fight Poland in the process?

It muddies the moral waters for the westerners. Fighting for the Czechs against the Germans seems to be a moral decision. Even the Soviets helping the Czechs seems moral. But the Soviets invading invading Poland over the Poles bitter objections to get there - that makes people in the west wonder about who their new friends are, and gives doubters about fighting in over the Czech matter in the first place, an opportunity to say, 'see, I told you so'.

 

[WolfBear]

It muddies the moral waters for the westerners. Fighting for the Czechs against the Germans seems to be a moral decision. Even the Soviets helping the Czechs seems moral. But the Soviets invading invading Poland over the Poles bitter objections to get there - that makes people in the west wonder about who their new friends are, and gives doubters about fighting in over the Czech matter in the first place, an opportunity to say, 'see, I told you so'.

All of this needs to be weighed against the fact that if Soviet troops are going to have the opportunity to do more bleeding for Czechoslovakia, then this would likely mean that Anglo-French troops would have to do less bleeding for Czechoslovakia themselves, which the Anglo-French publics should be rather pleased about. And the Soviet Union should withdraw from its Polish corridor after the end of the war, so what should be the problem? If the Soviets refuse, then the Anglo-French should forcibly expel them, no?

 

[raharris1973]

All of this needs to be weighed against the fact that if Soviet troops are going to have the opportunity to do more bleeding for Czechoslovakia, then this would likely mean that Anglo-French troops would have to do less bleeding for Czechoslovakia themselves, which the Anglo-French publics should be rather pleased about. And the Soviet Union should withdraw from its Polish corridor after the end of the war, so what should be the problem? If the Soviets refuse, then the Anglo-French should forcibly expel them, no?

That is what the pro-war, anti-Fascist side in London and Paris would indeed say. Of course there will be skeptical segments of the public, and the natural reaction of the Poles to any proposal by the Soviets and even Allies for it to be 'temporary' is to not believe it. If the Allies promise publicly to fight the Soviets if the Soviets go back on a promise to withdraw from Poland (and I suppose Czechoslovakia) postwar, the Poles can still doubt it, and the Soviet Union would most naturally complain that the western allies are being rude and provocative talking aloud hypothetically fighting them in a future war, and insulting Moscow at the same time by saying Moscow won't keep its word. And all of this will sound very complicated and confusing to the man in the street in London, Paris, Warsaw, Berlin, Prague.

 

[WolfBear]

and the Soviet Union would most naturally complain that the western allies are being rude and provocative talking aloud hypothetically fighting them in a future war, and insulting Moscow at the same time by saying Moscow won't keep its word.

Well, if the USSR is so honest and faithful, then it shouldn't complain about its Western Allies making contingency plans for an event that should never actually happen and that should thus be a non-issue.

 

[sillygoose]

If the Anglo-French fight over Czechoslovakia in 1938, just how easy would it be for the USSR to create a corridor thru Poland or Romania so that it could move its troops to help Czechoslovakia? The goal would be to create this corridor as narrow as possible in order to avoid seeming threatening while also allowing Soviet troops and supplies to easily move through this corridor in large amounts/numbers. And obviously the intention here would be to demonstrate that the Soviet Union will withdraw from this corridor after the end of this war.

Based on the map above, it seems like a Soviet occupation of southeastern Poland would be the best way to go about this since that would secure the major railroad running between the USSR and Czechoslovakia and which runs through Lviv, which was a part of Poland back then. But if the USSR does this, do the Nazis subsequently decide to occupy the rest of Poland? What do you think?

It would be very difficult. Romania would serve as a corridor to fly in supplies and equipment, but Hungary would probably react negatively since they'd likely join in on an invasion to get all of Slovakia back. Poland too would be interested in spoils, but would be more interested in keeping the Soviets off their back more. The only option for a land corridor is through Poland, which means if the Soviets invade Poland is officially a German ally and makes the position of the Allies internationally very difficult, as now the Soviets have invaded a much larger country to save small Czechoslovakia. Poland also isn't a push over vs. the Soviets if they can go all in on the fight in the East, even if the Belarussian and Ukrainian minorities might favor the Soviets. The Soviets in 1938 are even less prepared for war than they were to invade Finland in 1939, so it would be a bloodbath for them, especially if the Germans decide to help the Poles, which they most likely would given that the Poles would keep the Soviets away from Germany. If Poland were collapsing then yes you could see Germany annex west Poland, but at this point Germany and Poland are still very friendly and anti-Soviet together.

BTW these maps are better to see the routes and rail line quality not to mention terrain:

Central Europe 1937

Map Maker: Rand McNallyPublisher: P.F. Collier & SonType(s): World Region Map, Continent MapSize: 11.25" wide x 14.25" highID: 2022041137Collection: WardMaps LLCAtlas: Collier's World Atlas 1937

wardmapsgifts.com

OpenSeadragon

openseadragon.github.io

Likely due to the pace of events the Soviets would get into the war before they were ready and face the million man Polish army, which could get ready much quicker and more effectively due to the greater infrastructure development and smaller size of the country. Due to the motivation differential and Polish innocence (in terms of international support) at this point if the Soviets invade then they'd probably well outperform the Soviets due to greater efficiency and help from nearby countries. The Czechs would get screwed, as the Soviet aggression would overshadow the German aggression against the Czechs, so the Allies might well back down to let Hitler then support Poland against Stalin, since the big fear in the west at this time was another Soviet attempt to invade Europe rather than Hitler. IOTL even in 1940 the French and British were more interested in ways to attack the Soviets than directly fight Germany, hence the effort to get involved in Finland and Operation Pike, not to mention French plans to invade the Balkans.

Ultimately everything will come down to whomever has more staying power. If the Allies cut bait after Czechoslovakia falls (extremely likely), which won't take long for a variety of factors, largely due to how unprepared they were, then it is very hard to see the Soviets keeping the war going long, as getting into a long war with Poland which would likely have international or at least German support would be crippling given the state of war preparedness. This would be a disaster for Stalin, as Poland would then look to Hitler for an alliance, which prevents the OTL start of WW2, and ensures Central Europe largely falls under German sway, probably along with the Balkans. I doubt the Romanians then would do much besides increasingly look to Germany now that both Poland and Germany are effectively allies, since the Allies would not be viewed as particularly valuable after Czechoslovakia falls. The Soviets meanwhile would also be humiliated by how things play out in Poland, especially if they have to then back down as a result of being abandoned by the Allies and being smashed initially by Poland.

Hitler and Poland then get isolated from the west even if peace is made quickly, the Allies rearm, and Stalin also keeps on expanding his forces, but perhaps has more purging to do first. Hitler gets his formal Polish ally and Czechoslovakia in one swoop, Hungary is a confirmed dependency, Mussolini probably increasingly formalizes his relationship to Hitler since he looks strong in the aftermath of the war, and Europe in general looks a lot less stable and waiting for the match to touch of WW2.

 

[ATP]

Problem is,soviet do not planned making corridar,but attack Poland sending 2/3 of their forces North,not South.
They wanted Poland gone,not save Czech.

 

[sillygoose]

Problem is,soviet do not planned making corridar,but attack Poland sending 2/3 of their forces North,not South.
They wanted Poland gone,not save Czech.

Clearly the Czechs would be the excuse, but there was an ideological conflict with the Nazis that would be aided by the Czech state continuing to exist. Slav unity tends to only extend to states not directly bordering Russia.

 

[ATP]

Clearly the Czechs would be the excuse, but there was an ideological conflict with the Nazis that would be aided by the Czech state continuing to exist. Slav unity tends to only extend to states not directly bordering Russia.

BWAHAHAHA
What slav unity? it was pipedream in which czech belived,but sralin was commie,who wonted world communism in which slavs would be,well,slavs.Just like rest of survivors.

That is why he provoked WW2 making alliance with germans - to let germans burn Europe and take over remnants.
Now,he would slowly take over poland waiting till germans bleed french for him - and attack weakened survivor.

 

[sillygoose]

BWAHAHAHA
What slav unity? it was pipedream in which czech belived,but sralin was commie,who wonted world communism in which slavs would be,well,slavs.Just like rest of survivors.

That is why he provoked WW2 making alliance with germans - to let germans burn Europe and take over remnants.
Now,he would slowly take over poland waiting till germans bleed french for him - and attack weakened survivor.

I meant the silly doctrine that slavic peoples who weren't neighbors to Russia believed. Stalin was less about international communism, that was Trotsky, than national communism. In the end though he just turned into the Czar with red paint and less humanity.

Oh I know about his strategy, but in 1938 that wouldn't work because the Brits and French weren't ready for war and weren't ready to ally with Stalin and see him start dominating central Europe. Chamberlain was about containment of communism.
Hitler too would try to negotiate out of the war with the Allies and support Poland to lock them into an alliance and cover his flank while also letting the Poles bleed out fighting Stalin, becoming ever more dependent on him. Question is how long the Allies opt to fight, if at all, over the Czechs once Poland is invaded by Stalin. And how badly the Soviets get smashed by the Poles in the first round.

 

[ATP]

I meant the silly doctrine that slavic peoples who weren't neighbors to Russia believed. Stalin was less about international communism, that was Trotsky, than national communism. In the end though he just turned into the Czar with red paint and less humanity.

Oh I know about his strategy, but in 1938 that wouldn't work because the Brits and French weren't ready for war and weren't ready to ally with Stalin and see him start dominating central Europe. Chamberlain was about containment of communism.
Hitler too would try to negotiate out of the war with the Allies and support Poland to lock them into an alliance and cover his flank while also letting the Poles bleed out fighting Stalin, becoming ever more dependent on him. Question is how long the Allies opt to fight, if at all, over the Czechs once Poland is invaded by Stalin. And how badly the Soviets get smashed by the Poles in the first round.

First round which would last no more then 3-6 months.Poland do not have ammo for more fighting,and our production could cover maybe 30-40% of what we think we would need./We use more in 1939/

But you are right,Allies would support Hitler here to fight soviets for them.

 

[sillygoose]

First round which would last no more then 3-6 months.Poland do not have ammo for more fighting,and our production could cover maybe 30-40% of what we think we would need./We use more in 1939/

But you are right,Allies would support Hitler here to fight soviets for them.

Are you talking about existing stockpiles? The Soviets would have ammo issues too and Germany could act as resupply since there was considerable overlap in calibers. Plus probably lots of captured Czech gear and ammo. The Soviets were not ready for this scale of fighting in 1938.

 

[ATP]

Are you talking about existing stockpiles? The Soviets would have ammo issues too and Germany could act as resupply since there was considerable overlap in calibers. Plus probably lots of captured Czech gear and ammo. The Soviets were not ready for this scale of fighting in 1938.

Yes,stockpiles.Poland in 1939 had ammo for 3-6 months depending on caliber,and could produce for 20 dyvisions per month.
In 1938 it should be less.
But you are right,germans and soviets would face problems,too.