Alternate History Could Operation Barbarossa had been succesful megathread

Buba

A total creep
We already have the obligatory Sealion thread - time for Barbarossa, Japan takes Hawaii after PH, etc.

So, what are your thoughts about alt-Barbarossa? What could Hitler had done differently? Should he had - as suggested by his generals in their self serving memoires - listened to them more? Would recalling Ubermensch Rommel from Africa had given him Moscow?
What wunderwaffe could had granted the Wehrmacht that extra edge?
Or maybe wait for 1942?
 

Lord Sovereign

Well-known member
Not be unrelenting vicious cunts. That's it. The most resistance they'd have faced is a barrage of flowers and tears of joy from a people terrorised and ground beneath Communism's boot for twenty years.

The again, this "what if" requires the Nazis not to be mass murdering lunatics, which is a very tall order.
 

Sol Zagato

Well-known member
Easy PODs:
1. Strike Leningrad with no delays for people getting nervous. L-Grad fallen, except for holdouts, in August is doable without making other sectors suffer. This probably leads to greater Finnish involvement and Murmansk cut-off. This also frees up a LOT of troops for Moscow. Team G can still lose, but this gets them a good way there.

2. The old standby: the Soviet Government suffers from instability in September-October, due to Stalin snapping or having another incommunicado period, or a mass panic in Moscow.

3. Richard Sorge doesn't report in.

4. Instead of turning left for Kalnin in the 1st phase of Typhoon (September), they drive straight forward. There was nothing there but air. This won't probably won't get them into Moscow before December, but, by getting close before the mud, may cause a panic and changes the tactical situation to their benefit.

5. The 2nd phase of Typhoon gets an attack of common sense. Instead of a continued general offensive in November, priority is on digging in, local beneficial attacks to keep the Soviets off-balance, and winter supplies. This is essentially "WI the Rhzhev meatgrinder started in November and was right next to Moscow". The Soviets can't survive another loss of that scale that early. Moscow falls in the spring then everything crumbles.

6. 'Successful' Blau. Yeah, they aren't just walking to Baku, but they don't have to, to win. They just have to deny the Soviets the use of Baku, own the Black Sea (for logistics) and avoid a Stalingrad. Stalingrad was a huge morale boost for Soviet troops.

I've read about the Soviet economy in WW2. Except for farming, they did incredible things. Barbarossa inflicted damage that would have been fatal to almost any other country, but the Soviets managed to keep the war effort going with unbelievable measures.

The upshot of Soviet heroism is that they were really, really close to breaking, for far longer than most people think.

Not be unrelenting vicious cunts. That's it. The most resistance they'd have faced is a barrage of flowers and tears of joy from a people terrorised and ground beneath Communism's boot for twenty years.
Harder than it first appears. They needed food badly. To do it right, they'd have to manage the conquered land intelligently, not just treat people well.
 

gral

Well-known member
In 1941, go no further than Narva, Smolensk, and the Dnieper River. Consolidate. Let the Soviets come to you. Will it work? No idea, but it's a better bet than running full tilt towards Moscow and Leningrad.
 

Buba

A total creep
6. 'Successful' Blau. Yeah, they aren't just walking to Baku, but they don't have to, to win. They just have to deny the Soviets the use of Baku, own the Black Sea (for logistics) and avoid a Stalingrad. Stalingrad was a huge morale boost for Soviet troops.
My take on successful Blau is, after taking the Donbas, to strike at Stalingrad - 1st PzArmee, starting at Rostov, and Saratov - 4thPzArmee, starting at Svoboda/Voronezh. Both lines of advance have a railroad line supporting them. The push into the North Caucasus could be given to the Romanians, Italians and one German foot army. See map:
products-Ax01305.jpg


Reaching the Volga around Saratov practically cuts off Stalingrad and the WHOLE CAUCASUS from the rest of the USSR.
The very important barge traffic on the Volga is blocked, the right bank RR's leading to Stalingrad are blocked, thus Stalingrad can only be resupplied though a single RR from the Urals.
North Caucasus is even worse off - there is a a line leading from Astrakchan to more or less Mozdok - but the region's main route of supply from the rest of the USSR is maritime traffic over the Caspian, with all the related involved in unloading and reloading trains and ships.
How is this different? The Germans reach the Volga - and cut off this traffic artery - much sooner.

In other words - I envision cutting off the Caucasus at Saratov and then having it wither on the vine (with some help).
Sorry for derail!
 
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History Learner

Well-known member
To quote from Robert Forczyk's Moscow 1941: Hitler's First Defeat:
By 15 October, 1st Panzer Division was approaching towards Torshok- i.e. moving away from Moscow! The forces dispatched to Kalinin were insufficient to achieve to achieve a decisive victory on their own, but the diversion seriously weakened the main push on Moscow and forced the Third Panzer Army to devote significant resources to a protracted attritional fight around Kalinin. If XLI Panzer Corps had pushed east towards Volokolamsk, the Germans might have been able to prevent Zhukov from establishing a new line east of Moscow.
By the time in question Zhukov had only 90,000 troops spread out over a single defensive line before Moscow, with only limited NKVD security troops in Moscow itself so the city was virtually undefended once the Germans bust through Zhukov's line. The loss of Moscow also makes it impossible for the Soviets to continue to hold Leningrad, with the German offensives in November/December likely cutting the city off completely and it being forced to surrender no later than the Spring of 1942. With the loss of their two main industrial and administrative centers, as well as the associated prestige, it's likely the USSR collapses decisively in 1942.

With the USSR out, the Western Allies would make peace with the Germans. See Mark Stoler's Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II, because in it the author reveals the planning of the JCS as it concerns the war and situational contingencies therein. From Page 72:
Eisenhower and his subordinates were far from alone or original in perceiving the overriding importance of continued Soviet participation in the war. As previously noted, in the summer and fall of 1941 Roosevelt and army planners had begun to recognize that victory over Germany might not be possible unless the Red Army continued to tie down the bulk of the Wehrmacht, and they consequently had made assistance to Russia a focal point of their global strategy. The JB had forcefully reiterated this conclusion by informing Roosevelt on December 21 that ‘‘Russia alone possesses the manpower potentially able to defeat Germany in Europe.’’ 26 The Soviets’ late 1941 success in stopping the German advance on Moscow and launching a counteroffensive, occurring at a time when Axis forces were everywhere else successful, further reinforced this belief.
As a result virtually all Allied planning papers in late 1941– early 1942 stressed the critical importance of aiding the Russians so that they could survive a renewed German onslaught. Roosevelt agreed. ‘‘Nothing would be worse than to have the Russians collapse,’’ he told Treasury secretary Henry Morgenthau on March 11. ‘‘I would rather lose New Zealand, Australia, or anything else than have the Russians collapse.’’ Five days earlier the JUSSC had bluntly stated that ‘‘Russia must be supported now by every possible means’’ because the absence of a Russian front would postpone ‘‘indefinitely’’ the end of the war.27 And as army planners realized, such postponement would only increase public and naval pressure to turn away completely from the indecisive European theater in favor of the Pacific.
Page 80:
Marshall’s reasoning was based not only on Eisenhower’s February–March presentations but also on military and political events since then which had heavily reinforced the OPD’s original conclusions. Once again the focal point was the Soviet Union. ‘‘The retention of Russia in the war as an active participant is vital to Allied victory,’’ now acting chief of staff McNarney had emphasized on April 12; if German armies were allowed to turn west, ‘‘any opportunity for a successful offensive against the European Axis would be virtually eliminated.’’ 56 In mid June the staff again warned that Russian collapse would necessitate a strategic reassessment, ‘‘possibly with the result of directing our main effort to the Pacific rather than the Atlantic.’’ 57
Page 93:
As early as April–May, OPD, g-2, and the joint committees had begun to explore the appropriate response should this ‘‘desperate situation’’ result in a Soviet collapse, and in early August the JUSSC completed and forwarded to the JPS a massive study of such a contingency. This study indicated that Russian collapse would be a ‘‘catastrophe’’ of such magnitude as to put the United States in a ‘‘desperate’’ situation too, **one in which it ‘‘would be forced to consider courses of action which would primarily benefit the United States rather than the United Nations.’’**
Indeed, it might be the only remaining major member of the United Nations, because the British Commonwealth might collapse and the British public react to Soviet defeat by overthrowing Churchill and agreeing to a negotiated peace that would leave Hitler in control of Eurasia. A revival of isolationism and an ‘‘increase in defeatism’’ within the country were also possible in this scenario. Even without British withdrawal, however, the only sound U.S. response to a Soviet collapse would be to ‘‘adopt the strategic defensive in the European Theater of War and to conduct the strategic offensive in the Japanese theater.’’ On August 19 the JPS the great strategic debate 93 approved this report, forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs as JCS 85, and ordered the preparation of a strategic plan for the defeat of Japan.40
Concurrent to these concerns, the following documents were prepared:

"Conditions under Which an Armistice Might Be Negotiated between the United Nations and the European Powers", on June 11, 1942 by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong (S Document 22)

Col. Nevins, ‘‘Courses of Action Open to the United States in the Event the Prospective 1942 German Offensive Forces Russia to Capitulate,’’ memo, Apr. 1942, and unsigned memo to Nevins, Apr. 25, 1942, Wedemeyer Papers, box 76, folder 2, HI

With the removal of the Russian Front, the conclusion by American planners was the need to shift from the Europe First to Pacific First strategy at the minimum, drawing down forces in the Atlantic purely to those sufficient to safe guard the United Kingdom from a German invasion. With the benefit of hindsight we know this wasn't a realistic concern in terms of invasion, but the JCS was concerned with such given they didn't have access to German documents like we do. In the first document, written by Maj. Gen. Strong, it was recommended negotiations be opened to convene an armistice, as it was not thought possible to defeat the Germans without the Red Army tying down large elements of it.
 

ForeverShogo

Well-known member
I suppose you could also have Hitler willing to dismantle the Soviet Union in a series of conflicts instead of all at once.

Shortly after Barbarossa, Pavel Sudoplatov was ordered to meet with the Bulgarians in the hopes that Bulgaria could function as an intermediary between the Soviet Union and Germany. He was authorized to offer what would essentially be the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 2.0 (giving Germany the Ukraine, the Baltics, and eastern Poland).

Hitler completely ignored the offer because he thought Germany would be able to take everything all in one go.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
For another PoD, have Hitler avoid his bad decision concerning how to conquer the Dnieper Barrier:

On 18 March Hitler decided that Sixth Army was to carry out the main thrust of Army Group South. The plan for a Twelfth Army advance from Moldavia toward the northeast was abandoned. The German and Romanian units assembling along the Pruth were to tie down the opposing forces and pursue them only in the event that they should withdraw. This change in plan had to be made because Hitler contended that the Dnestr was a formidable obstacle that could not be surmounted by a frontal attack without considerable delay. According to the new plan the powerful left of Army Group South was to punch its way to the Kiev area and approach the Dnestr line from the rear. The forces assembled in Moldavia would have to be sufficiently strong to prevent a Russian penetration into Romania, but this danger did not seem acute since Brauchitsch had expressed the opinion that the Russians would not attack Romania unless they were attacked from Romanian territory. According to Hitler, Hungary was to take no part in Operation BARBAROSSA, and Slovakia was to assist only in the concentration and supply of German troops.​
The Yugoslav coup d'etat on 26 March induced Hitler to expand the operations in the Balkans by attacking Yugoslavia in addition to Greece. The greater scope of the campaign in the Balkans necessitated that an army headquarters assume control of the occupied territories after the end of hostilities. Twelfth Army, which was in charge of the operations against Greece, was selected for this role, and Eleventh Army was designated as substitute headquarters for the forces assembled in Moldavia.​
On 30 March 1941 the army group and army commanders reported to Hitler. During this conference the mission of Eleventh Army was discussed, and Hitler ordered the army forces divided into three separate groups, capable of backing up the Romanian divisions in case of need. Since Eleventh Army had thus been given a defensive mission, the motorized forces originally earmarked for that area were transferred to First Panzer Group. The encirclement of the Russian forces in the western Ukraine was to be effected by a single envelopment from the north, during which the armored forces were to thrust to the Dnepr at and south of Kiev, bear southeastward, and follow the bend of the river to its mouth, thus preventing the Russian forces in the western Ukraine from withdrawing across the river.​

Instead of a broad front advance, lacking in the finesse shown by Army Group Center in their major encirclement operations, here Army Group South is able to carry out a pincer envelopment which converges around Shepetivka and Zhitomir. Three Soviet Armies-the 6th, 12th, and 26th-would be encircled; this is basically the entirety of Southwest Front removed from the board. At this point, AGS has moved up its timetable significantly and can handle Kiev on its own, enabling Army Group Center to advance on Moscow and avoiding the entire Kiev debate.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Per an email with Nigel Askey of the Operation Barbarossa book series fame, the war could have been won by continuing on to Moscow in August-September rather than diverting to the flanks.
He has accumulated insane amounts of data and extensively wargamed it with military grade computer simulations and found that it was nearly an inevitable victory around Moscow-Gorky in late Summer had they continued onwards. The Soviets could have muddled on for a little while, but without Moscow and the Upper Volga they would be doomed in short order.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Per an email with Nigel Askey of the Operation Barbarossa book series fame, the war could have been won by continuing on to Moscow in August-September rather than diverting to the flanks.
He has accumulated insane amounts of data and extensively wargamed it with military grade computer simulations and found that it was nearly an inevitable victory around Moscow-Gorky in late Summer had they continued onwards. The Soviets could have muddled on for a little while, but without Moscow and the Upper Volga they would be doomed in short order.

Anything you can share or point to any particular? I've read a lot of his articles on his Operation Barbarossa website, but I was unaware of the computer simulations and the like.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Anything you can share or point to any particular? I've read a lot of his articles on his Operation Barbarossa website, but I was unaware of the computer simulations and the like.
Same here about the simulations, yes he did say it could be shared, but the email wasn't with me originally, it was shared by someone else.
Does this forum allow pdf attachments? I don't see the option anywhere on the toolbar.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Same here about the simulations, yes he did say it could be shared, but the email wasn't with me originally, it was shared by someone else.
Does this forum allow pdf attachments? I don't see the option anywhere on the toolbar.

We need you to post some threads about August-September Operation Typhoon and the like, definitely.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
We need you to post some threads about August-September Operation Typhoon and the like, definitely.
Honestly I think Stolfi's scenario is the go-to for that. Though his book "Hitler's Panzers East" is a bit lite on the info and numbers his scenario is basically what Askey said would work.

Here is a map from his book:
ccf21042017-jpg.318434


Here is a post I made a while back on another forum:
Its generally been taken as an article of faith all around that attacking Moscow in August was not feasible for either logistical reasons or the danger of the Soviet armies in Ukraine to the flank of AG-Center. During the course of the discussion Stolif's argument came up, as did Stahel and David Glantz's books, plus of course van Creveld's essay on the logistics of Barbarossa. Looking into all of the above, it doesn't actually seem impossible had the decision been made early enough. Certainly German logistics were not particularly strong as of August, but the Smolensk rail line had been connected and it had been taking trains since the end of July. Guderian had the supplies to fight the Kiev battles, while AG-Center had the strength to engage in high intensity combat with the Soviet Western Front during August-September, while 3rd Panzer Group did break up and send 1 corps to destroy the Soviet 22nd army on it's flank and the other to attack Leningrad with AG-North.

Alternatively had Leningrad and Kiev not been made priorities once the Smolensk pocket and Roslavl pockets and been dealt with German mobile forces in AG-Center could have sat still for a week or two to recover before starting an offensive in mid/late-August. In the meantime 4th Panzer Group, rather than attacking the Luga line, could instead have turned East to attack the Soviet forces engaged in Staraya Russa offensive with the full support of the 1st Air Fleet, as 18th and 16th armies of AG-North defend the Luga river line. 4th Panzer Group could then clean up the flank of AG-North, going after the Soviet 22nd army at Veliyki Luki once dispatching the Soviet 34th and 27th armies at Staraya Russa, plus then continuing to operate to cover the seam of the two Army Groups all while on the rail network/supply lines of AG-North, leaving AG-Center to just support their same forces as of July. Looking at the situation map for August 8th below, it is possible for the intact 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups to launch the Vyazma Pincer when they are rested and read just as the Soviets are engaged in their August counteroffensives east of Smolensk, which would hit forces weaker than they would be in October and not able to resist well.

With 4th Panzer Group covering the northern flank against Soviet forces left outside the pocket, while 2nd army in the south cover the Ukraine-Kiev threat, it seems very possible to have AG-Center crush Western Front in August-early September and then be able to move East, but this time minus Soviet reserves being available or ready to stop them. 2nd Air Fleet would be intact to support them, while the Soviets in Ukraine aren't really in a position to attack hard on the flank of AG-Center due to their own AG-South pressing on them, while if Hitler sends 2nd and 5th Panzer divisions to bolster 2nd Army in it's flank guard mission (the strategic panzer reserve as of August-September), they'd stiffen it to the point that it was secure against what the Soviets had in August-September-October to throw at it. With Western Front basically crushed by early September there really is nothing left but the recently formed Reserve Front, with it's highly limited combat abilities, to stop the Germans. Thoughts?

aug-jpg.318623


aug-8-jpg.318490


Rather than waiting to be hammered throughout August, AG-Center, specifically 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups, were sufficiently free enough to push East and pincer Soviet troops in the immediate vicinity. The Panzer Corps at Roslavl in the south was capable as of August 8th to turn east against the Soviet 24th army and Reserve Front and lop it off, freeing up IX Corps to help VII Corps hold the flank around Roslavl against the Soviet 13th and 43rd Armies, as Guderian's 2nd Panzer, instead of pushing further South, then strikes Northeast, through the Soviet 24th army into the flank of the Soviet 16th army as 3rd Panzer Group in the North pushes through the 29th and 30th Soviet armies and helps pincer them from the north. Guderian and Hoth's Panzer armies could meet East of this map, pocketing all the Soviet armies between them, much like the Vyazma pocket in October. Meanwhile to the north of this map, if ordered 4th Panzer Group could be attacking out of Dno toward Staraya Russa to secure the flank of AG-Center and envelope the Soviet 27th-22nd-29th armies with the help of part of the 16th and 9th German armies, as the majority of the 16th hold the Luga and the majority of the 9th helps deal with the pocketing of the Western Front with the AG-Center Panzer armies.


Germany & railway bottlenecks in the east - Axis History Forum
To operate the rail lines, the Germans had to regauge rail sidings and marshalling areas and, depending on battle damage, to repair buildings and equipment at the train stations.{14} On the most important rail line in Barbarossa, the tracks from Brest directly toward Moscow, the Germans completed the line from Brest to Oranczyce by 29 June 1941 and began to move German trains on normal-gauge track on 30 June. That day. four supply trains arrived at Oranczyce, 85 km into the Soviet Union, with approximately 2,000 tons of supplies. Meantime, regauging of Russian lines continued with work being completed to Baranovice junction by 2000, I July, and three trains reaching that city, 210 km into the Soviet Union. The Germans continued their impressive pace of building a normal-gauge rail system into White Russia and completed regaug-ing from Brest to the capital, Minsk, at noon on 5 July. Army Group Center ran four supply trains there the same day, more than 330 km into the Soviet Union.{15} By 5 July, the Germans began to develop a great rail head at Minsk, which capably supported the lightning panzer advance to Smolensk that overran the city on 16 July. In a historic performance, the Germans regauged the Russian rail system from Brest to Minsk by early July and extended construction to Smolensk before the end of the same month. Their performance established a logistical system able to support an offensive toward Moscow before the middle of August 1941 and bridge the gap between Smolensk and Moscow in a single offensive, similar in style to the earlier leaps to Minsk and Smolensk.

That generalization derives from the actions of Army Group Center from the middle of July to early August 1941. On 15 July 1941, the quartermaster general reviewed the supply status of, Army Group Center in terms of its capabilities to continue offensive operations. He made it clear that the great rail head for continuing operations lay in the cities of Minsk and Molodecno, no longer on the prewar frontier. The army group then had 45,450 tons of 60-ton truck columns and, deducting one-third as inoperable at any time and in repair, still had approximately 30,700 tons available for continuous operations.{16} In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed the substantial total of fourteen trains and 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk. This logistical feat was moderately impressive for the middle of July, with enough trains arriving at the Minsk-Molodecno railroad and more than enough trucks to move a panzer group and an infantry army to Moscow. Meanwhile, the Germans were fighting the battle of Smolensk and would take two more weeks to finish the job and another week to tidy up operationally. The Germans used this time to build up logistic stockpiles at the rail head in the center of White Russia and regauge the main rail line from Minsk through Orsha into Smolensk{17}.

By the second week of August 1941, Army Group Center regained operational freedom of movement. If the army group had been directed by Hitler and OKH at the end of July 1941 to continue operations toward Moscow as soon as possible, it would have eliminated remnants of Soviet forces in the great pocket just north of Smolensk and cleared the communications zone of Panzer Group Guderian to the south. Unhampered by Hitler's stubborn attempt to diffuse the combat strength of Army Group Center about the Russian countryside, and the battle between the Fuhrer and OKH over one decisive objective rather than many indecisive ones. Army Group Center would have entered a period of rest, rehabilitation, and stockpiling on approximately 5 August 1941. Regarding the logistical possibilities for an advance a little over a week later, on 13 August 1941, Army Group Center would receive almost double the number of trains daily it had received a month earher{18} — approximately twenty-four trains rather than fourteen. With time to establish larger stockpiles, and with rail heads advanced to Orsha and Smolensk, Army Group Center obviously had the logistical system to support its advance on Moscow with its entire strength{19}.

14. The additional track would comprise a substantial 15 percent over and above the track constructed among cities. See, for example, the mileages in Gen. d. Eisb. Tr. Aus-schnitte. Stand derStreckenwederherstellung. 1941-1942. U.S. NationalArchives. Records. German Army High Command. Microcopy T-78, Roll 117. Fr. 6041049.

15. Eisenbahntruppen. U.S. National Archives, German Army High Command. Microcopy, T-78. Roll 113, Fr. 6035898. See also Bock. Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. 13.

16. See Halder. Diaries, vol. 6, p. 241.

17. Note the use of the rail system through Orsha. Vitebsk, and Smolensk in the first half of August 1941 in Generalma)or Windisch, Personal Diary of the German 9th Army Supply Officer German Language Copy) (from 1.8.1941-31.1.1942Ë5 February 1954), p. 7. U.S. Army, European Command, Historical Division, MS P-201.

18. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 248. in which fourteen trains are noted as available for Army Group Center as of 18 July 1941, and Halder. Diaries, vol. 7. pp. 25. 26, in which twenty-four trains daily are noted as running to supply the center after 7 August 1941.

19. As early as 12 July 1941, the quartermaster general of the German army noted in a telephone call to the chief of staff that Army Group Center had enough supplies to maintain an armored drive to Moscow. He also notes that the infantry had only enough to get to Smolensk. It follows that as early as 12 July, the Germans were close to having logistics under control for a push almost straight through to Moscow. See Halder. Diaries, vol. 6. p. 231.
 

ATP

Well-known member
In 1941 4 millions of soviets surrender.During first 3 weeks they lost 11.000 tanks - most abadonned.My friend told me about soviet tank unit near his family town which run abadonning all tanks without any fight.

Just tread people like people,and they would not fight.Gave them land,and they would fight for germans.But - for germans treating other as people as good as them is mission impossibile,so ...
Sorry,germans could easily win - if they stop being germans.Not possible.
 
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BlackDragon98

Freikorps Kommandant
Banned - Politics
In 1941, go no further than Narva, Smolensk, and the Dnieper River. Consolidate. Let the Soviets come to you. Will it work? No idea, but it's a better bet than running full tilt towards Moscow and Leningrad.
This is actually the best choice.
All Soviet counterattacks after Moscow in late 1941 and early 1942 all ended in disaster with huge losses on the Soviet side.
And this was in winter. While the Germans were rather unprepared.
A defense line from Narva to Smolensk and Kiev designed to grind down Soviet forces might work.
And then counterattack after the Soviets have used up all their strength in useless assaults against fortified German positions.
Would also solve the winter gear problem, give the supply line a rest and allow units to be resupply and prepped for winter.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
This is actually the best choice.
All Soviet counterattacks after Moscow in late 1941 and early 1942 all ended in disaster with huge losses on the Soviet side.
And this was in winter. While the Germans were rather unprepared.
A defense line from Narva to Smolensk and Kiev designed to grind down Soviet forces might work.
And then counterattack after the Soviets have used up all their strength in useless assaults against fortified German positions.
Would also solve the winter gear problem, give the supply line a rest and allow units to be resupply and prepped for winter.
You'd miss out on the 1 million casualties inflicted during Vyazma-Bryansk for about 50,000 German casualties. Best casualty ratio of the war for any power in any battle. Likely it would have been higher if they had actually closed the Bryansk pocket and liquidated it rather than Guderian trying to advance on Orel instead.

Letting the Soviets counterattack actually resulted in far worse casualty ratios for the Germans until winter hit. Then it was the result of previous losses of trained men and equipment plus the weather that resulted in such heavy Soviet losses; contrary to the narrative that 'general winter' was on the side of the Soviets, it was actually the Soviet's biggest enemy and prevented their offensive from success, while despite the losses to the cold it was the Germans who benefitted the most due to mostly being in defensive positions by January. It was only in December that the Germans had a bad time on the defensive since they were retreating from exposed positions close to the Soviet jump off point. The further the Soviets got away from that the worse their losses got.

However if the Germans let the Soviets basically sit unimpeded from say September onwards then they will do VASTLY better when attacking from October on and can marshal their economic resources without any of the OTL September-December disruptions caused by the German advance. Plus then you don't see the phenomenal offensive successes that inflicted millions of casualties on the Soviets for a couple hundred German casualties. Honestly August-November was the best casualty ratios of the war for the Germans and really any nation in any campaign of WW2 other than the Ruhr pocket when the Germans just gave up and surrendered en masse without much of a fight.

Settling down in November on picked lines would be the optimal German strategy if all else remained the same about the war to that point.

Really though the very best strategy would be to advance on Moscow in August rather than in October; Nigel Askey is firmly convinced it was virtually inevitable that Moscow would fall had that been done and not only that, but the entire Upper Volga region as well, which would decisively cripple Soviet military industry (disproportionately concentrated around this area) and gut their transportation capacity, meaning counteroffensives like the OTL winter one would be virtually impossible.
 
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ATP

Well-known member
This is actually the best choice.
All Soviet counterattacks after Moscow in late 1941 and early 1942 all ended in disaster with huge losses on the Soviet side.
And this was in winter. While the Germans were rather unprepared.
A defense line from Narva to Smolensk and Kiev designed to grind down Soviet forces might work.
And then counterattack after the Soviets have used up all their strength in useless assaults against fortified German positions.
Would also solve the winter gear problem, give the supply line a rest and allow units to be resupply and prepped for winter.

Still do not save them,if they continue treating soviets as shit.Their only hope for victory in the East is win support,or at least neutrality,of locals.
I read memories of poles send to Kazachstan - people there in 1941 was waiting for germans,but when news about their behaviour come in 1942,it ended.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
You'd miss out on the 1 million casualties inflicted during Vyazma-Bryansk for about 50,000 German casualties. Best casualty ratio of the war for any power in any battle. Likely it would have been higher if they had actually closed the Bryansk pocket and liquidated it rather than Guderian trying to advance on Orel instead.

Letting the Soviets counterattack actually resulted in far worse casualty ratios for the Germans until winter hit. Then it was the result of previous losses of trained men and equipment plus the weather that resulted in such heavy Soviet losses; contrary to the narrative that 'general winter' was on the side of the Soviets, it was actually the Soviet's biggest enemy and prevented their offensive from success, while despite the losses to the cold it was the Germans who benefitted the most due to mostly being in defensive positions by January. It was only in December that the Germans had a bad time on the defensive since they were retreating from exposed positions close to the Soviet jump off point. The further the Soviets got away from that the worse their losses got.

However if the Germans let the Soviets basically sit unimpeded from say September onwards then they will do VASTLY better when attacking from October on and can marshal their economic resources without any of the OTL September-December disruptions caused by the German advance. Plus then you don't see the phenomenal offensive successes that inflicted millions of casualties on the Soviets for a couple hundred German casualties. Honestly August-November was the best casualty ratios of the war for the Germans and really any nation in any campaign of WW2 other than the Ruhr pocket when the Germans just gave up and surrendered en masse without much of a fight.

Settling down in November on picked lines would be the optimal German strategy if all else remained the same about the war to that point.

Really though the very best strategy would be to advance on Moscow in August rather than in October; Nigel Askey is firmly convinced it was virtually inevitable that Moscow would fall had that been done and not only that, but the entire Upper Volga region as well, which would decisively cripple Soviet military industry (disproportionately concentrated around this area) and gut their transportation capacity, meaning counteroffensives like the OTL winter one would be virtually impossible.

The November halt order maintained combined with your PoD for a movement on the Volkhov in AGN's sector is, I think, the last great PoD for the Germans in 1941.
 

BlackDragon98

Freikorps Kommandant
Banned - Politics
The November halt order maintained combined with your PoD for a movement on the Volkhov in AGN's sector is, I think, the last great PoD for the Germans in 1941.
It would have given the Germans a chance to solidify their gains, get railways converted to standard gauge and for winter gear to be brought up to the front.

Soviets are now badly equipped (most of their supply depots were close to the border and thus overrun) and their attacks in December 1941 and early 1942 will be in vain against a fortified German defense line.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
It would have given the Germans a chance to solidify their gains, get railways converted to standard gauge and for winter gear to be brought up to the front.

Soviets are now badly equipped (most of their supply depots were close to the border and thus overrun) and their attacks in December 1941 and early 1942 will be in vain against a fortified German defense line.

Secure the Volkhov and Leningrad falls by early 1942 as well.
 

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